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I N T R O D U C T I O N . 
L U I G I E I N A U D I : P O I S E D B E T W E E N I D E A L A N D R E A L * 
1. AN UNUSUAL PREMISE: THE ROOTEDNESS OF THE MAN AND HIS WORK 
Luigi Einaudi (1874-1961) was a liberal thinker, a leading economist and 
journalist, and one of the most eminent politicai figures in the pantheon of 
Italy's founding fathers: a member of the Constituent Assembly, governor 
of the Bank of Italy, minister for the Budget and first elected president of 
the Republic. Although among scholars he is best known for his works on 
public finance, his long-lasting research into the foundations of a good gov-
ernment, broadly understood as good polity or good society, stili remains to-
day an unknown and unexplored field. This book, for the first time, provides 
the English-speaking world with a collection of essays aimed both at focusing 
on Luigi Einaudi's good government and questioning its fecundity and rele-
vance in contemporary human society. 
Accordingly, and in an attempt to give shape to a new research path 
prompted by the "Osservatorio sul buon governo" [Observatory on good 
government], which follows on from initiatives already developed by the "As-
sociazione Polis", in 2009 the editors of this volume organized a conference 
on "The ideal of good government: Luigi Einaudi and the nexus between in-
dividuai and society" (Cuneo-Dogliani, November, 26-27-28, 2009). A num-
ber of the articles in this volume are revised drafts of contributions first pre-
sented and discussed at the conference; others come from scholars who kindly 
gave us their contribution, expanding, piece by piece, our perspectives and 
representations of good government. 
* We wish to express our debt of gratitude to Luigi Roberto Einaudi for his trust in us, for his 
continuous support and for having believed in this volume, even in the most adverse circumstances. 
Special thanks also goes to Rachel Barritt Costa for having supervised and reviewed the English lan-
guage of some of the contributions here included, as weìl as this introduction and the afterword. 
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The focus on the issue of good government, by its very nature interdisci-
plinary and elusive, called for the involvement of scholars from a number of 
different disciplines: history and philosophy of politics, law and philosophy of 
law, economists, philosophers and epistemologues. The main objective of the 
conference was to reopen an interdisciplinary inquiry into the issue of good 
government, understood in the Einaudian sense as a unitary figure related 
to both the individuai and institutional level. What guidelines were to be pur-
sued in this research path which, starting out from Einaudi's quest, lead us 
beyond Einaudi, into the heart of many contemporary debates? 
As a starting point for our reflection we suggested an 'ideal' locus classicus 
of the Einaudian search for good government, to which the choice of the 'real' 
locus of the conference was profoundly linked, for it would have been impos-
sible to address the topicality of the good government issue without symbo-
lically restoring Einaudi to his beloved birthplace from which his quest for 
good government drew sustenance and inspiration. The inaugurai session of 
the conference was held in what was from the very beginning the elected place 
of Einaudi's teachings (and preachings): the Faculty of Law of the University 
of Torino and, in particular, in its relatively new detached site in Cuneo, 
whereas the second part was held in Dogliani (Cuneo), the land to which Ei-
naudi always returned, as every man travels back to his home to rediscover his 
roots and draw afresh on the symbolic and trusted resources - constantly to 
be reappraised in the light of the ever-changing contemporary scene - without 
which no "crisis", whatever its nature, can be overcome. 
The 'ideal-real' locus classicus of Einaudian research is the introduction, 
written in memoriam, to the Appunti per la storia politica e amministrativa 
di Dogliani dell'Avv. Francesco Fracchia [Notes on the Politicai and Adminis-
trative Life of Dogliani by the Lawyer Francesco Fracchia] (1922). These 
Notes were a collection of writings by Einaudi's uncle, selected and edited 
by Einaudi himself, as if to gather together and build on the legacy of this 
symbolic figure, who, after the death of Einaudi's own father, welcomed 
the young boy into his family home, and whom Einaudi, in turn, "worshiped 
like a father". The introduction, written while the old liberal system was being 
swept away by World War I and during the ensuing social and economie 
crisis, recalls this father figure, dwelling on many of his characteristics, for in-
stance "his predilections" for "faets and monuments" of the city, in particular 
its institutions that were at one and the same time both concrete and sym-
bolic, "highlighting the forces that hold steadfast the machinery of human 
society". These reflections also underpinned the Einaudian quest for the foun-
dations of a good society, searching for a dynamic equilibrium between 
private and public, past and future: 
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This manner of living that I used to observe in the family home represented the 
universal habits of the Piedmontese bourgeoisie for the greater part of the 19th cen-
tury. [These habits shaped] a ruling class that left a profound imprint of honesty, cap-
abilities, parsimony, devotion to duty in the politicai and administrative life of the 
Piedmont which subsequendy created Italy itself. [At that time] man, the family, were 
not conceived in isoladon from their rootedness in the land, the home, the locai area, 
and these are sentiments that also engender dedicadon to the homeland and the spirit 
of sacrifice which, alone, is capable of nurturing the young shoots that will burgeon 
into sound states.1 
This 'picture' can also be likened to another topical moment of Einaudi's 
search for good government, which evokes the ethos of those components of 
the middle class who 
deemed that the most consummate art of statesmanship lay in ensuring 'good govern-
ment' of public affaire, where 'good government' was to be understood as that wise 
and prudent manner of administrating which they adopted in private affaire.2 
Last but not least, this allusive-narrative mode of portraying good govern-
ment seems to assume particular significance when the then president of the 
Italian Republic interspersed within his collection 11 buon governo (1954)3 a 
few details of Ambrogio Lorenzetti's fresco, The e f f e c t s of good and bad gov-
ernment, as if he sought to bring to light, in a condensed and allusive form, an 
aesthetic-ethical foundation of the good society. 
Hence, there are several reasons that prompted us to start out again from 
this 'ideal-real' topos of Einaudian speculation. But above ali, this research 
and the related conference were also driven by a sense of dissatisfaction or 
lack which is stili far from being overcome. The frustration springs from 
the fact that a liberalism seeking to champion liberty must better thematize 
and develop a reflection on the 'institutional' from a philosophical-anthropo-
logical perspective. By 'institutional' we mean not only the statual, govern-
mental, politicai, legai and economie sphere but also that of culture, within 
which religion, myths, narratives, images, values, beliefs, traditions and norms 
1 L. EINAUDI, "Avvertenza del compilatore" [1922], in Pagine doglianesi, 1893-1943, ed. by the 
Municipality and the "Luigi Einaudi" Civic Library, Dogliani, 1988, pp. 32-34. On the significance 
of this essay, "a key text to fully understand Luigi Einaudi's thought", see M. EINAUDI, Presenta-
zione, in Pagine doglianesi, 1893-1943 cit., pp. 11-12. 
2 L . EINAUDI, La condotta economica e gli e f f e t t i sociali della guerra italiana (Bari, Laterza, 
1933), p. 400. 
3 ID., Il buongoverno. Saggi di economia e politica (1897-1934), E. Rossi (ed.) (Bari, Laterza, 
1954). 
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should be encompassed. A concept of 'institutional', therefore, broadly un-
derstood as 'instituting' 'educating' or 'founding' the human, but without fall-
ing into the sociological and/or holistic view which results in an annihilation 
of the individuai into the whole. 
From this perspective, we felt it was stili meaningful to note that in Einau-
di's sui generis liberalismi there remains a fruitful tension, a duality, which is 
interesting precisely because it is not resolved into a dualism or a monism. 
On the one hand, there is an institutional sphere that is, lato sensu, founda-
tional, while on the other there is also, undoubtedly, an anthropological-indi-
vidualistic foundation of the good society, that makes an appeal to the free-
dom, responsibility and dignity of every individuai man. 
If one wishes to achieve a more penetrating insight into Einaudi's anthro-
pology, the above-mentioned 'ideal-real' locus classicus must be borne in mind 
and compared with a second and more famous topos of Einaudian specula-
tion, The beauty of struggle (1923). There he declares his "repugnance" for 
any form of paternalism and his "sympathy" for the "efforts of those who 
desire to elevate themselves under their own impetus and who, in this struggle, 
fight, falter and rise again, learning at their own expense how to win and to 
better themselves".4 Indeed, this is nothing short of a veritable eulogy of the 
modem homo faber fortunae sue, of man as the free, responsible maker of his 
destiny, but also of fallible man, who learns through experience by "trial and 
error", always open to "risk" and the "unknown". This is the Einaudi who is 
prompted by the awareness that there is no father, law, science, institution or 
welfare state capable of shielding us from the risk and contingencies of life, 
but also that this originai deficiency intrinsic to human beings is the very ele-
ment which opens up the potential for life and the emergence of novelty. 
By the same token, it is these fallibilities themselves, this ignorance and 
deficiency within mankind, this impossible perfection, which kindle that ten-
sion, that reaching out "towards", expressed by Einaudi in the title Verso la 
città divina [Towards the divine city], another veritable eulogy, 
a hymn to discord, struggle, disunity of spirits [...]. What on earth reason is there for 
the state to have its own ideal of life, and then be compelled to force men to conform 
with it, à la Napoleoni Why only one religion rather than many different kinds? Why 
only one politicai, social or spiritual point of view and not an infinity of opinions? 
Beauty, perfection, cannot be equated with uniformity, nor with unity: the essence 
resides in variety and contrast.5 
4 L . EINAUDI, "The Beauty of the Struggle" ( 1 9 2 3 ) , in ID., Selected Economie Essays, L . EINAU-
DI, R . FAUCCI and R . MARCHIONATTI (eds.) ( N Y , Palgrave Macmillan, 2 0 0 6 ) , pp. 6 6 - 7 2 : 6 6 . 
5 L . EINAUDI, "Verso la città divina" (1920), in ID., Il buongoverno cit., pp. 32-33. 
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Such considerations, in our view, are also closely linked to the Einaudi 
who, as was recently recalled, had always heeded the moral commandment 
"never forget the common man", which he was wont to express with the motto 
"the only person who knows whether the shoes really fit him is the one who is 
wearing them". By this he implied that "the intellectual and the politician 
have no right to decide what's good for the peasant or the worker", thereby 
expressing "a profound conviction of the individuai value of the person and 
the respect due to ali persons irrespective of their social status, and without 
politicai sectarianism".6 Perhaps this view may illuminate Einaudi the story-
teller of tales from the life of everyday people, in whose circles he moved com-
fortably and from whom he picked up more useful teachings than those 
drawn from the learned: 
If I took in little from intellectuals or politicians I learned much every time I had 
the chance to enter into conversation with tradespeople, industrialists, bankers, busi-
nessmen [...]: each one of them, in talking about his own affaire, utters truths based 
on observation, which theoretical economists are sorely wrong not to take to heart.7 
Here we have not only a lesson in epistemological humility, but a testi-
mony of Einaudian awareness that no form of knowledge, nor any scholar, 
should fail to be mindful of the freedom of each individuai; it also demon-
strates that the goal of human sciences and scientists should be a represen-
tation, however asymptotically ideal, of "the whole man", that is to say, a 
representation of the human that is not fragmented and split up by the dif-
ferent branches of knowledge. Accordingly, in his spiritual last will and tes-
tament, Politici ed economisti [Politicians and economists] (1961), Einaudi 
wrote: 
The task of the economist who is not only an expert in one or several branches of 
social and economie science is that of considering the relationships between the eco-
nomie operation and the politicai or moral or spiritual action.8 
6 L.R. EINAUDI, "Le molteplici eredità. Un ricordo personale di Luigi Einaudi", in Luigi Einau-
di nella cultura, nella società e nella politica del Novecento, R . MARCHIONATTI - P . SODDU (eds.) (Firen-
ze, Olschki, 2010), pp. 319, 320, 322. 
7 L. EINAUDI, "Prefazione", in ID., Cronache economiche e politiche di un trentennio (1910-
1914), voi. HI (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1959), pp. xxiv xxv. 
8 ID., "Politicians and economists", Il politico, X X V I I , 2 (June 1962), pp. 253-263: 260. On the 
complexity of the Einaudian methodological approach see F. FORTE - R MARCHIONATTI, "Moralista, 
storico, economista. L'economia liberale di Luigi Einaudi", in Luigi Einaudi nella cultura, nella so-
cietà e nella politica del Novecento cit., pp. 3-56. 
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In conclusion, keeping in mind the above mentioned two topoi and the 
suggestions highlighted as a sort of starting point for contributors, we may 
sum up the issues here briefly introduced as follows: Einaudian anthropology 
is stili deserving of attention precisely because it takes shape within a fertile 
line of tension between institutional and individuai, rootedness and restless 
wandering, heteronomy and autonomy, tradition and innovation, state and 
market, science and l i f e , model and reality, theory and practice, law and free-
dom. 
2 . THE STRUTTURE OF THE BOOK, POISED BETWEEN IDEAL AND REAL 
The collection of essays presented thus appears poised, as it were, be-
tween past and present, between the theoretical and the practical, between 
interpretation of the work of Einaudi and a rereading of his oeuvre in the light 
of problems that illuminate it in a contemporary perspective. The book offers 
a miscellany of studies, some referring explicitly to Einaudi and others which, 
while presupposing his work, do not make specific mention of his writings. 
This methodological approach was prompted by two underlying assumptions: 
a) the conviction that a first stage in the analysis of Einaudi's thought, 
above ali as far as his reflections in the economie or historiographic-institu-
tional sphere are concerned, has to a large extent already been carried out 
during the fifty years that have elapsed since his death - although the poten-
tial lines of enquiry are far from having been exhausted - and that a number 
of conclusions have been reached; 
b) the belief that Einaudi's thought can continue to kindle theoretical and 
practical effeets that extend far beyond the studies and research already pub-
lished, in particular if the composite body of his works is read as a complex 
and structured whole, midway between the ideal and the real, spanning a vari-
ety of different genres and disciplines. 
This books seeks to outline an attempt within this perspective, proceeding 
along a line of research that endeavors to hold together, in a manner that may 
not always appear orderly and systematic, insights of a theoretical but also of 
an exegetic nature, as well as interests of relevance for the contemporary 
world, in the recognition that such traits belonged at one and the same 
time to the lifelong work and production of Einaudi but also to his personal-
ity. Indeed, this very feature can highlight an element that would otherwise 
remain in the background: the Einaudian conception and interest in a global 
vision of man. But it is a vision that never became an organic and self-con-
tained philosophical system: rather, it was an open-ended conception which 
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never forgot the concrete and practical action of man, yet also appealed for an 
in-depth appraisal of the epistemological status of social science and earnestly 
pleading not to be mummified in a cult of achieved results or of personality. 
On the contrary, in order to maintain its vital spirit, it begs to be succeeded, 
yet without being merely set aside and stored in the attic. 
Einaudi stili has something to say with regard to the contemporary scene 
- something which has perhaps not yet been fully grasped, and not merely 
"unimplemented" (starting from his Useless Preachings). This is the challenge 
the book seeks to launch, circumscribing a specific theme (but the same op-
eration could be attempted in other settings): namely, the relation between 
the ideal of good government and the practice - stili conceptually undefined 
but currently very much in vogue - of governance. 
The book is divided into three parts, as follows. 
I) The Einaudian legacy: good government, and the relation between private 
and public 
Part I gathers together the essays more directly aiming to re-read the sense 
of the Einaudian quest for good government. This part is opened by Massimo 
L. Salvadori, Luigi Einaudi. Reflections on the lifelong journey of a great Ita-
lian. Retracing Einaudi's life path, Salvadori paints an introductory fresco 
of one of the most prominent Italian intellectuals, a great master and journal-
ist, liberal economist, statesman and protagonist of Italy's rebirth and recon-
struction. Through the analysis of three momentous issues in Einaudi's ex-
tended speculation - his quest for the good society and good government; 
his search for the good élite and, in this context, his praise of the pars sanior, 
his position midway between the conservative liberal and utopian Europeanist 
- Salvadori highlights the ultimate foundation of Einaudi's good government 
as residing in "civil ethics, honest hard work, the enterprising spirit and courage 
of industrious individuai". 
Francesco Forte, in The architecture of Luigi Einaudi's good government, 
offers an originai rereading and reinterpretation of some of Einaudi's lesser-
known pages, and casts new light on the typical Einaudian "distensio" (which 
indeed is also a tension) between private and public, oikos and the public 
sphere. Forte maintains that Einaudi's vision of good government can be con-
strued as an urban, social and politicai 'architecture' characterized by "imper-
fectism", not "perfectism". It represents a variegated society, allowing the 
possibility of social ascent but free from excessive social inequality, in which 
the middle class plays a fundamental mediating role. In conclusion, the ethos 
of the Einaudian oikos and locai community not only emerges as the ultimate 
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and concrete foundation of good social bonds but also constitutes the scaffold 
of the resulting institutions of liberty. 
In Government and market failures in Luigi Einaudi and today, Franco Re-
viglio examines Einaudi's good government with special reference to the gov-
ernment-market paradigm. Charting identities and differences, Reviglio offers 
a comparative assessment of Einaudi's thought and the more recent debate on 
liberty, equality and opportunity (Rawls, Sen and others), underscoring the 
continuing relevance of Einaudi's contribution to the definition and correc-
tion of market inefficiencies caused by Government. 
Giuseppe Garofalo's article, Luigi Einaudi and Federico Caffè: outlines of a 
social policy for a good governance, opens with an approach which, in sketch-
ing a comparative picture of the two thinkers, endeavors to free them from 
old stereotypes and mistaken interpretations. After outlining Caffè's thought 
in relation to the Italian liberal tradition, Garofalo goes on to explain why Ei-
naudi's thought cannot be reduced to an argument in favor of an unbridled 
market. In his conclusion, he illustrates how the proposai of a social, liber-
al-democratic, reformist policy aimed at good governance can emerge from 
a synthesis of their work. In this perspective a 'good' policy for an open society 
should be based on ethical values, a long-term perspective, efficiency and 
equity, individuai and collective responsibility. 
In the article that concludes the first section, The ideal of good government 
in Luigi Einaudi's thought and life: between law and freedom, Paolo Silvestri 
offers an appraisal of some cruciai nodes in Luigi Einaudi's speculation, con-
strued as if they were five variations on the law-freedom nexus. "Law" is as-
sumed here, lato sensu, as a figure of the limit, and limits are taken as the 
foundation or conditions of possibility, as much on economie, politicai and 
legai institutions as on thought and human action. Consequently, it can be ar-
gued that in Einaudi's thought there emerges phenomenologically an aware-
ness that the question of freedom involves not only the relation of individuals 
with their own respective limits, or a community's relation with its limits, but 
also the problem of overcoming such limits in the pursuit of novelty and im-
provement. "Good government" and Einaudi's allusive reference to the Lor-
enzetti fresco thus seem to take on importance precisely as an "ideal" tension, 
by virtue of which the gap between reality and possibility, law and liberty, 
cannot and must not be bridged. 
II) Good government and public governance 
In part II, we asked contributors to freely reinterpret or focus on the Ei-
naudian search for good government in terms of the current issues or theories 
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of (good?) "governance", in this case referring to public powers or legal-
political institutions. 
In Patterns of identity in the perspective of European governance, Alessio 
Lo Giudice analyses the different approaches - mainly essentialism and con-
structivism and those derived from or related to these - to the problem of 
identity at an individuai and collective level. He then shows to what extent 
the legai and politicai translation of these approaches to collective identity 
leads to several useful models that could be of relevance in shaping the poli-
ticai and legai mise en scène of European governance. 
Jànos Frivaldszky, in Good governance and right public policy, beginning 
with a brief analysis of the transition from the 18-19th century models of par-
liament, government and governance to the contemporary models of good 
governance, raises the question of whether 'good governance' and 'good gov-
ernment' should be considered as opposites or whether, instead, there is a 
need to find a third model. In Frivaldszki's view, if the goal to be pursued 
is that of guaranteeing the principles of the common good, personalism, jus-
tice and participation, then the paradigm of the subsidiary state provides the 
answer. He concludes by sketching some guidelines of good governance and 
the most suitable politicai form, in an attempt to propose a normative concept 
and the institutional reality of a global politicai community. 
The following two articles address the issue of good government from a 
public law perspective. Roberto Caranta, in Good administration in the age 
of governance, after a few opening remarks on the pre-administrative State ap-
proach to 'buon governo', directs his attention to the legai rational government 
model and then analyses the emergent patterns - especially governance and 
new public management - in order to investigate how they have changed 
our understanding of 'good administration'. 
Andràs Zs. Varga's Legai control of administration: premise of good govern-
ment argues that traditional instruments of control of public power, such as 
democracy and the rule of law, as well as legai remedies against abuses attri-
butable to the public administration, are sometimes, and in some specific si-
tuations, ineffective and need to be completed with special institutions and 
procedures. Ombudspersons, public prosecutors and ordinary civil proceed-
ings of courts could have important roles in effective legai control of admin-
istration and could lead to a better government. 
In Freedom of contract and good government, Alessandro Ciatti, taking his 
cue from Einaudi's critique of the concept of "social usefulness" (as stated in 
art. 41 of the Italian Constitution) and from the Einaudian search for the good 
law that governs the market - "law as a frame" (or nomoi in Hayek's sense) - , 
interprets "good government" from the specific point of view of a civil-law 
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scholar, seeking to find a workable equilibrium between freedom of contract 
and social usefulness. 
This second section is concluded by Alberto Andronico's The dark side of 
governance. It is a philosophical reflection on the notion of Governance and its 
use (and abuse) in legai, politicai and economie discourse. Starting from the 
paradox according to which "governance" is "a word without sense", he ana-
lyses the ways in which governance, after the decline of the state - "too big 
and too small" - seems to have become a sort of passepartout to govern 
the complexity of contemporary society, in the name of its alleged immanence 
and capacity to produce an "intrinsic" order, thus without an "external" 
authority and/or law. Nevertheless, "shadows" appear on the horizon: it 
may well be that the governance discourse is just another (new) mask of 
the (new) powers. 
Ili) Governance and liberty: the complexity of the human 
Part III takes as its starting point some elements and results already ob-
tained by the Einaudian interpreters in the contributions of Part I, but it is 
also spurred by the impetus to introduce novel questions not typically ad-
dressed in studies which, as in Part II, inquire into Einaudian thought. Thus, 
in a perspective poised between the ideal and the real, between the contem-
porary world and that of the past, a range of considerably diverse elements are 
presented, such as the theory of complexity, the classic themes of liberalism 
and rationalism as well as new anthropological and aesthetic readings of Ei-
naudi's works. These elements are framed within a horizon which, although 
by no means professing to be theoretically organic and complete - given 
the heterogeneity of the contributions and the themes analyzed - nevertheless 
endeavors to identify features of vitality and new research lines traceable to 
the Einaudian heritage (objectively difficult though it may be to pinpoint 
them exegetically within his works). 
This book does not make so bold as to claim among its overall accom-
plishments the presentation of theoretical results or practical formulas applic-
arle to genuine problems. But it is our hope that it will be regarded as an en-
deavor not to dismiss that unitary feature of Einaudi's theoretical vision and 
social action, both private and public, that feature which, however challenging 
the task may have appeared - and even though admitting of no easy solution -
stood for the foundation of the freedom and life of the institutions. 
The first two articles of the third part present the question of complexity 
in reference to social sciences and economie theory. Flavia Monceri's Rethink-
ing 'good governance'. Complex societies and individuai differences, is a critique 
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both of the idea of "good" and of that of "governance" implied by the notion 
of good governance, and presents arguments in defence of individuai differ-
ences, even the most radicai ones. The critique and the defence are argued 
from the perspective of radicai constructivism, system theories and the epis-
temology of complexities theories, applied to contemporary societies. 
Magda Fontana, in Policy in complex social systems, adopts the complexity 
perspective, examining the issue of governance in terms of policy. She formu-
lates the hypothesis that the cause of policy failures is not to be found in eco-
nomie theories: rather, it resides in their underlying ontology - such as assim-
ilation of the economy to a machine ruled by equilibrium. Complexity implies 
a radically different perception of the nature of economie phenomena (in 
comparison to the mainstream view), as complexity relies on heterogeneity, 
processes and evolution. In turn, with regard to economie theorizing and 
modelling, this results in rejection of several cruciai notions, namely not only 
linearity, the perfect rationality postulate, equilibrium, reductionism, but also 
economics as a purely mathematical science, and last but not least, the notion 
of prediction on which many policies are based. Ali in ali, any aprioristic posi-
tion must be reconsidered in the light of the uniqueness of economies in time 
and space. 
The next two articles are an attempt to provide an epistemological foun-
dation for good government, here taken to mean open society. Francesco Di 
Iorio's article, Mind, market and open society in Hayek's thought, underlines 
the linkages between Hayek's politicai philosophy and his theory of mind, also 
highlighting the connections by comparing Hayek's work with some recent 
contributions from the cognitive sciences, namely the neurophenomenological 
paradigm of the self-organization of the mind in the framework proposed by 
Maturana and Varela. From a neurobiological point of view, Hayek's theory 
justifies Gadamer's idea of the "historical finitude" of man by offering argu-
ments in favour of pluralism and an open society. 
The laic chooses criticai reason, by Enzo Di Nuoscio, may be interpreted 
as a comprehensive attempt to develop - in societies characterized by reli-
gious pluralism - a sentence from Einaudi which Di Nuoscio places as an 
epigraph to his paper: '"Trial and error', the possibility of making an at-
tempt and being mistaken; freedom of criticism and opposition; these are 
the characteristics of free regimes". The argument is developed through five 
centrai propositions: the laic is such precisely by virtue of being criticai; but 
this does not mean that for the laic everything is possible; the advocates of 
laicity and confessionalism are not laics; we must be laic because we are fal-
lible and ignorant; we must be laic if we seek to achieve the best fulfilment of 
religious sentiment. 
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In The economy of images, or the symbolic horizon of social exchange, Gra-
ziano Lingua takes his cue from Einaudi's choice to include the images of Lo-
renzetti's frescoes on Good government in his collection of essays, Il buongo-
verno, taking up again, albeit from a different vantage point, the aesthetic 
references present in the articles of Part I. Lingua then reflects on the politicai 
significance of images, and thus on their role in the social construction of 
sense and, more generally, the comprehensive symbolic frame of "living 
in common", which he also terms the "general economy of exchanges of sense 
that constitute the bond of a society". 
With a title that suggests a criticai perspective, in Useless non-preachings? 
The criticai point and the complex anthropology of freedom in Luigi Einaudi, 
Paolo Heritier proposes an anthropological and philosophical-juridical read-
ing of a specific text, the third part of Lezioni di politica sociale [Lectures 
on social policy], considering the text as though it were a "fresco made of 
words". In such a perspective, this work by Einaudi is seen as embodying 
an ideal and figurative vision of the human, equivalent to the reference to Lo-
renzetti's fresco on Good government, which formed the theme of the articles 
in the first part of this book. Heritier attempts to forge a link in which the 
"sacrificai" vision of the theory of savings and the family emerging from 
the Einaudi of the Lectures ties up with contemporary readings of the inter-
section between economics and the sacred in terms of social complexity. Heri-
tier thus raises the problem of a research program on the anthropology of 
freedom, connected to the work of Einaudi, in a criticai perspective as well. 
In the afterword, Silvestri, drawing some conclusions in an attempt to 
further re-launch this research program, will return once more, as a token 
of literary and quintessentially allusive leave-taking, to this anthropological-
aesthetic reading of the Einaudian oeuvre, suggesting analogies between the 
search for good government and Italo Calvino's (re-search for) invisible cities. 
Are there unfrequented paths of Einaudi's journey in search of a good so-
ciety? 
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L U I G I E I N A U D I . 
R E F L E C T I O N S O N T H E L I F E L O N G 
J O U R N E Y O F A G R E A T I T A L I A N * 
Luigi Einaudi disliked utopias, which he considered to be an escape from 
reality and destined either never to be realized or to be dramatically changed 
into their contrary. But equally, he disliked Realpolitik, devoid of moral sense 
as it was, and flaunting its pretension to adhere strongly to reality, Realpolitik 
ended up blocking the path to the innovative actions aimed at improving the 
conditions of human life. Einaudi was an economist, historian, journalist, pro-
fessor, politician, statesman, the first elected president of the Italian Republic. 
Although never indulging in stricdy philosophical speculation, he built up his 
politicai philosophy, his ethics, his vision of the world in a clear and effective 
manner. He enjoyed a prominent position in the national public debate, and 
can be ranked alongside eminent figures such as Croce, Salvemini, Gentile 
and Gramsci on the 20th century Italian political-cultural scene. Like other 
men of his generation, Einaudi experienced the dramatic crises which struck 
his country between 1898 and 1900, 1919 and 1925, 1943 and 1945, with an 
inexorable escalation of intensity; he lived through the tragedy of the two 
world wars brought about by the conflicts among Europe's major powers, 
and he witnessed first the eclipse of that XIX111 century which, by virtue of 
its economie and civil progress, he had felt to be one of the happiest periods 
of the old continent. Then, first in 1917 and again in 1939, in the so-called era 
of modem tyrannies, he also witnessed the spread of authoritarian and tota-
litarian regimes, in a context of violent social and politicai conflicts, cmel civil 
* This is the English translation of the text of the Lectio Magistralis held in the presence of the 
President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano, inaugurating the exhibition "L'eredità di Luigi Einau-
di. La nascita dell'Italia repubblicana e la costruzione dell'Europa" (Roma, Quirinale, May 18,2008). 
Published in Italian in «Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi», XLII (2008), pp. 147-154. Trans-
lated into English by Paolo Silvestri and revised by Rachel Barritt Costa. 
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wars, and devastating economie crises. Yet he also had the good fortune to be 
a participant in periods that were times of social and civil growth in Italy, 
when the country was being revitalized by institutional reconstruction and 
economie progress. In particular, improvement began in the decade led by 
Giolitti, whom Einaudi - despite uttering words of harsh criticism against 
Giolitti's manner of governing and administrative actions - acknowledged 
as having had the great merit of deep awareness of the need to promote 
the rise of the working masses. Thus Luigi Einaudi remained an eminent pro-
tagonist throughout the fifteen years of Italy's rebirth and reconstruction. 
In an era of great upheavals, in which ideologies, classes, social groups, 
movements, politicai parties and States were locked in ferocious combat 
and hatred, Einaudi remained steadfast, supported by two principles which 
never failed him: first, faith in the superiority of freedom and of exchange 
of ideas within society as founding principles of good government, and sec-
ond, the conviction that as soon as the premises of civil life are threatened 
by aill-out war and strife among the different components of society, it is ne-
cessary to re-establish the authority of the State. When, after the first world 
war, the attack on private property by "pro-Bolsheviks", together with the 
weakness of governments during the organic crisis of the politicai and institu-
tional system, led him to realize that the hegemonic capacity of liberal forces 
had run its course, he invoked and insisted on restoration of the authority of 
the State. This affords some insight into the reasons that initially prompted 
Croce, Giolitti, Orlando, Salandra and other illustrious liberals to applaud 
the policy of fascism, under the illusion that it could not only re-establish 
the authority of the State, but also fulfil this task as a reincarnation of the spirit 
of liberalism. Nevertheless, when the illusion was revealed for what it was, 
Einaudi himself joined the chorus of the opponents of Fascism, voicing sharp 
criticism against what was fast becoming a dictatorship. 
During the twenty years of the Fascist regime, he held firm to his values, 
continued his studies, and engaged in research and teaching. With the moral 
support of Croce, he overcame the torment of conscience caused by the hu-
miliating oath imposed on university teachers in 1931, convinced as he was 
that one's first duty should always be to spare no effort in pursuit of the task 
of educating young people. And he continued to work tirelessly and cease-
lessly, like the industrious bee he had always been and would forever be. 
When the regime collapsed in 1943 and the most tragic period of the 
entire history of united Italy began, Einaudi eluded Republican Fascism and fled 
to Switzerland. While the defeat of Hider and his allies became increasingly 
certain, his thoughts turned to how to rebuild Italy. During his exile he made 
plans and outlined the politicai and social rebirth of Europe, and formulated 
in his mind the reconstruction of Italy after the ravages of destruction, accord-
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ing to his own feelings and beliefs, in a spirit of lively and even sharp contro-
versy with the opposing politicai forces. 
Upon returning to liberated Rome in 1944, he took his place, as if by destiny, 
in a ruling class engaged in the most difficult task a country could ever face: re-
building a destroyed nation. The economist then became a statesman, who within 
the space of the next few years held the office of Governor of the Bank of 
Italy, became a member of the "Consulta nazionale" in 1945, was elected to 
the Constituent Assembly in 1946, and subsequently became Deputy Premier 
and Minister for the Budget in 1947; in 1948 he became a Senator by Right 
in 1948, and then, on May 11 of that same year, he was elected President of 
the Republic. After completion of his term of Presidency, he returned to his stu-
dies, and to the useful "sermons" which, although paradoxically dubbed as 
"useless" by Einaudi himself, had indeed always been the salt of his existence. 
Einaudi was a great educator and master, revered by those who read his 
articles, essays, books, by the students who attended his courses, the young 
scholars and men of action who, expressing their own free and (in many 
respects) even divergent feelings, drew inspiration and example from their 
master. Three among them rose to become leading figures in the cultural 
and civil history of Italy: Piero Gobetti, Carlo Rosselli and Ernesto Rossi, 
and it is interesting to note that Einaudi shared these same pupils with 
another unique yet quite different master: Gaetano Salvemini. 
1. IN SEARCH OF THE GOOD SOCIETY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 
The lifelong journey of a man who was active in a vast range of fields for 
over half a century is inevitably affected by changes, enrichments and route 
adjustments. Yet at the same time, the path taken by Luigi Einaudi was 
marked by strong elements of continuity. In this sense, he was the one who, 
among the above mentioned great protagonists of the cultural and national 
politicai life of his day, was best equipped to bind together the stages of 
his existence with a Heri dicebamus. The alpha and omega of his sense of 
mission centered on the defense of freedom and of cultural and social diversity, 
upholding the concept of a life-giving struggle designed to increase the capa-
city for initiative and enterprise necessary to achieve civil progress, whilst 
guarding against any degeneration into a war of everyone against everyone. 
Thus his quest focused on the search for a ruling class that would be capable 
of ensuring good government and would guarantee coexistence by preventing 
one party from oppressing another; furthermore, he exhorted ali those involved 
to respect the positive hierarchies produced by history, which he regarded 
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as vital for the proper functioning of the social machine. Accordingly, his 
vision included a strong defense of the institutions that would safeguard the 
possibility of promotion of the most worthy citizens, together with an ack-
nowledgement of the legitimate aspirations of the working classes to achieve 
an improvement in their conditions through a number of important reforms 
and within the legai order and, finally, an exhortation to preserve the values 
and the most precious convictions that the bygone generations pass on to the 
living. These beliefs are expressed in Luigi Einaudi's politicai and economie 
liberalism and, at the same time, in his conservatism and reformism, as well 
as in his ideal of good government. 
Among the many passages of Einaudi's writings that shed light on his so-
cial and politicai philosophy, there is one that comes springs to mind on ac-
count of its significance and its exemplary nature. It is a passage written in 
1942, when Europe was already in the throes of terrible disruption. The the-
me is the identification of the "ideal types of the good society" and the means 
by which "to revive" the social classes "in which a sound society flourishes". 
In describing these ideal types, Einaudi remarkably awards the most promi-
nent position to the category of "smallholders who own sufficient land for 
the lives of their families". Such a choice may appear to be litde more than 
a manifestation of conservative nostalgia, especially if seen from the perspec-
tive of an era dominated by big businesses, big mergers and financial markets. 
However, in Einaudi's thought the peasant who farms his own land is the 
living metaphor of human independence and productive industriousness 
which, in Einaudi's perspective, are the supreme values. In second place after 
the peasant farmer he sets the independent craftsman, the entrepreneur run-
ning a small or medium-sized business, the trader and the self-employed pro-
fessional - provided that such figures operate with probity - and the unbia-
sed, the good soldier, the officiai devoted to "the tradition of service rendered 
to the state". The revival of these classes - Einaudi stresses - can be obtained 
through "the laws, through custom, by example, by preaching". These posi-
tive social figures are set against "large firms, giant industries, megastores, the 
working class council estates and projects, the monstrous cities" of which "the 
extension is to be reduced", because it is within such agglomerations that there 
lurks the danger of gray uniformity, the spirit of drab sameness, the mor-
tification of individuality. 
What Einaudi believed, ideally inspired by an ancient line of thinking that 
can be traced back even as far as Aristotle, was that good government of so-
ciety could not be accomplished if the middle class, which constituted the 
backbone of society, was weakened or even eliminated. And it should be no-
ted that Einaudi's "middle class" is not simply an economie class: rather, it is 
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primarily a moral subject. It is the class in which dwells the spirit of self-
reliance, that spirit by virtue of which individuals, through the everyday perfor-
mance of their duties, are educated to the concept of exercising the self-
governance that is the primary unit of the government of society and of the 
spirit of freedom. Here is the key point of Einaudi's politicai philosophy, 
and it is also the explanation of the attitude which, for much of his life -
indeed until he acknowledged an irreversible turning point - prompted 
him to share with so many liberal thinkers the hostility towards universal suffrage, 
considered an element of that homogenization which was undermining the 
centrai role of the middle class as the cornerstone of the liberal system. 
Einaudi was keenly aware of the danger of homogenization and confor-
mist uniformity, which are the enemies of common and individuai freedom. 
Uniformity, he felt, risked quashing the spirit of independence, diversity 
and therefore of cultural politicai and social pluralism - a danger that he also 
perceived under the powerful stimulus of thinkers such as Tocqueville, Mill 
and Burckhardt. In Einaudi's thought these threats stem from three different 
lines, but converge in the disasters they cause. He argued that their origin lay 
in three different types of project: that of statist collectivism, supported by so-
called scientific socialism, that of a capitalist, industriai and financial plutocra-
cy, aiming at monopoly and favors from the state, and, finally, that of a poli-
ticai order threatened and weakened by an authoritarianism that extinguishes 
the vital social and politicai dialectic without which there can be no healthy 
public life. The common outcome of these three approaches, he believed, 
was the reduction of people to automata, to a routinization, a distressing uni-
formity, where the "beauty of the struggle", of competition, of the selection of 
the best was violently denied. 
Within this conceptual and problematic framework, between 1927 and 
1943 Einaudi conducted a polemical debate with the other great exponent 
of Italian liberalism of the twentieth century, Benedetto Croce. Arguing against 
the philosopher's claim that freedom, conceived as the irrepressible and imma-
nent force in history, could possibly disengage from economie liberalism and 
private property and, in certain circumstances, even adapt to communist collec-
tivism, Einaudi staunchly maintained that the spirit of freedom lives through 
struggle, competition and economie pluralism, and that "the liberties are rela-
ted to each other". He insisted that they cannot live "in a 'coercive' communist 
society or in a 'closed' capitalist society"; freedom dies, with ali its manifesta-
tions, wherever and whenever there is "a single force - communist bureaucracy 
or capitalist oligarchy - capable of dominating the other social forces". 
In contrast, Einaudi's attitude towards reformist socialism and towards 
the working classes that looked to its precepts for guidance was favorable, 
as he considered them vital and necessary components of a dynamic liberal 
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system. But he condemned Marxism, and with it the purportedly scientific so-
cialist doctrine which, in his eyes, had very little of the scientific to it. Moreo-
ver, lilce Mill, he believed that figures such Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier, who 
had sought positive ways to support the rise of the workers, should not be 
ranked among the utopian socialists: rather, such a designation should be re-
served for Marx and Engels with their communism that was unrealizable 
other than by reversing its own ideal presuppositions. In the Italian context, 
Einaudi showed overt sympathy, from his early articles onwards, for the 
workers' struggles to improve their wages and working conditions and to defend 
the right to organize and to strike, but he displayed equally open hostility to 
the trade union struggles in support of revolutionary plans aimed at abolishing 
private property. Therefore, yes to unions, yes to cooperatives, yes to reforms 
and reformism in the manner of the Labour movement, yes to the action of 
the State in protecting the right to strike and more generally in seeking to 
create opportunities for the weaker classes, but no to monopolistic trade 
unions and to restrictions on freedom of work and enterprise. Einaudi as a 
liberal economist carne to accept - as can clearly be seen in the Lezioni 
di politica sociale - a program of Welfare as long as it was not corrupted 
by an interventionist bureaucratic state that overstepped the line separating 
the promotion of opportunities, especially for young people and in support 
of the socially most vulnerable, from parasitic behavior and inertia. 
2 . P R A I S E O F T H E PARS SANIOR 
Einaudi conceived society as a system which, if it was to give of its best, was 
to stand on two pillars, which were not naturally given, and therefore needed 
to be renewed day by day: a ruling class, which would be such only if it were 
capable of attaining moral, intellectual and politicai prestige, and a middle 
class capable of embodying and promoting economie and social initiative in 
a framework of diversity and pluralism. In Einaudi's vision, free debate within 
public opinion (in a Kantian sense), social, politicai and electoral struggles, the 
functioning of representative institutions, together with the free market that 
should be subject to the rules established by the institutions and the laws, con-
stituted the basis for a virtuous selection of the pars sanior of society, culmina-
ting in the formation of the ruling class of a country and a State. In his early 
works Einaudi had subscribed to Mosca and Pareto's theory of the politicai 
class, but by the 1930s he had developed a certain intolerance towards their 
stark realism which, similar to that of Marx, "sees the world as composed only 
of the oppressed and their oppressors, subjugated classes and dominator 
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classes". Einaudi thus lent his support to the conception of the French thinker 
Le Play, who claimed that the "select class" - as Einaudi wrote in 1953 - was not 
to be construed as the class which exerted its superiority in terms of politicai and 
social power, but rather as the entire set of "social authorities" capable of pro-
viding society with moral and civil guidance. It was that guidance which politicai 
authoritarianism, bureaucratic statism, 'massification', communist collectivism 
and capitalist plutocracy tended inexorably to mortify and destroy. 
3 . THE CONSERVATIVE LIBERAL AND THE UTOPIAN EUROPEANIST 
Luigi Einaudi is often characterized as a "conservative liberal". This is a 
definition that is extremely apt if it is taken within its own demarcation: i.e. 
without disregarding the significance of a liberalism which emphasized the 
value of struggle and social and cultural innovation, and appeared not only open 
to the rise of the working masses but indeed strongly supportive of their en-
deavors, as we have already seen. It is said, rightly, that Einaudi had the same 
spirit as Burke. Effectively, he had great disdain for what he termed abstract 
ideologism as well as for that form of rationalism which contrasts with the les-
sons of history: he viewed Rousseau and the Jacobins and their modem Com-
munist heirs as wild beasts, and had boundless admiration for Cavour, the sta-
tesman who represented a perfect blend of the talents of the innovative 
idealist, the realist builder of good events and the intelligendy selective con-
servative. It was Cavour, he asserted, who bestowed great prestige on the Mo-
narchy of his beloved region of Piedmont, that driving force of the Risorgi-
mento which Einaudi, inspired by the thought of Constant, continued until 
the institutional referendum of 1946 to consider as the moderating mainstay 
and guarantee of the institutions. It was likewise Einaudi's conservative ap-
proach that long impelled him to favor liberalism over the form of democracy 
expressed through universal suffrage, until the reality of facts led him to re-
solve the dilemma and to accept both democracy and the republic. 
Nevertheless, there was one field where the man who had consistently 
preached the worship of good traditions and criticized the tendencies that 
set the present in opposition to the past did decisively assume the role of 
the Utopian, planning a place that was nowhere to be found yet urgently nee-
ded to be found. This was the field of Europeanism, an idea that was first 
awakened in him during the First World War and was later revived by World 
War II. In this field Einaudi became a Rousseau, paradoxical though this may 
seem. Responding to the catastrophes of the two world wars, he declared that 
Europe was sick, that it was necessary to radically turn over a new leaf, to 
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dose the book on the old story and make a fresh start. He criticized the 
Europeanism of the cautious, of those who in the name of outworn traditions, 
precautions and compromises, first sponsored the League of Nations and then, 
during World War II, remodeled the ongoing process of integration according 
to a confederal-functionalist approach. On the theme of Europeanism, 
Einaudi composed the pages of his most impassioned and most originai 
politicai thought, and the fruit of his reflections begun as early as 1918 opened 
up the route that would substantially be followed by Altiero Spinelli and Erne-
sto Rossi two decades later. Einaudi issued a harsh verdict on the concept and 
reality of the "absolute sovereignty" of the European states that had sown war, 
politicai authoritarianism and economie and social crises. He berated the timid 
and the traditionalists: the flag he raised was that of the "United States of Eu-
rope", turning his gaze towards the examples of the great expanses of America 
and die litde country of Switzerland, in the name of peace, free government, 
economie reconstruction of the continent and a renewed European civilization. 
4 . THE MESSAGE OF A PRESIDENT 
Upon his election as President of the Republic, on May 12th 1948, Einau-
di addressed a memorable message to the two Chambers, where he affirmed 
his support for the republican regime and his conviction of the complete re-
concdiation of the dichotomy between liberalism and democracy. In his 
speech, he recalled the "two solemn principles" - principles in which the 
foundations of his own conception of freedom and social progress could be 
clearly recognized - set forth in the constitution, which, in the stirring words 
of the great Italian, stated: "the commitment to preserving, of the current 
social structure, ali and only that which is the guarantee of the human person 
against the omnipotence of the state and overweening private arrogance; and 
to guarantee that ali persons, irrespective of the accident of their birth, shall 
enjoy the greatest possible equality at the starting points"; finally, he urged the 
country to cooperate strongly with the other countries of the continent for the 
reconstruction of Europe. 
To conclude, it is worth mentioning another memorable moment of Ei-
naudi's presidency: the meeting, held on January 17th, 1954, with the old far-
mer who had become known as the "Father of the seven Cervi brothers", ali 
seven of whom had been shot by the firing squad in December 1943. Two old 
men, upheld by the wisdom of their age, face to face: the farmer, his face 
furrowed by his seven plagues and by toiling on his beloved land; the great 
statesman, who in turn deeply loved the land and the work that makes it flourish. 
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The father tells the story of his life and that of his sons, a story which deeply 
touches the heartstrings of the President, who finally asks, "Do you believe 
the seven brothers would have sacrificed themselves if they had not been 
slightly crazy builders of their land and if their father had not been a wise 
creator of good laws for his family?". In these words one can perceive the es-
sence of Luigi Einaudi's politicai and social philosophy and his untiring 
preaching of good government, which has its primary foundation in civil 
ethics, in honest hard work, in the enterprising spirit and courage of indu-
strious individuai. Unquestionably, the President recognized in the Cervi 
family the concrete embodiment of the first of his ideal types of societies - the 
figure of the peasant farmer, the smallholder who owns that which is sufficient 
to provide for his family - of which he had woven a eulogy in 1942 as the 
symbolic expression of ali those who work in a productive manner, reaping 
the fruits they deserve, serving society with a spirit of independence and 
responsibility towards the overall community. 
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FRANCESCO FORTE 
T H E A R C H I T E C T U R E O F 
L U I G I E I N A U D I ' S G O O D G O V E R N M E N T * 
A N INTRODUCTION THROUGH HIS WRITINGS IN II MONDO, THE LETTERS TO 
PANNUNZIO AND THE PAGINE DOGLIANESI 
1. An in-depth treatment of the topics considered in the title of this paper 
would be a very ambitious task, going far beyond the purposes of this collec-
tion. In Einaudi's vision, good government can be construed as an 'architec-
ture' of the community in which man lives and fulfils the role of steward of his 
home and country, and as the scaffold of the resulting institutions of liberty 
(not only in the economie but also in the politicai and social sense). Thus 
an inquiry into the ideals that inspired Luigi Einaudi implies touching deep 
chords of the human soul, probing the sentiments, values and utopias of 
a statesman who was not only an economist or a 'theoretical economist', but 
a 'complete' man of vast and versatile interests. In his long and complex life, 
he not only combined the duties and challenges of a professor with his role 
as the leader of a scientific school, but he was also an authoritative journalist, 
an editor and director of scientific reviews, Governor of the Bank of Italy 
from 1945 to 1948, an eminent member of the Parliament and the first elected 
President of the Italian Republic. Furthermore, his multiple activities in-
cluded managing his farming estate and fulfilling the role of an architect 
for his landed property, his mansion and his library. To begin to address 
the great range of issues involved in the concept of good government, I feel 
that a good starting point of the present paper would be to focus closely 
on the title of this meeting: "The Ideal of Good Government: Luigi Einaudi 
and the nexus between the individuai and the society". This alludes to a period 
in Einaudi's life1 when he was exploring the possibility of reconstructing the 
* Translated into English by Paolo Silvestri, revised by Rachel Barritt Costa. 
1 As indicated by the organisers of the convention and the editore of this volume. 
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liberal institutions that had been destroyed by fascism and the civil war. Evok-
ing the modus agendi of the components of the Italian middle class, Einaudi 
underlined that the pre-war period had been characterized by "the great for-
tune" that social classes genuinely representative of Italy, composed of small 
and medium-sized entrepreneurial firms, landowners, tenant farmers, mer-
chants and craftsmen, ali of them very industrious, as well as [...] honest up-
right professional figures and civil servants devoted to the public good, stili 
supplied the state with a fair number of men who went into public service 
and held government office. Righteous and hard-working, they believed that 
the most consummate art of statesmanship lay in ensuring good government of 
public affairs, where "good government" was to be understood as "the same 
wise and prudent manner of administrating as they adopted in private 
affairs".2 I will develop my reflections on Einaudi's "good government", 
in the perspective of this distensio between "public" and "private", and my 
investigation will highlight the link between these Einaudian writings and an-
other Einaudian text of a profoundly autobiographical nature known as the 
'Pagine Doglianesi [Dogliani Pages], to which I will refer in the conclusions. 
"Il buon governo" is also the title which Ernesto Rossi, under the careful 
guidance of Luigi Einaudi, the then President of the Italian Republic, gave in 
1954 to a book of collected papers and short articles by Einaudi on economics 
and politics, written between 1897 and 1954. Rossi, a devoted disciple of Ei-
naudi, felt that his collection of Einaudi's writings built up an eloquent pie-
ture of the ideals and principles of Einaudi's good government. The book 
is subdivided into seven parts with the following tides: "Good Government, 
Social and Economie Policy, Assault on Public Money, Trade Unionism and 
Corporativism, the Problems of Schools, Newspapers and ]ournalists, the Eur-
opean Federatiorì'. These subdivisions indicate Rossi's view that Einaudi's 
conception of good government had perspective extending considerably be-
yond the economie sphere. The book-cover features an architectural image 
of a city ruled by a good government. Likewise, in the first edition, the text 
was interleaved with parts of the famous painting by Ambrogio Lorenzetti 
on "The Effects of Good and Bad Government in the City and in the Country". 
The architectural image of the city with a good government suggests that 
the idea of good government is, in itself, a concept embracing an wide range 
of aspeets, which first and foremost concern the private family, the family 
home and the farm, and then broaden out to include social life and the gov-
2 L. EINAUDI, La condotta economica e gli e f f e t t i sociali della guerra italiana (Bari, Laterza, 
1933), p. 400. 
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ernment of the city, as well as the buildings that house the democratic govern-
ment and the other public offices. The good government of the domus and of 
the civitas would not be complete without the schools and the libraries. These 
are located partly in public buildings, where "public" means that they are 
open to the public - not necessarily that they belong to the municipality or 
to the state - but partly also in the home. 
This far-reaching architectural notion of good government as an architec-
ture of the home, the farm and the city, partly private and partly public, in 
which each person is "lord" of his life and property, can be traced back to 
the Italian tradition of politicai and economie thought of the late Middle Ages 
and Renaissance. The concept first appeared in Brunetto Latini's verse com-
position, Il Tesoretto: 
Ond'io non so nessuno 
Ch'io volesse vedere 
La mia cittade avere 
Del tutto a la sua guisa 
Né che fosse divisa; 
Ma tutti per comune 
Tirassero una fune 
Di pace e di ben fare. 
It was further developed in the fifteenth century with Matteo Palmieri's 
book La Vita Civile [Civil life]; Leon Battista Alberti's essay Momus sive 
De Principe [Momo or on the Prince]; Diomede Carafa's, treatise Doveri 
del re e del buon principe [Duties of the King and of the Good Prince] ; Fran-
cesco Patrizi's two treatises De istituzione res publicae [On the institution of 
res publicae] and De regno et regis institutione" [On the institution of the 
reign and the King]; the book by Bernardo Sacchi, who was known as 'Il Pla-
tina', L'ottimo cittadino [The Excellent Citizen] and Gerolamo Savonarola's 
Trattato del Reggimento degli Stati [Treatise on the Regiment of the States], 
in the sixteenth century. Subsequently, after the realistic analyses of Govern-
ment by Machiavelli and Guicciardini, the Italian tradition of research on 
"Good Government" was further enriched by Donato Giannotti with La Re-
publica Fiorentina [The Fiorentine Republic], Gianfranco Lottini with Avve-
dimenti Politici [Politicai Wisdom] and Silvestro Gozzolini with I modi come i 
principi hanno denaro [The Ways by which Princes have Money]. The treat-
ment of the theme of the Good Government later became more specialised 
and its connection with the family and urban life faded. For instance, this per-
spective is no longer to be found in Botero's Ragion di Stato [Reasons of 
State] or in his Discorsi sopra Cornelio Tacito [Reflections upon Cornelio Ta-
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citus], where 'the reasons of state' are not regarded as the ruling principle but 
rather as a principle to be adopted in exceptional circumstances. In Campa-
nella's utopian Città del Sole [City of the Sun] the concept of Good Govern-
ment is reversed. In the politicai economy treatises of Broggia, Genovesi, Bec-
caria, Verri and Romagnosi the concept of good government of the state is no 
longer linked to that of the home and the farm and bears no relation to the 
architectural and city planning perspective. Nor is the architectural figure 
to be found (apart from sporadic mentions) in the economic-political-techni-
cal treatment of Carlo Cattaneo. 
2. Einaudi's conception of Good Government, as noted above, concerns 
the ideals of the "complete" man-lord and is intimately related to architectur-
al design. But since the present paper is designed to be merely an introduction 
to Einaudi's thought, I will restrict myself to sketching an outline, quoting 
from some of his non academic writings published in the weekly periodical 
Il Mondo, and from his correspondence with Mario Pannunzio, the former 
editor of the weekly Risorgimento Liberale and subsequently of II Mondo; I 
will also draw on Einaudi's Pagine Doglianesi and his Introduction to France-
sco Fracchia's Note sulla vita politica e amministrativa di Dogliani [Noto on 
the Politicai and Administrative Life of Dogliani]. 
I will begin with Einaudi's letters to Mario Pannunzio3 in II Risorgimento 
Liberale. In a brief letter of March 27, 1945, Einaudi wrote: "a situation of 
state monopoly in international trade and foreign exchange causes a very 
notable and fatai restriction affecting both imports and exports, more so for 
the latter than for the former". The more the obstacles are eased up the better 
the Italian economy will be. Einaudi, as Governor of the Bank of Italy, had 
been accused of triggering inflation by liberalizing the use of the foreign 
money that exporters obtained with their sales. The credit restriction Einaudi 
subsequently enacted was claimed to derive from his realization of the unde-
sired inflationary effects of liberalization, which he sought to remedy by a de-
flationary intervention. This criticism is groundless. Under Einaudi's princi-
ples of good Government of money, the liberalization of foreign exchange 
was a necessary step: allowing enterprises to utilize as they wished the foreign 
currency obtained through exports had the aim of restoring a free market 
economy. The increase in the velocity of money circulation resulting from this 
3 The Einaudi-Pannunzio correspondence taken from the Einaudi archive consists of 29 letters, 
of which 20 are by Einaudi - some of which are very long. One, however, consists of a single line of 
'accompaniment' to three articles to be published on the Risorgimento Liberale and so is to be elimi-
nated from the correspondence list. The nine by Pannunzio are short or very short. 
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liberalization was a physiological fact of the market economy. The consequent 
excess of money was to be sterilized by a global maneuver involving reduction 
in the supply of bank currency, via an increase in bank reserve parameters in 
order to achieve the goal of monetary stability. Einaudi's action thus aimed at 
two converging objectives, with two orthodox 'instruments': foreign exchange 
liberalization to restore the free international market, and the increase in 
compulsory bank reserves to stabilize price levels and assure monetary stability 
for savers and for market transactions in general. 
On December 15, 1945 Einaudi wrote to Pannunzio, criticizing Luigi Bar-
zini's proposai that newspaper editors should be allowed to express their jud-
gement of the government by voting rights proportional to their newspapers' 
circulation. Einaudi maintained that such a criterion was unacceptable, point-
ing out that in countries with parliamentary experience, for example the United 
Kingdom, low circulation newspapers such as the Times, the Manchester Guar-
dian and the Scotsman had a stronger influence on voters than papers with a 
circulation of a million copies like the Daily Mail and the Daily Sketch. Behind 
this argument lay Einaudi's theory of the elite, which held that in a democracy 
the majority is oriented by an informed minority who represent them on the 
decision-making level. Doctrinaires, Einaudi believed, had little impact; rather, 
the major policy decisions were based on practical considerations, but those in-
volved in policy-making were neither ignorant nor demagogues. 
3. Of the nine articles by Einaudi in II Mondo of May 1949 and May 1955,4 
three published in May-June 1949 were letters to Ernesto Rossi, written in the 
period from 1942-43 when Rossi was a politicai prisoner banished to the Island 
of Ventotene. The titles of two of these are: Il Contadino Signore [The Farmer 
Lord] and L'uomo libero e la terra [The Free Man and the Land]. 
The first letter-article5 is sharply polemical towards the proposai of agrar-
ian reform championed by Ernesto Rossi, who favored the expropriation of ali 
large and medium-large farming estates. The letter focuses on good govern-
ment of agriculture by the owner of such farms, and maintains that they 
are essential for the market economy as they allow the emergence of innova-
tore who, with their novel projects, become a model for the modernization of 
farms undertaken by other smaller entrepreneurs following their example. 
4 These were years when Einaudi had important duties, such as holding the office of President 
of the Republic, which absorbed a great part of his time. Nevertheless, Einaudi was an assiduous 
reader of II Mondo. 
5 L. EINAUDI, " E contadino signore", Il Mondo ( 2 8 May 1 9 4 9 ) . 
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The productive developments thus spurred are greater than those obtained by 
any form of public intervention. The innovative entrepreneur, "vineyard ar-
chitecture" and technological progress in agriculture are the striking domi-
nant figures of the article: 
A 'foolish' entrepreneur managing a large or medium sized company ("foolish" 
in the sense described elsewhere of a man gifted with imagination, endowed with 
patience and resigned to being judged adversely by peers and inferiore, who scorn 
his use of superfluous money which he may have borrowed at 5 % or 6%) is worth 
more than any "economie pian" to promote improvement in the cultivated property, 
more than many articles in agricultural journals, more than the innumerable re-
commendations from itinerant professors and more than many legislative provisions. 
In further remarks on these issues, Einaudi commented on the experience 
he had acquired in his property in Dogliani. 
When I began in 1917 , 1 was among the very first to set up vineyards on Amer-
ican rootstocks, breaking up the land a meter deep and ramming small branches of 
wood with their roots trimmed short into the naked earth (without compost, without 
manure, without faggot-joining bundles - in contrast to the ancient tradition). Often 
the locai farmers stopped in passing to pronounce: 'the professor has money to throw 
away. But a few years later they saw that I had managed to harvest my grapes 
whereas they had a very poor crop, let alone to any grapes to sell, or wine to drink; 
and they also saw that those who had constructed the vineyards in the traditional way 
with ditches, manure and bundles would produce weak and ugly vines, while mine 
were strong and beautiful. Only then did they begin to adopt my method, and 
now these small properties are saved. Not only thanks to myself, but also to others 
like me who set a good example. 
And here is the conclusion: 
I had some merit, though I will not go into ali the details except6 to put forward 
a small argument in favor of the claim that personal factors may at times be worth just 
as much as the most widely praised legislative provisions. 
Then Einaudi paints a lively picture that icastically represents his ideal of 
the state as an actor promoting good government in a market economy. The 
letter features a dialogue between a Professor Lorenzoni and some farmers in 
6 It is worth noticing that this was originally a letter to an internee, not an article composed for 
a weekly journal. 
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Dogliani, interviewed by Lorenzoni in the framework of an officiai agricultur-
al enquiry. At the end of the interview the Professor addresses the group of 
farmers with the following question: "What do you ask from the govern-
ment?": Einaudi's depiction shows them reflecting on the issue, and he notes 
that the essence of their position could be epitomized in the following com-
ment: "the government should improve our roads, shouldn't make us pay too 
much tax; and then leave us to take care of ali the rest". 
In the second of the letter-articles to Ernesto Rossi which appeared in 
Il Mondo on 4 June 1949, Einaudi sketched the optimal conditions that 
would be enjoyed by citizens under "Good Government", arguing that 
a farmer, under such a government, would be "a hundred times more a 
lord than multimillionaire industrialists who have to depend on those 
who commission them to engage in production, or than clerical employees 
who are dependent on their principals for their careers, or than ali those 
who have wishes that only others can satisfy". For the farmer is a person 
who "lives on his farm and exploits it in a rational manner; who brings up 
his children in harmony with their environment; who is proud of the dig-
nity of his status (even if he may not be fully aware of it and never boasts 
of it), who is no servant to anybody, and has no fear that another may take 
away his bread". 
In the last of the three letter-articles to Ernest Rossi published in II Mondo 
Einaudi again contests Rossi's project of radicai agrarian reform, which Rossi 
insisted should be brought into action immediately. Einaudi argues that 
in order for the reforms to be seriously effective I persist in saying that they must be 
graduai. Radicai reform is a concept that is similar to a constituent assembly. Nothing 
more: a leap in the dark. Where do the masses enjoy a higher standard of living? Swit-
zerland, Holland, Scandinavia and Great Britain. And these are countries that are 
averse to radicai reform and love graduai introduction of change which slowly modi-
fies existing situations here and there, section by section of territories and of the 
world of work. By proceeding one step at a time, great distances can be covered. 
By doing things on the spur of the moment, disasters may strike. Disaster befell 
France because of this mania for logie, perfection, orderliness. [...] Reforms of the 
existing state of affairs must be discussed and meditated upon and carried out as pro-
gressive experiments. 
This cautious reformism earned Einaudi a reputation as having somewhat 
antiquated ideas. But now that his theory of Good Government is being re-
discovered, one should not make the mistake of considering it to be rational-
ist. "Imperfectism", not "perfectism", characterises the manner of operation 
of Einaudi's Good Government. 
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In a letter of late 1952 to Mario Pannunzio,7 the then editor of II Mondo, 
Einaudi took a stance against an article by an English or American journalist 
that carne out in Pannunzio's publication. Einaudi protested that the jour-
nalist 
reveals in his article that he does not have the faintest idea of what can be done and 
what cannot be done in agricolture. [...] He praises what they are doing in Pomposa 
but adds that they are doing it on an absolutely insufficient or barely sufficient scale. 
Instead of millions, he wishes to spend billions of liras. Improvements, in his view, are 
evidendy supposed to have spectacular characteristics. He wants reclamation projects 
to be set in motion more quickly. Everything that has to be done must be done im-
mediately and on a grand scale. [...] These superficial journalists, who imagine that in 
agriculture great things can be done at a great speed and that billions can be found on 
every street-corner should be banned from newspapers like II Mondo. No one can 
bitterly accuse those who are working for reclamation of making mistakes, because 
any large-scale agricultural project is inevitably going to contain a fairly high propor-
tion of wrongly chosen investment. Everything good we see in Italian agriculture has 
been created with the sacrifice and disenchantment of those who carne before us. 
Einaudi believed that this line of reasoning, based both on his theory and 
on his private experience with agricultural work, could provide support for 
his criticism of the Keynesian argument that an increase in aggregate demand 
will automatically lead to an increase in supply, with the benefit of additional 
economie growth. Savings are not the only element needed to finance invest-
ments. There is a need for entrepreneurial capabilities, sensible projects, and 
skills and know-how, but these cannot be improvised. There are no automa-
tisms. The approach to growth on the supply side needs patience and perse-
verale . 
4. "Good Government" is imagined in the dimension both of urban archi-
tecture and social architecture, in an article that appeared in II Mondo in 
March 1951. It was drawn from a short travelogue he wrote in 1926 during 
a trip to the United States, in which he visited New York, Chicago and 
San Francisco.8 Here Einaudi describes the urban landscape of New York 
and San Francisco where "private houses give the impression of seeking to 
blend into the road and into public property so as to obtain enrichment of 
spirit and of light". He adds an interesting comment: 
7 Of Decomber 20 1952. The journalist was Stephen Spende. 
8 L. EINAUDI, "Ricordi di viaggio di un tempo lontano", Il Mondo (10 March 1951), p. 3. 
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I saw no gates and garden walls around the detached houses. Often I couldn't see 
any closing fixtures on the windows except on windows that open vertically, which 
seem easy to use because they open from the bottom and from the top, and they 
are attractive since one window alone occupies its entire casement space. [...] There 
is continuity between the land belonging to the house and the area of the road. Thus 
the private garden continues and merges with the grassy verges of the road and the 
avenue. This often gives the impression of walking in an immense public park where 
- here and there - are scattered large and small houses, sometimes assembled to-
gether; and at other times in isolated groups or alone. 
Such a place, Einaudi felt, was a "humane city" in the city planning sense 
of the term. In Chicago, when visiting the University, Einaudi noted that the 
concept of a 'University degree' as a qualification having legai effects would 
be meaningless in the USA because only a small minority of Universities were 
state owned, most of them being private foundations, with varying levels of 
accreditation. Thus the value of the degree issued by these institutions was 
exclusively moral and not legai. He then went on to reflect that the Italian sys-
tem, where a university degree is an officiai qualification with legai value, 
tempted the academic bodies to lower their standards in order to compete 
for students and thus increase their student enrollments. The result was a de-
valuation of university degrees. "In contrast, when these titles have a mere 
moral value the academic bodies will aspire to make that value grow and they 
will be unable to achieve that goal unless they limit their market supply". It 
was this personal experience during his American trip in 1926 that gave rise 
to the Einaudian suggestion of abolishing the legai value of Italian university 
degrees. His idea, as mentioned, was that the rules of the game should allow 
universities to compete not for a reduction but for an increase in the quality of 
the supply, at the expense of quantity if necessary, in order to help the best 
students to achieve their full potential. This was one of the pillare of his archi-
tecture of Good Government, in which the cultural elite have an important 
role but are not identified merely on the basis of possessing a legai certificate. 
5. A letter of 26 December 1951 from Einaudi to Pannunzio, the editor of 
Il Mondo, against off-balance earmarked taxes, is little short of a small treatise 
on Good Government of the public budget. Einaudi outlined his criticism by 
illustrating a specific example, namely the fact that the tax on theatre and 
movie performances was destined by law to cover the financing of opera houses. 
In Einaudi's eyes, such a tax should be considered as revenue forming part of 
the general budget, because the size of the funds allotted to operatic institu-
tions should be determined according to the citizen-taxpayers' evaluation of 
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the various public wants, making a comparison between the costs involved 
and the personal cost of foregoing the satisfaction of the private needs. An 
evaluation of this kind has no logicai connection with the expenses of con-
sumption of movie and theatre performances. The funds taxpayers are willing 
to assign to opera could, in actual fact, prove to be lower or higher than this 
expense. However, it is usually the case that if this connection is established 
and the revenue from the earmarked levy exceeds the sum thought to be ap-
propriate for the operatic institutions, then their financing is increased above 
the level the tax payer would consider appropriate, thus depriving the tax-
payer of a revenue that would have been better devolved for some other pur-
pose. It is clear that the Einaudian critique of earmarked taxes has no hearing 
on taxes linked to the benefits accruing to taxpayers such as the social contri-
butions devoted to financing pensions and locai waste disposai taxes. But Ei-
naudi's caveat that it would be wrong to allot any increase in revenue to an 
increase of expenditure is also relevant in the case of taxes that are the fiscal 
price of compulsory public services. Thus if there is an increase in the ear-
marked revenue exceeding that of the ordinary trend of expenditure, the pos-
sibility of reducing the tax should be contemplated, instead of automatically 
increasing the expenditure. 
In a longer letter of December 1953 to Mario Pannunzio9 Einaudi 
addressed the issue of the Mezzogiorno, beginning with an examination 
of the massive migration from the south to the north of Italy. Einaudi observes: 
Certainly we cannot wait for absolute or relative depopulation... and for the ef-
fect of the increase in agricultural salaries. Depopulation will eventually come about 
in the South as well, but it will take decades. Therefore the best course of action 
should pursue the following aims: 
- the "Cassa per il Mezzogiorno" [the Special Fund for Southern Italy] should 
offer and promote temporary as well as permanent opportunities for jobs; 
- a program should be established for the building of primary schools well 
equipped with playgrounds and school dinners, so that there will be less of a ten-
dency simply to send children out to work at a tender age; 
- vocational training should be intensified in order to create a pool of technically 
qualified young people in response to the market demand for skills, as opposed to the 
present situation where students receive a generalist education that serves no useful 
purpose; 
9 The letter was reproduced in Einaudi's book Lo Scrittoio del Presidente with the tide "La trat-
ta degli alani" [The slave trade in great danesi, a metaphor referring to the conditions of migration 
from Southern Italy to the North. 
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- restrictions on imports and other form of protectionism (which favor the con-
centration of industries in the north) should be abolished, in order to allow a more 
naturai distribution of labor in the various parts of the country; 
- etc. etc.: because the list of innocuous measures that should be enacted could 
be extended, as could the list of damaging provisions which could be omitted, with 
considerable saving of expenses. 
Naturally, in putting forward such proposals for applying his principles of 
Good Government to the question of the Italian South as well, Einaudi was 
well aware that suggested action should normally be based on appropriate di-
rect experience, and that care should be taken to avoid doctrinaire proposals. 
He himself had not forgotten the criticisms he had voiced against the doctri-
naires who sought to lay down the law in agriculture despite their total lack of 
concrete knowledge in the field. Furthermore, he did not feel there were any 
short cuts for development of the South. 
In 1951, in two letters to Pannunzio of August 12 and 26, Einaudi con-
tributed to the debate on unification of the "Liberal party", arguing against 
the position held by Leone Cattani. In Einaudi's view, terms like "politically 
centrai", "third force motions" and "contrast between a liberal conservative 
party and a liberal democratic party" or between "right and left" and other 
similar expressions generated confusion because they were too vague. There 
was little sense, Einaudi contended, in discussing "where liberals should posi-
tion themselves" - whether at the center or to the right or to the left. Rather, 
what needed to be established is what they tangibly wanted. He added that 
although it was true, as Cattani maintained, that simplistic definitions cannot 
give a genuine picture of liberalism and that it was not enough merely to 
"declare allegiance to the patriodc tradition of liberalism, respect freedom of con-
science, affirm the principle of equality of rights, defend private initiative and 
competition, and seek to restore morality in public life", it was equally true that 
the key concepts indicated by Cattani were likewise inadequate as they lacked 
concrete proposals. Cattani spoke of the need to interpret responsibly the trend 
towards the right and to resist any tendency to distrust democracy, and in this 
context he warned against succumbing to institutional forces that might risk re-
viving dangerous passions. What Cattani advocated was a more elevated sense 
of the state, greater government efficiency, a stronger national sentiment, more 
attention to defense problems, and better awareness of the social problems of 
the country. But Einaudi10 felt that much time was wasted on pointless discus-
10 On 12 August, in a shorter letter. 
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sions as to "what kind of stance the liberals should adopt", whether they should 
take up a position at the center or oriented towards the left or the right. What 
was needed was to establish what goals they were pursuing concretely. 
However, in a letter dated August 26, Einaudi slightly revised his assess-
ment, acknowledging that the debate on the liberal party set in motion by two 
articles whose authors were Croce and Cocco Ortu was "getting off to a good 
start". He now conceded that once it was established who the liberals were 
and what goals they were pursuing, it would be possible to establish "who 
can set off along the same path together" because "politics is made up of 
compromises and not of giving in and groveling, as was the case during the 
celebrated Giolittian times". Einaudi had been criticai of Giolitti's methods 
of achieving consensus, but in the letter he admits that "fertile results" had 
come not only from Cavour's alliances and Depretis' compromises but from 
Giolitti's approach as well. The letter concludes with the recognition that "the 
liberals, catholics and democratic socialists ali have something to say [...] but 
as long as they suffer from the inferiority complex of not doing enough of 
whatever the others say they "will go to ruin". In Einaudi's Good Govern-
ment there is no place for doctrinaires who expound obscure politicai formulae. 
There must be clear programs. But this does not imply contempt for the need 
to reach an agreement by reciprocai concessions. 
6. Among his contributions to II Mondo, Einaudi published two long ar-
ticles, La società liberale [The Society of the liberals]11 and L'idolo rinnegato 
[The Disowned Idol],12 which have the nature of essays on the basic princi-
ples of a free society. They originally carne out as pamphlets, immediately after 
the second world war. We will begin here with the earlier of the two papere 
(although it was effectively published in II Mondo after the other article), 
because of its nature as a Manifesto on the society of the liberals. Its incipit 
states: "What we liberals seek to create is a society where the number of em-
ployees and public pensioners does not exceed a criticai point beyond which 
11 The paper on "La società liberale" of May 1955 was edited as a pamphlet in Aprii 1945. 
Obviously the term "Liberal party" was used in the European sense of "Party of freedom" and 
the society of liberals coincides with the free society. 
12 L. EINAUDI, "Risparmio e investimenti. L'idolo rinnegato", Il Mondo (15 September 1953), 
pp. 3-4. This article is the second part of an essay originally appearing in English in 1953 in a volume 
written in honor of Ludwig Erhard, published by the University of Zurich under the tide 
"Wirtschaft ohne Wunder". The first part appeared in II Mondo on 9 September with the tide: Ri-
sparmio e investimenti. I pasticci di lepre [Saving and Investment. Failed Hare Pies]. The essay was 
later published as an introduction to a collection of Erhard's writings, La Germania ritoma sul mer-
cato mondiale (Milano, Garzanti, 1954). 
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its destiny would be that of subjugation to a tyrant". As Einaudi then clarifies, 
a tyrant is any form of dominating power that has to be served, whatever 
name is given to the myth adopted to justify it. The term 'myth' is a fruitful 
legacy of Pareto (with reference to "derivations") that Einaudi had already 
employed in criticizing the dominating principles of taxation, such as the 
minimum or equal sacrifice to justify progressive taxation and the concept 
of perfectionism whereby "every tax payer pays up to the last penny due". 
The tyrant in this case is the burden of unproductive public expenditure that 
generates an excess of fiscal weight together with the vote of the majority op-
pressing the minority. What Einaudi wished to achieve was 
a society not flawed by excessive disparity of fortunes and in which extreme peaks of 
high income are eliminated, and where no one (apart from the morally, psychologi-
cally and physically deficient, who must otherwise be provided for) is denied the 
chance to achieve a life worthy of modem civil society through the fruits of a working 
occupation that creates the opportunity for rising to a higher social status. A society 
providing such stimuli for public and private initiative will favor a continuous in-
crease in the average income level; and this increase also implies a moral and spiritual 
elevation for the greatest possible number of persons living in society. 
Einaudi also clarifies that in the model society he seeks to usher in the 
middle class "is continuously enriched by energetic men who rise from below 
to enter within the ranks of the middle class while the latter is, at the same 
time, continuously depleted by the loss of those who become its leaders, its 
initiators and promoters". Thus his ideal of good government is that of a var-
iegated society with a large number of small enterprises and independent 
workers; it is a society that does not display enormous social disparities, yet 
it guarantees a minimum for those who are unable to provide for themselves, 
while giving ali individuals the opportunity to achieve a better life through 
their own efforts. This architecture of society provides the stimulus for the 
continuous increase in average income (in contemporary terminology, an in-
crease in average GDP per head), which comes about through an increase 
in the income of ali members of society or at least of the greatest possible 
number. Einaudi then indicates his fundamental principles of this society as 
follows: 
a. Independence of the judiciary; 
b. Autonomy of universities; 
c. Freedom of the press; 
d. Abolition of the Prefecture and autonomy of the provinces, munici-
palities and regions; 
e. Abolition of dirigisme and of any form of command economy; 
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f. Repression of any attempt by workers' and entrepreneurs' associa-
tions to create monopolies on the labor market; 
g. Repression of monopolies, cartels and trusts in the market economy; 
h. Stabilization of the Italian currency prior to establishment of a stable 
single European currency; 
i. Abolition of taxes that hinder wealth creation and adoption of a sys-
tem of a consumption tax, income tax and inheritance tax, using non inqui-
sitorial methods that can act as tools for reducing the distances among social 
classes; 
j. Creation of public enterprises only when socialization is the best 
means for achieving the common good, and not when the state or locai gov-
ernment becomes an accomplice in theft at expense of the public; 
k. Urban planning not consisting of lines drawn on paper but com-
posed of roads, side-walks, public lighting, drainage systems, churches, council 
houses, gardens and parks available to everyone and provided by the public 
expenditure. 
The above list ends with the ideal of Good Government: "the day when 
mortals will no longer live in those horrendous prisons that are houses and 
apartments with the flights of steps leading down to common and closed 
courtyards, with the linen hanging damply in the shadows; the day when ali 
people will be able, if they so wish, to live in their own home with a garden, 
bathed by sunlightg". But ali this must not be a free gift because "a man who 
is a citizen will always be proud to say to his children: 'This house I built my-
self, with the fruit of my work' ". 
Luigi Einaudi's manifesto for a liberal society thus ends with the home 
that each man has built for himself: The home can be seen as the alpha 
and omega of the ideal of good government. 
7. A different topic is addressed in the second essay L'idolo rinnegato 
[The Disowned Idol], dating from 1953. It deals with the fundamental role 
of private savings in Good Government. Einaudi believed, unlike Keynes, 
that without private savings no investments could be made. But in our era, 
savings are always in short supply, a realization that prompted Einaudi's 
rhetorical question: 
In an era where it is really necessary for investments to grow rapidly and to be 
distributed throughout the world; in an era where the amount of capital necessary 
for providing operative units with work is becoming higher and higher; in an era 
where there is a serious need to elevate the working capacity of the average man 
and consequendy the overall standard of living, and in an era where this necessity 
is felt by hundreds of millions of men living on the border of starvation, is it really 
— 26 — 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF LUIGI EINAUDI'S GOOD GOVERNMENT 
sufficient simply to invest at the usuai rhythm and thereby generate savings in the 
quantity we are seeing today? If we reply negatively to this question, is it not, there-
fore, urgent to rid ourselves of the obstacles that today limit the creation of private 
savings: tax levies on the share of expenses devoted to the reconstruction of capital, 
difficulty in disinvestment of capital invested abroad, and scant respect for the invar-
iance of the gold standard? 
Traditional economics, which formed the background context in which 
Einaudi developed his observations, applied the rules of private microeco-
nomics to public macroeconomics. Keynes endeavored to demonstrate that 
in macroeconomics, and therefore in fiscal policy, private virtue often be-
comes a vice because saving and investment are two different notions: and 
the act of saving does not necessarily translate into investments. While the 
latter can create ex post savings, ex ante savings may not result in investment. 
However, Einaudi noted that the wartime and post-war experience in devel-
oped societies and the situation of developing countries showed that it is pre-
cisely the virtues of private saving that generate economie growth by feeding 
investments under substantial monetary stability. 
These issues on which Einaudi reflected are stili extremely relevant today, 
in the light of the great crisis of 2008 caused by over-expanded credit in ad-
vanced industrialized economies like those of the USA, Great Britain and 
Spain. Mortgages, home loans and credit cards had been made freely available 
to families who were devoid of savings and had inadequate incomes to repay 
their debts, but this vast expansion of credit gave the illusion of a cost-free 
social policy. It was assumed that the debts arising from loans to insolvent fa-
milies could be covered ex post through growth in the value of real estate and 
through the increase in incomes resulting from the overall growth in GDP, 
the latter being generated by the high global demand which, in turn, was trig-
gered precisely by this "deficit lending". And the financial intermediaries who 
brokered the loans or insured the stocks and bonds representative of these 
debts, which were subsequently resold on the market, were operating without 
parameters capable of determining whether the underlying assets were pro-
portional to such commitments. There was a general reliance on the assump-
tion that such checks were unecessary because the debts would be repaid 
thanks to the growth of the economy, except in a few isolated cases. But 
growth without savings - a "hare pie without the hare", to use an Einaudian 
expression - is not possible in the long run. The spirai is inverted, thus gen-
erating a crisis and unemployment. 
History repeats itself and appears to validate Einaudi's proposition ac-
cording to which: "In the competition among various countries of the world, 
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the prize appears to belong to those living where there is the maximum re-
spect for the traditional rules of economie conduct".13 Einaudi's Good Gov-
ernment applies the rules of the private home to the public home. And in the 
family there is no growth of prosperity without savings. 
8. Einaudi was an assiduous reader of II Mondo.14 However, after 1956 
the Liberal Party underwent a scission, in which the center-right retained 
the originai name while a rump characterized by a more left-wing politicai 
orientation gave rise to the so-called Radicai Party. Il Mondo became the 
headquarters of acrimonious politicai skirmishes that can be defined as battles 
of Jacobin liberalism. Einaudi, who up to that time had remained a faithful 
reader and contributor of II Mondo, silendy withdrew. And the correspondence 
between Einaudi and Pannunzio ended with a Christmas greetings telegram 
dated 24 December 1955 from Pannunzio to Senator Einaudi.15 Now having 
completed his term of office as President of the Republic, Einaudi was able to 
devote a greater amount of leisure time to writing letters and articles. But he 
did not send them to II Mondo.16 I believe that his dissociation from II Mondo 
can be attributed to two factors. On the one hand Einaudi was not in agree-
ment with the newspaper's new line, which he regarded as excessively secularist, 
whereas his liberal credo subscribed to the common ethical values of Chris-
tianity - in Benedetto Croce's sense of common western values: indeed, in 
a perhaps even more inclusive sense. And above ali, Einaudi opposed the 
13 L. EINAUDI, "Introduzione" to L. ERHARD, La Germania ritorna sul mercato mondiale (Mila-
no, Garzanti, 1964), p. xxi. 
14 As he explains in a letter to Pannunzio on 13 February 1950, where he also writes that the 
photographs are "very good" and the authors and articles generally appear praiseworthy. The only 
disagreement concerns the literary part, which deserves to be quoted m order to show that Einaudi 
was a "complete man", with interests ranging from science, politics, agriculture and architecture to 
arts and literature. With regard to a short story by S . CAMBOSU, Il Carnevale di Silvestro [Silvester s 
Carnival] Einaudi comments, "It is a senseless typical modem story of people who have achieved 
their goal. Why was it written? It is no more than an external descnption of people and events. 
[...] One may surmise that young people are keen on stories likes this, but it is certainly written 
in a poor style". 
is Addressed to his office in the building of the 'Bank of Italy' in Via Tuscolana in Rome. 
i<> I am skeptical about the suggestion that this caesura may be attributed to the fact that the 
editorial board of II Mondo induded many Uberai sociahsts. For not only had the young Einaudi 
made a number of contributions to Critica Sociale, the leading sociahst reformist magazine, but m 
the late 1950s he wrote a long chapter of his Prediche inutili ["Useless Preachings ] on the dilfer-
ences and convergences between UberaUsm and sociaUsm. The chapter offered him the opportunity 
for an in-depth analysis in which he theorized that despite the evident diversities between the gra-
dualist, humanitarian and individuahstic versions of sociaUsm and UberaUsm, the different ap-
proaches also shared many similarities and a Constant dialogue. And he expressed sympathy for 
the graduaUst conceptions of Ezio Vanoni and his ten-year pian for the development of employment 
and income And II Mondo, in its radicai version, certainly was not sympathetic to Marxism, and 
neither did it sympathize with coUectivism or communism. 
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illuminist and Jacobin positions of the liberal-radicals. His liberalism was 
shaped around a theory of limited rationality which he had been elaborating 
since his early work on economics; over the years he had gradually moved 
away from the analytical pragmatism of Giovanni Vailati and shifted towards 
the Marshallian idea that "Natura non facit saltus", while carefully maintaining 
an empirical attitude. 
9. An interesting example of this analytical-empirical attitude can be 
found by perusing his Pagine Doglianesi [Dogliani Pages], his Memoriale 
per stabilire le regole generali per l'amministrazione di una azienda agricola a 
vigneto nelle Langbe [Memorandum for Establishing the General Rules for 
the Administration of a Winery in the Langhe] written in the years 1942-
1943,17 the same period as his letters to Ernesto Rossi on the principles of 
Good Government. At first sight, these pages may seem little more than an 
arid presentation of the balance sheets of the Dogliani estate, analyzing the 
costs for improvements and maintenance of the estate, agency fees, and the 
agent's annuities and partnerships. But throughout the statement of accounts 
one senses Einaudi's manifest love for his property, whose Good Government 
calls for careful savings to finance appropriate investments. 
In his calculation of the agent's payment Einaudi dwells on the change in 
the purchasing power of money and on the manner of calculating it. He dis-
cards the cost of living index because it is based on the expenses of the city 
workers, adopting in its place the change in the market price of grapes, with 
the argument, spurious though it may be, that this is the main product of his 
farms. This, however, leads to a shift from analysis of the purchasing power of 
currency, which would imply the wage escalator of the managers supervising 
the farm, to the concept of the revenue obtained from the farm, at market 
prices, under the assumption of invariance of the quantity produced. Such 
a method would also give wage flexibility in relation to the revenue of the es-
tate seen as dependent upon exogenous market factors. Within the logie of a 
competitive market where the salary is not a subsistence minimum or an in-
dependent variable determined by trade union power in a collective labour 
contract, but a variable dependent upon the average return of the production 
factors in the market considered, Einaudi recognizes that the price of grapes 
may oscillate from one year to the next due to exogenous factors. He there-
17 L. EINAUDI, "Memoriale per stabilire le regole generali per l'amministrazione di ima azienda 
agricola a vigneto nelle Langhe" [ 1 9 4 2 - 4 3 ] , in ID., Pagine doglianesi (1893-1943) (Dogliani, Comune 
di Dogliani - Biblioteca civica Luigi Einaudi, 1988), pp. 41-85. 
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fore adds a clause that the agent's fee cannot go below six thousand lire an-
nually. It is a minimum guarantee, not an escalator clause because it does not 
take inflation into account, a problem which was by no means secondary in 
those years. The agent also received a productivity premium in the form of 
profit participation, parameterized upon the value of the goods produced 
at Constant prices, as measured by reference to the price of gold. The share 
of the profits for the agent was initially 10%; later increased to 20%, then 
to 30% and 40% and even 50% in case of special increases production. Thus 
there emerged an ingenious model of a labor contract based on incentives, 
with some risk sharing. Furthermore, the criteria adopted to calculate depre-
ciation, which varied according to the goods considered, constitute a model of 
Good Government of the private sector which could be of use for the public 
sector. Here the various components of the architecture of the farming estate 
are laid out before of us. For ordinary improvement of the vineyards and 
orchards and their out-buildings Einaudi suggested the simplest method of 
detracting, every year, the effective expenses incurred for such works 
like deep plowing in the fields, special compost for the vineyard, transformation of 
the fields and planting alfalfa. In this case one may presume that every year something 
is done and therefore the new expenditure offsets the depreciation. Moreover, it is 
not worth setting up an ad hoc account for depreciation, when the duration of the 
improvement works is only a few years. 
But with regard to farm buildings and roads, 
we are faced with an investment destined to last a very long time. [...] Instead of cal-
culating depreciation on the basis of uncertain suppositions, the best method [...] is 
to take into account [...] the entire range of maintenance expenses, whatever they are, 
be they small or large. 
For the vineyard and orchard installations, on the other hand (like those 
mentioned earlier which were the object of a very ambitious innovative Einau-
dian project), "one needs to calculate the realistic annual depreciation. We 
cannot include the expenditures due to the installations as costs in the profit 
and loss account, because the figures are too large and unequal from year to 
year". Nevertheless the annual depreciation charges could vary as compared 
to those initially estimated. The depreciation schedule could be shortened or 
lengthened on the basis of experience. 
10. Let us conclude this review with a small scene from life in the home. 
We will enter into the house of Francesco Fracchia, Luigi Einaudi's uncle on 
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his mother's side. After the death of Luigi Einaudi's father, Francesco Frac-
chia welcomed his widowed sister and her children into his own home. This 
home became Luigi's home, of which he gives the following description in the 
Introduction to the Pagine Doglianesi-. 
It was a home where everything suggested the cult of age-old and austere med-
itations. I remember my grandmother, who was very hard-working, and she was al-
ways active and busy, right up to the day when she suddenly died. I have vivid mem-
ories of my grandfather, who religiously preserved objects and memories, and I can 
stili picture the store room under the high eaves where our old folks would bring the 
clothes to dry in the sun and air, and the family furniture going back generations, the 
ceilings with wooden beams. [...] Dinner was a frugai meal, we were only allowed a 
short playtime in the garden, and it wasn't often that we went for walks. I can never 
forget the solemn occasions of our trips to the country when it was threshing time and 
during the grape harvest. Everyone went to the locai schools and leamt the disciplines 
of rhetoric and the humanities, as Dogliani had well-stocked libraries thanks to a Na-
poleonic endowment. [...] And then the children thronged to follow the family tradi-
tions, learning off by heart the names of grandfathers, great-grandfathers and ances-
tors, doctors, men in the armed forces, lawyers and judges, ali honored with 
decorations and awards, which once were more rarely bestowed than today. 
The scene depicted by Einaudi then broadens out from the home envir-
onment to the élite who governed Piedmont and who would later be among 
the makers of Italian national unity. Thus Einaudi notes: 
Ali these aspects that I would observe in the ancestral home were the national 
habits of Piedmont's middle class for most of the 19 th century. And in an era when 
social mobility from place to place was not frequent, one can readily understand how 
such habits shaped a ruling class that left profound traces of honesty, thrift, devotion 
to duty in the politicai and administrative life of that Piedmont which created Italy. 
Einaudi also adds: 
The formation of a robust army - traditionally devoted to the King and to its 
country - cannot be explained unless one bears in mind that relations between the 
soldiers and officers were the continuation of the interactions which, in their native 
villages, formed a link between the social classes to which they belonged [...]: rela-
tions of respect and familiarity. 
And Einaudi infers: 
It seemed naturai that professionals, clerical workers and civil servants would 
come from certain families. Salaries, extremely moderate even for those times, were 
received without complaint and without contempt, for they saw their roles in their 
4 
31 — 
FRANCESCO FORTE 
officiai capacity as an honor and a duty. [...] Their needs were few and it appeared 
honorable for an officer, at the end of his military career, to be rewarded with a pen-
sion of two hundred lire a month and the honorific symbol of a cross of the saints 
Maurizio and Lazzaro. 
This was indeed also the case of Francesco Fracchia, who lived in a 
"provincial background with close-knit family ties forged by hard work and 
by the affection of the devoted women members of the family, and who 
was destined to be esteemed by his own countrymen". The cycle of life, with 
its discipline and sense of duty, which was rooted in the house with its ampie, 
solid and functional architecture, and in the steadfast work that creates bonds 
between generations, radiated forth to the wider community and to public 
office and public affairs in general. Thus in Einaudi's vision the ideal and 
the institutions of Good Government of the public economy are conceived 
as an emanation of the spirit of Good Government of the home and the working 
environment, both aspects being the fruit of an order that has developed over 
time and has endured over the centuries, generating solid affluence. The ideal 
of Good Government of public affairs is fulfilled when it is managed in the 
interest of the country, according to the principles learnt in the family 
home, by the middle class which, as we have seen, in a free society - a "liberal" 
society - is not a caste but a rank continuously renewed. This is because "life 
is work and only those who have spent their life on earth complying with the 
laws of duty have the right to eternai peace". 
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G O V E R N M E N T A N D M A R K E T F A I L U R E S 
I N L U I G I E I N A U D I A N D T O - D A Y 
THE GOVERNMENT-MARKET PARADIGM FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT TO-DAY 
1. Ali through his working life, Luigi Einaudi was concerned with good 
government, both in his writings and social activity. His moral teachings 
are stili particularly relevant because the values for which he fought are too 
frequendy violated.1 
Einaudi wrote on those aspects of the Government-Market paradigm re-
levant to good government and made a significant contribution to the defini-
tion and correction of Market inefficiencies caused by Government. In many 
ways, these contributions are stili valid to-day.2 
In his attempt to show that the solutions adopted for good government 
must work for the overall good, Einaudi has taught us that the Govern-
ment-Market paradigm for good government changes over time and space 
and that consequently each generation must resolve its own problems that 
are not the same as those of the past or the future. 
Subsequent literature studied the Government-Market paradigm further 
following two lines of thought: the first outlines the distributive inefficiencies 
1 The ideal of Good Government is behind Luigi Einaudi's prolific writing, from articles in 
journals on social and economie policy and in the Corriere della Sera, to the 'notes' published as Pre-
sident of the Republic of Italy. A summary of his opinions can be found in L. EINAUDI, Il Buongo-
verno. Saggi di economia e politica (1897-1934), E. Rossi (ed.) (Bari, Laterza, 1954, second edition in 
2004). 
2 Einaudi's ideas on the relations between the Market and Good Government were further 
analysed by Francesco Fotte, first by comparing his philosophy with that of contemporary famed 
economists and then through an illustration in a number of essays on his liberal economy. See 
F. FORTE, Luigi Einaudi: il mercato e il buon governo (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1982) and ID., L'economia 
liberale di Luigi Einaudi. Saggi (Firenze, Olschki, 2009). For a significant multi-discipline argument, 
see P. SILVESTRI, Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi o del Buongoverno (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 
2008), pp. 252 ff. 
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and insufficiencies of the Market and their correction by Government inter-
vention; the second states that in many cases this intervention was also ineffi-
cient and insufficient. 
Einaudi's methods for eliminating the Government's inefficiencies and in-
sufficiencies generated wide debate that is stili unresolved, because no general 
agreement has been reached on the possible solutions. They depend on the 
politicai systems that determine collective decisions in the various government 
organisations. But politicai systems differ and are always imperfect. Therefore, 
they can be evaluated only pragmatically on the basis of the results.3 
2. The Market is inefficient under certain circumstances such as naturai 
monopolies, the external nature of production and consumption, incomplete 
or skewed information and imprudence, uncertainty and the risk of unfore-
seen events.4 Furthermore, as experience has shown, the Market is incapable 
of giving an automatic guarantee of a stable balance of full employment. 
Market inefficiencies do not apply to national markets only, but also glo-
bal ones, as demonstrated by climate change and the creation of bubbles 
leading to financial crises. The Market is not able to correct its excesses by 
itself. 
Market inefficiencies are coupled by insufficiencies in income distribu-
tion, nationally and internationally. Distribution differences, especially acute 
in developed and developing countries, are strictly related to energy and the 
environment. They have opened a global question that remains unanswered. 
3. Market inefficiencies and insufficiency with respect to the income dis-
tribution have justified State intervention in the past and up to today through 
public expenses, taxes, budgets, public debt and public companies. 
Each government action has been justified by the need to correct one or 
more market inefficiencies and at the same time achieve redistribution. In 
some cases the pursuit of these aims has been sufficient only to justify public 
intervention, for example in the provision of direct public health services as 
an objective example of 'health rights' seen as part of citizens' rights. 
The corrective actions taken so far using various instruments have proved 
to be inadequate to meet the huge questions of globalisation, distribution and 
3 On the merits and problems of politicai reforms aimed at reducing the inefficiencies of 
Government, see F. REVIGLIO, La spesa pubblica. Conoscerla e riformarla (Venezia, Marsilio, 2007), 
pp. 225 ff. 
4 For an analysis of the inefficiencies and insufficiencies of the Government-Market paradigm, 
see F . REVIGLIO cit., pp. 1 7 - 3 6 . 
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climate change. Answers to these problems can only come from a new world 
order based on a non-national authority. But this new order has yet to mate-
rialise. 
4. Government action can also prove ineffective and insufficient, as shown 
by developments in public spending, taxation, public enterprise and public 
debt. Much has been written on the causes and effects of, and possible reme-
dies to, the inefficiencies of State action. An important contribution has been 
made by the innovative school of Public Choice. 
More recently, the economie crisis has highlighted governments' incapa-
city to regulate and control financial markets efficiently. To avoid a collapse 
caused by the moral ineptitude of the market, the so-called 'too big to fail', 
governments have intervened by making financial companies and institutions 
public and injecting large sums of public money. 
In fact, this injection of money has rewarded those who behaved wrongly, 
without managing to stop another wave of bonuses for the managers of finan-
cial institutions and a new development of derivatives that could lead to the 
creation of new bubbles that would explode in the future and provoke new 
financial crises with an effect on the real economy. 
Removing government inefficiencies and insufficiencies is complicated be-
cause the possible solutions depend mainly on two very difficult and contro-
versial reforms: changing the national politicai and electoral systems and 
adopting a world government able to regulate and control super-national eco-
nomie and financial activities. 
GOVERNMENT-MARKET FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LUIGI 
EINAUDI 
1. To Einaudi's mind, the Market represented by competition is the ideal 
model of society, an essential component of Good Government and the foun-
dation of a liberal economie, politicai and social community. 
Einaudi recognises that the Market may be inefficient, therefore correc-
tive action by government can be justified in certain cases. First of ali, he 
believes that it is government's job to establish appropriate obligations for dis-
closures, regulations and controls through supervisory authorities, not just 
indicate and order operational modes: a particularly topical idea after 
the current serious, and as yet unfinished, financial crisis. 
Einaudi also points out that the Market is insufficient because it is neutral 
from the point of view of distribution. In other words, it creates an optimum 
of resources for each distribution of profits. 
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Redistribution by the Government can therefore be justified by a priori 
politicai motivation, but for Einaudi the Government must pursue only the 
redistribution of income to achieve equality of the starting points, without 
having a negative influence on savings and investments, therefore without 
reaching a universal levelling of mass society, which he believed was the "most 
frightening phenomenon of contemporary society". 
2. The Market does not possess the mechanisms to finance free public ser-
vices through prices. It therefore has to use taxes. The tax finances the indi-
visible cost of the functions that the public body has assumed.5 
It is not possible to finance indivisible public services by prices for two 
basic reasons: because they satisfy several demands at the same time and be-
cause they cannot be divided from the offer, excluding who does not pay the 
price. Einaudi's analytical explanation of the reasons why recourse cannot be 
made to prices is persuasive, even if different from later literature with the in-
struments of free riding and the prisoner's dilemma. 
According to Einaudian theory, tax must be "economie", that is such as to 
have a positive influence on production and productivity. It must finance only 
productive expenses that increase the product and saving.6 In order to in-
crease production, savings and capital gains must be relieved of tax and bank-
ing secrecy should be adopted. 
For Einaudi progressive taxation should be based on these limits. Its 
foundation should not include ali profits because income put aside for savings 
and capital gains must be exempt from taxation. Furthermore, Einaudi 
favoured death duties, which he believed necessary to reduce the excessive 
concentration of wealth. 
3. Among Market inefficiencies Einaudi emphasised monopolies and ex-
ternal economies enhancing economie development, justifying Government 
corrective measures in both cases, in the case of monopolies through regula-
tion rather than privatisation; in the case of external economies enhancing 
economie development, through benefits to businesses that can generate ad-
vantages to other businesses. 
5 Einaudi defìnes tax after having examined private, quasi-private, public and politicai expen-
diture and payments. See L. EINAUDI, Principi di scienza delle finanze, 4th ed. (Torino, G. Einau-
di, 1948). 
6 Further analysis of the Einaudian theory of taxes from the point of view of Uberai economy 
can be found in F. FORTE, L'economia liberale di Luigi Einaudi cit., pp. 143 ff. 
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Einaudi did not deal with other Market inefficiencies considered in later 
literature. He did not examine the whole taxonomy of the external effects of 
production and consumption that justify further public corrective measures, 
especially for toxic consumption and environmental protection. 
Protection of the environment is however at the centre of Einaudi's think-
ing over forest management where he indicates quasi-private prices as the me-
chanism for the abolition of forest protection. Einaudi justifies the non-use of 
private prices with the external economies produced by forestry conservation. 
Einaudi does not deal with the asymmetric information between patient, 
doctor and pharmaceutical companies that justifies regulatory action by the 
State. Usually, the patient accepts the diagnosis, prognosis and cure suggested 
by the doctor and cannot evaluate the use, usefulness or danger of the drug. 
This asymmetry does not in itself require the funding of a public health sys-
tem, but the prohibition to practise the medicai profession and to sell medi-
cines without proper and legai certification. 
Einaudi did not even examine the inefficiencies in private health insurance 
that lead to a inadequate coverage of risk. The health risks of a large popula-
tion with known characteristics, illnesses and accidents can be statistically pre-
dicted and therefore can be covered by private insurance, offering individuals 
proper protection on payment of a sustainable premium commensurate to the 
medicai risk. 
But the solution offered by private insurance may be inefficient because 
the asymmetric information between the insurers and the insured create an 
adverse selection: the former try not to cover 'bad risks', the latter tend not 
to insure against 'good risks'. 
Consequently, premiums decided on the basis on average risk may result 
in being too high because they reflect bad risk too much, excluding a part of 
the population from health insurance, with a vicious circle than increases 
overall inefficiency and therefore finally justifies public provision of health 
services. 
Einaudi approved public health services not to resolve the inefficiencies of 
private insurance, but to correct an insufficient distribution in favour of those 
with lower incomes. 
4. Government inefficiencies worried Einaudi as much as, if not more, 
Market ones. Einaudi studied them and proposed some solutions. He concen-
trated on the inefficiency of public monopoly created by law, suggesting that 
it be removed by suitable public regulation. In the case of transport services 
(urban, railways, electricity, gas and water) where public bodies might act in a 
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damaging or inadequate way, he believed that privatisation could be the 
answer.7 Einaudi argued against the Keynesian theory of global demand 
and government deficits and increasing public debt to overcome cyclical 
slumps. He believed in a budget balance that tended to be neutral, even 
though he admitted that a temporary recession could be allowed when the needs 
for the recovery required it, but always in the context of market liberalisation 
aimed at flexibility.8 
Einaudi suggested facing Government inefficiencies through federalism 
and decentralisation only if it was possible to avoid imposition and excessive 
public spending. In this way he anticipated the school of Public Choice that 
highlighted the possible inefficiencies that may arise for the decentralised as-
signation of responsibilities.9 
Einaudi also argued against protectionist barriers that should be removed 
with the European federation. He hoped for wider globalisation because he 
believed that economie logie would lead to the end of sovereign States and 
the start of a free society, but he did not go so far as to suggest a world gov-
ernment.10 
5. The correction of State inefficiencies that Einaudi hoped for, have 
occurred at least in part. Starting from the 1990's, there has been a new regula-
tion of public utility companies to remove privileges and inefficiencies and 
there has been an extraordinary number of privatisations, not always efficient 
ones. 
Privatisation has taken place in many countries and been extended to var-
ious sectors of public utility services. In the period 1990-2006 income from 
privatisation was considerable, amounting to over a trillion dollars. 
Since 2008 the situation has changed. Because of the financial crisis, gov-
ernments resorted to nadonalisation to the sum of over 1.5 trillion dollars, 
higher than that from privatisations in the preceding 15 years. 
Government intervention in banks has raised delicate questions on the 
governance of these institutions. To solve these, in may cases privileged shares 
7 As restateci by F . FORTE, L'economia liberale di Luigi Einaudi cit., pp. 306 ff. 
8 For the cooperative State in Einaudi and his theory of generally balanced budget, see ibid., 
pp. 107 ff. and p. 228. 
9 On this subject, see E. GIARDINA, "Locai finance and intergovernmental relations in the phi-
losophy of Luigi Einaudi", Il pensiero economico italiano (2004), pp. 77-105, reproduced in Selected 
essays 1960-2007 (Milano, Franco Angeli, 2008), pp. 430-468. 
10 F. Forte notes that there is a contradiction between this idea and Einaudi's theory of a con-
federation limited to western Europe. 
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without voting rights have been issued and management restraints have been 
imposed to force the banks to pay back the capital received from the State. 
6. Over the years policies on public deficit have also changed. European 
limits were then set adopting a stability pact that resisted until the recent 
financial crisis which has forced the State to intervene through an increase of 
the public deficit of unprecedented size, particularly in Great Britain and the 
USA. The increase was inevitable, but opens delicate questions for future 
sustainability. 
The creation of the European Union has eliminated the barriere, as Einau-
di had hoped, but global barriere stili partially exist because the ongoing eco-
nomie crisis has given them new life. 
Globalisation has increased wealth also in the less developed areas of the 
world, proving at least in part Einaudi's theory that globalisation would gen-
erate economie development, but a 'World Federation' is stili a long way off. 
In Italy federalism has yet to be introduced and the centralist Government 
continues to play a determining role in a situation of financial irresponsibility 
on the part of the Regions, as is shown by the case of federalist health services. 
7. In Lezioni di politica sociale (Lessons on Social Policy),11 Luigi Einaudi 
claims that the State must take social actions coherent with the market econ-
omy and with the values of liberty and individuality. Government intervention 
must come after that of citizen and voluntary associations. Ali the same Einau-
di agreed with the idea of redistribution to ensure that the poor had a mini-
mum pension and a health service. 
Einaudi's reduced theory of the Social State can be attributed to his an-
tagonism to Beveridge on the Welfare State that gives everything to everyone 
with no responsibility or freedom of choice. 
The later development of welfare was the opposite of the originai idea, 
with the crisis of the Welfare State Einaudi's ideas are today valid. His Gov-
ernment-Market model is applicable today and opposes the ideology of the 
1970S that considered it obsolete.12 
Einaudi believed that it was the government's responsibility also to 
provide free education, albeit within certain limits, because State intervention 
11 (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1949), republished in B. CROCE - L. EINAUDI, Liberismo e liberalismo 
(Milano - Napoli, Ricciardi, 1988). On the social policies of Einaudi, see F . FORTE, L'economia libe-
rale di Luigi Einaudi cit., pp. 119 ff. and 2 3 5 ff. and P. SILVESTRI cit., pp. 2 5 2 ff. 
12 F. Forte compares and contrasts the theory that Einaudi's model of Government well-being 
would be outdated. See L'economia liberale di Luigi Einaudi cit., p. xvn. 
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should be accompanied by a variety of schools competing between themselves 
and the freedom of choice of private citizens. In order to reduce inequality 
from the beginning, Einaudi believed mainly in a system of private and public 
schools. 
8. Einaudi's reform consisted in the graduai removal of the inefficiencies 
of Government, as can be clearly seen in the debate with Ernesto Rossi on the 
limits to agrarian reform and schooling.13 
Einaudi argues against Ernesto Rossi's theory that it is the State's respon-
sibility to broaden the scope of economie privilege from small owners and to 
redistribute territory in a more equal manner. On the contrary, he affirms that 
the redistribution of land should be graduai, guided by the market with the 
entry of new autonomous owners. 
With regard to school reform Einaudi believed that a limited number of 
admitted students would constitute an obstacle to the necessary competition. 
The world according to Einaudi is made up of small businesses working 
for larger industries that, through free competition, ensure efficiency and 
growth. In this context, the Market is for him the best mechanism to guaran-
tee sustained growth, widespread prosperity and freedom. 
9. If the distribution of wealth is politically not acceptable because it is not 
equitable, Einaudi believes it is right for government to try and correct it. 
The debate has been over two questions: are there objective criteria to de-
fine re-distribution and is income an adequate and sufficient point of refer-
ence. With regard to the former question there is doubt about the type of dis-
tribution that can be considered 'unequal'. 
Here we are faced with two polar opposites: in brief, egalitarian extremists 
and extremists of the 'invisible hand'. The various politicai parties have tried 
to find an acceptable answer to these two extreme positions. 
The egalitarians based their theory on the decline of marginai utility of 
successive wealth so that the best collective well-being can only be brought 
about by an egalitarian redistribution. But this solution lacks objectivity be-
cause the theory of utility is not able to deal with measuring and comparing 
inter-personal Utilities. 
Conversely, the extremists of the 'invisible hand' defended the actual mar-
ket distribution as the naturai expression of individuai rights. 
13 The limits of reformation in the papers with Ernesto Rossi are cited by P. SILVESTRI cit., 
pp. 244 ff. 
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10. A compromise between these two extremes could be a redistribution 
that permits ali people, particularly poor ones, to have at least 'a minimum' 
income or consumption, in accordance with prevailing collective standards. 
The best attempt to put this proposai on a scientific basis is that of John 
Rawls.14 Starting from the supposition that the well-being of a society de-
pends only on the well-being of the individuai in the worst conditions (the 
person with the lowest level of utility), Rawls concluded that collective 
well-being can only improve if the worse-off, that is those with a lower level 
of utility, better their standing. 
To free himself from the impossibility of measuring or comparing Utilities, 
the American lawyer-philosopher employed a logicai structure based on a 
review of the theory of the social contract founded on the analysis of a person's 
reaction to risk. 
11. Using the logicai artifice of the 'veil of ignorance', Rawls thought that 
if people made their choice without personal considerations (that is without 
knowing their place in society, in other words whether they were to be born 
rich or poor, sick or healthy), they would want the society that looked for the 
best for the poorer, or the worse off. This would insure against being born 
poor or taking a turn for the worse. 
Against Rawls' commonly accepted theory of guaranteeing the minimum, 
it has been noted that it leads to the maximisation of the minimum and not 
the guarantee of the minimum and is also not linked to responsibility as it 
is based on the idea that the least lucky are born the least lucky.15 
On a more general level, Rawls' thinking has also been accused of being 
simplistic by assuming only one reaction to risk, when in real life individuai 
responses are very different. It has also been argued that the base income 
which people would agree to be covered by the veil of ignorance cannot be 
determined. 
Ali the same, if literature has judged the theoretical basis of Rawls' ideas 
to be in some way simplistic and undefined, the idea of redistribution has 
widely influenced public policies in the last fifty years. 
12. Alongside the search for the best criteria for the redistribution of 
wealth, there have been many arguments on a second question: if income is 
a significant variable, is it an adequate and sufficient reference for redistribu-
tive policies? 
14 J. RAWLS, A theory ofjustice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971). 
15 Criticai observation by F. Forte. 
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Einaudi agreed with criticism of the exclusive nature of income and ar-
gued that together with income there were other variables, like family and 
social standing and living standards that, first and foremost, depend on living 
in a beautiful and well-organised town/city, or the Einaudian agricultural so-
ciety. 
Amartya Sen has made an important contribution to this subject. Accord-
ing to Sen, equality must be sought not just through the traditional indicatore 
of the availability of material goods (wealth, income and consumption), but 
more importandy by analysing the possibility of experiences and situations 
to which the person gives a positive value.16 
Sen believes that, the traditional monetary indicatore of wealth (indices of 
poverty and inequality based on income or expenses) are incomplete or par-
tial measures of the quality of life of a person. To measure people's freedom 
and standard of living, one must use more suitable standards such as capaci-
ties, attributes and functionality. Capacities and attributes are choices, or the 
functions that a person may make freely. Capacities, or capabilities, include 
not only the possibility to be fed or have an adequate dwelling place, but also 
to earn the respect of his/her neighbours and take part in the life of the com-
munity. 
This set of alternative "baskets" of available goods also includes rights and 
opportunities, the "attributes", the size of which depends on economie devel-
opment. 
13. Sen's theory seems convincing, but closer study and the empirical 
measure of the functions and capabilities needed to define the attributes are 
stili unresolved. This has given rise to much research that has fed the debate 
on the themes he deals with. 
The work of Ian Carter and Marc Fluerbaey is particularly significant to 
this argument. Carter concentrates on the connection between liberty and 
equality through an analysis of the logicai structure of the idea of liberty 
and the right to freedom and property rights.17 
16 A. SEN, On economie inequality (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973); ID., Inequality reexamined 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992); ID., "La libertà individuale come impegno sociale", in La 
dimensione etica nelle società contemporanee/scritti di I. Berlin, A. Sen... [et al.] (Torino, Fondazione 
Giovanni Agnelli, 1990); ID., Scelta, benessere, equità (Bologna, E Mulino, 2006) and A. SEN - P. FAS-
SINO - S. MAFFETTONE, Giustizia globale (Bari, E Saggiatore, 2006). 
1 7 I. CARTER, A Measure of Freedom (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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Fleurbaey has seen social justice as equal opportunity and has considered 
the fair distribution of resources and goods as when people are free to judge 
the opportunities that arise and are also responsible for the results.18 
The debate begun by Sen on liberty, equality and opportunity is in no way 
finished and stili has to be pursued. Certainly it would have been of great in-
terest to the brilliant Piedmontese economist. 
1 8 M . FLUERBAEY, Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
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L U I G I E I N A U D I A N D F E D E R I C O C A F F È : 
O U T L I N E S O F A S O C I A L P O L I C Y F O R G O O D G O V E R N A N C E * 
1. INTRODUCTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
There are two errors to be avoided when reading works from the past. The 
first is to fall into the trap of old stereotypes, such as the one, in our case, that 
Einaudi was a critic of public intervention and an advocate of a rigid deflation-
ary policy, with a rather simple classification as 'right-wing', and that Caffè was 
a convinced interventionist, critic of the market and therefore 'left-wing'. The 
second mistake is to be deceived by linguistic style and its immediate rhetorical 
purpose by making facile criticisms on one point or another (as, for example, 
Einaudi's insistence on questions about peasant culture), which miss the 
deeper meaning and present day relevance of an idea. This comment was made 
by Caffè in his Introductory note to Einaudi's Lezioni di politica sociale, but it 
can also apply to Caffè's own works which were at times dated. 
We believe that once the super-structural differences have been elimi-
nated, their thought is not only relevant today, but there is also a great affinity 
between them.1 This is what the paper will try to show. First, we will trace 
Caffè's thought in relation to the Italian liberal tradition (section 2) and then 
explain why Einaudi's thought cannot be reduced to a thesis in favour of an 
unbridled market (section 3). To conclude, we will illustrate in section 4 how 
* An early version of this paper is in N . ACOCELLA (ed.), Luigi Einaudi: studioso, statista, gover-
natore (Roma, Carocci, 2010). 
1 Correspondence between the two authors, written between 1945 and 1961, is available in the 
archives of the LUIGI EINAUDI FOUNDATION, Carteggio Luigi Einaudi vs Federico Caffè (1945-1951), 
Turin. The most detailed correspondence concerns the publication of the volumes of the Complete 
Works of Francesco Ferrara. There are also some very interesting comments on excess savings in 
relation to their use and the subsequent lack of real demand, as well as the role of public saving 
in a cycle; these are typically Keynesian topics. 
See also G . PARRAVICINI - E . POLACEK with collaboration of F. CAFFÈ et al. ( 1 9 5 4 ) , Scritti nei 
quali si fa riferimento al pensiero economico di Luigi Einaudi e recensioni di sue opere (Roma, Banca 
d'Italia). 
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the outline of a social, liberal-democratic, reformist policy aimed at good gov-
ernance emerges from a synthesis of their work. The adjective 'social' is used 
by both authors in their works of 1964 and 1970, respectively, instead of the 
more classical adjective 'economie' to define a policy that is sensitive to the social 
consequences of the market, a perspective that is as relevant today as ever. 
Both Einaudi and Caffè believed the market and the State are not in a 
trade-off. But they were also convinced both forms of economic-social orga-
nisation were responsible for 'failures'. Before we venture upon the question 
of good governance in the last section of the paper, we will first have to define 
a common ground of analysis, an area which actually reflects the imprinting of 
the Italian tradition in economics, dating back to its beginnings in the refor-
mism of the 18th century, with Verri, Beccaria, Genovesi, Galiani and Filan-
gieri, a movement that was well integrated into European politicai and cultural 
events. This imprint is given by the continuity between theoretical and ap-
plied investigations, based on the specific historical and institutional nature 
of the economie system being studied.2 In order to contrast a 'partisan' inter-
pretation of their thought, we will emphasise the elements in Caffè that are 
closest to Uberai thought (in the next paragraph) and those aspeets in Einaudi 
closest to reformist thought (see the following paragraph).3 This is, however, 
really only a rhetorical strategy, because there are clear differences (in our 
view, of degree rather than general approach) between the two. For a reasons 
of space we have to be brief on ali points. 
2 . CAFFÈ AND LIBERAL THOUGHT 
Nerio Nesi, who has a long, involved poHtical past with the Left, asked the 
following question in an article on June 26, 2007 4 Was Federico Caffè a liber-
al? His answer was: 
If we think of liberal thought as conceived by its two greatest exponents, Benedetto 
Croce and Luigi Einaudi, we would be tempted to answer this question in the affir-
mative. 
2 M. FINOIA (ed.) (1980), Il pensiero economico italiano: 1830-1930 (Bologna, Cappelli); G . GARO-
FALO and A . GRAZIANI (eds.) (2004), La formazione degli economisti in Italia (1950-1973) [volume spon-
sored by the Italian society of economists] (Bologna, E Mulino); G. GAROFALO (2005), "Gli economisti 
in Italia negli anni 1950-1975", Economia politica, journal of analytical and institutional economics, n. 3. 
3 Ernesto Rossi, a member of the Partito d'azione, was quite influential in shaping Einaudi's 
thought: see G. BUSINO and S. MARTINOTTI DORIGO (eds.) (1986), Carteggio Luigi Einaudi - Ernesto 
Rossi (1925-1961) (Torino, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi). 
4 http://www.aprileonline.info/notizia.php?id=3773. 
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In the case of Croce we can cite his definition of utopians: 
Utopians were those people who said they believed that the social question or 
'the question of History' would be solved once and for ali with the raising of econom-
ie Uberai expedients to absolute principles, to the law of human society, thus promis-
ing the settling of ali conflicts, the solution of ali difficulties, human happiness; and 
this could not be considered, ultimately, without placing the law of history beyond 
history itself.5 
A reference to laissez faire is appropriate in the case of Einaudi, if we con-
sider his definition of the market: 
the mechanism of the market is an insensitive economie instrument, which ignores 
justice, morality, charity and ali human values.6 
And again: 
In the market needs are not satisfied, demand is.7 
Clearly Caffè was a progressive liberal à la Roosevelt, who wrote as follows 
in a cover note to two bills (Public Utilities Company Act and Tennesse Valley 
Authority Act) to Congress in the United States in 1933: 
Regulation has little chance of success against the concentration of wealth and 
economie power that holdings have created in the field of public services. 
To be more exact, Caffè was a reformist in the sense he gave in an article 
in II Manifesto on 29 January 1982, tided "La solitudine del riformista": 
A reformist is convinced of working in history, that is within a system for which 
he wants to be neither apologist nor undertaker; but, within the limits of his possibi-
lities, he wants to be a component who eagerly brings about ali the improvements 
that can be realized in the immediate future and are not just desirable in vacuo. 
He prefers a little to everything, the possible to utopia, the gradualism of transforma-
tions to a radicai transformation of the system which will always be postponed ... for a 
scientist what the others define as utopia is only a foretaste of results that have to 
overcome the resistance of the present. 
5 B. CROCE (1932), Storia d'Europa nel secolo decimonono (Bari, Laterza), p. 142. 
6 L. EINAUDI (1964), Lezioni di politica sociale, with an Introductory note of F. Caffè (Torino, 
G. Einaudi), p. 245. 
7 ID. (1964), p. 23. 
5 
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Caffè was, above ali, a meticulous scholar of liberal economie thought, in 
particular Italian liberal economie thought, perhaps because it was here that 
he found particular attention being paid to social questions and less dogma-
tismi than in similar foreign schools. He had a profound knowledge of the 
writings of Italian liberal scholars, from Francesco Ferrara and Gustavo Del 
Vecchio to Luigi Einaudi, with whom he shared the belief that: 
it is only by considering man as a value in himself that you can hope to bring some 
clarification to matters in which a show of certainty, rather than theoretical argu-
ments, can be confusing in discussions about economie policy.8 
And on Einaudi, he wrote: 
What deserves to be noted in Einaudi in particular is the perfect continuity that 
can be found between the man of thought and the man of action; the unfailing loyalty 
he showed to principles inspired by the market economy in both his works and his 
politicai decisions; loyalty that was the expression of beliefs that were constantly 
being reconsidered and confirmed critically in view of new experiences and a chan-
ging historical situation.9 
In a perspective that also involves Ferrara and other liberal authors, he 
stated: 
The 'dialogue between facts and theory', which is what economie science should 
be about, and the interactive process between questions raised by theory and the 
answers provided by empirical investigations have been a Constant characteristic of 
Italian economie thought, from Francesco Ferrara to Luigi Einaudi [...]. The lesson 
of the intimate connection between theory and reality which emerges from this needs 
to be salvaged.10 
In Frammenti per lo studio del pensiero economico italiano (Milan, Giuffrè, 
1975), Caffè encouraged the rediscovery of Italian authors by collecting a series 
of papers which had been published from 1955 onwards, in particular a 
criticai edition of Ferrara's works and Einaudi's Cronache economiche e politiche 
di un trentennio. 
8 F . CAFFÈ ( 1 9 9 0 ) , La solitudine del riformista, N . AGOCELLA et al. (eds.) (Torino, Bollati Borin-
ghieri), p. 254. It is interesting to notice that Caffè paraphrases an expression of F. HAHN (1984), In 
Fraise of Economie Theory (Cambridge, Churchill College), p. 20. 
9 F. Caffè, Introductory note to L. EINAUDI ( 1 9 6 4 ) , Lezioni di politica sociale (Torino, G . Einau-
di), p. xvn. For the evolution of Caffè's judgment on Einaudi see F. CAFFÈ ( 1 9 6 7 ) , Luigi Einaudi 
(Torino, UTET) and ID. ( 1 9 8 7 ) , "Einaudi Luigi", entry in The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Eco-
nomies, voi. 2 (London, Macmillan). 
10 F. CAFFÈ (ed.) (1975), Autocritica dell'economista (Roma - Bari, Laterza), p. v. 
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I would like to conclude with an extract from Caffè's Un liberale sulle cose 
(.L'Opinione, 1981, November 17), which leads direcdy into the discussion 
about Einaudi which I will present in the next section: 
[In Einaudi] economie harmonies formed an ideal paradigm, but on earth the 
tendency to monopolize prevailed, against which it was necessary to be vigilant, com-
bative and ready to act. I have the impression - [these are Caffè's exact words and the 
ending is particularly interesting] - that there is a tendency to pay homage to Einaudi 
which is convenient, but to forget his determination and severity (especially, after a 
careful reading of his attitude towards banks and bankers). 
3 . EINAUDI AND REFORMISM 
In an anthology of August 2002, Per la ripresa del riformismo (Milan, Nuo-
va Iniziativa Editoriale, available at http://www.syloslabini.info/online/wp- 
ontent/uploads/2007/03/riformismo.pdf), the editors Paolo Sylos-Labini 
and Alessandro Roncaglia consider Luigi Einaudi a liberal and reformist 
thinker, similar to Carlo Cattaneo and Piero Gobetti. 
The entry Liberismo [Laissez-faire], edited by Einaudi in the Piccolo dizio-
nario politico as part of a course in civics called "Uomo e cittadino" [Man and 
Citizen] (Berne, 1945) and now in Annali of the Luigi Einaudi Foundation of 
Turin, XX, 1986, pp. 151-153, reads as follows: 
The famous maxim of laissez-faire, laissez-passer, does not mean that the state 
has to overlook what is wrong or tolerate damage for the many to the advantage 
of a few. It means that in most cases, except in the unlikely case of evidence to the 
contrary, the industrialist and the agriculturalist should be left to work and take their 
own risks, and not be protected from foreign competition. Whoever asks for protec-
tionism or subsidies or aid from the state, nine times out of ten, is the real enemy of 
his compatriots. He wants to achieve a monopoly to extort higher prices, bigger prof-
its and abnormal wages to the detriment of his compatriots. There is, however, that 
one case out of ten or a hundred that deserves to be considered. But the free market-
er stili hesitates, because experience has taught him that the smuggling of a thousand 
adventurers and exploiters in the public sector proceeds triumphandy in the shade of 
one deserving project of state encouragement. Laissez-faire is not an economie doc-
trine; it is a moral thesis. 
An obvious reference is his experience at the Riforma sociale, a journal 
founded by Francesco Saverio Nitti in the last decade of the 19th century, 
which, together with Maffeo Pantaleoni, Antonio De Viti de Marco and Vil-
fredo Pareto's Giornale degli economisti, left its mark on economie and social 
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studies in Italy, as Faucci has noted.11 Luigi Einaudi became a contributor to 
the combative Turin periodical in 1900 and editor in 1908: the Riforma sociale 
in his expert hands fostered a fruitful dialogue with other economie and po-
liticai periodicals of the time until its closure in 1935. In an article of 1924, 
significantly called La bellezza della lotta [The beauty of struggle],12 introdu-
cing a collection of his writings on labour and the working class that was pub-
lished at the request of Piero Gobetti, Einaudi criticized ali those forces, re-
gardless of whether they had the name of corporatism or supreme national 
interest or were disguised as monopolies, which took part in a free debate 
on labour conflict in the name of a misinterpreted principle of social harmony 
and demanded the coherence of a liberal point of view, drawing cleverly on 
the abundant literature in English on social conflict and industriai develop-
ment in Great Britain, the first nation to have experienced forms of worker 
organizations. 
Caffè challenged the idea that "fundamental concepts are revived and re-
affirmed in Einaudi's teachings" by using the very terms of counterrevolution 
that monetarism was throwing at Keynesianism at the time he was writing 
("Luigi Einaudi nel centenario della nascita", Il giornale degli economisti e An-
nali di economia, lug.-ago. 1974), terms which reflected a new faith in the 
"adaptation entrusted to spontaneous market forces". He pointed out how 
it is 
exacdy his sense "of referring to history" that clearly distinguishes him from the auto-
matism of neo-monetarists and the simplistic prescriptions they propose.13 
Caffè believes the best proof of this is to be found in the speech Einaudi 
gave on becoming Governor of the Bank of Italy in 1945: 
No magical means exist that can work the miracle of improving the monetary si-
tuation. The only known and effective means, even in the midst of an inevitable clash 
of ideas, is the mutuai tolerance of clear, precise and transparent compromises that 
allow the realization of a common programme of action. If the state, after having 
defined the exact area of its direct economie management and its attitude towards 
control over the private sector, encourages the renewal of trust and hope in enjoying 
11 R . FAUCCI ( 1 9 8 6 ) , Einaudi (Torino, UTET). For a reconstruction of Einaudi's thought in the 
context of the Turinese School see R . MARCHIONATTI ( 2 0 0 7 ) , Luigi Einaudi, speech at study-day on 
"La scuola di economia di Torino 1893-1940: Einaudi, Cabiati, Jannaccone e gli altri", organized by 
Centro di studi sulla storia e i metodi dell'economia politica "Claudio Napoleoni", Turin, 25 ott. 
12 L. EINAUDI ( 1 9 2 4 ) , Le lotte del lavoro (Torino, G . Einaudi). 
13 F. CAFFÈ (1975), Commemorazione di Luigi Einaudi nel centenario della nascita (1874-1974) 
(Torino, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi), p. 20. 
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the fruits of one's work, savings and enterprise, the tax payer, muttering to himself as 
he is wont to do, will put up with it... and he will continue, nevertheless, to save, 
deposit his cash in banks and underwrite public loans.14 
The conclusion of Caffè's reasoning is 
to confirm that the present day relevance of Luigi Einaudi's thought cannot be sought 
in the developments of the monetarist counterrevolution. We have to ask to what ex-
tent and with which reservations his thought has greater affinity with the develop-
ments of the Keynesian revolution.15 
In spite of the famous statement by Einaudi in which 
his own pian [to be understood in the broadest sense of the word] was not Keynes's, 
... there can be no doubt about the complete agreement between Luigi Einaudi's 
thought and what Keynes wrote about the function and advantages of individuai en-
terprise and responsibility.16 
The following is a quotation from Keynes's General Theory which clears 
the field of any risk of state holism: 
Individualism [...] is also the best safeguard of the variety of life, which emerges 
precisely from this extended field of personal choice, and the loss of which is the 
greatest of ali the losses of the homogeneous or totalitarian state.17 
4 . A PROGRAM FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE 
If what has been said above constitutes the common ground between Ei-
naudi's and Caffè's thought (but also with Keynes's),18 our argument is that 
their synthesis can define the outline of a social policy, where the adjective 
14 The speech has been republished in P . BARUCCI (ed.) (2008), Luigi Einaudi, Considerazioni 
finali della Banca d'Italia (Napoli, Treves), p. 339. On Einaudi Governor of the Bank of Italy see 
P. SAVONA (2008), "Sulle 'Considerazioni finali' di Luigi Einaudi", Economia italiana, n. 3, pp. 725-
727. 
15 F. CAFFÈ ( 1 9 7 5 ) , Commemorazione di Luigi Einaudi cit., p. 21. 
16 Ibid, p. 21. 
1 7 J . M . KEYNES ( 1 9 3 6 ) , The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Italian trans-
lation (Torino, UTET), p. 337. 
18 Keynes defined his 1936 work as "moderately conservative in its implications". In his opi-
nion, the idea that free market economies can function without control has to be abandoned if ca-
pitalism is to become stable. This is especially true of financial markets which are dominated by short 
term speculation and are not very attentive to the fundamentals of economies. 
— 51 — 
GIUSEPPE GAROFALO 
used by both authors in works published in 1964 and 1970, respectively,19 
instead of the more classical adjective 'economie', describes a policy that is 
sensitive to the social consequences of the market. This policy, which can 
be defined as liberal, democratic and reformist, is aimed at good governance. 
In other words, a 'good' policy is based - and here the choice of words is 
especially important and, I would add, truly significant and relevant today -
on ethical values, a long-term perspective (in contrast with the so-called 
short-termism that has done so much harm) and the objective of efficiency 
(acting without waste). At the same time, it is grounded on equity (equal start-
ing points), individuai responsibility (everybody is responsible for the choices 
he makes) and also collective responsibility (social harmony cannot exist with-
out guaranteeing resources and opportunities for everyone).20 
This policy is based on the idea of an "open society" characterised by the 
rational attitude of free criticai discussion, in which politicai action appears as 
a social technology that does not claim to reorganise society totally and in a 
definitive way, but tackles specific problems one by one in search of the most 
appropriate solutions. This is the well-known thesis proposed by Karl Popper, 
the author of The Open Society and its Enemies in 1945. The term is very apt 
here in view of the opinion expressed by Sergio Steve in 1975, when he attrib-
uted to Einaudi "faith in an open society".21 
As Norberto Bobbio recalls in Teoria generale della politica (1999): 
G o o d governance and bad governance [is] an antithesis that runs throughout the 
history of politicai thought; it is one of the great themes, if not the greatest, of poli-
ticai reflections of ali t imes. 2 2 
Good governance is "the government for the common good" in contrast 
with the government for the good of one's own faction.23 
19 L. EINAUDI ( 1 9 6 4 ) , Lezioni di politica sociale (Torino, Einaudi); F . CAFFÈ ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Teorie e 
problemi di politica sociale (Bari, Laterza). 
On Einaudi's politicai belief see A. BAFFIGI (2009), "Luigi Einaudi: teoria economica e legisla-
zione sociale nel testo delle 'Lezioni' ", Quaderni di storia economica (Roma, Banca d'Italia); BANCA 
POPOLARE DI SONDRIO (Swisse) (2007), Luigi Einaudi. Valori umani per l'economia e la politica, 
http://www.bps-suisse.ch/var/plain_site/storage/original/application/6cddc99cb6948a98be3bf0ff 
614638fc.pdf; A . GIGLIOBIANCO (ed.) (2010), Luigi Einaudi: libertà economica e coesione sociale (Ro-
ma - Bari, Laterza). On Caffè's politicai belief see among others G. AMARI and N. ROCCHI (eds.) 
(2009), Federico C a f f è . Un economista per il nostro tempo (Roma, Ediesse). 
20 In modem terminology we would talk today about the governance of processes as an alter-
native approach to the free market and the planned economy. 
2 1 S . STEVE (1975), La lezione di Einaudi, introduction to Convegno intemazionale nel cente-
nario della nascita di Luigi Einaudi, Roma, 6-8 febb., in ID., Scritti vari (Milano, F. Angeli), p. 711. 
22 N. BOBBIO (1999), Teoria generale della politica (Torino, G. Einaudi), p. 149. 
23 Regarding to the mission of a good politician ID. (1999), Teoria generale cit., pp. 148-149 
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Ambrogio Lorenzetti's famous affresco of the 14th century Sienese school 
depicts the fundamental nature of three factors in the management of public 
affairs and as a precondition for the normal evolution of civil and economie 
life: justice, knowledge and harmony. In other words, good governance means 
administering public affairs jusdy and wisely, thus promoting social harmony. 
Bobbio goes on to say that: 
No one uses the terms good governance and bad governance any more, and any-
body w h o stili does, seems to be looking back at a distant past which only a composer 
of useless sermons stili has the courage to resurrect. 2 4 
Einaudi, "a composer of useless sermons", revived the myth of good gov-
ernance in light of the overwhelming influence of the economy in the society 
he was working in and its effects on law, politics and ethics.25 He viewed good 
governance as an ethical, juridical and institutional framework in which public 
affairs are administered with the same wisdom and caution that is used in 
private matters in order to achieve the common good.26 He therefore 
attempted to re-found the liberal institutions that had been compromised 
by the First World War and undermined by fascism. Luigi Einaudi's liberal-
ism or good governance is the reconstruction of a "a vision of the world" 
centred on the defence of that "supreme good that is the freedom of man", 
but it promotes first and foremost the cause of "concrete freedom" so that 
everyone can: 
continually tear down the frontier of the known, of what has already been experimen-
ted, and move towards the unknown that is stili open to the material and moral pro-
gress of mankind. 2 7 
compares Einaudi's assertion "It is impossible to achieve a good governance without an ideal' 
(L. EINAUDI (1941), "Liberismo e comunismo", Argomenti (December); this essay is been written 
during the famous dispute with Croce on economie freedom vs politicai liberalism) and Max 
Weber's assertion "Three are the criticai qualities for a politician: passion, sense of responsibility, long 
view" (M. WEBER (1918), Wissenschaft als Beruf - Politile, als Beruf, Italian translation II lavoro 
intellettuale come professione (Torino, Einaudi, 1977)). 
24 N. BOBBIO (1999), Teoria generale cit., p. 158. 
25 The dominant role of the economy over other areas (ethics, politics, law) has become even 
stronger since Einaudi's and Caffè's times, making their teachings that recommend mediation and 
conciliation without sacrificing too much civil and politicai liberties very edifying. 
26 In Einaudi's approach, if we compare the ideal model of society to an 'ellipse', good govern-
ance has two 'foci', cf. P. SILVESTRI (2008), Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi o del Buongoverno (Soveria 
Mannelli, Rubbettino): competition (the market) and discussion (public sphere); in the first 'focus', 
there are economie freedoms (private property, enterprise and contract) and in the second, civil and 
politicai liberties (freedom of speech and expression and free parliamentary activity). See also F. FORTE 
(1982), Luigi Einaudi: il mercato e il buongoverno (Torino, G. Einaudi). 
27 L. EINAUDI (1956), Prediche inutili (Torino, G. Einaudi), p. 194. 
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The moral premise lies in the fact that the individuai has his own irrepres-
sible dignity which matures with perseverance and sacrifice in the voluntary 
effort to improve himself, better stili if in competition with others. At the 
centre of the scene is the individuai who is free to choose. In one of his 
most significant passages, Einaudi asks: 
Why should it be an ideal to think and act in the same way? ... Why just one re-
ligion and not many; why one politicai or social or spiritual opinion and not infinite 
opinions? Uniformity is not beauty and perfection, variety and contrast are.28 
And he continued: 
An idea, a way of life that everyone accepts is no longer worth anything. Ideas are 
bom from contrasts. If no one says you are wrong, you will not know if you are 
right.29 
However, we are not at the point of extreme individualism because: 
The rule of law [is] the necessary condition for the anarchy of spirits.30 
The law has to fix the rules of the game, avoid monopolistic behaviour 
and guarantee the impartiality of the public administration. Good governance 
cannot remain a simple ideal, but has to be translated into concrete acts. As 
far as competition is concerned, it should be noted that Einaudi was not a 
defender of the automatism of competition (which he believed had to be 
stricdy regulated, especially to prevent monopolies and therefore the dominance 
of the strong over the weak), but he was a convinced supporter of the need to 
guarantee what today we could cali the "contestability" of markets, that is po-
tential competition guaranteed for example by the absence of entry and exit 
costs in the market. 
The final point of this comparative analysis of the thought of two great 
Italian economists is that there is not necessarily a trade-off between efficiency 
and equity. It is not possible to rely only on the market or only on the state 
because both can 'fail', leading to sub-optimal results. As subsequent debate 
has shown, while it is true that public intervention and, specifically the Wel-
fare State, contributes positively to economie growth up to a threshold level, 
28 L. EINAUDI (1954), Il buongoverno. Saggi di economia e politica (1897-1954), E . Rossi (ed.) 
(Bari, Laterza), pp. 32-33. 
29 Ibid., p. 33. 
30 Ibid., p. 35. 
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above which negative effects prevail, it is also true that an increase in inequal-
ity can prove to be counterproductive for growth and slow it down.31 It is the 
task of the policy maker, but, more generally, of the institutions of a civilised 
society32 to define the optimal mix, which can vary locally and temporally as 
the result of a country's history, and to try not to sacrifice either of the two 
objectives too much. 
31 On these aspects, see M. FRANZINI - L.M. MELONE (1999), "I dilemmi del welfare state 
nell'epoca della globalizzazione", in N . ACOCELLA (ed.), Globalizzazione e stato sociale (Bologna, Il 
Mulino). 
32 The active role of society is essential in order to reconcile the public with the private do-
mains, as the Italian tradition of the Enlightenment has shown with Antonio Genovesi. 
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THE IDEAL OF GOOD GOVERNMENT IN LUIGI EINAUDI'S 
THOUGHT AND LIFE: BETWEEN LAW AND FREEDOM* 
PROLOGUE 
There has been no authentic liberal thinker insensible of the problem con-
stituted by the relation between freedom and law. It is a problem that can be 
stated, in a nutshell, as the need to avoid two the extremes of law without 
freedom or freedom without law, that is to say, either absolute power or ab-
solute anarchy, the extreme of law that shackles, confines or paternalistically 
guides freedom, or the extreme of absolute freedom that destroys its own con-
ditions of possibility. However, it is important to avoid the temptation of con-
figuring the two extremes in dichotomic, oppositional and static terms, as if 
the problem were Freedom versus Law. This would invite a twofold risk: 
on the one hand, that of configuring the law consistendy and exclusively as 
a coercive act, which thus inevitably coerces freedom, and on the other hand, 
the risk of fading to grasp that the real problem is obedience to the law - but 
an obedience by virtue of which the law is not perceived as coercive, and is 
felt instead as an obligation complied with by free consent. In this perspective, 
the problem of human freedom appears not only as a problem of freedom un-
der the law, but also as an appeal for " f r e e d om from the law". It is an appeal to 
* This article is a translated, modified and expanded version of "Legge e Libertà. Cinque var-
iazioni attraverso la vita e il pensiero di Luigi Einaudi", Biblioteca della libertà, XLIV, n. 195 (May-
August 2009), pp. 1-31 (English revision by Rachel Barritt Costa). It has also been used and deliv-
ered as the basis of my "Luigi Einaudi public lecture", The Dream of Good Government (Aprii 26, 
2011), held at the Cornell Institute for European Studies (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY) as Luigi 
Einaudi Chair Holder. I'm particularly grateful to those who helped me to make this little "American 
dream" come true and gave me one more chance to do further lectures and debate about my re-
search, as well as to those who gave me a very warm welcome: Luigi R. Einaudi, the San Giacomo 
Charitable Foundation, Sydney van Morgan, Sidney and Susan Tarrow, Christopher Anderson, 
Holly Case, Camille Robcis, Mabel Berezin, Karen Pinkus, Timothy Campbell, Annalise Riles, Jo-
nathan Kirshner, Gail Holst-Warhaft, Kora Battig von Wittelsbach, Cindy K. Greco. 
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supersede, to go beyond the "Law" (tradition, authority, a scientific para-
digm, custom and even the constitutional order), should the law be felt as 
no longer just and/or justifiable, i.e. no longer legitimate. Yet precisely be-
cause an appeal of this nature emerges from the concrete experience of life, 
it is never foreseeable a priori. 
I will argue here that Einaudi's thought reveals an awareness - albeit 
never made sufficiendy explicit in philosophical terms - that the question 
of freedom has to do with two inter-related problems: the relation of indivi-
duals or communities with their respective limits - of which Lex, Auctoritas 
and Veritas are emblematic figures - and the question of going beyond these 
limits. Limits are to be understood here in the meaning of the foundation or 
conditions of possibility both of institutions (economie, politicai and juridical) 
and of thought and human action. The concept of law I will try to put forward 
thus does not refer to the version given by legai positivism. Indeed, such a 
version would have been precluded within the worldview embraced by Einau-
di, steeped as he was in the English tradition. Rather, "Law" should be inter-
preted here - in a broader sense and hearing in mind the necessarily ambiva-
lent relation it holds with freedom - as a figure of the limit.1 
It is certainly no coincidence that on the one and only occasion where Ei-
naudi ventures a definition of liberalism, he terms it a "doctrine of limits".2 It 
is likewise no coincidence that he never defines freedom, either analytically or 
conceptually.3 Fully aware that the problem of freedom is the eternai quandary 
1 In this paper I refer in particular to the problem of the limit as discusseci by P. LEGENDRE, 
Della società come testo. Lineamenti di un'antropologia dogmatica (2001), Ital. transl., P. HERITIER 
(ed.) (Torino, Giappichelli, 2005); P. HERITIER, "Introduzione", ibid., pp. 1-31; ID., "Urbe-internet", 
voi. 2, Società post-hitleriane? Materiali didattici di estetica giuridica (Torino, Giappichelli, 2007). On 
Legendre's thought cf. also L . AVITABILE, La filosofia del diritto in Pierre Legendre (Torino, Giappi-
chelli, 2004); A . SUPIOT, Homo juridicus. Saggio sulla funzione antropologica del diritto, Ital. transl. 
(Milano, Mondadori, 2006). On the question of the limit, see the fundamental work by P. NERHOT, 
La metafora del passaggio. Il concetto di tempo in S. Agostino. Fondamento di una nuova etica (Pado-
va, Cedam, 2008). Cf., from various different perspectives, P. HERITIER, "Uscire dal secondo millen-
nio? Problemi metodologici nel discorso sulla libertà", in ID. (ed.), Problemi di libertà nella società 
complessa e nel cristianesimo (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008), pp. 39-104; B. MONTANARI, "Li-
bertà, responsabilità, legge", in ID. (ed.), Luoghi della filosofia del diritto. Un manuale (Torino, Giap-
pichelli, 2009), pp. 27-63. 
2 L. EINAUDI, "Liberalismo" (1944), in Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia, 1943-1947, 
P. SODDU (ed.) (Florence, Leo Olschki, 2001), pp. 65-66. 
3 Though the Two Concepts of liberty analysed by Berlin (see I . BERLIN, "TWO Concepts of Lib-
erty" (1958), in ID., Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118-172) 
both exist in Einaudi's speculation, in my judgment, Einaudi's above mentioned sentence evokes an 
idea of liberty which cannot easily be conceptualized as "autonomy", or "absence of coercion". 
Though this liberty is difficult to define, it differs from the previous ones because it takes into ac-
count the dimension of time, which is the proper dimension of man, and seems to be connected 
to that "man's look addressed toward the new and the high", which I will dwell on later. I discussed 
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of mankind, Einaudi sounded a warning, precisely when the first distinctions 
between liberalism and "neo" or "new liberalism" were being drawn. He 
cautioned that 
liberalism is one and one alone and it endures over time; but each generation has to 
solve its own problems, which are different from those of yesterday and will be super-
seded and renewed by tomorrow's problems. Therefore even liberals must at ali times 
ask themselves the following searching question: how should I solve the problems of 
my own day, in such a manner that the solution adopted serves to safeguard the su-
preme good that is the freedom of man?.4 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Einaudi sets his portrayal of the human 
appeal for freedom within a context that invokes the emergence of the "new". 
Even more significant is the fact that he formulates this demand more in me-
taphorical than in categorial terms, as when he writes "[to] constantly break 
down the frontier of the known, of previous experience, and move towards 
the unknown that is stili open to the material and moral advancement of 
man '.5 That Einaudi did indeed have profound insight into the above-de-
scribed complexity of freedom emerges first and foremost from the emphasis 
he places, in each of the spheres of human and social activity (in primis, the 
economie, politicai and juridical sphere), on leaving open the possibility of 
change. The same perceptive awareness was expressed elsewhere by Einaudi 
as an anti-reductionist aspiration, or better, as the need for man and society to 
retain a line of communication open to a 'qualitative' level of discourse that 
would integrate the purely 'quantitative' level. In Einaudi's words, which 
we will dwell on again later: a progression from the rationality of interests 
to shared values (so that, in the "divine city", "the word 'tax' shall be un-
known", since "ali people know the underlying reason and the value of the 
sacrifice offered on the aitar of common good"); from "compromise" as a uti-
litarian exchange (do ut des or "pure self-seeking and biased calculation") to 
compromise seen as "loyal allegiance" (or "overcoming opposites and mer-
ging them into a higher unity"); from the rationality of procedures (the ma-
jority criterion of the "major pars") to the identity-based recognition of the 
"sanior pars"; from the mere legality of the law (which "is always formally 
the Einaudian conception of freedom with A. Giordano (in a review of his book II pensiero po-
litico di Luigi Einaudi, Genova, Name, 2006): P. SILVESTRI, "On Einaudi's liberal heritage", History 
of Economie Ideas, XVI, nn. 1-2 (2008), pp. 245-252; A. GIORDANO, "A Short Reply", ibid., 
pp. 253-255. 
4 L. EINAUDI, "H nuovo liberalismo" (1945), in Riflessioni cit., p. 119. 
5 ID., "In lode del profitto" (1956), in Prediche inutili (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1956-1959), p. 192. 
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coercive") to its full legitimacy (by virtue of which "the people say: this is the 
law - and abide it"); finally, almost as if to slow down the race to reduce eco-
nomie activity to the rational-calculating aspect, Einaudi stressed the anthro-
pological dynamics of desire. For if on the one hand "the fundamental eco-
nomie principle was and will forever be the limitedness of means suitable 
to achieve the numerous and ever-changing and constantly proliferating goals 
men set themselves", on the other he placed emphasis not so much on rational 
calculation of the means but on the overwhelming force of desire, which con-
tinually rewrites the limits of the human: 
Even though technical and scientific advances daily push back [...] the obstacle 
of the limitedness of means which thwarts satisfaction of human desires [...], man's 
desires race faster than does science [...] In fact, if man's gaze were not directed to-
wards the new, and upwards, then how would humans be distinguished from animai 
species? 6 
I will thus try to propose a possible re-interpretation of some key passages 
of the Einaudian discourse which appear to represent crisis or turning points 
and yet, at the very same time, act as signals of a process of growth and ma-
turation of his thought that ceased only with his death. These were passages 
that were constantly being written and rewritten, through that interweaving of 
life and thought, experience and reflection which was constitutive of Einaudi 
the man. Unceasingly spurred by the great changes and the dramatic, often 
tragic, events of his era, he was compelled to reformulate over and over again 
the statement of his guiding principles, the laws of his thought. These pas-
sages from the life and thought of Einaudi are therefore important inasmuch 
as they highlight a theme that proves recurrent, yet is never identical to itself: 
the Law-Freedom relation. In accordance with the logie of variations on a 
theme, I will develop this relationship through five emblematic figures. 
1. IN PARTICULAR: "RULES OF THE GAME" AND "STRUGGLE" 
As I have tried to show elsewhere, Einaudi's liberalism cannot be adequately 
understood other than by tracing it back to his prolonged and uncon-
cluded search for good government.7 Despite the innumerable interpretations 
6 ID., Scienza economica ed economisti nel momento presente (Torino, Tip. Artigianelli, 1950), 
p. 23; English trans!: "Economie science and economists at the present days", International Social 
Science Bulletm, E, 2 (1950), pp. 160-171. 
7 Here I take up again and develop several themes and conclusions I put forward in the hook II 
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Western politicai thought has given of good government - a veritable mythic 
symbol that has constandy risen again to new birth during the history of over 
two millennia,8 - in its broader sense it has maintained the general meaning of 
the ideal model of society or also called the good society or good polity .9 This 
was not, however, a model that Einaudi regarded as an ideal representation of 
the perfect society: rather, a perfectible model (as we will see more clearly in 
the conclusions - section 5 - but it is helpful to underscore this aspect from 
the very start in order to avert any misunderstandings concerning the sup-
posed impossibility of reconciling liberalism and good government).10 Turn-
ing his attention again to this mythic symbolization, and refreshing it in the 
light of his own day, Einaudi began to refer to good government, often in 
an allusive manner, above ali when his intellectual efforts concentrated on 
the attempt to reconstruct the liberal institutions destroyed first by the war 
and then by fascism. 
The ideal model of the liberal society that formed the object of Einaudi's 
quest consists of two essential moments, which represent the two moments of 
the "struggle", or, as it were, the two foci of good government: competition 
and debate, or more generally, the market and the public sphere,11 which he 
liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi o del buongoverno (Soveria Mannelli, Rubettino, 2008). On Einaudi, 
Bobbio wrote: "no-one uses the words good government and bad government any longer, and any-
one who does stili use them seems to be looking to the past, a distant past, which only a composer of 
useless preachings has the courage to bring up again any more". Now, while noting that the antith-
esis "good government and bad government" is "one of the great themes, if not the greatest of ali 
themes in politicai reflection of ali times, Bobbio reductively construed Einaudian good government 
as government by good rulers (specifically, he referred to the figure of Cavour as an Einaudian ex-
emplum of a good ruler). For a construal of Einaudian good government in terms of a theory of 
greatest collective welfare: F. FORTE, Luigi Einaudi: il mercato e il buongoverno (Torino, G. Einaudi, 
1982). Ròpke alluded to the "vast programme of 'good government' to which Einaudi devoted his 
whole l i f e " , with a reference to the problem of the relation between political-legal institutions and 
the market: W. RÒPKE, "La lezione di Luigi Einaudi", in A. DALLE MOLLE (ed.), Il maestro dell'eco-
nomia di domani (s.l., Edizioni di via aperta, 1961), p. 30 (my italics). 
8 Cf., among others, N. BOBBIO, "Il buongoverno", Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, voi. Vili, 5 
(1983), pp. 235-244; Q. SKINNER, Visions of Politics, voi. II, Renaissance Virtues (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002). In this important works there is a lack of reference to the reception-
translation, by Italian humanism, of the theme of good government in oikonomia treatises, and today 
this stili leads to misinterpretations (see infra, notes and text). 
9 For a reappraisal of this issue see the essays in A . HAMLIM - P . PETTIT (eds.), The Good Polity. 
Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989). 
10 A misunderstanding often due to interpretation of "good government" in terms of Greek 
politicai philosophy or of republicanism; cf. for ex. A. PASSERIN D'ENTRÈVES, La dottrina dello Stato. 
Elementi di analisi e di interpretazione, second edition (Torino, Giappichelli, 1967), p. 321; Engl. 
Transl. The Notion of the State. An Introduction to Politicai Theory (Oxford, Clarendon press, 
1969). For a re-reading of the theme of good government in a liberal-democratic perspective see 
C. DONOLO, Il sogno del buon governo. Apologia del regime democratico (Milano, Anabasi, 2002). 
11 Bruno Leoni already perceived in Einaudian thought the existence of a "parallelism of the 
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perceived as embodying the principle of material and intellectual progress. If 
competition is conceived as a mechanism for selection of the deserving and 
for ushering in the better and the new, by the same token debate acts as a 
principle that operates with a view to establishing truth. What they share is 
the necessary condition of struggle, that is to say, variety and diversity (of ac-
tions and opinions): in a nutshell, pluralism. Aware that World War I, the red 
two-year period and, later, fascism that had become a regime, had to a large 
extent undermined the foundations of the old Uberai order, eroding it slowly 
at first, but then at an ever increasing pace, Einaudi initially sought to mount a 
staunch defense of the old system.12 In the article Verso la città divina [To-
wards the Divine City] (1920), written in that context of social unrest from 
which fascism drew its lifeblood, Einaudi wrote a criticai reply, underpinned 
by his liberal convictions, to an article by Giuseppe Rensi. The latter had spo-
ken of a "genuine hymn to the force that unifies, that kills doubt and marks 
the way" and had urged intervention by an authoritarian power capable of re-
estabhshing order. After recognizing that "his hymn responds to a need of the 
human spirit that is loath to engage in conflict, or in the struggles of men, par-
ties, ideas, and desires instead to seek peace, harmony and concord, the unity 
of spirits, even if obtained by means of the sword and blood", Einaudi 
responded with a spirited counter-proposal, outlining the presuppositions 
of the "divine city", i.e. his ideal conception of the rule of law, built up 
around the polarity between the fecundity of struggle and a necessary 
framework of rules. 
If I could, I would like to write as impetuous and captivating a hymn as his, a 
hymn to discord, struggle, disunity of spirits [...] What on earth reason is there for 
the state to have its own ideal of life, and then be compelled to force men to conform 
with it, à la Napoleoni Why only one rehgion rather than many different kinds? Why 
only one politicai, social or spiritual point of view and not an infinity of opinions? 
Beauty, perfection, cannot be equated with uniformity, nor with unity: the essence 
resides in variety and contrast.13 
economie order and the politicai order", suggesting that it includes "another pair of reciprocally cor-
responding concepts: the market on the one hand, debate on the other", B . LEONI, Luigi Einaudi e la 
scienza del governo (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1964), p. 21. 
12 For an analysis of this dramatic phase of Einaudi's speculation see M.L. SALVADORI, "Einau-
di e la sua concezione del conflitto sociale", Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, XXXVII (2003), 
pp. 7-31. 
13 L. EINAUDI, "Verso la città divina" (1920), in II buongoverno. Saggi di economia e politica (1897-
1954), E. Rossi (ed.) (Bari, Laterza, 1954), pp. 32-33. Note the similarity between the passages taken 
from Einaudi mentioned in the text and the Popperian praise of the tower of Babel: K.R. POPPER, 
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But variety and contrast are to be found only within that which Einaudi, 
in this very first allusion to the "divine city", terms the "limit state" (see sec-
tion 3.2). 
The vision of the fecundity of struggle can be traced back to the anthro-
pological core of Einaudi's liberalism (his "generative ideas"), as set forth 
most explicitly in La bellezza della lotta [ The Beauty of Struggle] (1923). 
Against any imposition from on high, or even worse, against any surrepti-
tiously paternalistic attempt, whether brought about at the hand of whichever 
petty politician happens to wield power at the time, or espoused by socialism 
or the rising growing corporative doctrine, Einaudi re-affirms the value of the 
"efforts of those who desire to elevate themselves on their own and in this 
struggle, fight, falter and rise again, learning at their own expense how to 
win and to better themselves".14 It is by no means superfluous to point out 
that at the origin of the Einaudian conception of struggle and freedom there 
lay anti-perfectist Christian anthropology: man as a flawed and fallible being, 
not perfect, yet perfectible.15 Although Einaudi refers only occasionally to this 
background,16 it remains as the underlying setting of many of his statements 
on the fallibility of knowledge and human action. It is a setting Einaudi would 
draw on more than once when re-reading the works of some English thinkers 
who, while not necessarily Christian, were considered by Einaudi to be among 
the "founders" and/or advocates of the exercise of criticism in the public 
sphere: Milton, Junius,17 Mill, Dicey, Bryce. 
Congetture e confutazioni (1969), G. PANCALDI (ed.), it. transl. (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1972), p. 598; 
also by K.R. POPPER, Alla ricerca di un mondo migliore. Conferenze e saggi di trentanni di attività, 
it. transl., B. DÌ Noi (ed.) (Roma, Armando, 1989), p. 213. For a recent re-reading of these themes: 
E. DI NUOSCIO - P . HERITIER, "Le culture a Babele: scacco od opportunità?", in E. DI Nuoscio -
P . HERITIER (eds.), Le culture di Babele. Saggi di antropologia filosofico-giuridica (Milano, Medusa, 
2008), pp. 7-15. 
14 L. EINAUDI, "The Beauty of the Struggle" (1923), in ID., Selected Economie Essays, L. EINAU-
DI, R. FAUCCI and R. MARCHIONATTI (eds.) (NY, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 66-72, 66. 
15 On the possible configurations of the relation between Christianity and liberalism, cf. the 
essays contained in P . HERITIER (ed.), Problemi di libertà nella società complessa e nel cristianesimo cit., 
especially P . NEMO, Quattro tesi sul tema dei rapporti tra liberalismo e cristianesimo, ibid., pp. 129-
161; most recently, D. ANTISERI - G . GIORELLO, Libertà. Un manifesto per credenti e non credenti, 
Afterword by S. Tagliagambe (Milano, Bompiani, 2008). 
16 See L. EINAUDI, "Perché la guerra continua" (1920), in Cronache economiche e politiche di un 
trentennio (1893-1925), 8 volumes (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1961-1966) [henceforth Cronache], voi. V, 
1963, pp. 967-977, where Einaudi contrasts two conceptions of man and, consequendy, of society, 
namely the perfectist vision of "reasoning reason" which seeks to "create the state and society by 
starting out from the premise of naturally good mankind perverted by politicai institutions", versus 
the "Roman, Christian, Bridsh view of the real man, a mixture of virtues and vices, reason and pas-
sion, of historical man as he has evolved over the millennia, as he is molded by the land, the institu-
tions of the past, of previous generations". 
17 It is worth recalling that Einaudi himself worked under the pseudonym of Junius, especially 
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After levelling harsh charges against The silence of the industrialists '8 fol-
lowing the assassination of Matteotti, Einaudi reluctantly had to recognize 
that the exercise of criticism had been relinquished in the wake of this event 
that was to signal the turning-point towards dictatorship. Yet at least at the 
beginning, Einaudi was of the opinion that only a tiny minority had effectively 
forsaken their criticai voice; he remained confident that in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, the power of criticism would prevail. 
One year before his forcible resignation from the "Corriere della Sera", 
followed by the expulsion of its Director, his friend Albertini, Einaudi again 
staunchly defended the liberal position, issuing one of his last warnings to the 
Italians in the Preface (1925) to Mill's On Liberty. Mill's work, he wrote, was 
being brought out in its Italian version "at a moment when it is vitally urgent 
that the right of criticism and of non conformism, and ali the issues involved 
in the struggle against uniformity, should come to the fore and be given pride 
of place. Precisely because fascism had begun to shackle the press and the 
country was bit by bit being "driven towards intolerance", Einaudi believed 
it was necessary to reiterate loud and clear the "immortai principles" pro-
claimed by Mill: "truth can become a principle of action only when ali people 
are allowed the broadest possible freedom to contradict it and confute it [...] 
Truth, once it has become a dogma, no longer exerts its effectiveness in im-
proving men's character and behavior".19 Further expanding on the teachings 
of Mill, Einaudi realized, as he wrote years later in a preface to the writings of 
Albertini, that fascism was supported by mass consensus; therefore the real 
and "undying problem" of freedom is that of "defending the freedom of 
the minority against the tyranny of the majority".20 
After the old Uberai order had been definitively swept away, and Einaudi 
had retired from pubUc life to devote himself to study, he focused his intel-
lectual efforts on the attempt to re-found the Uberai order by molding it on 
a framework of widely shared (Uberai) values that would be catalyzed by 
the ideal of good government. In effect, it had been the very circumstance 
of the broad-ranging popular support achieved by fascism that had led him 
in his most polemical articles, some of which he then gathered together in Lettere politiche dijunius 
(Bari, Laterza, 1920 ) , thereby evoking the celebrated Letters ofjunius, considered as the "trailblazer 
of the modem press": J . HABERMAS, Storia e critica dell'opinione pubblica ( 1 9 6 2 ) , it. trans! (Bari, La-
terza, 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 7 8 - 7 9 . 
18 L. EINAUDI, "Il silenzio degli industriali" (1924), Cronache cit., vo! VII, 1965, pp. 767-768. 
1 9 ID., Prefazione to J.S. MILL, La libertà (Torino, Piero Gobetti editore, 1925), p. 4 . 
2 0 L . EINAUDI, Prefazione to L . ALBERTINI, In difesa della libertà. Discorsi e scritti (Milano - Ro-
ma, Rizzoli, 1947), p. xv. 
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to realize (as will be seen further on, in section 2 concerning his exchange of 
ideas with his pupils) that the struggles of the red two-year period were not 
merely fomented by struggles among different interests, but were struggles 
for the recognition of axiological goals the liberal regime had failed to grasp. 
In his attempt to gain insight into the causes of the disintegration of the social 
fabric, the route Einaudi would follow was that of re-reading the past in order 
to re-found the future liberal institutions. Thus as he reflected on one of the 
cruciai points that engaged his thoughts, and calling to mind the ethos and 
modus agendi of those who made up the middle class, Einaudi dwelt on what 
in his view had constituted a favorable circumstance: 
The classes genuinely representative of Italy, composed of small and medium-
sized industrialists, landowners, tenant farmers, merchants and eraftsmen, ali of them 
very hard-working, as well as [...] honest upright professional figures and civil ser-
vants devoted to the public good, stili supplied the state with a fair number of 
men who went into politics and held government office. Righteous and hard-working, 
they deemed that the most consummate art of statesmanship lay in ensuring 'good 
government' of public affairs, where 'good government' was to be understood as that 
wise and prudent manner of administrating which they adopted in private affairs.21 
The scope and significance of this passage can best be understood by as-
sociating it with another work by Einaudi, a profoundly autobiographical 
work, in which Einaudi re-evokes the ethos and narrates the events and under-
takings of his family, especially his mother and his uncle (he was extremely 
attached to his uncle, whom he had "worshipped like a second father"): "this 
manner of living that I used to observe in the family home represented the 
universal habits of the Piedmontese bourgeoisie for the greater part of the 
19th century". These habits shaped "a ruling class that left a profound imprint 
of honesty, capabilities, parsimony, devotion to duty in the politicai and ad-
ministrative life of the Piedmont which subsequently created Italy itself". 
At that time, Einaudi continued, 
man, the family, were not conceived in isolation from their rootedness in the land, the 
home, the locai area, and these are sentiments that also engender devotion to the 
country and the spirit of sacrifice which, alone, are capable of nurturing the young 
shoots that will burgeon into sound states.22 
21 L. EINAUDI, La condotta economica e gli e f f e t t i sociali della guerra italiana (Bari, Laterza, 
1933), p. 400. 
22 ID., "Avvertenza del compilatore" (1922), in Pagine doglianesi, 1893-1943 (Comune di Do-
gliani - Biblioteca civica Luigi Einaudi, Dogliani, 1988), pp. 32-34. On the relevance of this essay see 
M. EINAUDI, Presentazione, ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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Reading between the lines of these two citations, a synthesis of some of 
the most recurrent problems of politicai, juridical and economie philosophy 
can be perceived: the problem of order, legitimacy and obligation; the ques-
tion of the ruling class and of those holding power in government, and the 
question of the relation between private and public, and between society in 
general and the government as well as that between the market and the state; 
and, last but not least, the problem of individuai, family, affective and social 
relations, the question of values, traditions and the civic virtues on which 
every social order is built (in dwelling on these issues Einaudi mentions spe-
cific aspects such as prudence, parsimony, a hard-working approach, honesty, 
a professional attitude, loyalty, trust, spirit of sacrifice). The veritable conun-
drum of these issues was to become the crux of Einaudian research on liberal 
good government.23 
Now, as far as our analysis is concerned, it is significant that these problems 
are evoked through a latent analogy between government of one's 
own home and civil government. Although the Einaudian approach to good 
government did incorporate the classical categories associated with these 
themes - the rule of law, government by good ruling class, government or 
mtxed constitution24 - it takes on a heightened significance precisely by virtue 
of this analogy, which was typical of humanism (microcosm-macrocosm) and 
was particularly recurrent throughout the Italian treatise tradition dealing 
with oikonomia, above ali in the 16th and 17th centuries. It was a tradition im-
bued with the profound conviction that the economie approach constituted 
"a valid tool for regulating both family and civil affairs: hence the frequent 
association, found in almost ali the treatises, between home and city, govern-
ment of the home and politicai government, father and prince".25 
23 In many respeets this conundrum can be likened to the so-called Bòchenforde paradox: "the 
secularized state lives on presuppositions it is unable to guarantee" (E.W. BÒCHENFORDE, "La for-
mazione dello stato come processo di secolarizzazione" (1967), in P. PRODI - L. SARTORI (eds.), Cri-
stianesimo e potere (Bologna, EDB, 1 9 8 6 ) , p. 121); on which, most recendyj. HABERMAS, "I fonda-
menti morali prepolitici dello stato liberale", in J . RATZINGER - J . HABERMAS, Etica, religione e Stato 
liberale (2004) (Brescia, Morcelliana, 2005), pp. 21-40. 
24 Since the cruciai role assigned to the middle class in terms of social equilibrium, Einaudi 
refers to "Good government" as "mixed constitution" in the same sense used by Adam Smith in the 
third book of The Wealth o/Nation, in A. SMITH, Glasgow Edition ofthe Works and Correspondence 
of Adam Smith (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 405 and 412, which has properly been recog-
nised as the "locus classicus of the theme of commerce and liberty" (D. FORBES, "Sceptical Whiggism, 
Commerce and Liberty", in Essay on Adam Smith, Glasgow Edition cit., p. 193). See also D. WINCH, 
Adam Smith's Politics. An Essay in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
press, 1978), p. 70. 
25 D. FRIGO, Il padre di famiglia. Governo della casa e governo civile nella tradizione dell"'eco-
nomica" tra Cinque e Seicento (Roma, Bulzoni, 1985), p. 68. 
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The vision of the ancient regime and the systems of thought that underpinned it, 
as portrayed and made visibile by the treatises on oikonomia, thus ranges over a far 
broader horizon than the purely domestic context, and encompasses deep-set mental 
structures. It conjures up a type of politicai and social framework that is not defined in 
opposition to the private sphere, but ratber by starting out from this very sphere: it 
therefore become possible to theorize "good government" of the city, or of the 
"republic", only insofar as "good government" of the home has already been delineated 
and implemented. From this point of view oikonomia forms part "of a general project 
of 'constitutiori [also in the sense of 'institution ] 2 6 of the old regime; it is a backdrop 
that reflects and allows the further visualization of certain 'unwritteri rules that are the 
supporting structures of the entire organization of the early modem age.27 
However, these observations should not lead to the mistaken belief that 
Einaudi's aim was to restore the order of bygone times. For as has been noted, 
in his capacity as an authoritative "minister of public opinion" Einaudi had 
provided "his own running commentary on the great process of transforma-
tion" experienced by Italy, thereby building "at the same time a model of the 
ideal society, less distant from Italian society than might be thought".28 But I 
would argue that the cruciai point does not reside in investigating the degree 
of realism of this model. Rather, what is important is to focus on the model 
itself and to enquire into the meaning of (and arising from) the gap between 
the model and reality. In other words, if good government is the answer Ei-
naudi provides, in that particular historical context, for an Italy that was en-
during the agonizing torment of war and fascism, then by the same token 
Good government is the response to the deep-seated need, felt by every com-
munity, to share a representation-vision of justice and the good that endows 
men in society with a shared sense of common action (suffice it to mention 
that Einaudi included in the collection II buongoverno [Good government] 
several details from the well known fresco by Lorenzetti, which the rules of 
Siena demanded should be visihle on the walls of the "Palazzo Pubblico"). 
Thus the passages pertaining to the analogy between government of the home 
and government of res publica cited above serve as a preview to a more gen-
eral interpretation of the Einaudian quest for a liberal form of good govern-
ment, a quest prompted by the need to gain insight into the dynamics of those 
26 Here the Author refers to the concept of "Consitution" as used by O. BRUNNER, "La 'Casa 
come complesso' e l'antica 'economica' europea", in ID., Per una nuova costituzione economica e so-
ciale (1968), it. transl. (Milano, Vita e pensiero, 1970), pp. 133-164. 
27 Ibid., p. 200 (my italics). 
2 8 R . FAUCCI, Einaudi (Torino, UTET, 1986), p. 417. 
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"deep-seated mental structures", those "'unwritten' rules which act as the 
supporting structures of the entire organization" of society. Einaudian good 
government is therefore a "project of 'constitution'", eternally under construc-
tion and never fully "instituted", studded with metaphors, narrations and 
images acting as the backcloth through which the "invisible" and founding 
rules of the social order "are reflected and visualized". 
2 . C O N C R E T E L Y : T H E " F A T H E R - M A S T E R " A N D T H E " S O N - P U P I L " . R E F O R M S O R 
R E V O L U T I O N ? 
If the relation between father and son has, since earliest times, always 
been one of the most concrete figures of the law-freedom nexus, that between 
master and pupil is no less evocative of the ties linking the two aspects. It is no 
coincidence that the paired terms appearing in the tide - "father-master" and 
"son-pupil" - draws on an expression used by Busino to depict the "myster-
ious" relation between Einaudi and Ernesto Rossi (see infra). But it is also 
possible to extend this figure of the intermeshing of law and freedom to 
the relations Einaudi entertained with another two celebrated pupils, Carlo 
Rosselli and Piero Gobetti, although it should be borne in mind that on ac-
count of their early and tragic death, the relationship was interrupted too 
early for Einaudi to have been able to develop with these two pupils the spe-
cial (but no less problematic) relationship he had with Rossi. For the present 
purposes it is interesting to note that the themes developed in the master's 
discussions with his pupils reveal the presence of an additional problem, 
which made itself felt rather strongly and significandy. This was the relation 
between tradition and criticism, which can in many respeets be assimilated 
to the figure of the law-freedom interaction. 
Once again, and re-stated in slighdy different terms, there emerged the 
issue that was at the forefront of debate in various forms from the end of 
the nineteenth century and throughout the greater part of the twentieth cen-
tury, focusing on the burning question: reform or revolution?29 Ali three of 
the above-mentioned pupils were, albeit to varying extents and in varying 
ways, mesmerized by socialist doctrine. And they were attracted - this was 
especially true of Rosselli and Gobetti - by the clarion cali of the Russian re-
29 The question is very similar to that discusseci by Marcuse and Popper (where Einaudi's posi-
tion can be assimilated to the Popperian thesis, despite the different epistemological and philosophi-
cal foundations). H. MARCUSE - K.R. POPPER, Reform or Revolution? A Confrontation (1971), Engl. 
trans! (Chicago, New University Press, 1976). 
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volution, the echoes of which were not slow to reach Italy, further amplified 
by the struggles of the red two-year period. During the course of these events, 
Einaudi reached a conviction he would thereafter hold unshakably, which he 
expressed icastically in the following terms: "revolutionaries are like children: 
they want to take the production machine to bits to see what it's like inside, in 
the illusion they can then put the pieces together again better, without the 
present-day friction, which they attribute to capitalism". The Einaudian cri-
tique is based on an institutional and evolutionary vision of the market. 
The market, Einaudi wrote, is a "highly delicate and extremely complicated" 
mechanism, which only "the slow action of the centuries and the cooperation 
of millions of patient, far-sighted, inspired and hard-working men" can truly 
create.30 In other words, as the Piedmontese liberal never tired of repeating, 
while the market was not the best of ali possible worlds (and for this very rea-
son it could always be reformed) it had nevertheless assured the multiplication 
of previously unheard-of opportunities and prospects, which no other eco-
nomie system known so far had ever succeeded in achieving. "Breaking down 
this highly delicate and extremely complex mechanism", Einaudi argued, 
amounted to a leap into the unknown and was likely to cause more harm than 
it was intended to remedy. 
The criticisms Rosselli advanced against his master shordy after the pub-
lication of La bellezza della lotta, i.e. in the immediate wake of the red two-
year period, are emblematic in this respect. For Rosselli "the drama of officiai 
Italian liberalism" was that of having undergone a transformation from a pro-
gressive-oriented to a "conservative" approach. It "remained a theoretical 
construct, as if suspended in a void of concepts" and it was "embroiled in 
the contradietion between method and system", the "method" being repre-
sented by the theory and the preaching of struggle, antagonism and discord 
(in primis between workers and entrepreneurs), while the "system" was the 
capitalist-bourgeois system, accepted as a necessary premise, indisputable 
and insurmountable.31 
Rosselli's argument has been seen as voicing a criticai view of 
30 L. EINAUDI, "Rivoluzionari ed organizzatori" (1920), in Cronache cit., voi. V , 1963, pp. 750-
7 5 1 . 
3 1 C . ROSSELLI, "Luigi Einaudi e il movimento operaio" ( 1 9 2 4 ) , in Socialismo liberale e altri 
scritti, J. ROSSELLI (ed.) (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1 9 7 3 ) , pp. 4 4 - 5 1 . On the distinction between "method" 
and "system", C . ROSSELLI, "Liberalismo socialista" ( 1 9 2 3 ) , in Scritti politici, P . BAGNOLI - Z . CIUF-
FOLETTI (eds.) (Napoli, Guida, 1988), pp. 57-58. In formulating this distinction, Rosselli seems to 
have drawn inspiration from his cousin and friend Alessandro Levi, a historian of the Risorgimento 
and philosopher of law: A. LEVI, "Liberalismo come stato d'animo", in La rivoluzione liberale (5 June 
1 9 2 3 ) , p. 7 2 . 
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one of the weak points of a conception of liberalism as a mere complex of unchange-
able rules of the game, devoid of any internai developmental principle, and above ali 
lacking any realization that the victor may change the rules definitively in his own fa-
vour. Rosselli contended that Einaudi failed to realize, or did not wish to perceive, in 
what direction the "struggle" - on the beauty of which Einaudi had waxed eloquent -
was moving, namely the victory of one side or the other, in a manner that might per-
haps not be reversible.32 
But in this regard it should be noted that while Einaudi, as an economist, 
did have a tendency, especially in this early phase of his thought, to hyposta-
tize the bourgeois liberal state, considering it as a framework of laws suited to 
disciplining struggle within civil society, it is equally trae that the framework 
was by no means conceived as unchangeable: its developmental principle 
rested on the cruciai issue of criticai debate within public opinion. The real 
problem, however, resided in the fact that this legai framework presupposed 
a shared axiological horizon which would allow struggle, taken as competition 
and debate, to come about in the form of peaceful struggle. Now, what the 
struggles of the red two-year period had severely undermined was precisely 
the complex of values on which the liberal state of the bourgeois era had been 
built up. Thus if Rosselli had not fully understood the principle of gradualist 
reformism of his master, Einaudi, on the other hand, reflecting critically on 
the red two-year period and the emergence of fascism in its wake, began to 
constrae good government as a problem of shared values. 
In an article in memory of Gobetti (1926), the master seems to chart once 
more the distance that had separated him from the latter (and perhaps also 
from Rosselli), almost as if seeking to span the gap. For despite acknowled-
ging Einaudi as his master,33 Gobetti had drawn closer to the thought of 
Gramsci and the group of communists of Ordine Nuovo, above ali in his last 
years. In Einaudi's eyes, this signalled that the time had come to reflect on the 
problem of how to hold together tradition and criticism, conservation and in-
novation. 
On the one hand, the liberal in him maintained that it was stili of value to 
recognize "the utility of religiously observed traditions, of the ancient institu-
tions which impose themselves on peoples almost as if they were endowed 
with a supernatural virtue\ hence the very serious social danger arising if revo-
lutionary events shake up that sense oftaboo which holds the basic social struc-
32 R. FAUCCI, Einaudi cit., p. 222. 
33 See P. GOBETTI, "H liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi" (1922), in Scritti politici, P. SPRIANO (ed.) 
(Torino, G. Einaudi, 1960), pp. 322-336. 
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ture firm". Re-reading Le Play, who investigated the reasons underlying pros-
perous and stable societies, Einaudi explains by means of a metaphor that in-
stitutions are founded on a sort of "magic speli": "ali the social world's a stage 
curtain; and behind it there's nothing". Yet it is precisely this stage act that 
enables societies to hold together, which implies that the criticai and revolu-
tionary spirit can push things up to a certain limit, beyond which, however, 
"the paper casde [which] stood firm of its own accord under the shelter of 
the speli", collapses.34 
On the other hand, even if his pupil was not convinced by these com-
ments on Le Play, he could nevertheless clearly see, Einaudi went on, 
that the cult of traditions, the continuity of the home environment, the respect for 
saving that enables people to build their home or set up their business, or till their 
land, are powerful ideas and that such ideas must be set on a par with criticai and 
creative thought, with the revolutionizing machine of the economy and with the pro-
found aspiration of the working masses to move upwards, disrupting the existing 
social equilibrium. 
Such ideas, Einaudi felt, "have just as much right of citizenship in that 
ideal city he was shaping in his mind, a city that is fine to behold because it 
is not rigidly motionless but is continually in transformation under the con-
trasting pressures of the many forces that act upon it".35 With a classic pro-
jective judgment, Einaudi was thereby making a first attempt to focus on the 
"ideal city" as the core problem of good government, which is such only if it 
succeeds in deriving its solidity from a dynamic equilibrium of latent and con-
trasting forces. 
With regard to the relationship between Einaudi and Rossi, which devel-
oped above ali in epistolary form through their correspondence when Rossi 
was in internai exile on the island of Ventotene, it was dialectically the most 
criticai and fertile of his experiences of interaction with his pupils. The issue 
on which debate centered most intensely was that of the limit of reformism: 
that is to say, how far can reforms be driven without overstepping the limit 
and escalating into revolution? The very same problem of the limit, interest-
ingly, comes to the fore in the essence of the master-pupil interaction as well: 
up to what point should the master instruct, that is to say, educate, his pupil? 
In this educational process, should the master not set the conditions for his 
34 L. EINAUDI, "Piero Gobetti nelle memorie e nelle impressioni dei suoi maestri", IlBaretti (16 
March 1926), p. 80 (my italics). 
35 Ibid., p. 80 (my italics). 
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own 'disappearance', so that the pupil can begin to walk on his own legs? 
And, conversely, how far can the pupil express a criticai stance towards the 
master without undermining that very educational process which, as such, 
constitutes the basis of their interaction? 
Precisely in this regard, and pondering on the profound difference in 
character and temperament between Einaudi and Rossi - the former cairn, 
prudent, tempering and apparendy cold, the latter full of warmth, sponta-
neous, sharp and to the point, trenchant to the limit of flippancy - , Giovanni 
Busino raised the question of whether here one might not be "facing the mys-
tery of the father-master and the son-pupil".36 In this meeting and clash of 
positions concerning the limits to be placed on reformism, the debate be-
tween Einaudi and Rossi was destined to intensify in a crescendo of polemics, 
almost to the point of breaking up the relationship.37 Einaudi's pupil was per-
fectly aware of the distance that separated him from his master, so much so as 
to declare himself "an exceedingly Jacobinical Jacobin". On the other hand, 
Rossi did up to a certain point share Einaudi's gradualist reformism, albeit ar-
guing that this could be successful only in "normal times" and not in the 
midst of a "crisis" period, when "the old rules of the game become an obsta-
cle" and other rules have to be set up. The latter statement is of extreme im-
portance, and while Rossi subsequendy let it drop and did not elaborate on 
the matter further, Einaudi himself would later take up the question again 
at the dawn of the Constituent Assembly, when discussion focused on the 
problem of "legally unsolvable dilemmas" and on the possibility of overriding 
even the constitutional order (see section 3.2). During their exchange of cor-
respondence, the debate reached a point where the master confessed his 
regret at his pupil's infatuation with 
methods of law-making imposed by compulsion, rapidly, with the force of a revolu-
tion that has set itself a program and is determined to implement it, crushing any 
form of opposition. It truly pains me that this mentality has been endorsed by your-
self as well. I have no faith in this type of law-making, and it is my belief that the poi-
36 G. BUSINO, "Un'amicizia esemplare", in L. EINAUDI - E. Rossi, Carteggio (1925-1961), 
G. BUSINO and S. MARTINOTTI DORIGO (eds.) (Torino, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, 1988), p. 4. 
37 In the following citations I refer above ali to the exchange of correspondence between Ei-
naudi and Rossi in the period between the beginning of 1941 up to the beginning of 1943, in 
L. EINAUDI - E. Rossi, Carteggio cit., pp. 6 5 - 1 2 1 ; and "Aggiunte e complementi al carteggio L. Ei-
naudi, E. Rossi", G . BUSINO - P . GIORDANA (eds.), Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, X X X V I I 
( 2 0 0 3 ) , pp. 2 9 3 - 4 4 6 : 3 9 9 - 4 0 1 . I dwelt more extensively on this debate in II liberalismo di Luigi 
Einaudi o del buongoverno cit., pp. 2 4 4 - 2 5 2 . Cf. also R. FAUCCI, "Einaudi, Croce, Rossi: il liberali-
smo fra scienza economica e filosofia", Quaderni di storia dell'economia politica, V I I , n 1 ( 1 9 8 9 ) 
pp. 1 1 3 - 1 3 3 . 
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son the French revolution left in 19th-century society, which has spilled over into the 
present century, derives to a large extent from this cause. 
In the attempt to clarify this position, and accusing his pupil of an excess 
of "geometrie" spirit conducted in the name of a reason that bordered on 
"pure logie", Einaudi put forward the following thesis: "a society is sound 
and lively and vibrant only if it has within itself many incomprehensible things. 
If the men of a society begin to reason about everything, one can be quite cer-
tain that such a society is dose to beaking down".38 This argument could 
hardly fail to infuriate his pupil, who, feeling he could almost no longer recog-
nize or agree with (what was in his view) his master's "illuministic" teaching, 
objected: 
What is this lack of faith in the Goddess Reason? Where do you think we should 
stop, sir, when developing an argument? Who should decide which points are not to 
be questioned? As far as I am concerned I am going to continue beating my knuckles 
against ali the institutions that happen to stand before me in order to try to establish 
whether they are made of marble or wood or plaster, and I am going to continue ask-
ing, just as my old friend Bentham did: "What is the use?", without ever allowing 
myself to be imposed upon by tradition. 
By the time the debate reached this point, a misunderstanding had occurred. 
The pupil interpreted his master's argument as a sort of invitation to genuflect 
before tradition (whatever it may be), tradition having been assumed as dog-
matic. On the other hand, when the pupil himself effectively professed his un-
conditional faith ("trust") in the "Goddess Reason", and also in the criterion for 
meting out a judgment on "institutions" shaped in the utilitarian-Benthamian 
mould ("What is the use?"), he unwittingly testified to his belonging to two tra-
ditions, illuminism and utiliarianism, no less dogmatically assumed.39 
However, it is perfeedy legitimate to conjecture that Einaudi was trying to 
reformulate the problem of the "invisible" foundations40 (as he would later 
38 As noted by Faucci (Einaudi, Croce, Rossi cit.), Einaudi's position against the supporters of 
authoritarian intervention, and the related argument that there exist many "incomprehensible 
things", has a certain resemblance to that of Hayek: "even if such power is not in itself bad, its ex-
ercise is likely to impede the functioning of those spontaneous ordering forces by which, without 
understanding them, man is in fact so largely assisted in the pursuit of his aims" (F.A. HAYEK, 
"The Pretence of Knowledge" (1974), in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economies and the His-
tory of Ideas (London, Roudedge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 42-43). 
39 I refer here to the concept of "dogma" as formulated by P . LEGENDRE, Della società come 
testo cit. 
40 On "invisible organizations and invisible concrete foundation", understood as "that which 
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designate them), or of the "speli" that holds up the fabric of society. This was 
a problem he had already touched on in the reflection on Gobetti, and the 
reformulation he proposed in the present circumstance was even more allu-
sive. Einaudi would offer no further precise thematization until he later expli-
citly raised the problem of legitimacy (see section 3.2). The misunderstanding 
was further aggravated by the failure, on both sides, to clarify what was meant 
by the term "reason". The term is invoked several times but with different 
and sometimes overlaid meanings: "criticai reason", "pure logie" (or con-
structivist reason), "means-end rationality". 
In any case, the divergences between master and pupil could hardly be 
described as clear-cut. The tensions were mediated by their common search 
for the ideal "good government" around which a cohesive society could de-
velop and withstand disruptive pressures, and with which both men could es-
tablish a bond of allegiance that would accommodate their respective distinc-
tions.41 It is in fact no coincidence that it was the "son-pupil", no less faithful 
than he was criticai (faithful precisely because the "father-master" allowed 
scope for criticism, which was in fact scope for freedom) ,42 who saw to the 
editing and publication of Einaudi's selected essays entitled II buongoverno 
[Good government]. By the same token, it was once again the pupil who wrote 
the counterpart: Il malgoverno [Bad Government].43 
3 . I N G E N E R A L : A U C T O R I T A S , L E X , V E R I T A S 
In order to gain insight into the specificity of Einaudi's liberal good gov-
ernment, it is helpful, as a first step, to outline some commonplace concep-
precedes the established law", see P . HERITIER, Uscire dal secondo millennio? Problemi metodologici 
nel discorso sulla libertà cit., pp. 93-100. 
41 According to Giovanni Busino, they shared a common "world view": "It is the belief that 
freedom is an ethical fact, it is an individuai and social practice in everyday life and in history. In 
order for it to prevail, it is indispensable for there to be struggle, diversity, discord, debate. Life 
is freedom and freedom is variety and contrast. Being free means being able to move within a dense 
network of interrelations among men and among groups, within the fabric of naturai and social con-
straints and of rules, values and signs that fix limits and indicate forced directions. Moving amid so 
many obstacles, in order to live and act as a free man, requires exact, concrete knowledge of such 
obstacles, and it calls fot the formulation of suitable means to face them. Acting, knowing, being free 
are inseparable. Without freedom, civilization cannot live" (G. BUSINO, Un'amicizia esemplare cit., 
pp. 6-7). 
42 Rossi confessed this aspect in a letter written to his wife on 25 th August 1940, where he also 
stressed Einaudi's great epistemological humility, cf. E. Rossi, Miserie e splendori del confino di polizia. 
Lettere da Ventotene 1939-1943, M. MAGINI (ed.) (Milano, Feltrinelli, 1981), pp. 69-72 (my italics). 
43 E. Rossi, Il malgoverno (Bari, Laterza, 1954). 
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tions on the function of the public sphere in the so-called bourgeois state. We 
may, firstly, analyse the following quotation where, in reference to the princi-
ple "Veritas non auctoritas facit legem",44 it is stated that nineteenth-century 
liberalism held the view that 
since it is impossible to suppress public power [...], such power must at least be im-
personal, the expression not of a will but of a universal reason which does not derive 
from an authority but from the truth. This truth is 'the law'. Thus the problem will 
not be that of knowing who is the 'good ruler' or which is the 'good government', 
but rather of establishing which procedures lead towards reason and truth [...]. Ac-
cordingly, for nineteenth-century liberalism, the activity of the state is reduced to 
the essential, to production of the law through discussion and 'halancing within 
the legislative power. But were liberalism to be viewed purely as a theory of the limits 
of politicai power, to be summarized in the formula 'how much, how far, to govern', 
it would fail to be a complete doctrine of the state, given that such a doctrine cannot 
neglect to address the more ancient question: 'how to govern'.45 
This type of reconstruction of modernity and liberalism presupposes a 
series of categories and dichotomies which have likewise become common-
places. Einaudi's liberal good government, on the other hand, appears to re-
tiate these commonplaces. We will list them here, with the proviso that they 
will be examined in detail further on: a) the reduction of good government 
and, more generally, the problem of legitimacy, to a purely procedural criter-
ion; b) the - typically modem - reduction of auctoritas to potestas; c) the so-
lution of the problem of power through the mechanism of checks and bal-
ances; d) the superiority of the "Rule of law" over "rule by men", a 
dichotomy which, from the historiographic point of view, neglects the funda-
44 As is well known, the triad Veritas-Auctoritas-Lex evokes a series of problems that have been 
pervasive throughout the history of western theological, politicai and juridical thought. For a revisi-
tation of the Hobbesian arguments: U. SCARPELLI, "Auctoritas non veritas facit legem", Rivista di 
filosofia, LXXV (1984), pp. 27-43; for a focus on the philosophical juridical approach: F. VIOLA, 
Autorità e ordine del diritto (Torino, Giappichelli, 1984); for a complete political-philosophical 
and juridical reconstruction cf. G. PRETEROSSI, Autorità (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002). From the point 
of view of my reconstruction, it is important to re-read Einaudian liberalism in order to become 
aware that in Einaudi's thought Auctoritas, Veritas and Lex appear with the always subde and elusive 
characteristics of the limit: with its manner of being potentially, and at one and the same time, that 
which "clips" but also that which "blows below" the wings of freedom. I have tried to show that this 
same problem is also found, in a structural analogy between legitimation of power and the legitima-
tion of savoirs, with regard to juridical or economie "Science": P . SILVESTRI, "Veritas, Auctoritas, 
Lex. Scienza economica e sfera pubblica: sulla normatività del Terzo", Il pensiero economico italiano, 
17, n. 2 (2009). 
4 5 P . PASQUINO, "Prefazione" to C . SCHMITT, Parlamentarismo e democrazia (1923), it. transl. 
(Cosenza, Marco editore, 1999), p. xrv (my italics). Cf. also J. HABERMAS, Storia e critica dell'opinione 
pubblica cit., p. 103. 
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mental re-elaboration-transformation of good government between the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, as mediated by the treatises on oikonomia 
(we will not dwell further on this particular point, see supra). 
3.1. "Élite" as "authority" 
It is important first and foremost to note that Einaudian research on the 
good elite focuses on figures of authority that do not derive their legitimacy 
only from their 'prudenti mode of action and their knowledge of economie 
science as a 'science of good government'. Rather, they are legitimated to 
the extent to which their action is undertaken in a context of values, prefer-
ably shared values.46 
As Einaudi developed these themes, his ideas became more distant from 
Mosca and Pareto's politicai theories, and he began to criticize both their con-
figuration of the elite and their manner of theorizing power legitimation stra-
tegies. Briefly, their theory maintains that power is always held by an élite that 
obtains legitimacy and consensus by appealing to the authority of "common 
opinion", "myth", "dogmas", "politicai formulas" (Mosca), "derivations" 
(Pareto), which exploit the irrational (passionai, emotive or affective) sphere 
of the governed or the masses. Einaudi's growing distance from the sociolo-
gica! conceptions of the ruling class that dominated politics was prompted by 
his reflection on the theory of the élite in Frédéric Le Play (193 6) 47 As we will 
see in greater detail further on, a number of reasons can be put forward to 
illustrate when and why Einaudi assigned a meaning to the concepts of "taboo", 
"myth", "dogmas" or "formulas" that was not necessarily negative, but 
could instead be described as neutral. Here we will merely note Einaudi's 
significant emphasis on the concepts of "naturai authority" and "social 
authority" (the latter in the sense of socially recognized) utilized by the 
French reformist writer. 'Authority' is conceived here as pre-politicai and 
pre-juridical, or better, as emerging, so to speak, "from the bottom up", from 
the substrate of social relations 48 This authority 
46 See also M.L. SALVADORI, "Einaudi e la teoria della classe politica", in Luigi Einaudi nella 
cultura, nella società e nella politica del Novecento, R . MARCHIONATTI - P . SODDU (eds.) (Firenze, 
Leo Olschki, 2010), pp. 269-283. 
47 L. EINAUDI, "H peccato originale e la teoria della classe eletta in Federico Le Play" (1936), in 
ID., Saggi bibliografici e storici intorno alle dottrine economiche (Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 
1953), pp. 307-344. 
48 It is worth recalling that Einaudi was a great supporter of locai self-government precisely be-
cause it offered a model of a "spontaneous" community that rises "from the bottom up": L. EINAU-
DI, "Via il prefetto!" (1944), in 11 buongoverno cit., p. 59. 
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is vested in 'those who have, through their virtue, become the models of private life, 
who demonstrate a strong trend towards the good [...] and who, with the example of 
their family and their working life and business, with their scrupulous dedication to 
the decalogue and customary practices of social peace, gain the affection and respect 
of ali those who surround them, and thus ensure that prosperity and peace reign 
throughout the locai area.49 
Now, since there are major differences between Einaudi and Pareto, it is 
helpfui to compare these two figures in order to highlight the specificity of 
Einaudian liberalism.50 With regard to a comparative assessment of their ac-
tivity as editorialists and essayists, it has been pointed out that unlike the well-
known scepticism that characterized Pareto, Einaudi's Cronache "reveal the 
Constant conviction that the message will not fall on deaf ears" and that 
"homo politicus, if appropriately enlightened, pursues objectives that are 
not in contrast with those of homo oeconomicus",51 It is worth keeping in 
mind that the Einaudian homo oeconomicus is an "idealtype" embodied in 
the ethos of the middle class (struggle and sacrifice to improve one's own con-
ditions, the ethic of hard work, skill, honesty, frugality and prudence) and 
whose conduct is thus ethical-economic. Accordingly, the above-mentioned 
conception can be summarized in the claim that in Einaudi's vision the illu-
ministic-liberal ideal of rationalizing politics in the name of morals signified 
embracing the aspiration that politics, or rather, the policy maker, should 
be tuned to the individuai and social moral code of the middle class, thereby 
contributing to harmony between civil society and the government. It is pre-
cisely the public sphere that is called upon to enact this mediation. 
In the Einaudian perspective, the circle of an ideal model of public space 
is completed into the nexus between the three spheres of the press, the par-
liament and the ruling class. Public opinion (the press and parliament), acting 
through struggle and criticai debate involving ideas, values and visions of the 
world, not only fulfils the function of becoming a principle of selection of the 
"truth" - for the purposes of institution of the "law" and recognition of its 
49 ID., "H peccato originale e la teoria della classe eletta in Federico Le Play" cit., p. 316. 
50 I addressed the relation between Einaudi and Mosca in "E buongoverno nel pensiero di Ei-
naudi e Mosca: tra governo della legge e governo degli uomini", Annali della Fondazione Luigi Ei-
naudi, XL (2006), pp. 157-196; as regards Einaudi and Pareto, I take up again and further develop 
some considerations in F. FORTE - P. SILVESTRI, "Pareto's Sociological Maximum of Utility of the 
Community and the Theory of the Elites", in The Big Book in Fiscal Sociologa, J.G. BACKHAUS 
(ed.) (Heidelberg - New York, forthcoming: 2012). 
5 1 R . FAUCCI, La scienza economica in Italia. Da Francesco Ferrara a Luigi Einaudi (1850-1943) 
(Napoli, Guida, 1982), pp. 28-29. 
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legitimacy - but it also becomes a mechanism for choosing and controlling 
(and, if necessary, overthrowing) the ruling class, and thus for recognizing 
its (legitimate) "authority". According to this model, the best ruling class is 
expected to emerge through the electoral competition for votes, under the 
eyes of an illuminated and criticai public opinion. It should be noted, though, 
that confidence in the possibility of this type of mediation accomplished by 
the public sphere depends to a large extent on the presupposition that good 
rulers - who are operating in pursuit of good government, that is to say, an 
ideal and shared model of society - would be expected to emerge from the 
middle class, the embodiment of the above described virtues. This middle 
class, conceived as the fulcrum of the public sphere, would play an equally 
ideal role of mediety-mediation in the social equilibrium. 
In contrast, for Pareto, "good government", reductively assumed to be 
merely the problem of good rulers, is simply impossible.52 The reasons un-
derlying this impossibility can, in my view, be traced back to the lack of any 
positive function of the public sphere in Paretian thought. Rather, the pub-
lic sphere, as conceived by Pareto, was seen only as the place where ideol-
ogies and values dictated by sentiment and an emotive response, which are 
in their very essence irrational, clash without any possibility of mediation. It 
should also be pointed out that this manner of thinking conceals a confu-
sion and inability to distinguish between "incommensurability" and "in-
comparability": for even if one believes that subjective values are incom-
mensurable, this need not mean that they are by their very nature 
incomparable.53 In contrast, the Einaudian conception of the public sphere 
starts out from the idea that comparison and exchange of ideas and values 
can open up a route to mediation. Furthermore, as an advocate of the 
beauty of struggle, Einaudi sees the comparison-contrast of ideas as desir-
able, so that the quest for truth, for improvement and the new can always 
be left open. 
52 V. PARETO, "Il crepuscolo della libertà" ( 1 9 0 4 ) , in Oeuvres complètes, t. XVIII, Écrits poli-
tiques, II, Reazione, libertà, fascismo (Genève, Droz, 1 9 8 9 ) , pp. 3 9 9 - 4 1 3 : 4 1 1 . 
53 Here I use the distinction made by G. MARRAMAO, La passione del presente. Breve lessico del-
la modernità-mondo (Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2 0 0 8 ) , p. 4 2 , where the author argues that is it ne-
cessary to (re)consider - and thus seek to go beyond the perspectives of Rawls and Habermas - the 
role of rhetoric in the public sphere, provided that it is a case of "rhetoric with proof': "only by 
adopting this kind of criterion will it be possible to elude the paralyzing dilemma between the abso-
lutism of truth and point-of-view relativism, taken as mirror-image and opposite forms of justified 
self-reference. Not everything that presents itself as incommensurable - i.e. quite literally, that cannot 
be reduced to a homogeneous criterion of measurement (for example, the values or beliefs of different 
cultural contexts) - must thereby necessarily be regarded as incomparable". 
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I would therefore argue that one of the problems of Pareto's political-
sociological theories lies in his conception of struggle, in particular struggle 
for power, as well as his conception of "social heterogeneousness" (today, 
it would be referred to as value polytheism). The Paretian conception of "social 
heterogeneousness" is extreme to the point that he is unable to conceive of 
any form of mediation between rulers and the ruled: the struggle for power 
is a struggle with no holds barred, history is but an "élite graveyard" and 
"freedom is a luxury".54 
But one might have felt moved to address the following question to Pa-
reto: if everything is just power, then what is the point of voicing your opinion? 
Why on earth devote yourself to the exercise of criticismi What is it that spurs 
you to engage in criticai debate? Or alternatively, as suggested in Einaudi's 
objections, if history is none other than a cyclical succession of "the oppressed 
and the oppressors, subordinate classes and dominating classes", if rulers ob-
tain obedience, legitimacy and consensus only through tools that are effec-
tively "pseudo-logical [i.e. "myth", "formulas", "derivations"] helpful for giv-
ing a false stamp of approvai to the brute fact" of power,55 then everything is 
power. And yet, equally, if everything is power, then nothing is such any long-
er. Any regulatory criterion is lost, as is any "ideal schema", to quote the term 
Einaudi adopted as a means of distinguishing good rulers from the bad ones 
and good "myth" and/or "formulas" of legitimation from the bad versions. 
But for Einaudi, unlike Pareto, evil is not a necessary and ineluctable datum 
that is reiterated throughout history according to the logie of eternai recur-
rence: history is not cyclical, and the future is open. If Pareto held good gov-
ernment to be impossible, for Einaudi good government is another world that 
is (stili and always) possible.56 
In short, the great difference between Pareto ad Einaudi lies in the fact 
that the latter attributed enormous importance to the public sphere, both 
in terms of its function as a criticai constraint on power, and also as the "third 
54 As shown in Busino's very effettive synthesis, in Pareto's political-sociological thought "one 
reality alone is ever-lasting: namely, there is a stratifìcation in politicai and social life, that of the ruling 
and the ruled. It is essentially oligarchie. Politicians promise radicai change but as soon as they have 
come to power they defend a society which has nothing to do with whatever they promised. Then, 
social life is hell, cruelty is unending and the social agents are victims of illusion and myths. Men have 
only one small light at their disposai, a single weapon with which to fight: science" (G. BUSINO, "The 
signification of Vilfredo Pareto's sociology", Revue européenne des sciences sociales, 38, n. 117 
(2000), pp. 217-228: 226). 
55 L. EINAUDI, Miti e paradossi della giustizia tributaria (1940, second edition revised and exten-
ded) (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1959), p. 290. 
56 Symptomatic in this regard are the conclusions of the essay on Le Play: L. EINAUDI, Il peccato 
originale e la teoria della classe eletta in Federico Le Play cit., p. 328 (my italics). 
7 
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place" of mediation between the ruled and the rulers, and, additionally, as a 
place where it is possible to cooperate by starting out from (or with a view to) 
shared values. 
Einaudi had reached these same conclusions in his attempt to distinguish 
the "optimum tax" from the "taille tax" (that is to say, a tax that is perceived 
as an imposed levy). The "optimality" of the tax could not be based exclu-
sively on a cost-and-benefit criterion, and it inevitably raised the problem 
of power, leading to the need to discriminate between rulers who rule with 
a view to promoting the common good and those who rule for their own gain, 
or otherwise stated, to distinguish the "finance of the Periclean city" from the 
"finance of the tyrannical government".57 In this sense, the conclusions put 
forward in Miti e paradossi della giustizia tributaria are emblematic: 
If it's a question of coercing people into paying taxes, then any old despot is per-
fecdy able to do that. But the leader chosen by the valentior pars of the citizens [...] 
intends to elevate the mortals of the earthly city to the divine city, where the word 
"tax" is unknown, because ali the people know the reason and the value of the sacrifice 
offered on the aitar of the common good.58 
3.2. "Rule of law", constitutional order, legitimacy 
In Einaudi's thought one finds no hierarchical opposition between the 
"rule of law" and "rule by men". This was not simply because he was firmly 
convinced that in order to make good laws it is essential to have good (and 
prudent) rulers, or because, as is often said, laws exist only insofar as they 
are made by men (although in this case a distinction should be drawn between 
governing per leges and governing sub lege):59 rather, it was also because even 
the supreme constitutional Law cannot, according to Einaudi, be absolutized 
or hypostatized, and it must remain open to the possibility of change. More-
over, the "rule of law" and "rule by men", inasmuch as these involve 'ruling' 
or 'governing' or 'commanding', need to be recognized in order to be obeyed. 
But let us proceed step by step. 
The expression "rule of law" [" impero della legge"]60 is used by the Pied-
montese liberal statesman in three different ways, in different contexts. 
5 7 L . EINAUDI, Miti e paradossi della giustizia tributaria cit., pp. 263 and ff. 
ss Ibid., p. 297. 
5 9 N . BOBBIO, "Governo degli uomini o governo delle leggi?", in ID., Il futuro della democrazia 
(Torino, G. Einaudi, 1991), pp. 175-179. 
60 Einaudi's phrase in Italian "Impero della legge" is, very probably, his translation of the "rule 
of law". We hold die expression "impero della legge" signifìcant because of its analogy, though 
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Firstly, and in the generic formulation adopted in Verso la città divina, Einau-
di dwells on "the limit ed state which guarantees men the rule of law", under-
stood here "as a condition for anarchy of the spirits", that is to say, as a con-
dition for the pluralism of ideas, actions and visions of the world.61 Many 
years later, musing on his earlier thoughts and turning over in his mind the 
objection he had raised against Croce's liberalism concerning the virtual indif-
ference of the latter towards the economical, legai and institutional aspect of 
liberalism,62 Einaudi utilized the phrase "rule of law", describing it as a "ne-
cessary condition", albeit not a sufficient condition, for a free society. In his 
view, the observance of these conditions "embodies, to a large extent, the 
content of concrete liberalism, liberalism as politicai action. Clearly, this is 
not ali there is in liberalism", because "the life of a man living in society can-
not be infused from outside, but rather must come from an inner creative 
force. This notwithstanding, forms themselves have a virtue of their own; only 
within the forms can man satisfy the need for freedom, and undertake the ef-
fort to achieve material and moral elevation". But we are dealing here with 
"formai conditions or guarantees that are necessary so that men living in 
never explicated by Einaudi, with the "impero della verità" ["rule of truth", see section 3.3]. On the 
historical relationship between rule of law and constitution cf. C.H. Me ILWAIN, Constitutionalism: 
ancient and modem (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University press, 1 9 4 7 ) ; M. DOGLIANI, Introduzione aldi-
ritto costituzionale (Bologna, E Mulino, 1994 ) . From a liberal point of view: cf. B. LEONI, Freedom 
and the law (Princeton, N.J., D . Van Nostrand, 1 9 6 1 ) ; F.A. VON HAYEK, The Constitution of Liberty 
(London, Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1 9 6 0 ) ; ED., Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 3 volumes (London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973-1976-1979), and, more recendy, V.J. VANBERG, "Liberal constitu-
tionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy", Constitutional Politicai Economy, 4 / 0 3 / 2 0 1 0 
(on line). For a re-reading of Leoni's thought, also with particular reference to the criticisms raised 
against von Hayek as the advocate of the Continental "rule of law": C. LOTTIERI, Le ragioni del di-
ritto. Libertà individuale e ordine giuridico nel pensiero di Bruno Leoni (Soveria Mannelli - Treviglio, 
Rubbettino - Facco, 2006), pp. 13-50. For a different reading of Hayekian philosophy of law: P. HE-
RITIER, Ordine spontaneo ed evoluzione nel pensiero di Hayek (Napoli, Jovene, 1 9 9 7 ) , especially 
pp. 2 4 3 - 2 9 4 . From different perspectives: J. RAZ, "The Rule of Law and Es Virtue", in ED., The Author-
ity of Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1 9 7 9 ) ; ED., "The Politics of the Rule of Law", Ratio Juris, 3 , n. 3 
( 1 9 9 0 ) , pp. 3 3 1 - 3 3 9 ; contra: F. VIOLA, " E Rule ofLaw e E concetto di diritto", Ragion pratica ( 30 
June 2008), pp. 151-168; E. COLOMBATTO, "It Was the Rule ofLaw, Will It Be the Rule of Judges?", 
Revue économique, 5 8 , n. 6 (November 2 0 0 7 ) , pp. 1 1 6 3 - 1 1 8 0 . 
6 1 L . EINAUDI, Verso la città divina cit., pp. 3 2 - 3 6 . 
62 L. EINAUDI - B . CROCE, Liberismo e liberalismo, P . SOLARI (ed.) (Milano - Napoli, Ricciardi, 
1957). On this debate cf., among others, B . LEONI, "Conversazioni su Einaudi e Croce", Biblioteca 
della libertà, X X I I , n. 98 (July-September 1987), pp. 55-81; R. FAUCCI, Einaudi cit., pp. 294-302; 
F . FORTE, " I liberalesimi di Einaudi e di Croce" (1989 and 1994), in ID., L'economia liberale di Luigi 
Einaudi. Saggi (Firenze, Leo Olschki, 2009), pp. 193 -221; P. SILVESTRI, Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi 
o del buongoverno cit., chap. IV, pp. 191-232; I have tried to unravel the knotty points and the mis-
understandings of this debate in a critical-constructive approach in "Rileggendo Einaudi e Croce: 
spunti per un liberalismo fondato su un'antropologia della libertà", Annali della Fondazione Luigi 
Einaudi, XLI (2007), pp. 201-240. 
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society can be assured of a life lived in freedom".63 Finally, during his 
exchange of ideas with Croce, Einaudi had introduced the concept of the rule 
of law as a criterion to distinguish between liberalism-liberism (which for him 
were strictly linked) on the one hand and socialism and communism on the 
other, in the attempt to dispel the common misconception that identifies 
liberism with non-interventionism. Since it had now become quite clear to 
him that the difference between "liberist" and "interventionist" did not reside 
in the quantity (for example, private property vs. public property) but rather 
in the type of intervention by the state in the market, the problem now 
became that of distinguishing among the different types of intervention. 
In Einaudi's view, whereas the "interventionist law-maker" proceeds 
through command-rules or directives, i.e. by telling individuals what "they 
must do and not do", the liberal-liberist law-maker says to the people: "I will 
certainly not teli you what you must do, but I will fix the limits within which 
you will be able to move freely, at your own risk".64 The distinction would 
thus seem to He between "command-rules" and "framework-rules", or be-
tween "specific command" and "general and abstract law", "arbitrary power" 
and "law", "administrative" and "juridical" action.65 
While it may be true, as Bobbio pointed out, that there is a hint of an ana-
logy with the Hayekian distinction between rules of organization and rules of 
conduct,66 it is nevertheless undeniable that Einaudi did not enquire into the 
full philosophical-legal imphcations of these distinctions. In other words, in 
Einaudi there is no clarification either of the meaning of the law-maker's 
act in "fixing the limits" or of the nature of this "limit", even though Einaudi 
mentions it repeatedly, associating it with the notion of "condition" of possi-
bihty. In actual fact, the distinction between "command" and "framework" is 
labile because even the framework itself imposes some "constraints".67 More-
over, as already noted by Leoni, however general and abstract these con-
straints may be, they do not avert the eventuaKty that even the liberist law-
maker may end up telling men "what they must do". For instance, following 
the examples adduced by Einaudi, "the Hberist law-maker" who sets the limits 
on free action, says: 
6 3 L . EINAUDI, Memorandum, G. BERTA (ed.) (Venezia, Marsilio, 1 9 9 4 ) , pp. 4 5 - 4 6 (my italics). 
64 ID., "Liberismo e comunismo" (1941), in II buongoverno cit., pp. 273-274. 
65 ID., Memorandum cit., p. 30. 
66 N. BOBBIO, "Il pensiero politico di Luigi Einaudi" (1974), in L. EINAUDI, Memorandum cit., 
p. 94. 
67 Cf. also ID., "Discorso elementare sulle somiglianze e sulle dissomiglianze fra liberalismo e 
socialismo" (1957), in Prediche inutili cit., p. 220. 
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If you are an industrialist, you will be able to freely choose your workers, but you 
will not be allowed to keep them at work for more than such and such a number of 
hours a day or night, and the number will vary depending on whether they are ado-
lescents, men or women; you will have to insure them against accidents in the work-
place, disability, old age, or illness. Your will have to make comfort rooms available 
for breast-feeding women, and washing areas equipped with showers and water for 
the workmen to get washed; you will have to abide by health and safety regulations 
in the working areas68 
and so forth. Surveying these examples, Leoni objected that it is 
hard to understand why the liberist intervention should limit itself, say, to showers for 
the workmen and not go so far as to include, one might suggest, play-school for the 
workers' children; or why it should go so far as to include the showers instead of lim-
iting itself to water or cleaning the various areas. In short, one is quite spontaneously 
prompted to ask: where does the intervention called liberist begin, or indeed, where 
does it end? And why should it be regarded as being of a different type compared to 
the intervention known as socialist? 69 
However, on closer inspection, it could be said that Einaudi's line of rea-
soning presupposes that the "duties" imposed by the liberist lawmaker will be 
obeyed inasmuch as certain minimum prerequisites of dignity and hygiene in 
the workplace have received prior recognition and have been commonly ac-
cepted. In this context, it is no coincidence that during the period of time 
in question, while drafting an extensive review of Ròpke's Die Gesellshaftskri-
sis der Gegenwart, Einaudi had begun to address the question of the limits 
and condition of possibility of competitive struggle. Granting that the degen-
erations of capitalismi were not to be attributed to "the economics of compe-
tition" but to " f a i lur e to observe the rules of the game of competition", he felt 
it was nevertheless imperative to recognize the "cruciai importance of an ethi-
cal-legal-institutional setting suited to the principles of the economy itself', 
where the pride of place awarded to "ethical" would seem to suggest that 
the " legal-institutional' aspect itself presupposes values.70 
68 ID., Liberismo e comunismo cit., p. 274 (my italics). 
69 B. LEONI, Conversazioni su Einaudi e Croce cit., p. 65 (my italics). 
70 L. EINAUDI, "Economia di concorrenza e capitalismo storico. La terza via fra i secoli XVHI e 
XIX", Rivista di storia economica (June 1942), pp. 49-72. Note that Ròpke had not only grasped "the 
vast programme of 'good government' to which Einaudi devoted the whole of his life" (see supra), 
but he also reciprocated Einaudi's admiration, to the point of considering him as one of the "leaders 
of modem liberalism" (W. RÒPKE, Scritti liberali, A. FRUMENTO (ed.), ital. transl. (Firenze, Sansoni, 
1974), p. 114). On Einaudi and Ròpke, allow me again to refer the reader to P. SILVESTRI, Il liberali-
smo di Luigi Einaudi o del buongoverno cit., pp. 238-244; cf. most recendy F. FORTE, "Einaudi e Ròp-
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Once again, Einaudi's argument should be more carefully considered by set-
ting it in the context of the aim he was seeking to achieve, namely that of con-
futing the false identifìcation between liberism and non interventionism. His 
conclusion in this regard is instructive. The line of demarcatìon sought by Einau-
di did not so much concern the "framework/command" dichotomy, since both 
the framework and the command, inasmuch as they are limits, must be freely 
recognized in order to be obeyed. The decisive question thus becomes the "cri-
ticai point", a theme introduced by Einaudi in this context and then developed 
later (see section 4). Moreover, open and active participation in the public 
sphere, criticai debate and its publicity (rather than the framework-law per se) 
plays an essential role in rendering any legislative measure "universal" and not 
"arbitrary", and therefore legitimate. In other words, the dread of command 
laws stems not from the argument that they have a coercive "essence", but from 
their potentially paternalistic impact, although it has to be admitted that not 
even the general and abstract laws are exempt from such an eventuality. Patern-
alism is always an inbuilt feature of what Einaudi called the "short route" to 
security, happiness and well-being. By contrast, the "long route" is necessarily 
"laborious and uncertain", and "it cannot be otherwise; because men have to 
engage in experiments at their own risk [...]; because men do not improve when 
someone takes it upon himself to decide, on their behalf and in their name, what 
they must and must not do: rather, men must acquire their education by them-
selves and make themselves morally capable of taking decisions under their own 
responsibility".71 Therefore, what is really at stake in the 'doctrine' of the "cri-
ticai point", in the sense described here, is the twofold concept of freedom-
responsibility. "If I had to give a definition", Einaudi concluded, 
I would say that any measure for greater social justice or statization that goes be-
yond the criticai point is communistic, and any measure that wisely succeeds in re-
maining somewhat below it is liberal. This clearly shows that the crux of the dispute 
[on liberism-liberalism vs. socialism-communism] does not reside in the measure it-
self but in the means which ensure it stays within the criticai point limits or else make 
it overstep these limits.72 
Einaudi also focused attention on an identical problem of limits and their 
recognition with regard to the founding values of the constitutional order. He 
ke. Interventi conformi ed economia sociale di mercato" (2001), in L'economia liberale diL. Einaudi 
cit., pp. 223-238. 
71 L. EINAUDI, Liberismo e comunismo cit., p. 2 7 5 . 
72 Ibid., pp. 277-278. 
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expounded his ideas in the substantial essay «Major et sanior pars» ossia della 
tolleranza e dell'adesione politica (January 1945),7j written as he looked to-
wards the phase of the Constituent Assembly in Italy, of which he himself 
was one of the most eminent protagonists. This essay was also one of the ways 
in which, as an 'old liberal', he sought to come to terms with the nascent de-
mocratic order: if "the constitution of the modem states is founded on the 
principle of the major pars, of the majority", nevertheless this principle, he ar-
gued, could not and was not to be considered its ultimate foundation. For our 
purposes here, it is sufficient to highlight just a few of the problems addressed 
by Einaudi. 
First, it was important to avoid reducing legitimacy to the procedural 
criterion of the major pars, and likewise to avoid reducing legitimacy to legality. 
This was vital, Einaudi wrote, not only to limit the "abuse of power by the 
majority over the minority, or because democracy can always degenerate into 
"demagogy", but also because a state of "tyranny" and corruption can per-
fecdy easily take shape under the umbrella of "legality". Therefore the most 
appropriate regulatory criterion to pursue is one where 
if we use the term 'democratic' to designate a society whose government is intent on 
achieving the greatest possible moral and material good of the men who today and 
tomorrow are the components of the national community, then we can say that the 
more the 'majority' - which is necessarily entrusted with choosing the select govern-
ing group - succeeds in identifying the elected with the sanior pars of the politicai 
ruling class, 
in other words with the "meliores", the "mise", the "prudent", the greater will 
be the likelihood of fulfilling the aim of establishing a democratic society. 
With regard to the regulatory criterion of the tendency towards identification 
between the ruled and the rulers, in the liberal approach this was to be 
brought about through the fundamental mediating function of the public 
sphere. In contrast, the mechanism of checks and balances, important though 
it was in containing the abuse of power or arbitrary power of the majority, 
appeared to Einaudi as a second best, so much so that "checks" can fulfill 
their function only "if the men [of the majority] are willing to be "tolerant", 
that is to say only in the extent to which society lives in a climate of concord 
supported by inalienable values, which are usually and historically recognized 
as such in the wake of bloody batdes, injustice and unspeakable suffering. 
73 Ali the citations below are taken from L . EINAUDI, "Major et sanior pars ossia della tolleranza 
e dell'adesione politica" (1945), in II buongoverno cit., pp. 92-112. 
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Now, Einaudi went on, over time these values crystallize into dogmas and 
taboos internalized by common consciousness, and it is these dogmas and 
taboos that operate as "invisible" limits on power. 
An old English brocard - Einaudi explained - states that the House of Commons 
can do anything save transform a man into a woman and viceversa. Like ali brocards, 
it is silent on the point that that there are many things law-makers could do, but do 
not do because a mysterious invisible hand closes their mouth and prevents them from 
uttering words different from those the centuries have engraved in men's consciences. 
Continuing in this same line of reasoning, and in a passage of Burkean 
ascendancy,74 Einaudi writes that: 
The checks are an extension of the will of dead men, who say to the men that are 
alive today: you shall not operate as you please [...]; you shall, under pain of violating 
solemn oaths and constitutional charters, observe certain rules that we held to be 
essential for conservation of the state we founded. If you wish to change these rules, 
you must first engagé in prolonged reflection, you must obtain the consensus of the 
greater part of your fellow-men, you will have to tolerate the circumstance that some 
groups among them, the minority of them, will obstinately refuse to consent to the 
change desired by the overwhelming proportion of citizens. 
On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the "legai checks writ-
ten into the constitution are rigid" and since "in moments of great politicai 
tension, when men become intolerant" and there is an "urgent demandi for 
"reforms", "the lack of a safety valve can lead to a violent change of regime". 
Given these circumstances, Einaudi maintains, it is only through the prudence 
and the "sense of historical responsibility" of the ruling elite that a way out of 
this type of " l e g a l l y insoluble dilemma" can be found. 
In short, it can be observed that the Einaudian approach calls for a two-
fold legitimation criterion: politicai, i.e. concerning the question of how those 
who are ruled over can proceed to identify the good elite, and juridical, which 
is to a large extent dependent on the criterion that regulates criticai discussion 
concerning both ordinary and constitutional laws. "An enduring, fertile law 
has as its essential characteristic the support of the minority for the resolution 
passed by the majority". But in order for this "support" to be authentic and 
consciously expressed, and not merely the fruit of a compromise of do ut des, 
it must necessarily undergo the stage of "criticism", "debate", "contrasting 
74 An ascendancy noted by B . LEONI, Luigi Einaudi e la scienza del governo cit., p. 83. 
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ideas", as it proceeds on the route that leads to the formation of laws. Only 
through criticism and contrast can the law, which is "always formally coer-
cive", "become the common fruit of the majority and the minority"; "only 
then do the people say: this is the law. And only then do they obey it". 
However, in Einaudi's vision there is one more "final" level of legitimacy, 
namely the foundational and invisible level (to use Einaudi's own words). This 
coincides with the myth and dogmas that act as the supporting structure for 
the entire institutional and social order: these are by definition, albeit tem-
porarily, shielded from criticism. In the one and only essay where Einaudi 
focuses directly and explicitly on the problem of legitimacy, he maintains that 
stable "politicai society" are "built on the rock-solid base of juridically inde-
finable myth, and of some words whose meaning is probably impossible to 
define, yet these myth and words embody the will of the past and the consensus 
of the living". These myth are often condensed into a "formula that goes vir-
tually unnoticed [...] against which nobody raises any objection". Inasmuch as 
they are a force of social cohesion, these formulas and/or rituals are "states of 
mind" that constitute "the basis of legitimacy". This is how institutions come 
to be accepted by the "future generations".75 
Resuming the basic theme being developed in this article, we can thus as-
sert that these "myth" are figures of auctoritas (in Latin augere = to found, pro-
mote, endow with authenticity) from which springs power, and which form the 
supporting structure of society. It is an auctoritas which precisely for this reason 
cannot be reduced to a procedural, legalistic or technical-engineering config-
uration of power, such as the modem version of legal-rational power. From this 
perspective, it is worth noticing that many current social sciences adopt, in my 
view, a reductive conception of laws and institutions as mere "rules of the 
game" meant as a set of constraints or opportunities, or the means for the pur-
suit of given aims. Such approaches neglect the problem of the internalisation 
of institutions and of their normative authority, thus overlooking the anthropo-
logically more authentic meaning of "instituting ' in the strict sense of instituere 
[establishing (statuere) inside (in-)], but also of founding and educating. Insti-
tutions are far more than mere "rules of the game": they are mirrors of (indi-
viduai and collective) identity and they are endowed with a normative structure 
that is much more profoundly rooted in feeling than in instrumentai rationality. 
Institutions are mediatore between "inner life" and "public life", as connecting 
structures and a medium of communication. 
75 L. EINAUDI, "Della paura" (1946), in Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia. 1943-1947 
cit., pp. 223-226 (my italics). 
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3.3. "Rule of truth" 
If the elected ruling class imagined by Einaudi was certainly not conceived 
as the repository of truth concerning the common good,76 much less was it in 
a position to impose such a good on the governed. In a final attempt to refor-
mulate the status of the public sphere, and, in particular, the fundamental role 
of the press as a criticai voice, Einaudi wrote: "truth is no person's privilege 
and arises only from open contrast among opposing opinions. Defense of the 
common good is the privilege of no social group"; therefore, since "the notion 
of the common good, of the general interest" cannot be defined [...] we must 
resign ourselves to listening with due respect to ali the multifarious views 
and obtaining the greatest possible harmony from that confused babble of 
voices".77 Another significant aspect is that even the 
power of the majorities encounters a lìmit in the truth of the resolution they have 
adopted. [...] In a free society, the process of debate does not end with the majority 
vote. [...] A law truly enters into the holy of holies and is inscribed in the bronze 
tables of the law when [after prolonged debate] criticism falls silent. [...] Therefore 
the most supreme legislative power in every free country, does not reside in parliament. 
The latter is only one of the manifestations, the legai face, of power. 
In this essay, what is significant is not only the fact of assuming "truth" as 
the "limit" on power, but also the fact that Einaudi assigns to criticai con-
science - in its specific manifestation as the press, which acts as the "mouth-
piece" of this conscience - the duty to speak in the name of a veritas which 
here seems to assume a transcendental dimension. The newspaper, Einaudi 
concludes, should become the "mouth of truths", of "eternai" truths, so that 
it can give voice to "the conscience of man, who aspires to reach up to 
God".78 Admittedly, this line of reasoning is more allusive than persuasive, 
but it does testify to Einaudi's persistent need to leave open that 'third place' 
in which the 'rule of truth' is decreed and freely recognized, and from which 
legitimacy should issue. In the words he wrote as late 1957, "truth lives only 
because it can be denied. Since we are free to deny it at any moment, we assert 
the rule of truth [" impero della verità"] every time".79 
76 In this regard: ID., "Gian Giacomo Rousseau, le teorie della volontà generale e del partito 
guida e il compito degli universitari" (1956), in Prediche inutili cit., passim. 
7 7 ID., "Tipi di giornali" ( 1 9 4 6 ) , in Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia. 1943-1947 cit 
p. 2 4 6 . 
78 Ibid., pp. 259-260. 
7 9 L . EINAUDI, Gian Giacomo Rousseau, le teorie della volontà generale e del partito guida e il 
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4 . IN A NUTSHELL: THE DOCTRINE OF THE "CRITICAL POINT" 
To clarify the elusive meaning of the "criticai point", never formalized by 
Einaudi himself, but constantly reformulated with examples and metaphors, 
one can paraphrase his 'definition' of liberalism: the criticai point is a doctrine 
of limits. It expresses the need for a median point, a genuine golden mean, as 
well as a 'mediating figure', in other words a figure capable of mediating the 
oppositions and the different tension lines that emerge in the 'moments of 
crisis' Einaudi had found himself facing during his prolonged reflection: security 
versus struggle, conservation versus innovation, tradition versus criticism, so-
cial equilibrium versus dynamism, state intervention versus individuai free-
dom. In its essence, the doctrine of the criticai point lies at the core of that 
"sound, vibrant and vital society" Einaudi had alluded to in his debate with 
Rossi, which he had subsequently addressed in greater detail in the essay-
review on Ròpke. In this sense, the "criticai point" is a figure that synthesizes 
the law-freedom nexus.80 Its most effective formulation is perhaps found in 
the Lezioni di politica sociale [Lectures on Social Policy] (written during his 
Swiss exile in 1943-44), when, with the rising concept of the welfare state, Ei-
naudi felt it was essential to consider the problem of the 'demarcation line' 
between the state and civil society. "The criticai point marks the transition 
from live men to automata".81 It is the point beyond which the intervention 
of the state is transformed from physiological to pathological, and beyond 
which the welfare state, as Einaudi often repeated, is turned into a society re-
duced to "panem et circenses". In this perspective, and in a final chapter on 
compito degli universitari cit., p. 201. Here Einaudi warned against acridcal acceptance of the many 
"formulas" which, over the curse of history, "from Robespierre to Babeuf, from Buonarroti to Saint-
Simon, from Fourier to Marx, from Mussolini to Hitler, from Lenin to Stalin", have claimed to 
impose themselves as absolute truths: "virtue", "the religion of science", "the dominance of blood 
and race", "dictatorship of the proletariat", and so forth. Thus Einaudi warned his young students, 
to whom these comments were addressed, not to lose the awareness "of not knowing; our motto is 
one and one alone: we do not know, but we seek, the truth; we are never sure of possessing it and we 
will come back to seek it day by day, constandy unsatisfied and always spurred by curiosity". 
80 For a different interpretation of the criticai point: S. RICOSSA, "Sulla teoria del punto criti-
co", in Luigi Einaudi. Ricordi e testimonianze (Firenze, Le Monnier, 1983), pp. 67-73. 
81 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale (Torino, G . Einaudi, 1949), p. 238. Therefore, Einaudi 
explains, if we extend "the program" of state intervention "beyond its own sphere, which is the pub-
lic sphere, to include the sphere that is proper of the individuai, the family, the social group, the 
close-knit community, the voluntary association, the charitable educational foundation, ali of which 
are certainly coordinateti and intertiependent institutions but endowed with their own independent 
life, their own will, then we will have overstepped the criticai point. In this case we would be faceti 
not with a society of living men, but an aggregate of automata maneuvered by a center, by a higher 
authority" (ibid.). 
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The task of the market and how it can be oriented, Einaudi endeavored to re-
formulate once again his gradualist reformism. 
We can and therefore we must ensure that the market makes use of its good abil-
ity to govern the production and distribution of wealth within certain limits, which 
we consider to be right and just and conforming to our ideals of a society where 
ali men have the possibility of developing their abilities in the best possible manner, 
and where, even if absolute equality cannot be reached - for this would be compa-
tible only with the kind of life in anthills and beehives, known in the world of men 
as tyranny, dictatorship, totalitarian regimes - there exist no excessive inequalities 
of wealth and income. Therefore we must establish good laws for ourselves, good in-
stitutions, create a good educational system open to and suited to the various human 
capabilities, and create good habits and customs. We must therefore try to be men 
with a developed sense of awareness, desirous of becoming enlightened and/or of 
acquiring knowledge and education, and we must reach upwards, in a noble compe-
tition. The market, which is already a wondrous mechanism, capable of giving the 
best results within the limits of existing institutions, customs and laws, will be able 
to give even more wonderful results if we succeed in perfecting and reforming the 
institutions, customs and laws of the framework within which the market lives, 
in order to reach up to the highest ideals of life. We will succeed in doing so, if we truly 
desire to.82 
The most comprehensive essay in which Einaudi focuses on the "criticai 
point" as the hallmark of a genuine Uberai society is In lode del profitto [In 
Fraise ofProfit], written in 1956.83 This essay deserves to be extensively cited 
because it offers a highly accomphshed compendium of Einaudi's UberaUsm 
(or the UberaUsm of good government) as a "vision of the world" and "of life" 
which is "varied and plenteous", open to "the uncertain unknown where one 
can glimpse and achieve a new and higher future",84 A socially stable society, 
Einaudi wrote, "must seek to provide safeguards so that life offers security for 
the overwhelming majority of men, who do not love and are incapable of tol-
erating uncertainty, who do not wish to run risks and would be at a loss as to 
how to cope with them". Hence the importance of "public services" and 
"social insurances". This notwithstanding, he warned, ali these proposals 
can be implemented "at one condition: namely, that the criticai point is not 
82 Ibid., p. 36. For a very good account on Einaudi's great equilibrium in keeping together free-
dom, market and social justice, see P.L. PORTA, "Libertà, mercato, giustizia sociale", in Luigi Einau-
di: libertà economica e coesione sociale, A. GIGLIOBIANCO (ed.) (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2010). 
83 The following citations are taken from L . EINAUDI, In lode del profitto cit., pp. 171-193. 
84 ID., Memorandum cit., p. 44. 
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reached". But this criticai point cannot be determined a priori, since the "optimal 
proportion" between security and struggle (and the "risk" the latter brings with 
it), between tradition and criticism, conservation and innovation, "can be 
determined only by experience which is constantly renewed". In order to avoid 
exceeding the criticai point, "the men of the minority are necessary because the 
economie, social, moral and intellectual mechanism of a vibrant and progressive 
society is necessarily subject to risks; because l i f e itself is change, it is continuous 
variation, it is a succession of crises, of high and low points, continuous 
transitions". It is important to recali that for Einaudi, in economie activity, in 
private property and in the enterprise spirit, it was the very essence of freedom 
that was at stake. In contrast to Croce's point of view, Einaudi believed that 
economie activity could not be reduced to the category of "Utile". This was, 
fundamentally, the conviction that led Einaudian liberalism to set limits on state 
interference for reasons that were first and foremost 'moral', rather than simply 
involving considerations of the efficiency of the system. It therefore need come 
as no surprise that in this context "profit" becomes a condition and a symbol of 
a freedom evoking "man's gaze [...] directed towards the new, and upwards". A 
"society without risks" is a society condemned to death or inevitably on its way 
towards a "totalitarian" system. It is precisely for this reason that 
the risk-related profits of entrepreneurs must continue to exist if the economie system 
is to be elastic, capable of withstanding the jolts of the never-ending variations of 
technical change and of industriai inventions; if, in other words, we wish human 
society to undergo transformations and grow. Profit is the price that has to be paid in 
order to allow thought to advance freely towards the conquest of truth, and in order 
for innovatore to have a chance to test their discoveries, for enterprising men to con-
stantly break down the frontier of the known, of the already experienced, and move to-
wards the unknown that is stili open to the material and moral advancement of man. 
5 . ALLUSIVE (IN)CONCLUSION: THE FIGURE OF THE GOOD GOVERNMENT 
Throughout his long years of reflection on the challenges of his era and 
the fertile exchange of ideas with some of the illustrious scholars of the time, 
Einaudi had reached the conclusion that the liberal doctrine of struggle, 
which presupposes an ideal model of man and society and was thus to be re-
garded as a non-neutral doctrine, should on the one hand not be imposed, 
but, at best, preached,85 and on the other, it should be subjected to limits, 
85 In this regard, a position very similar to that of Einaudi is the point of view adopted by 
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so that it could be widely recognized and accepted. If throughout his life Ei-
naudi remained faithful to his conviction of the fertility of struggle, as time 
went by he nevertheless revised the two foci of good government in terms 
of "ceaseless endeavouring and experimenting",86 operating both in "debate" 
and "action". These were the themes addressed in some of Einaudi's last Pre-
diche inutili [Useless Preachings] (1955-1959), where struggle takes on the role 
of no less than a method of freedom. "The method 'of freedom' - Einaudi 
specified - is founded on the principle of trial and error". Those who apply 
this method 
recognize from the very start that they may fall into error and desire that others may 
attempt to demonstrate the error and discover the proper way to truth [...] Freedom 
exists as long as there exists the possibility of debate, and criticism. Trial and error, the 
possibility of making an attempt and going wrong; the freedom of criticism and op-
position; these are the characteristics of free regimes.87 
In sum, 
the great merit of free govemments as compared to tyrannical regimes is precisely the 
fact that in a regime where freedom reins, debate and action proceed through the 
method of trial and error. This is the emblem of the superiority of the methods of 
freedom over those prevailing under tyranny. A tyrant is never racked by doubt: a 
tyrant marches straight ahead on the chosen path; but the path leads the country 
to disaster.88 
Thus the liberal society whose advent Einaudi sought to promote "is 
founded", in the last analysis - in other words, stands or collapses - on a two-
fold "recognition" which must be conceded "from the very start": recognition 
of one's fallibility and recognition of the desires and beliefs "of others". This 
J . M . BUCHANAN, Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2 0 0 5 ) , in particular The Soul of Classical Liberalism, pp. 5 2 - 6 1 . 
86 L. EINAUDI, Discorso elementare sulle somiglianze e le dissomiglianze tra liberalismo e sociali-
smo cit., p. 241: "only through struggle, only through never-ending endeavors and experiments, only 
through successes and failures can a society or a nation thrive. When struggle comes to an end, this 
signals the death of society". Building on this argument, Marchionatti righdy defined Einaudi as a 
"theorist of the open society" (R. MARCHIONATTI, "Luigi Einaudi, economista e liberale", in Maestri 
dell'Ateneo torinese dal Settecento al Novecento, R . ALLÌO (ed.) (Torino, Centro Studi di Storia del-
l'Università di Torino, 2004) , pp. 61-84: 84) . 
87 L. EINAUDI, "Scuola e libertà" (1956), in Prediche inutili cit., pp. 57-58 (my italics). 
8 8 ID., "Che cosa rimarrebbe allo stato?" ( 1 9 5 9 ) , in Prediche inutili cit., pp. 3 4 5 - 3 4 6 . 1 under-
lined the identity between Einaudi and Popper - probably mediated by the thought of J.S. Mill and 
by Einaudi's reading of J . TALMON, "The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy" (London, Secker & 
Warburg, 1 9 5 2 ) - in II liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi o del buongoverno cit., pp. 6 2 - 6 3 . 
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in turn implies willingness to listen, and above ali, willingness to change.89 
However, in Einaudi's eyes these limits were not restricted to the list of con-
straints deriving from human deficiencies or fallibility: rather, as we saw 
above, they were also associated with the limits of the institutional framework 
that 'institutes' and 'guides' human action.90 The "ideal city" of Einaudi's as-
pirations, mid-way between heaven and earth, possibility and reality, is there-
fore a model which, while not claiming to be perfect,91 is perfectible, that is to 
say, it proceeds by trial and error along the road to betterment and improve-
ment, and remains open to the emergence of the "new" and the "unknown". 
Gazing up at the fresco by Ambrogio Lorenzetti on the Effects of Good 
and Bad Government in the countryside and the city, and inserting a few of 
its details into the collection entitled Good government (1954), Einaudi prob-
ably construed it as the ideal model of society that had so long formed the 
object of his quest and his teachings. Pointing to the images of good govern-
ment,, the then President of the Republic, at a distance of six centuries, seems 
to repeat the same gesture as the rulers of Siena, who were determined to 
make it visible, on the walls of the Palazzo pubblico [Civic Building, open 
to the public], as an unequivocal founding reference of their (good) govern-
ment. By doing so, Einaudi indicated a medium in which and through which 
the ruled and the rulers, public and private, could identify themselves. These 
are the images on which he would have aspired to found his "liberal society". 
This was one of the final stages of a journey studded with waystages and 
countless fresh starts: from the divine city to the Periclean polis, from the 
medieval cities "of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries" to the "Italian 
Risorgimento of Mazzini and Cavour" 92 Perhaps this spasmodic motion, 
proceeding by fits and starts, is symptomatic of an unsatisfied quest, an 
endeavor repeatedly taken up again and never brought to a conclusion, along 
the road that looked to good government as the ideal model of society. 
In effect, Einaudi had referred to good government more in an allusive 
manner than in theoretical-conceptual terms, although (as we will see shortly) 
89 I would argue that the same interpretation can be given to the assertion that sees in Einaudi's 
liberalism as a veritable forma mentis-. E. Di Nuoscio, "Le libéralisme de Luigi Einaudi", in 
L'histoire du libéralisme en Europe, P. NEMO - J . PETITOT (eds.) (Paris, Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2006), pp. 651-672. 
90 For a reflection on the institutional question cf. also R. CUBEDDU, Le istituzioni e la libertà 
(Macerata, Liberilibri, 2006), pp. 139-193. 
91 For an anti-perfectionist economie philosophy cf. also S. RICOSSA, La fine dell'economia. Sag-
gio sulla perfezione (1986), preface by E. Colombano (Soveria Mannelli - Treviglio, Rubbettino - Fac-
co, 2006). 
92 L. EINAUDI, Economia di concorrenza e capitalismo storico cit., p. 7 2 . 
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this does not mean it cannot be granted the epistemological status of a theory. 
If good government was never theorized nor, much less, systematized in a har-
monious and accomplished treatise, this is a mark of Einaudi's authentically 
Uberai spirit. The contemporary relevance of the Piedmontese Uberai resides 
in the very circumstance that his thought cannot be reduced to his writings; it 
does not constitute a logicai-categorial, closed and perfect system. His attitude 
of openness to comparison and exchange of ideas, to criticism and change, to 
"experience" and the "new", precluded that he could ever endorse such 
closure. Paraphrasing a celebrated passage from Musil, one could say that 
Einaudi's marked "sense of reaUty" was combined with a no less radicai 
"sense of possibiUty".93 
I would like to clarify this point by dwelling on the philosophical-legal 
perspective put forward by Enrico di Robilant concerning the epistemological 
meaning of "making theory". By introducing the notion of figure, and making 
reference to the aesthetic-perceptual component of theories, de Robilant under-
lines that theory "alludes to something which goes beyond its information 
content". In this perspective, 
the aesthetic force of theories should not be conceived as something aHen to their ex-
planatory structure, for it is inextricably bound up with their structure; therefore it 
can, imphcidy, increase their capacity of representation, their reduction to unity 
and explanation, inasmuch as it displays them in their structure and their internai 
dynamics. Yet although the aesthetic force of theories stems from this structure and 
this dynamic trend, its signifìcance goes beyond the theories themselves, in that it alludes 
to a meaning which cannot be reduced to their description or to information concern-
ing them. For analogously to the 'meaning of a work of art, it can never be fully and 
exhaustively put into words, but only conveyed by means of allusive indications. 
In this sense theories contain 
less of the reaUty that they propose to explain because they constitute a figure based 
on a selection with a theoretical bias; yet on the other hand they contain more than 
the reaUty that is explained, in that they are the bearers of an allusive meaning spring-
ing from their form and transcending the represented and explained reaUty 94 
93 R. MUSIL, L'uomo senza qualità, A. FRISÉ (ed.), ital. trans! (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1996), p. 13. 
While the 'concreteness' of Einaudian thought has often been noted (among others, J.A. SCHUMP-
ETER, History of Economie Analysis (NY, Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 820, 855), it seems to 
me that insuffìcient emphasis has been placed on this 'ideal tension'. 
9 4 E . DI ROBILANT, "La configurazione delle teorie nella scienza giuridica", Rivista internazio-
nale di filosofia del diritto, IV (1976), pp. 470-539: 536. 
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This epistemologica! perspective, applied to the 'juridical' context, implies 
that the law is "a set of theoretical figures that are present in this theoretical 
form and which have to be translated into actual reality"; the law is a "virtual 
reality endowed with the inherent pretence of transforming itself into actual 
reality".95 Now, it is precisely this gap between the virtual and the actual that 
gives rise to normativity.96 
By the same token, in order for ideal good government to become 'real 
(while stili holding the gap between these two registers open) - in order, 
say, for it to be genuinely capable of setting a limit on the "omnipotence of 
the state" but also on "private abuse and oppression",97 it must constitute 
a widely shared axiological horizon. But this horizon, which is itself also 
the figure of a limit, must in turn always remain open to the possibility of 
change, even to the possibility of going beyond its own limit. 
Similarly, and in a stili more significant manner, the ideal good govern-
ment preached by Einaudi in the public sphere spans the overlapping be-
tween economie theory (as a 'science of good government') and narration, be-
tween rationality and identity. It is a constellation of metaphors, symbols, 
emblematic figures, ranging from the myth of the self-made man to the sym-
bolic figure of the pater familias, from the "rule of law" to the "rule of truth", 
from the ideal of the mixed government to the good elite that would be ex-
pected to arise from the "models of private life". Not to mention Einaudi 
the narrator, Einaudi who narrated the 'deeds of the heroes', pointing to them 
as models: the "wise", the "patriarchs", the "innovatore", and the "crazy" 
"builders of their own land", the "speculatore", the "inventore", the "busy 
bees", the "savers", whom he contrasted with the "egoists", the "envious", 
the "slothful", the "wastrels", the "squanderers", the "lazy drones".98 In 
sum, good government itself, through a process of continuous translation-re-
writing - from the good government the Pythia had promised Lycurgus to 
95 ID., Diritto, società e persona. Appunti per il corso di filosofia del diritto 1998-99 (Torino, 
Giappichelli, 1999), p. 32. 
96 For further thoughts on this perspective, seen in terms of the relation between aesthetics and 
normativity, cf. P . HERITER, Società post-hitleriane? cit., especially pp. 167 and ff. 
97 In the solemn message read to the two houses of Parliament on 12'h May 1948 after his elec-
tion to the office of President of the Republic, and addressed to young repuhlican Italy, Einaudi 
spelled out his reformist credo: "to retain of the present social structure ali that which - and only 
that which - is a guarantee of freedom of the human person against the omnipotence of the state 
and against overweening private power, and to guarantee to ali citizens, whatever the circumstances 
of their birth may have been, the greatest possible equality of starting points". 
98 Precisely for this reason I believe it is mistaken, and misleading, to summarize the complexity 
of Einaudi's figure under the illuminist label of "demythologizer" (R. ROMANO, "Introduzione", in 
L. EINAUDI, Scritti economici storici e civili, R . ROMANO (ed.) (Milano, Mondadori, 1973), p. XLI). 
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Lorenzetti's fresco cycle, from the treatises on oikonomia up to the 'good gov-
ernance' of the present-day - is a great mythic symbol that is eternally reactua-
lized. 
However, there is a need for awareness that every translation-rewriting 
may always involve the risk of reducing good government to a legitimizing 
slogan. Such a risk is inherent in that particular construal of good governance 
where the insistence on governmental procedures (and on an instrumentai 
notion of rationality) seems to imply that the procedures are per se a guarantee 
of that good, thereby exploiting the alleged value of efficient procedures to 
mask the power politics going on behind the scenes. 
In some respeets, Einaudi's good government cautions us on this account 
as well. And this is not only because, as he warned, "every generation must 
address the everlasting problem of how to preserve the "freedom of man": 
it is also because the good government portrayed by Einaudi does not lend 
itself to being reduced to efficiency or to the procedures involved in govern-
ment affairs, for the simple reason that the scientific, economie, politicai or 
legai level of his line of reasoning is always overlaid with a mythic, symbolic, 
metaphoric and narrative piane. 
This is also why, in my view, Lorenzetti's pictorial cycle (and Luigi Einau-
di's reference to it) can be seen as far more antbropologically 'complex', open 
and rich then the modem theories of governance and/or good governance. It 
is because it depiets the problem of good government and bad government 
with the different registers and "languages" of the human: theological, politi-
cai, juridical, economie, historical, architectural/city planning-related, sym-
bolic, allegorical, narrative, musical. As such, Lorenzetti's fresco is an emble-
matic testimony to the complexity of the human. Thus the significance of this 
fresco may be rethought by contemplating its anthropological implications: on 
account of the possibility it embodies of developing into a structure that con-
neets, so that what becomes possible, always and only possible, is a meeting 
among men. Moreover, and finally, this fresco does not claim to supply a de-
finitive answer to the problem of good government: rather, it continuously re-
proposes the mystery of its foundation. Like an inexhaustible resource of 
meaningfulness it is everlastingly open to enquiry by man, by man who is for-
ever poised between good and bad government. 
In conclusion, good government is philosophically interesting precisely in-
asmuch as it is a synthesizing-allusive theory-figure. Furthermore, as a figure, 
model or image, good government institutes and inscribes a normativity in 
whoever enters into a relation with it. Indeed, I would say that good govern-
ment is the most all-embracing figure of the law-freedom interplay. Good 
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government is a meta-norm which, poised between 'internai' and 'external', 
internalization and representation, ethos and law, remains open to change if 
and in the extent to which man succeeds in maintaining open the gap between 
heaven and earth, between possibility and reality ("freedom exists as longs as 
there exists the possibility of debate, criticism [...], the possibility of trying 
and going wrong"). 
But, if one wishes to remain faithful to the 'spirit' of Einaudi rather than 
the letter of his 'law', the conclusion cannot but be inconclusive. What I 
might venture to add, with a 'final' variation, or rather with an Epilogue that 
alludes to the Fugue, is that if the "criticai point" represents a figure which is 
a synthesis of the law-freedom nexus, then good government is a figure made 
at image of that Foundation - construable as Authority, Law or Truth - which 
can never be fully possessed, instituted, constituted, positivized. Only by vir-
tue of this consciousness is it the source of a superabundance of meaning 
which is, as such, a guarantee of freedom. 
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PART TWO 
G O O D G O V E R N M E N T A N D P U B L I C G O V E R N A N C E 

ALESSIO L O GIUDICE 
P A T T E R N S O F I D E N T I T Y I N T H E P E R S P E C T I V E 
O F E U R O P E A N G O V E R N A N C E 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
Traditional conceptions developed to study individuai identity have 
formed a platform for analysing the possibilities of collective identities. These 
approaches towards collective identity may lead to some new models able to 
deal with the foundation of post-national processes of social and politicai in-
tegration (such as the European one). At the individuai level, the first ap-
proach to be taken into account is essentialism. Passing to the collective level 
we may find social structuralism. A second approach to individuai identity is 
constructivism, whose homologue at the collective level is social constructi-
vism (within this approach we have different views, too). According to a prag-
matic notion, collective identity is the product of the relationship between 
social actors deeply rooted in concrete experiences. Another view is a model 
of narrative identity that considers the biographical structure as a condition 
for thinkability of collective identity. This paper will show to what extent 
the legai and politicai translation of these approaches towards collective identity 
leads to several useful models that could affect the politicai and legai mise en 
scène of European governance. 
2 . STARTING FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION 
Analyzing the concept of identity requires rebuilding and then restructur-
ing conceptual models in order to be able to read its potential meanings. 
Moreover, we have to deal with a centrai and traditional philosophical ques-
tion - namely, the relationship between the one and the many. Such a rela-
tionship could be articulated on different levels, including metaphysical or po-
liticai, and based on different references, including individuai or collective. 
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Fortunately, my interest is delimited by my desire to study the conceptual 
structure of collective identity as the theoretical horizon from which to estab-
lish post-national institutional perspectives. 
Notwithstanding the boundaries of my research interest, an awareness of 
the huge philosophical question implied by the concept of identity could sup-
port a better understanding of collective identity. In particular, the first out-
come of this awareness is the idea that, while studying the collective dimen-
sion of identity, we have to take into account the traditional concepts 
developed in order to study individuai identity. In other words, the anthropo-
logically verifiable need to reference collective identity arises from the inter-
connection between a philosophical question and a politicai and social one. 
Both questions presuppose the development of individuai identities as fea-
tures of philosophical and politicai exchange. In addition, both questions 
could be previously read at an individuai level. Indeed, to determine one's 
own identity means to synthesize the variety of appearances of an individuai 
throughout life through a unit of agency. That is, by means of a self that is a 
permanent reference notwithstanding ali individuals change over time. This is 
why the philosophical question concerns the conditions for possibilities to ra-
tionally lead multiplicity to unity. Actually, existential pluralism, as an ontolo-
gical feature in living together, stimulates the search for a unitary and identi-
fying element of recognition - a search that is part of the individuai self-
understanding. Ultimately, the practice of social relationships generates a 
vague idea of collective identity - at least as conceived as human collective 
identity - that works to support individuai processes of identitarian specification. 
Clearly, considering the cultural and geographical conditioning of every 
human existence, moving from the idea of human identity to the idea of group 
identity is quite immediate since no relationship takes place out of a specific 
context. The politicai and social question is strictly related to the philosophi-
cal one. As long as a multitude of individuals decide to organize their coha-
bitation institutionally, a search for unitary and common elements arises. This 
search is meant to uncover shared principles, values, experiences, and cus-
toms that allow a group to recognize and identify itself, resulting in support 
for an institutional process of collective specification. At this stage, the refer-
ence is no longer the individuai subject, but the collective one - the group, 
tribe, community, or nation. Therefore, just as individuai identity results from 
the self-interpretation of the meaning that everyone gives to himself/herself, 
the collective identity results from the shared perception of a group as a 
"we" - as a collective unit based on the interpretation of real or imaginary 
common experiences. Linked to this perception of "we" is a corresponding 
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action component given by the collective action, or the idea of agency.1 These 
two features express the concept of collective identity. 
Based on this premise, we could outline the general scheme of this paper. 
In the first part I will present and schematize some of the general lines of 
thought traditionally elaborated upon in the concept of individuai identity. 
In the second part, I will show a possible translation of these traditions at 
the collective level. Finally, in the third part I will sketch the relevance of this 
passage - from the individuai to collective level - in order to support and un-
derstand the construction of a European identity in view of defined European 
governance. 
3 . THE ESSENTIALIST APPROACH IN THE CONCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 
Western philosophical tradition has elaborated on the concept of identity 
using three main ideas: unity, substance, and inner life. Obviously, the ela-
boration of these ideas has not been simultaneous and cannot be linked to just 
one line of thought, yet they are useful tools for reconstructing the most im-
portant conceptual models of identity. In particular, the different understand-
ing of these ideas and the different intersections of them have produced the 
matrixes of specific identitarian models. As long as these three ideas are con-
ceived as "naturai" constitutive elements of individual identity, then we are 
dealing with an essentialist model. The identity is what remains identical not-
withstanding ali changes. It is the quality of the undifferentiated being, the 
possibility itself to operate a reductio ad unum, able to determine what is uni-
form and identical in ali things and what their essence is. According to this 
concept, individual identity is a sort of pre-existent island, to a certain extent 
immutable and unconditioned by inter-subjective relationships or by social 
and cultural features. Parmenides' Eleatic philosophy provides the ancient re-
ference for this concept. His idea of human and non-human identity is repre-
sented through the concept of essence. Unity and substance acquire an onto-
logical qualification while identity is above ali a logic-theoretical term useful 
for reading every identifying experience. The search for truth must follow a 
single path that ascertains "[t]hat it is and that it is not possible for it not 
1 On the concept of agency, with particular reference to the legai realm, see P. HERITIER, "Fic-
tio iuris, persona, agency", in M. LEONE (ed.), "Actants, Actors, Agents. The Meaning of Action and 
the Action of Meaning. From Theories to Territories", Lexia. Rivista di semiotica, nn. 3-4 (2009), 
pp. 101-116. 
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to be".2 In other words, we have to exclude the possibility of a cohabitation of 
contradictory terms, of any discordance. Identity eliminates contradiction, ac-
cording to the logie behind Parmenides' principle of being. The logicai theo-
retical dimension of this principle explains its totalizing aspect - it is like a 
paradigm for a certain way of conceiving identity. This paradigmatic function 
derives from the fact that, for Parmenides, being is identical per se. Therefore, 
identity is an essential unit, immobile, without past and future, and eternally 
present. A clear ontological foundation exists for identity, given that Parme-
nides' understanding is a theory of the concept of the identical: the being, 
"[s]ince it remains the same and in the same, it lies by itself'.3 Following Par-
menides results in pointing out two decisive features for understanding a gen-
eral model of identity: 1) Identity is conceived in essentialist terms; and 
2) Identity is conceived as an ontological unity, as an immobile substance. Par-
menides' line has been developed with several further elaborations, starting 
from the Platonic idea of a pre-identitarian self. This general ontological view 
of the identitarian unity and substance is a kind of legacy that medieval cul-
ture receives and consolidates. Indeed, within the essentialist approach is the 
further development of this ontological line as well, linking the third typical 
idea - the idea of an inner life - to the notion of identity. Of course, this refers 
to the modem tradition that has founded the very idea of the individuai sub-
ject as a rational self. One of the fathers of this line is undoubtedly René Des-
cartes, who asserted that identity must be conceived as a thinking substance, 
or the identity of a rational self. In this sense, identity coincides with an im-
material dimension that allows distancing the self from the world. Here, the 
presupposition exists of an ideal and, to a certain extent, metaphysical identity 
that is antecedent to its social and cultural expression: "I thence concluded 
that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in think-
ing, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on 
any material thing".4 Continuity with Parmenides' line results from the 
equivalence between identity and thought, which is actually the meaning of 
the mental experiment proposed by Descartes' imagining the absence of 
the body. The difference is that no strict presupposition exists of a pre-iden-
titarian ontological substance expressed by a bio-material identity; instead it is 
the correspondence of the identity to the self-perception of being something 
2 PARMENIDES, On Nature, fr. I I , in R . D . MCKIRAHAN, Philosophy Before Socrates (Indianapolis, 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1994). 
3 Ibid., fr. Vili. 
4 R. DESCARTES, Discourse On Method, Part IV (New York, The Harvard Classics, 1 9 0 9 - 1 9 1 4 ) . 
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that thinks something. Indeed, with Descartes, the foundations of modem 
idealism are established as is the possibility of conceiving the individual as 
a being with an inner life that constitutes his real identity. Ultimately, the 
overall essentialist line could be summarized by underlining this idea of iden-
tity as an ontological essence that, to a certain extent, comes before every con-
tact between the individual and the physical, social, and cultural world: "So 
that T, that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct 
from the body, and is even more easily known that the latter, and is such, that 
although the latter were not, it would stili continue to be ali that it is".5 
4 . THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH IN THE CONCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL IDEN-
TITY 
A general alternative model for understanding individual identity has tra-
ditionally been provided by the constructivist approach, which asserts that 
identity is a human creation produced by self-representation. In particular, 
it is simultaneously both the process through which a subject recognizes him-
self and the outcome of the process itself. This view denies the dialectic be-
tween body and soul; therefore, identity is rooted in concrete existence. 
The presupposition of this conception is a philosophy of impermanence. In 
this case, the ancient reference is Heraclites, who to a certain extent opposed 
Parmenides' Eleatism. For Heraclites the unity and synthesis of the multipli-
city - namely, the identity of a being - is given by the coordination of discor-
dances. Identity is not the elimination of contradictions, but the harmony re-
sulting from bringing them together: "Things taken together are whole and 
not whole, something being brought together and brought apart, in tune 
and out of tune; out of ali things there comes a unity, and out of a unity ali 
things".6 The ontological qualification of differences and multiplicity implies 
a particular understanding of the concept of identity. Accordingly, identity is 
never totally defined, but is always in progress within a constructive process. 
It is impossible to determine a fixed state for the individual identity; we al-
ways change, and what we are now is different from what we were before: 
"It is not possible to step twice into the same river".7 Indeed, it is not possible 
for two convergent reasons; water flows, as does everything in the world, and 
5 Ibid. 
6 HERACLITES, Fragments, fr. X, in R . D . MCKIRAHAN cit. 
7 Ibid., fr. XCI. 
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thus will never be the same water, yet the individuai who decides to step into 
the river cannot be the same the second time either. Ultimately we are the 
synthesis of discordances, a superior harmony based on hard conciliations, 
but above ali based on the ontological flow of reality.8 As in Parmenides' case, 
Heraclites' theory is paradigmatic considering that he proposed a totalizing 
epistemological model. This philosophy of impermanence evolved thanks to 
various contributions - too numerous to mention here - but jumping (with 
caution) to the modem age, we could benefit from John Locke's analysis of 
individuai identity. His elaborations clearly show the inner potentiality of 
Heraclites' model.9 According to Locke, identity is the consciousness of mul-
tiple perceptions or, more precisely, the consciousness of self over time. The 
key concepts are consciousness and memory; applying them to the concept of 
identity, we immediately perceive the constructivist approach since identity is 
"created" by means of human faculties. From a certain point of view, some 
similarities with Descartes' approach exist, as Locke also perceives that the 
consciousness to be a rational self is decisive: 
To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands 
for; which, I think, is a thinking intelhgent being, that has reason and reflection, and 
can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; 
which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, 
as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive, without 
perceiving that he does perceive.10 
The main difference is that here Locke is speaking about the person and 
not identity. Such a difference is inconceivable according to Descartes, since 
identity corresponds with the thinking substance that constitutes a person. In-
deed, for Locke, individuai identity is a question of consciousness over time; 
the question is not whether it is possible to discover the same identical sub-
stance over time, because no such substance exists. The question is whether 
it is possible to discover the same person over time, "what makes the same 
person",11 what makes it possible to refer different thoughts and actions to 
8 "They do not understand how, being at variance with itself, it agrees with itself. It is a back-
wards-turning attunement like that of the bow and lyre" (ibid., fr. LI). 
9 Just consider Locke's definition of individuai identity and its similarity to Heraclites' ideas. 
The identity of the same man exists "[i]n nothing but a participation of the same continued life, 
by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body" 
0. LOCKE, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", voi. 1, Part. 1, Chapt. XXVII, § 6, in 
ID., The Works o/John Locke in Nine Volumes (London, Rivington, 1824)). 
10 Ibid., § 9. 
11 Ibid., § 10. 
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a unique self. The answer is memory - in particular, memory of past con-
sciousnesses: 
As far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or 
thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; 
and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action 
was done.12 
Clearly, no fixed identity exists here; it depends on human faculties, de-
veloped differently in every man. In the end, identity depends on personal 
ability to reconstruct one's past, referring one's thoughts and actions to one-
self. It is an identity permanently built and rebuilt. We have here the core of a 
constructivist approach. Identity is the product of a self-representation of life 
as a continued unity - a construction made possible by means of a conscious-
ness excluding the relevance of any ontological substance: "This may show us 
wherein personal identity consists; not in the identity of substance, but, as I 
have said, in the identity of consciousness".13 The constructivist approach 
has been further developed through the virtues of various contributions from 
truly different perspectives. For example, significant developments occurred 
within modem psychoanalysis; Freud14 and Lacan15 deconstruct the idea 
of an essential identity. Identity is built through the mediation of the "other", 
both the "other" as other human being and the "other" as the language. Witt-
genstein's16 linguistic tum also supports such deconstmction insofar as the 
self is conceived as an effect of the language; just think of the necessary public 
nature of the language. In this sense, identity does not come from the deep 
interior, but rather from a point of view of the self enunciated by the first-per-
son singular perspective. In this respect, the contribution of phenomenology 
is decisive as well. The self originates from the relationship with others, from 
the meeting of consciousnesses as a theatre of mutuai recognition. However, 
identity for us does not necessarily correspond with the identity for the other, 
and the identitarian "games" are played based on this gap. Therefore, identity 
is never given, but always has to be built and rebuilt. Beginning this philoso-
phical reconstmction, I pointed out that the different concepts of the ideas of 
12 Ibid., § 9. 
13 Ibid., § 19. 
14 Cf. S . FREUD, Group Psychology and the Analysis ofthe Ego (New York, W . W . Norton & Co. 
Ltd., 1975). 
13 Cf. J . LACAN, Écrits (New York, W.W. Norton & Co. Ltd., 2005). 
16 Cf. L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Basii Blackwell, 1974). 
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unity, substance, and inner life play a decisive role in framing conceptual 
models for interpreting identity. Clearly, within the constructivist approach 
these features are not naturalistically conceived. They are not ontological data, 
but are instead products of human representations, as in the case of unity and 
inner life, or unthinkable and unknowable elements, as in the case of sub-
stance. 
At this stage we need to explore the translations of the two general models 
just sketched at the collective identity level. 
5 . THE ESSENTIALIST APPROACH IN THE CONCEPTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
Translating essentialism and constructivism at the collective level provides 
a more complex schema. Within the essentialist concept, we have two differ-
ent approaches: a sort of metaphysical essentialism and a sort of sociological 
essentialism. The first internai approach can also be defined as social primor-
dialism. Identity results in naturai features building an alleged identitarian es-
sence conceived as the ontological consciousness of a collective subject. This 
approach presupposes some ascriptive attributions (race, gender, language) 
and leads to a romantic and normative idea of a common destiny. One inter-
esting example of this approach is given by Johann Gottfried Herder. His 
view provides a significant concept because his primordialism is sensitive to 
differences; therefore, it could be taken as an attempt to link the idea of an 
identitarian essence with the fact of pluralism. The complexity of Herder's 
thought is markedly notable; however, this is not the place to consider the 
general view of his thought.17 Here, the intention is only to show his concep-
tual elaboration of the element of Volk as a nation - a view stricdy related to a 
non-political dimension: "A State can perish, but the Volk remains intact 
provided it retains the consciousness of its distinctive cultural traditions".18 
Consistent with his general approach, Herder clearly shows his aversion to 
politicai organizations like the state: 
I f ind it hard to believe that man should have been made fo r the State and that 
his happiness springs f r o m its institution. For h o w many peoples of the w o r l d are 
17 In order to deal with these aspects, see (among others): F.M. BARNARD, J.G. Herder on Social 
and Politicai Culture (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969); I . BERLIN, "Herder and the 
Enlightenment", in E.R. WASSERMAN, Aspects of the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1965), pp. 47-104; R. ERGANG, Herder and the Foundations of German Hationalism (New 
York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1931). 
18 F . M . BARNARD cit., p. 30 . 
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entirely ignorant of this institution and yet are happier than a good many devoted ser-
vants of the State?19 
This provides the basis for an organicist concept of people. To consider 
people as an organism, even without any biological reminiscence as in Her-
der's case, implies a typical holistic vision that could accentuate the element 
of a primordial collective homogeneity. 
In this sense, it is possible to explain the link between organicist and spiri-
tual understanding of people through the spiritual constitution of the organic 
forces (Krà f t e ) of social and politicai cohesion. The Volk is a community kept 
together by a sense of collective identity derived by an inner awareness of 
having a common culture, language, way of living, traditions, and understandings 
of feelings. However, the internai coherence of Herder's approach, based on 
the importance of the self-expression of the Volk, has specific politicai conse-
quences as well - consequences of what I would cali Herder's primordialism: 
It is nature which educated families: the most naturai state is, therefore, one 
nation, an extended family with one national character [...] Nothing, therefore, is 
more manifestly contrary to the purpose of politicai government than the unnatural 
enlargement of states, the wild mixing of various races and nationalities under one 
sceptre.20 
This passage clarifies how Herder is aware of the inescapable conse-
quences of his pre-politicai spiritual and organicist view of the Volk. A multi-
national state would be structurally weak; politicai integration between differ-
ent peoples is not only a hard goal to attain, but above ali it is a distorted goal 
because it undermines the possibility for individuals and the people to express 
themselves freely in an authentic way. According to this line, for Herder Eur-
opean culture "is a mere abstraction, an empty concept [...]. The culture of 
man is not the culture of the European; it manifests itself according to place 
and time in every people" 21 The second approach, internai to essentialism, 
could be defined as social structuralism. Collective identity stems from social 
attributions that govern a category implying a structural commonality (social 
class, ethnicity). This approach presupposes a set of relational webs building 
structural connections between individuals. We have different views within 
1 9 J.G. HERDER, Ideas for a Philosophy of History ofMankind, book Vili, § V, in F . M . BARNARD 
cit., p. 310. 
20 Ibid., p. 324. 
2 1 J . G . HERDER, Letters for the Advancement of Humanity, X V I I I , in F . M . BARNARD cit., 
p. 24. 
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this wide approach. For example, according to the Marxist tradition, collec-
tive identity is the real product of social and economie structures. Individuai 
identity would therefore be the internalization of structural elements given by 
the dominant social order. Within this idea collective identity is the immediate 
product of the structural features of a specific social order. Therefore, in a so-
ciological sense it is a given identity - or at least given from the individuai 
point of view. As Pierre Bourdieu said, this conception explains the process 
of socialization in terms of domination and alienation by a dominant social 
order.22 Such collective identity uses the power of a "symbolic violence" as 
an exterior tool of identification. In this vein, the individuai identity of posi-
tion - dependent on the social role played by the individuai and socially mod-
ified and functionalised - reflects the social essence of a specific order. The 
essentialism of this approach consists of the idea of collective identity as 
the deterministic outeome of structural combinations at the social level. An-
other concept that could explain one of the potentialities within this kind 
of sociological essentialism is the sociological naturalism proposed by Emile 
Durkheim, who on the one hand deconstructs the idea of a biological sub-
stance able to determine the pure identity of an individuai and, on the other 
hand, points out the external aspect of social faets with respect to individuals. 
Individuai identity cannot be discovered within a supposed interior nature; it 
must be understood as the product of the anchorage to a given society that ex-
presses its way of thinking, feeling, and acting. This concept implies a particu-
lar status for the collective conscience, the collective being which Durkheim 
attributes a sort of moral personality that imposes its character on individuals. 
According to Durkheim, this collective dimension is to a certain extent inde-
pendent from its substrate - that is, from the associated individuals. It is the 
core of social life that goes beyond individuai aggregation. It is something 
more, a sui generis synthesis of social relationships and structures: 
The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same 
society forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may cali it the collective 
or common conscience [...] It has specific characteristics which make it a distinct 
reality. It is, in effect, independent of the particular conditions in which individuals 
are placed; they pass on and it remains. Moreover, it does not change with each genera-
tion, but, on the contrary, it connects successive generations with one another.23 
22 Cf. P. BOURDIEU, "L'identité et la représentation. Éléments pour une réflexion sur l'idée de 
région", Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n. 3 5 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 6 3 - 7 2 ; ID., "L'illusion biogra-
phique", Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n. 6 2 / 6 3 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , pp. 6 9 - 7 2 . 
23 E. DURKHEIM, The Division ofLabour in Society (New York, Macmillan, 1933), pp. 79-80. 
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This distinct reality has a sort of fixed form that passes over time. It is a 
structural feature that frames a specific social order. The collective synthesis is 
the expression of the social aggregate in its totality, and this aggregate thinks, 
feels, and wants as a collective being. We have a strong concept of collective 
identity here; undoubtedly it does not determine the origin of collective iden-
tity in some primordial or metaphysical substance, yet it is clearly built against 
the tradition of individualist sociology. The result is a dominant identity that 
imposes its characteristics on individuals while being conceptually indepen-
dent from them. In the end, its essence is purely social, based on the level 
of autonomous social facts. We could legitimately speak of essence, even if 
not in a metaphysical but an ontological sense, considering the transcendence 
of this identity in comparison with the individual elements that compose it. 
The Durkheimian concept of collective representations confirms this under-
standing since Durkheim conceives them as ideas that do not originate with 
individuals: 
They are collective representations, made up of ali the mental states of a people 
or a social group which thinks together. In these collectivities, of course, there are 
individuals who do have some role to play; but this very role is only possible as a 
result of the action of collectivity. In the life of the human race, it is collectivity which 
maintains ideas and representations, and ali collective representations are by virtue of 
their origin invested with a prestige which means that they have the power to impose 
themselves. They have a greater psychological energy than representations emanating 
from the individuai.24 
Excluding both materialist and idealist metaphysics, Durkheim asserts 
that social phenomena could be explained only by virtue of social or collective 
features. The complex has to be explained according to the complex, which 
means starting from a given social order - even with a historical awareness of 
its long construction processes. It also starts from social phenomena con-
ceived as specific facts within a distinct reality.25 Such a sociological approach 
implies that belonging to a specific social category determines the moral as-
pect of individual identity. This occurs based on a stronger collective identity 
with a coactive nature that leads to identifying the individual with the social 
system and its institutional expression. Ultimately, within this concept, collec-
24 E. DURKHEIM, Pragmatism and Sociology (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), 
XVH lecture. 
25 This is the nucleic meaning of what Durkheim calls sociological naturalism, cf. ID., Sociology 
and Philosophy (New York, Free Press, 1974), pp. 1-34. 
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tive identity is a sort of social identity that works as an essential substrate of 
individuai relationships. According to both Durkheim and Bourdieu, we 
could underline a sort of sociological realism that, as long as it points out 
the dominant power of a collective order with its identity, to a certain extent 
it translates, at the collective level, the philosophical realism that is the general 
background of the essentialist approach to individuai identity. 
6 . THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH IN THE CONCEPTION OF COLLECTIVE IDEN-
TITY 
A general conception of constructivism is evident within social construc-
tivism that in turn can be analysed along various views. According to this con-
cept, no determinable attributions are able to unequivocally identify a collec-
tive subject. Therefore, identities are built, created, and rebuilt rather than 
biologically, culturally, or structurally preordained. A preliminary view could 
be considered as a sort of pragmatic notion of collective identity following the 
work of Charles Peirce, John Dewey, and William James. Identity is the rela-
tionship with the world; it is the product of relationships among social actors 
deeply rooted in concrete experiences. Collective identity is thus understood 
as a shared symbol that allows us to know and order social reality. In this 
sense, identity cannot be separated from actions in everyday life. Therefore, 
identity is neither the expression of an abstract collective subject nor a mere 
vector of social structures; rather, it is the expression of collective actors aware 
of their own commitments and bonds.26 A second view is a further develop-
ment of the pragmatic and interactionist conception, particularly based on 
collective actors' trend to build a unifying identitarian space. It is a model 
built around the tension between the plurality of identifying contingencies 
over time and the need to have a unitarian frame keeping ali these moments 
together. It entails the reconstruction of the past in order to guarantee the 
continuity of identity. At the same time it implies an ongoing negotiation of 
actors with themselves and with others with the aim of achieving a consistent 
general explanation of collective life. Therefore, it is a model of narrative iden-
tity that conceives the biographical structure as being a condition for the 
thinkability of collective identity. Within this framework the unity of identity 
26 Among the three, Dewey's analysis is the most representative of this approach, considering 
his particular focus on the idea of community, cf. J . DEWEY, "The Public and Its Problems", in ID., 
The Later Works, 1925-1953, voi. 2 (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1986). 
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is not an expression of ontological substance, but rather an expression of re-
flexive aptitude of the actors forced to build their own internai orders since 
the latter are not guaranteed by naturai links. In this sense, reflexivity is the 
expression of the reactive and interpretative capacity of the collective actors. 
A deeper analysis takes into account Paul Ricoeur's thought as a significant 
description of the narrative model. The specific analysis of this approach ex-
plores his immediate link with a general idea of identity as a constructive pro-
cess. According to the narrative model, in order to have a collective identity, 
we need to perceive a narrative understanding of the collective life as an ele-
ment of politicai unity. The theoretical reference to Ricoeur should be useful 
in clarifying the relevance of the notion of narrative understanding at a collec-
tive level. Ricoeur's study is mainly devoted to enquiry into individual identity, 
but he seems quite aware of the possibility of analysing his theory at the col-
lective level.27 Basically, having a narrative understanding of life means: "In 
order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have 
become, and of where we are going".28 Thus, to consider our life as a narra-
tive implies a retrospective operation of connection of single events. This op-
eration could be taken into account as a condition of identity as well - a con-
dition that, notwithstanding the diversity of character and personality through 
time, allows the individual to refer to and ascribe a series of actions, thoughts, 
and feelings, to oneself and only oneself (at this level, the analogies with 
Locke's general understanding of individual identity are quite evident). This 
explains why Ricoeur evaluates narrative identity as a medium between same-
ness and ipseity, or selfhood. Jumping to the collective level, we could inter-
pret this view considering the collective self as a character whose identity is 
understandable, applying to it the narrative operation of construction of an 
emplotment. According to this view, the plot constitutes the identity of the 
27 In an article published in Le Monde, Ricoeur clearly takes into serious consideration the 
hypothesis of applying his cruciai analysis to the field of collective idendty: "Deuxième précaution: 
ne pas rester prisonnier de la notion d'identité collective qui se renforce actuellement sous l'effet de 
l'intimidation de l'insécurité. Et je voudrais opposer à cette idée d'une identité immuable l'idée 
d'identité narrative: les collectivités vivantes ont une histoire qui peut ètre racontée et je ferai du récit 
l'un des chemins de ce que je viens d'appeler le rayonnement croisé des cultures. Ce qui caractérise 
une identité narrative, c'est quelle n'est pas définie par le mème mais par l'ipse, non pas par 
l'identique, mais par le mouvant. Et je voudrais mettre en face de cette idée d'identité narrative, 
qui fait le récit de la vie des nations, l'idée de promesse: si l'identìté narrative est tournée vers le passée 
par son caractère mémoriel, l'idée de promesse est tournée vers le futur, et le problème n'est pas 
seulement de faire des promesses, mais encore de les tenir" (P. RICOEUR, "Cultures, du deuil à la 
traduction", Le Monde, 25 May 2004). 
2 8 C. TAYLOR, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 47. A sig-
nificant contribution to the daboration of the narrative modd has been provided by Charles Taylor 
within his major work on the modem individual subject. 
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character and therefore of the collective self. Actually, as Ricoeur points out, 
the dialectics between the contingent-descriptive nature of identity (idem) 
and its reflexive aspect (ipse), expressed by the selfhood, are a sort of inescap-
able internai dialectics within either individuai or collective identity. Reaching 
mediation between these two sides means conciliating what Ricoeur defines as 
both concordance and discordance in order to obtain the concept of discor-
dant concordance intended as the "synthesis of the heterogeneous" 29 (see the 
theoretical value of Heraclites' model in order to understand the internai 
workings of the narrative conception). This synthesis basically leads ali events 
to occur in the character within the temporal unity of the narration.30 Thus, 
the narration transmutes chance into fate. In particular, it faces a general con-
dition - namely, the necessity that identity continues and is permanent 
through time. The interconnection of events, guaranteed by the plot, specifies 
the complementary nature of idem and ipse; in particular, it "allows us to in-
tegrate with permanence in time what seems to be its contrary in the domain 
of sameness-identity, namely diversity, variability, discontinuity, and instabil-
ity".31 The identity question presented in terms of the answer to Who am I? is 
mediated with the answer to What am I? The first question - the question of 
who - is one of selfhood, reflexively allowing the subject to refer to contingent 
and differentiated actions, decisions, and thoughts, like a character in a story. 
The conditional nature of the narrative understanding is stricdy linked with 
the presence of contingency - we could say it is linked with the structural con-
tingency of identity at a collective level as well. This presence recalls the unity 
feature combined with the narrative interpretation; in particular, a retrospec-
tive reading of the collective life as a narration gives it a unitary shape. It finds 
necessity where arbitrariness could exist; it provides consistent series of pas-
sages where only inconsistency and fragmentation could exist. In other words, 
this reading generates unity within a structurally heterogeneous environment: 
"What is in question is, generally and characteristically, the shape of my life as 
a whole".32 Thus, by analysing the collective level, narrative understanding 
29 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 141. 
30 "The dialectics consists in the fact that, following the line of concordance and discordance, 
the character draws his or her singularity from the unity of a life considered a temporal totality which 
is itself singular and distinguished from ali others. Following the line of discordance, this temporal 
totality is threatened by the disruptive effect of the unforeseeable events that punctuate it (encoun-
ters, accidents, etc.). Because of the concordant-discordant synthesis, the contingency of the event 
contributes to the necessity, retroactive so to speak, of the history of a life, to which is equated 
the identity of the character. Thus chance is transmuted into fate" (ibid., p. 147). 
31 Ibid., p. 140. 
3 2 C . TAYLOR cit., p. 5 0 . 
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could be considered as an element of politicai unity. George H. Mead's social 
psychology provides an interesting link between the first pragmatic view 
and the second narrative view, in that it could be understood within a more 
general interactionist approach. According to Mead, identity is developed 
through doublé movement in the sense that we have interaction among data, 
subjects, social gifts, etc., on the one hand, and singularization and interpreta-
tion of ali these features within a unifying framework on the other. Therefore, 
identity is never definitively established or achieved because nothing guaran-
tees the spontaneous harmonization of different agents within a common 
framework (an interesting confirmation of this structural indeterminacy comes 
from psychoanalytic theories, such as Erik Erikson's theory).33 Actually, the 
unifying trend is carried out by means of a judgment on reality - perceptions 
and representation that can not be taken for granted. This kind of collective 
judgement produces shared meanings as the constitutive features of a collec-
tive identity: 
Meaning is thus not to be conceived, fundamentally, as a state of consciousness, 
or as a set of organized relations existing or subsisting mentally outside the field of 
experience into which they enter; on the contrary, it should be conceived objectively, 
as having its existence entirely within this field itself. The response of one organism to 
the gestures of another in any given social act is the meaning of that gesture.34 
In particular, these meanings arise by virtue of a process of internalization 
that is basically a social process: 
The internalization in our experience of the external conversations of gestures 
which we carry on with other individuals in the social process is the essence of think-
ing; and the gestures thus internalized are significant symbols because they have the 
same meaning for ali individual members of the given society or social group.35 
7 . THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY WITHIN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A EUR-
OPEAN POLITICAL SUBJECT 
The reconstruction proposed herein points to several conceptual models 
regarding the concept of collective identity. Particularly relevant is the strict 
link, which should now be clearer, among the models elaborated upon to 
33 Cf. E . ERIKSON, Adolescence et crise. La quète de l'identité (Paris, Flammarion, 1972). 
34 G . H . MEAD, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 78. 
35 Ibid., p. 47. 
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work at an individuai level and patterns for understanding the collective di-
mension of identity. The general division between essentialism and construc-
tivism seems to work at the collective level too, as confirmed by the fact that 
in our analysis of the collective dimension the most theoretical features are 
analogous to the centrai elements within models of individuai identity. The 
idea of a given unity and substance, which has to be taken as the starting point 
of an identitarian process, is shared by what we could cali the Parmenides-
Descartes line and by both social primordialism and social structuralism. 
On the other hand, the idea of identitarian unity as the product of a process 
of self-reflection is shared by what we could cali the Heraclites-Locke line and 
by either social pragmatism, the narrative model, or social interactionism. 
These analogies are above ali useful at the cognitive level in that the awareness 
of these resemblances should be taken as a guide to understanding the inter-
nai processes of constructing a collective identity. Categorizing the concrete 
dynamics within the different models - and, above ali, with the support of 
the huge scientific analysis developed within the individuai dimension -
means developing a better understanding of the directions of these processes, 
thus setting the conditions for regulating the construction of identities in view 
of specific politicai goals. Such a theoretical apparatus could be quite useful 
for dealing with an ongoing politicai process that needs to be governed, such 
as that of the European Union. In particular, my idea is that severa! features of 
the models sketched thus far are significant for understanding at least the role 
of and need for a European identity within this institutional process of gov-
ernance. Therefore, in these last pages, I will point out some politicai and in-
stitutional reasons supporting this role and urgency, understandable by virtue 
of the previous theoretical reconstructions. Why, on the basis of the model 
discussed, do we need a European shared identity? I will schematize the ar-
gument based on three reasons that could be also interpreted as three main 
governance conditions for the European institutional future. First, the sup-
port of such an identity constitutes the discursive expression of a specific 
social and politicai order. Collective identity - above ali, following a construc-
tivist approach - could be understood as the contingent vocabulary that allows 
meaning to be assigned to a specific political-institutional structure. It is the 
lexical frame that guarantees the narratability of an in fieri collective institu-
tional context. I am not saying that we have to deal with a performative ques-
tion - namely, the question of the rhetoric-persuasive power of a collective dis-
course on identity; rather, we have to understand that the discursive 
representation of a polity is in se an institutional feature. This representation 
is influenced by the support of an identity, which is quite evident within insti-
tutional contexts where works are in progress, as in the case of EU governance. 
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The self-representation of EU as a space of freedom, security and justice is a 
clear expression of collective discourse with institutional effects. Freedom, se-
curity and justice are in fact ideal aims from an identitarian point of view 
- namely, objectives that never can be truly achieved - thereby underscoring 
how the construction or re-construction of a collective identity aims at discur-
sively legitimising a specific institutional and normative order. Indeed, from a 
legai point of view, within the space of freedom, security and justice, the pos-
sibilities of a European criminal law policy, a unitary immigration policy, or 
the integration of different legai orders are ali aims at stake. Second, collective 
identity potentially guarantees a democratic integration as the product of a 
civic solidarity, which can be clarified by referring back to the model sketched 
using Durkheim's approach. Sharing ideal principles of social and politicai ac-
tion, and the sense of belonging to an organized collectivity that arises as a 
result, establishes the conditions for an effective solidarity. This role has been 
historically played by national identity. Collective identity justifies and legiti-
mises the practice of solidarity at an institutional level as well, since it presup-
poses a horizontal conception of the social relationships established between 
subjects that share ideals, customs, and traditions. As long as they participate 
in the same collective enterprise, these equal subjects, from an identitarian 
point of view, could be institutionally induced to act following solidarity prin-
ciples. Such dynamics influence the democratization processes as well. In-
deed, the formation process of a collective identity is a process of politicai par-
ticipation. Individuai experiences contribute to the creation of the common 
horizon for institutional actors. The formation of a collective identity is a pro-
cess of self-organization; therefore, it is a substantial democratic process that 
can be followed by a procedural democratic scheme. In this regard, the EU 
democratic deficit has to be understood as an effect of the incomplete, discon-
tinuous, and inconsistent constructive process of a European identity. Indeed, 
the democratic deficit cannot be explained merely through the insufficient re-
presentative structure of EU governance procedures or on the basis of defi-
cient legitimisation of its institutional organs. In fact, it is a profoundly iden-
titarian deficit. The individual consciousness of belonging to the European 
polity is widely lacking. Indeed, democratic procedures gain politicai meaning 
as long as they are perceived as tools for the self-government of a self-inter-
preted polity. Moreover, such procedures can offer effective possibilities for 
politicai participation only if they are available for people who share common 
meanings. Finally, collective identity expresses an indispensable politicai plan-
ning phase. At this level, the constructivist approach, above ali according to 
the narrative model, seems to effectively support an understanding of the 
planning potential of a collective identity. The collective project is clearly a 
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means of self-understanding and self-recognition - therefore, self-identifica-
tion. The formation process of a collective identity corresponds to the parti-
cipating elaboration of a common project. In particular, it corresponds to the 
elaboration of a pian based on a set of fundamental principles that both draws 
up an institutional scenario and represents the motivation for doing things to-
gether - which is the description of a constituent process ever upon the stage 
of identitarian self-recognition. In this regard, the EU experience is signifi-
cant. On the one hand, it demonstrates that, even within an institutional or-
ganization, passage to a real politicai level needs the sanction of a constituent 
process as the elaboration phase of a common project. On the other hand, this 
experience demonstrates that modem politicai lexicon cannot be used a-cri-
tically; otherwise, the adopted categories are ineffective. In the case of the re-
cent EU constitution, the constituent process was not supported by an 
adequate practice of identitarian politicai formation, which may have been 
one of the reasons for the contingent failure of that process. These three 
reasons as main governance conditions, touched upon only briefly herein, 
at any rate express the general cohesive role that European identity could play 
within the politicai and institutional construction of the EU. It is important to 
highlight that the question of identity is not a cultural question - or at least 
not only a cultural question. Within the EU experience, collective identity 
could have a politicai and institutional function establishing the conditions 
for making the EU an effective politicai subject. With this awareness in mind, 
we need to use the knowledge of possible conceptual models of collective 
identity to follow the concrete identitarian dynamics within the new post-
national contexts. We have already seen that the different models give rea-
sons for emphasising the role of a specific kind of collective identity in our 
scenarios. The next step should be to understand which model more adequately 
applies to the contemporary social conditions of the European space and to 
the politicai goals of the various member states acting together - quite 
reasonably a prospective topic for further analysis.36 
36 An example of this further analysis could be seen in A. Lo GIUDICE, Istituire il post nazionale. 
Identità europea e legittimazione (Torino, Giappichelli, 2011). 
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1. THE 18-19TH-CENTURY MODELS OF PARLIAMENT, GOVERNMENT AND GOVERN-
ANCE 
With the emergence of the concept of 'good governance', the modernist 
conception of statist governance, based on the ideas of public law and public 
power, has now become obsolete.1 According to the modernist conception, 
legitimacy of the legislative power is based on authorisation by the electorate. 
Having received authorisation, the legislature makes an autonomous legisla-
tive policy, which is then implemented by the government through executive 
norms and policies, and the government is responsible to Parliament. This 
19th-century conception promotes the separation ofpowers, it sets competences 
in a strict manner, and the production of law is characterised by the hierarchy 
ofthe sources oflaw. Public administration, together with the judiciary, mosdy 
belongs to the domain of the executive, which makes them mere organs of law 
application in a literal meaning. At the same time, these features also provide 
guarantees of 'Rechtsstaat', or more precisely, guarantees of rule oflaw. Legiti-
macy of government, and its responsibility to Parliament, stems from author-
isation by the electorate through elections, and the government programme is 
a summation of manifestoes of politicai parties. As a rule of thumb, voters can 
exert influence on the government programme through elections only. In An-
glo-Saxon countries using single-member districts with plurality formulae, 
two relevant parties compete for votes, and they make clear election pledges 
on the basis of their own manifestoes. The winner of the election usually 
forms a one-party cabinet, and it ought to enact its manifesto pledges as its 
government programme, since constituency voters will cali the party to ac-
count for it at the next election. Under this type of electoral system, the trus-
1 Cf. G. FIASCHI (ed.), Governance: oltre lo Stato? (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008). 
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teeship character of the government as well as its accountability become par-
ticularly visible. For this reason, appropriateness or government efficiency will 
be assessed at the next election on the basis of comparing the parties' election 
pledges with their government performance. In contrast to this, voters under 
a proportional or list system of election cannot and do not know exactly what 
policy the government will implement since the formation and programme of 
the government are results of deals and compromises made during coalition 
bargains.2 However it cannot happen that a government makes a policy that 
is in sharp contrast with its election pledges, just as it cannot make a major 
decision it ruled out in the campaign. This is explained by the fact that in 
a trusteeship the agent is not allowed to deceive the principal 'in his or her 
own interest'. 
2 . CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
In the contemporary view, good governance is not 'good' only by virtue of 
the government being legai and legitimate in the above sense, i.e. having 
received a mandate from the electorate. It is also 'good' because it is legitimate 
due to the substantive rightness of the governance, in which the members of 
the politicai community actively participate. 'The politicai' and 'public policy' 
do not coincide with the limits of public law as distinguished from private law 
or the private sphere any more. In the post-modern model of good govern-
ance, or in the case of multi-level or subsidiary governance, the citizens are 
not mere addressees of the legislative and governing activity, or the subjects 
thereof, but participants of governmental actions. (In England, they are re-
garded as highly satisfied customers, while in Germany they demand to be 
considered as active politicai agents). Without deciding yet which one of these 
models really exemplifies good governance, we may state that in terms of sub-
stance, it certainly means that 'civil' agents of public policy define the com-
mon good and accomplish it through periods of public policy together with 
governmental actors and according to particular fields of policy. Between 
elections, participatory governance achieves the maintaining and deepening 
of democratic legitimacy in a substantive sense, thereby improving its effi-
ciency as well. This latter is one of the main criteria of right public policy 
2 K . STROM - W . C . MULLER - T . BERGMAN (eds.), Delegatoti and Accountability in Parliamen-
tary Democracies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 3 ) ; G . B . POWELL, Elections as Instruments of 
Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions (New Haven, C T , Yale University Press, 2 0 0 0 ) . 
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nowadays. Yet the field of governmental activity cannot be rigidly defined in 
this case, nor can it be evaluated separately by limiting public policy to the 
sphere of public power, as governance is not something that affects the citi-
zens from the outside only and therefore it cannot be strictly and clearly 
separated from the active participants of governance broadly understood. 
One of the corollaries of participatory and multi-level governance, which 
seem to be the main components of good governance, is that governmental 
activities are shared by agents who do not have any democratic authorisation 
by, and are not responsible to, the electorate. Those participating in govern-
ance, the citizens and the members of their communities are, however, elec-
tors themselves, who evaluate governmental performance and the representa-
tion of their respective values by the government through their votes at 
elections. At the same time, due to the increasing horizontal participation 
in governmental decision-making, the idea of public-law legitimacy of govern-
ment, which is manifested in the responsibility of the government to the par-
liament, fades away, just like its basic role with respect to this branch of 
power, i.e. the execution of the laws enacted. Thus, it is not so much the par-
liament that governs. Politicai experience has taught us that a government 
with a strict party discipline leaves very narrow space for the initiatives of in-
dividual MPs, so one may say that it is not the parliament that 'has got a gov-
ernment' any more, but the majority, or rather the governing elite. 'The PM 
has got a parliament' to implement his governmental programme, to accom-
plish his legislative programme. Consequendy, the configuration of branches 
of power has substantially changed since the early period of modernity. It is 
not the parliament but its majority that governs, with the government making 
rules to an increasing extent, and the public policy of the latter is not limited 
to the mere execution of laws any more. Moreover, the politicai legitimacy of 
good governance is less limited to the moment of elections, but as an ideal 
type, its substance is strengthened through the processes of participatory 
and multi-level governance. Thus, the content and quality of public policy 
do not depend on the authorisation by the electorate only, but also on the 
contents accomplished through the processes of participatory governance. 
But who are those who need to be involved in governance? The question is 
not who are represented by the state (the parliament), as everyone has an 
equal right to be represented, which becomes manifest by the single act of 
election, through the principle of 'one citizen - one vote'. The question is, 
rather, whose interests are represented by the government in its public policy, 
what is at stake at the elections, or who are those actually governing, i.e. ac-
tually participating in public decision-making. 
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3 . 'GOOD GOVERNANCE' OR 'GOOD GOVERNMENT' - OR A THIRD MODEL? 
In this section we seek to answer the question of which model of govern-
ance most exemplifies the participatory and decentralised governance, which 
is a criterion of right - substantively legitimate and effective - public policy. 
Let us first compare the model of 'good governance , so fashionable in the EU 
nowadays,3 with that of 'good government', recently developed and propa-
gated by one of the leading Hungarian think-tanks,4 these two being the main 
competitors in contemporary politicai and scholarly discourses in our country. 
Exponents of the 'neo-Weberian' model of 'good government' sometimes 
blame the current of New Public Management, or 'good governance', because 
it is, after ali, only certain well-defined (and privileged) market actors who can 
actually participate in this kind of governance. As a consequence, market 
criteria of cost-efficiency prevail over the common good of the society as a 
whole. This latter is not equivalent to the good of the market, but it is the 
good of everyone: not in a functional, nor even in a social politicai sense, 
but rather in a moral philosophical sense. It includes, in particular, the good 
of those whose interests cannot be expressed and are therefore imponderable 
in terms of economie efficiency. The neo-Weberian model of good government, 
as opposed to good governance (New Public Management), conceives of a state 
which is active, strong, and responsible to the electorate, and is therefore 
capable of hearing the responsibility of governing - in the classical sense of 
the word - for the sake of the common good. The neo-Weberian conception 
of the state is a 'new' one as it draws on the model of good governance insofar 
as it seeks - it seems to us - to provide the customer-àxìzens with public ser-
vices of the best quality at the best price, by way of involving them in the 
decisions about these services and their parameters. Consequendy, administra-
tive decisions are not merely executing legai rules any more, but they imply the 
deliberation of substantive factors in a given situation. The actual deter-
mination of these factors calls not only for a 'modelling' of possible outcomes, 
but also for an active participation of those affected by the decision, in order 
3 COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, Governance europea: Legiferare meglio, Bruxelles, 
5.6.2002. COM(2002) 275 definitivo. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
COM:2002:0275:FIN:IT:PDF; M . GIULIANI, Attorno alla governance europea. Genesi, diffusione e 
metodologia di un concetto, Unità di Ricerca sulla Governance Europea (URGE), Working Paper, 
5/2007, http://www.urge.it/files/papers/2_3_wpurge5_2007.pdf 
4 Jó kormànyzas és az àllam 2008, A Szàzadvég Alapitvàny Politikai Barométere az orszàg àlla-
potàról. Szàzadvég, http://www.szazadveg.hu/files/lutatas/fo-kormanyzas-es-az-allam-2008.pdf. Cf. 
G. BOUCKAERT, "Public sector reform in centrai and eastern Europe", Halduskultuur, 2009, voi. 10, 
pp. 94-104. http://www.halduskultuur.eu/2009journal/94-104_Bouckaert.pdf 
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to reach a really sound governmental/administrative decision. Thus, the out-
put efficiency and social quality of public policy decisions concerning public 
services are at least as important as their professional quality in an administra-
tive or legai sense. An otherwise impeccabile administrative act, which does 
not take the real needs of the citizens or the actual nature of things and rela-
tions into account, even though legally possible, is by no means an act of good 
governance. Yet the interests of the participants of the administration, i.e. the 
citizens, where they can or have to be represented, do not only have to be ta-
ken into account in the absence of the stakeholders and according to their pre-
sumed content, but they also have to be made present in a consultative process 
of active dialogue, in the sense of real partnership. The model itself can be stili 
'Weberian', as it accomplishes the criteria of legality and common good, guar-
anteed by public law, through state bureaucracy. The state thus becomes 
strong in order to resist the egoistic efforts of certain privileged groups, 
rent-seekers, and those trying to make public resources and goods their 
own private goods through legislation.5 It is the Constant search for the com-
mon good of the whole society that makes the government of a neo-Weberian 
state, or a government in general, legitimate and good in a substantive sense. 
The question is, then, which model of governance/government best exempli-
fies the most adequate ways of this search for the common good. Which sys-
tem of institutions and which organisatory principles are the most compatible 
with this conception of good governance? The hazy, entropie system of the 
governance model is based on the bargaining of partnerships and networks, 
and thus blurs the decisive competences and responsibilities. What makes 
the neo-Weberian state so attractive is that instead of this, it makes the nor-
matively regulated traditional elements of legitimacy, responsibility and nor-
mativity the main factors of execution and governance. The main actors of 
good governance remain, to be sure, the state, the market, and society, yet 
the responsibility of governing in this kind of governance rests, without any 
excuse, with the government and the state. Without the authority provided 
by the state power necessary for governing, or the responsibility to the electo-
rate, there is no modem or post-modem government, nor any kind of good 
governance. In the last eight years, the governments performed a virtual kind 
of post-modernist 'communicative' governance in Hungary, which focused 
not on governmental performance, but rather on how it was communicated, 
5 According to the experience of the successful Asian developing states, the bureaucracy con-
tributing to the development is professionally competent, and separate, i.e. can resist social pressure, 
but not isolated. 
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i.e. presented and indeed sold to the electorate as media customers. In this vir-
tual space, governmental achievements (performance) became unmeasurable, 
and therefore relative or even subjective, with the politics of governance be-
coming consumerised. Every government has, contrary to these, to achieve a 
complicate system of real common goods relying on politicai wisdom, and the 
electorate has to be able to evaluate the transparent governmental perfor-
mance using objective criteria. If post-modernist good governance diminishes 
the public power character of governance, or the executive role of the govern-
ment, this can be accepted only on the condition that it is not accompanied by 
unlawfulness. According to the ideal and hypothetical functioning of this 
model at least, the loss in legitimacy in the legai sense - i.e. that it is not the 
parliament legitimated through elections that governs by general and abstract 
laws through the government responsible to it - may be balanced by an in-
crease in legitimacy in a substantive sense through good governance. As we 
mentioned, the increase in legitimacy of real good governance is not only 
due to governmental efficiency, but also (and in close relation to it) to parti-
cipatory governance.6 In such a case, the legai and constitutional legitimacy of 
government by a democratic majority in parliament (i.e. governance based on 
indirect representation), is complemented by the participative democracy of 
multi-level governance (i.e. the citizens, their communities and self-govern-
ments are involved in governance more directly). Thus, neo-corporatism 
and good governance are 'good' only if the decrease in parliamentary control 
of everyday governance is accompanied by an increasing substantive demo-
cratic efficiency on the part of the government, achieving the criteria of leg-
ality, professionalism and the representation of social needs at the same time. 
Even in this case, it is questionable whether the greater legitimacy of public 
powers inherent in the neo-Weberian model, or the model of governance in-
volving less transparent relations of participation is more preferable from the 
perspective of real good governance.7 In a certain sense, any method of 
'good', i.e. 'new' governance is less transparent than the modernist, classical 
parliamentary model of governance: networking, the informai forums of con-
sultation conceal the actual participants of decision-making, thus blurring re-
sponsibility for the decision itself. One may also state that public and private 
relations, public and private goods, or legislation and execution are less clearly 
6 The broadening of the participation in governmental processes is the main, if not the only, 
slogan of the governance model. A . ANDRONICO, "Governance", in B. MONTANARI (ed.), Luoghi della 
Filosofia del Diritto (Torino, G. Giappichelli Editore, 2009), p. 251. 
7 Cf. T . BOVAIRD, E . LOFFLER and S. PARRADO-DÌEZ, Developing Locai Governance Networks in 
Europe (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002). 
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separateci than before. Higher-level sources of law often demand that they be 
applied through 'multi-level governance'. In some cases, this precludes the ri-
gid, abstract and strict constitutional determination of competences. As a con-
sequence, the legai normativity of legislative and governmental activity, their 
actual public and representative character may be hidden from the electorate 
as a body of external judges. As recendy formulated in an analysis, the main-
stream post-modernist way of governance, the "model of 'governance' con-
centrates on relations and their networks rather than the separation of com-
petences, on execution rather than decision-making, and on the outcome, the 
results rather than normative legitimacy".8 Given ali this, specialised methods 
and institutions enhancing the transparency of governmental decisions and re-
lated systems of responsibility have to be set up, among which a strong and 
permanent, real social control has to have a major role. If the deficit in legiti-
macy in terms of public law and democratic majority, due to the governance 
model, is not balanced by the advantages of participatory democracy through 
'good' governance, then governance is not going to be good or legitimate in 
any sense: neither according to the model of parliamentary representative 
(majoritarian) democracy, i.e. parliamentary government, nor in the substan-
tive, participatory sense of multi-level governance, aimed at by the paradigm 
of 'good governance', which comprises elements of more direct democracy. In 
such cases, the lack of transparency, the deliberately increased 'opacity' of 
governmental and administrative decisions may hide the corruption of public 
affairs. We may not be entirely wrong in interpreting the last years of Hungar-
ian governmental practice - broadly understood - this way. Just as there is 
'good governance', there is also a real form of 'bad governance1, which can 
be objectively discovered through a reflective analysis of politological or po-
liticai institutions. It seems that in our public affairs the mere slogan of the 
former was coupled to the practice of the latter during the last years. Partner-
ship relations of the governance model inevitably lead to the intransparency of 
processes. As the emergence of networks presupposes a relation of trust be-
tween the partners, it may, alongside its advantageous effects on public policy, 
present a danger to the legitimacy based on majoritarian democracy in certain 
cases, and particularly in young democracies, it may also be a hotbed of cor-
ruption. Under the locai circumstances, it seems that 'good' governance in 
Hungary - if there was any real and serious effort to introduce it at least partly 
apart from virtual governing - did not bring any of its desired fruits, while it 
8 I . PÀLNÉ KovÀcs, Helyi kormànyzàs Magyarorszagon (Budapest - Pécs, Dialóg Campus, 
2008), p. 102. 
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eroded most of the traditional legai and politicai virtues of the classical model 
of governance. Thus, we think that as a first step, the present way of govern-
ance should move towards 'good governance'. It has to strengthen the classi-
cal constitutional establishment of legai and politicai relations, while bringing 
about the democratic participatory elements of 'good governance'. Yet the ac-
complishment of this model can be but an intermediary step towards the best 
model of governance, i.e. the 'subsidiary state'. This latter requires, however, 
that civil society as well as other sub-national levels of policy-making, become 
strong enough to Uve up to their participatory and controlling functions. The 
real subsidiary state adapts itself to the collective identity-forming and policy-
making levels of the communities that constitute the nation and its politicai 
society. What follows from the above is that - considering the Hungarian con-
text - first the level of counties, which have strong traditions, but also that of 
wards (or micro-regions) should gain a greater role in the shaping of the pro-
cesses of public policy, while the artificially created regional level has to re-
ceive politicai legitimacy in a legally regulated way. This latter has to become 
a transparent scene of policy-making oriented towards consensus and the 
good of the communities. It may be due to the lack of this that regional 
reforms in Hungary have been a failure so far, while certain decisions of major 
importance are already made at this level, and the region has become the fore-
most level of locai governance (i.e. the distribution of money).9 A comparison 
of the above models reveals that while the model of multi-level governance10 
prefers global and locai (in the EU, the regional) levels, or - fashionably put -
'glocalisation', thereby weakening the national, state level, the subsidiary model 
assigns a major role to the level of national governments in promoting the 
common good. This latter form of governance and state organisation and 
its principle of action is in accordance with the phenomenon of re-nationali-
sation, which can be observed today in the EU, and is certainly desirable, if 
we attribute to it a moderate sense, a harmonic attitude towards other actors 
of public policy. This phenomenon and process of strengthening the nation 
states cannot become some kind of paternalistic statism or aggressive nation-
alism, which often means a danger and temptation for the new democracies of 
9 ID.," Zàrógondolatok", in I . PÀLNÉ KOVÀCS (ed.), A politika ùj szintere a règio (Pécs - Buda-
pest, PTE BTK Interdiszciplinàris Doktori Iskola, Politikai Tanulmànyok Tanszék, Szàzadvég Kiadó, 
2009), p. 206. Cf. K. SZCZERSKI, The EU Multi-Level Governance in Eost-Communist Conditions -
Institutional Challenges, Poland, Business High School - National Louis University, Nowy Sacz 
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan018546.pdf 
10 One of the characteristics of good governance nowadays is the achievement of a territorially 
pluralistic model of power, i.e. multi-level governance. 
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Central and Eastern Europe (too). Ali this has to be borne in mind by the ex-
ponents of the neo-Weberian model as well. Consequendy, the neo-Weberian 
model can only work as a transitional model of governance, a step along the 
long and rough road towards the best form of state and governance; a subsidi-
ary one. It has to be acknowledged, however, that this step now seems neces-
sary for achieving legality, order and the improvement of the state. Problems 
with the governance model, however, become obvious outside the Hungarian 
context as well. It is not only that post-modernism delegitimised any model, 
and the concept of 'model' as such, in its efforts to 'demetaphysicise' and de-
mythise ali asymmetric meta-narratives and their underlying hierarchic oppo-
sitions. The real problem is that the governance model as a method and pro-
cess is not a mere way of governing, i.e. not a means to an end, but makes 
itself an end in its functioning,11 without aiming at any particular good in 
the objective sense, and therefore its rightness cannot be evaluated in the light 
of such a good. The conception of 'governance ' has thus become a politicai 
slogan with hardly any legai suitability or subtlety in terms of politicai science; 
it is actually (and paradoxically) a post-modernist ideology and therefore not 
capable of being measured with scientific and concrete politicai criteria. 
4 . THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMON GOOD, PERSONALISM, JUSTICE AND PARTI-
CIPATION CALL FOR A THIRD MODEL: THE EMERGENCE OF THE SUBSIDIARY 
STATE 
As the elements of the governance model "are not really self-evident, 
much less clearly formulated or generalisable, scholars consider this new form 
of governing in this sense a 'second best choice' ".12 Some even think that this 
post-modernist concept is incomprehensible, undefinable, like the diffuse 
concept of fitness', lacking any criteria, which has replaced the modem con-
cept of 'health'.13 In the Hungarian context - as we mentioned - the govern-
ance model has even led to chaotic and sometimes corruption-like situations 
(also) on a regional level, with certain leading figures of the previous govern-
ments and their politicai parties presumably involved. Thus the desirable di-
rection is that of 'good government', which means re-emphasising the follow-
1 1 A . ANDRONICO cit., p. 2 4 9 . 
12 I . PALNÉ KOVACS, Helyi kormànyzas Magyarorszagon cit., p. 102. 
13 A. ANDRONICO cit., pp. 248-249. The Italian legai philosopher draws on the insight of the 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman in his analysis of the concept of governance. 
10 
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ing elements: (1) execution subject to the laws, (2) normativity, (3) represen-
tation by the public powers, (4) legai legitimacy, (5) responsible governmental 
decisions, (6) transparency, and finally (7) accountability by way of elections. 
However, a desirable medium-term model of governing would be the form 
and method of a 'subsidiary state', which is solidary, i.e. social, but based 
on common-good oriented relations (partnership) and the social capital of 
participation. 
Problems with the paradigm of 'good governance' (which is otherwise 
rather fashionable in the EU nowadays) that partly follow from the theoretical 
weaknesses of the model, and the questions related to the danger of statism 
resulting from 'good governance' in our region, highlight that a third model, 
a relational state organised according to the principles of subsidiarity and so-
lidarity could be the right medium-term structure of government. We would 
like to emphasise that the characteristic features of subsidiarity, its method of 
governance, its conception of state and politicai organisation do not mean the 
disetatisation of (civil) society or the market in order to promote the (private) 
interests of enterprises and global financial agents interested in the present 
and complete achievement of the so-called 'Washington consensus'.14 Subsi-
diarity gives a new meaning to the word 'politicai' by overcoming the rigid 
19th-century dualism of 'state' and 'non-state'. It does not regard the domain 
determined by public law and characterised by the activity of state agents or 
those collective agents recognised by the state as identical with the politicai 
sphere,15 but focuses on the pluralist, multi-level and social (i.e. sub- and su-
pra-state) sense of the common good, to be integrated and accomplished 
through politics. The subsidiary model of governance recognises that certain 
relations, actions, communities and interests, previously considered as belong-
ing to the private sphere, are of public interest, as they represent common so-
cial interests and values, thus hearing politicai contents, in spite of their par-
ticularity, individuality or locai interest. It seems therefore that it is the model 
of subsidiarity rather than that of governance that represents a really ereditile, 
participatory and multi-level way of governing. By way of a thought experi-
ment, we identified 'good governance' with the governance model so far, since 
14 The notion 'Washington consensus' was first formulateci by John Williamson at a 1990 con-
ference of the Institute for International Economies, referring to the universal recipe of diminishing 
state activism. Cf. J. WILLIAMSON, "From Reform Agenda to Damaged Brand Name. A Short His-
tory of the Washington Consensus and Suggestions for What to Do Next", Finance & Development 
voi. 40, no. 3 (September 2003), pp. 10-13. 
1 5 G . SCACCIA, Sussidiarietà istituzionale e poteri statali di unificazione normativa (Napoli, Edi-
zioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2009), p. 42. 
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as an ideal type it is organised along the principles of partnership, participa-
tion and efficiency in public pohcy. Yet we have seen that there are a number 
of problems, particularly in the Hungarian context. This is why we now finally 
dismiss the governance model in our search for the best way of governing, as it 
is unable to serve the common good to the greatest possible extent - if its sub-
stantive elements can be determined and its results measured at ali. As for the 
practice of institutional and politicai decision-making, we have to add that 
'multi-level governance', one of the main substantial elements of good govern-
ance, is not accomplished in the EU, and its hopes were considerably lowered 
after the failure to make a constitution (for what was finally passed is hardly 
anything else than a failure instead of being a constitution aiming at high stan-
dards and desires for multi-level governance). It may be due to this fact that 
the Committee of Regions published its White Paper on multi-level governance 
in 2009.16 No real multi-level governance was accomplished by the constitu-
tion-making body, maybe it was not even intended to. Yet it is also possible 
that the aim or its formulation was false or unrealistic. Learning from that, we 
should turn towards the subsidiary model of governance, the principle of 
which is theoretically also one of the main foundations of the EU. It is another 
matter that the working committee dealing with subsidiarity approached the 
problem in a way that has shown that those drafting the constitution misinter-
preted the principle. The subsidiary model of governance is, in turn, a rela-
tional one as well, and therefore it is the /ogor-oriented common good formu-
lated discursively through different processes. It provides legitimacy for the 
government on every level, and it also includes normatively institutionalised 
para-governmental forums and procedures of consultation, involving sub-
state actors in the common search for the common good.17 Here it has to 
be noted that some consider the governance model a meaningless concep-
tion,18 and we think this is confirmed by its lack of logos, self-serving proce-
dural and processual orientation, as well as the chaotic-entropic network of 
partnerships and power relations. The principle of subsidiarity cannot serve 
to free the state from its responsibility to promote the common good within 
its sphere of competence (so the state cannot place a serious budget deficit on 
the locai governments to an excessive extent), but it has to involve those ac-
tors in a really multi-level decision-making process in terms of public policy, 
16 http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/DetailTemplate.aspx?view=detail&id=31bc9478-lacb-4870-
999d-cc867fl925f6. 
17 G . SCACCIA cit., p. 49 . 
18 A. ANDRONICO cit., pp. 237-239. 
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whose communities have their own particular common good to be integrated 
and accomplished. Consultation procedures in our preferred model of good 
governance are not institutionalised to legitimise themselves or governmental 
institutions and their decisions by their mere procedural character (sometimes 
by saying: "we tried to negotiate, 'only' in the given case the other party 'in-
volved' in the procedure did not know about it..."), but they have to give real 
place to the formation of the content of public policy decisions through inter-
personal communication. Participatory processes of good governance allow 
for the orientation of the expectations of those involved in decision-making 
towards the criteria of a higher-level common good, to include the opinion 
of those whose interests could not be formulated. This is a task particularly 
for the state or the governmental and administrative agents of regional and 
locai governments. If these consultative processes aiming at the common good 
succeed in making a qualitative consensus rather than a quantitative compro-
mise with a reduced perspective (like a highest common denominator), which 
is often frustrating for the parties, then the parties may be able to reach a 
spiritual addition in terms of public policy, which needs existential involve-
ment and which can come about only through existentially engaged govern-
mental policy-making.19 In the search for the common good, professional ra-
tionality of the single branches in public-policy decisions has always to be 
driven by the practical wisdom of prudence,20 a typically politicai virtue, 
which cannot be properly exerted except in the form of an open dialogue. 
Thus, we have seen that the dialogue aiming at the common good has to 
be a real dialogue, and the forums and procedures of consultation have to 
be created not only for the self-legitimacy of public-policy decisions. The con-
cept of common good is a normative one, with legai and social ethical content. 
An administrative decision may not be necessarily legitimate in the sense of 
good governance only by virtue of being made according to the procedures 
of the administrative-political social sub-system. A decision is a good one in 
terms of public policy if, in addition to legality, it aims at the common good. 
This requires the inclusion of the perspective of everyone concerned in the 
proper procedures and with the proper engagement. Similarly, those elements 
of the good governance related to the legai sub-system are not self-referential 
in the Luhmannian sense, as they cannot be separated from the classical nor-
19 See the distinction made by Bruno Romano between 'essential convention' ( c on v enz i on e es-
senziale) and 'functional convention' (convenzione funzionale). B. ROMANO, Critica della ragione pro-
cedurale, logos e nomos. Teuhner, Luhmann, Habermas discussi con Heidegger e Lacan (Roma, Bulzoni 
Editore, 1995), pp. 69, 71, 77, 85, 89, 109. 
20 C. MILLON-DELSOL, Il principio di sussidiarietà (Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 2003), p. 97. 
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mative concepts of 'law' and 'laws', a constitutive element of which is their 
orientation towards the common good {ad bonum commune).21 According 
to the concept of 'law' related to good governance, it is mainly the state 
and not the legai sub-system that is intended to make (produce) law. If the 
rules are to be considered laws in the classical sense of legai philosophy, they 
have to aim at the common good. For a self-referential system of law, that 
would be a mere 'informative environment' in the Luhmannian sense, just like 
the human being herself, together with her fundamental rights. Orientation 
towards the common good does not just come about by itself in such a 
high-pressure environment, where competing politicai powers and economie 
interests face each other and struggle for the accomplishment of their private 
interests through shaping the rules by influencing the lawmaking. In such a 
field of powers, the figure of the governing politician who exerts the public 
virtues of courage, wisdom and responsibility is inevitable for achieving and 
practising good governance. The virtuous figure of the politician in a respon-
sible government is thus a condition of good governance, as neither of the 
self-referentially organised systems, i.e. law, politics or the market (economy) 
by their professionally rational methods, or participatory democracy in itself 
can guarantee the orientation towards the common good, or the sincere ef-
forts to achieve it. As we have seen, self-referential systems do not have any 
external normative criteria of validity, as the respective social sub-system de-
termines by its internai logie what 'law' is, what and how can be made law, 
thus reproducing itself. Even the unborn human being may fall victim to this 
kind of logie if (s)he is not considered a human being in the legai sense by the 
lawmaker, e.g. by the Constitutional Court - the body which actually decides, 
by measuring the legai rules to the Constitution, which rule is 'legai' and 
which is not because of being unconstitutional. Ali these are particularly im-
portant to note because in our post-modem age heralding the lack of truth, 
common good or fundamental human rights do not automatically make sub-
stantial criteria of legai or public policy. Policy-makers tend to generalise the 
technical criteria of efficiency, usefulness/functionality, or procedural ration-
ality as exclusive standards of evaluation, or they simply have the process of 
governance legitimise itself.22 The aims of public policy-making can thus miss 
the person and his or her communities or their goals and serve selfish politicai 
21 'Et sic ex quatuor praedictis potest colligi definito legis, quae nihil est quam quaedam rationis 
ordinato ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis babet promulgata'. AQUINAS, Summa 
Tbeologiae, I-II, q. 90, a. 4. 
2 2 Cf. A . ANDRONICO cit., p. 2 4 9 . 
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interests and ideologies - as well as their underlying egoistic motives - rather 
than seemingly formai, technical-professional or system-immanent criteria. 
Decisions in public policy are never made in a politicai vacuum and they never 
follow technical rationality exclusively, even if one has to acknowledge that 
technocracy has gained real power in the age of governance.23 Power is 'dis-
persed' (in the Foucaultian sense of the word), i.e. it is not present in a con-
centrated form,24 and it is - as we mentioned - in the hands of technocracy. 
Yet direcdy or indirectly, this serves - as several analysts have shown - the 
interests of a (neo)liberal economic-financial elite after ali. This is why govern-
ance, a responsible politicai - not merely technical or economical - decision-
making activity has to be considered as the problem of politicai rule deliber-
ately accepted. It focuses, in a final analysis, on the right use of power for the 
sake of the common good, according to a well-defined and properly repre-
sented conception of the state. 
5 . THE PARADIGM OF THE SUBSIDIARY STATE 
The subsidiary state considers ali levels of communities, which form the 
nation, as politically relevant and constitutive in terms of public decision-
making, and it approaches them accordingly.25 It does not seek to legislate on 
the details of their relations, but to promote their common good by the means 
of legislation and governmental planning in a subsidiary way - i.e. by providing 
opportunities for these communities, through helping and supporting them. 
The main agents of the everyday fields of public policy-making are thus the 
locai and regional communities, consisting first and foremost of families 
and their members, who appear in their functional roles and professional 
communities as related to particular social sub-systems. These ali contain a 
number of elements of the common good for public policy-making, and these 
elements can be exhibited and represented politically only together with those 
persons concerned. It is these latter or more accurately their good that bears 
the common good that is to be served and developed through public policy. 
Thus it is not the professional rationalities of the social sub-systems them-
selves that bear the only legitimate and reliable standards, the 1 lo got of public 
policy-making, but the complex value and interest systems of the persons and 
23 Cf. A. ANDRONICO cit., pp. 244-245, 249, 258, 262. 
2 4 A . ANDRONICO cit., p. 2 4 2 . 
2 5 C . MILLON-DELSOL cit., p. 72 . 
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their communities appearing (also) in these sub-systems. These persons, in 
turn, are at the same time - or mainly - members of families, and they live 
their everyday life (also) in locai and other functional communities beyond 
this vital environment. The criterion of subsidiarity contributing to good gov-
ernance is not only the adequate limitation of competences, or the demand of 
non-interference with the competences thus determined:26 it also needs a con-
tinuous re-assessment of the distribution of competences with respect to the 
fulfilment of functions, and in some cases it also needs positive governmental 
politicai actions. Thus, competences cannot always be determined in advance 
through abstract rules, but they also depend on the multi-level accomplish-
ability of the common good, and pardy on the efficiency of the fulfilment 
of public tasks, and the capability of fulfilling these. The competences are, 
consequendy, dexible and can be changed or redistributed later on the basis 
of experience.27 According to this principle, the government performing good 
governance works for a common good, which is not the mechanical sum of 
the particular interests appearing at certain lower levels; but it contains and 
elevates these, never against the common goods of lower-level communities, 
into a higher synthesis and perspective. Yet a mere accounting of these low-
er-level common goods in the decision-making processes of the centrai gov-
ernment does not suffice. They need to be formulated in a governmental-ad-
ministrative process based on a living dialogue, through their representatives. 
It has to be noted that this is particularly true for the historical moment of 
constitution-making, which certainly presupposes a comprehensive discourse 
from the part of the society as a whole, as the process of constitution-making 
itself testifies those constitutional values (participation, subsidiarity etc.) that 
will be contained by the constitution in a normative way and in the form 
agreed upon. The committee preparing the EU constitutional treaty, which 
dealt with subsidiarity, did not, as we mentioned it, have this kind of ap-
proach.28 It is not by chance that no real European constitution could be 
drafted and passed, as the constitution-making process brought no additional 
legitimacy based on a broad participation, and that only a reform treaty 
(termed 'Lisbon Treaty') could be concluded. The creation and maintenance 
of 'good governance' is not really about structurally reforming the founding 
treaties, i.e. it is not a real institutional problem. This is clearly shown by 
2 6 C. MILLON-DELSOL cit., p. 80 . 
2 7 G . SCACCIA cit., pp. 4 4 - 4 9 . 
28 J . FRIVALDSZKY, "Szubszidiaritàs és az európai identitàs a kòzòsségek Európàjàért", ID. (ed.), 
Szubszidiaritàs és szolidaritàs az Európai Unióban (Budapest, OCIPE Magyarorszàg-Faludi Ferenc 
Akadémia, 2006), pp. 35-56. 
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the White Paper of the European Committee29 on good governance, published 
in 2001, but also by the White Paper of the Committee of the Regions on multi-
level governance,20 published a year ago (2009. 06. 18), independendy of the 
fate of the reform treaty. Thus, alongside the problems of the structural 
reform of the EU - not denying the progress made towards multi-level govern-
ance - there appears the basic demand for good governance aiming at the 
good of the persons living in organised politicai communities (cities, counties, 
regions and nations), which calls for a 'bottom-up' way of politicai thinking 
and attitude of actions. No one sees the ultimate truth about the way of 
achieving this. Yet it may be reassuring to know that the existential dialogue 
emerging for the search of the common good to be accomplished at different 
levels creates a certain kind of goods ('relational goods') by itself.31 For the 
common good is not the quantitative sum of the interests of politicai commu-
nities, nor is it a sociologically recognisable empirical fact,22 but a prudential 
search for it also needs an interpersonal governmental engagement which is 
communicative in creating values.33 The common good is thus shaped in an 
open discursive environment oriented towards it. Even for a moderate altruis-
tic politicai anthropology, the common goods of politicai communities are not 
grounds for continuous conflicts and hostility, as it was falsely claimed by Cari 
Schmitt or the Catholic legai and politicai philosopher Sergio Cotta. Rather, 
occasionally emerging conflicts show the considerableness of one another's at-
titudes and interests, which indicates the need to acknowledge these. If the 
negotiations are carried out as part of the search for justice and oriented to-
29 European Governance, a white paper commission of the european communities, Brussels, 
25.07.2001 COM (2001). 
30 http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/DetailTemplate.aspx?view=detail6dd=31bc9478-lacb-4870-
999d-cc867fl925f6. 
31 Piepaolo Donati speaks of a relational (social) state, 'Stato (sociale) relazionale'-. P. DONATI, 
"Una nuova mappa del bene comune: perché e come dobbiamo rifondare lo Stato sociale", in 
M. SIMONE (ed.), Il bene comune oggi, un impegno che viene da lontano (Bologna, Edizioni Dehoniane, 
2008), pp. 224-226,246. 
32 We cannot agree with Sergio Cotta, who thinks, based on a quasi-Schmittian phenomenol-
ogy of the politicai relation, that the internai solidarity of the politicai community involves but a par-
ticular and therefore necessarily exclusive kind of common good, due to the integrative-exclusive 
nature of the politicai relation. According to such a phenomenology, the common good understood 
in a descriptive, rather than normative, way is integrating from inside but exclusive to the outside, 
which almost inevitably implies the possibility of conflict, hostility and struggle: S. COTTA, Il diritto 
nell'esistenza (Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 1991), pp- 110-111, 116-122. Cf. the criticism and much 
subtler approach of Domenico Fisichella, formidated - among others - against Sergio Cotta: D. FI-
SICHELLA, Lineamenti di scienza politica. Concetti, problemi, teorie (Roma, Carocci Editore, 1998), 
chapters: 2.1-2.2. 
3 3 M . SIMONE (ed.) cit. 
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wards the higher common good by the politicai rule performing good govern-
ance, if they work through common efforts and are thus really 'common', then 
the elements of the common good accomplished in decisions of public policy 
can, alongside mutuai enrichment, achieve a right measure and content. Such 
an approach to governance needs a strong, responsible and efficient govern-
ment in order that dialogical procedures and decisions are correct in the light 
of 'right reason' (re et a ratio) in its classical sense (this is 'politicai correctness' 
righdy understood), and that the interests of socially weaker persons be repre-
sented as well. Ensuring the accomplishment of the different aspects of soli-
darity at different politicai levels is one of the main tasks for governance and 
the government, and this principle has to be consistently observed when ex-
erting subsidiarity. Another task for good governance is to encourage and 
support, alongside institutional governmental solidarity, the non-state emer-
gence of politicai and social solidarity at every level of decision-making. 'Re-
lational goods', such as ordinary and extraordinary forms of solidarity, can 
thus serve the real good of the persons. These forms range from home nursing 
care, through actively helping the regions struck by disasters, to the more in-
stitutionalised means of an active civil society (e.g. foundations, distance 
adoption, different forms of the so-called 'community economy' etc.), and 
reaching up to the global extent. Relational goods formed at these levels 
and justified interests appearing there represent real common social values 
that have to be supported by public policy, and that cannot be simply removed 
to the non-state (private) civil sphere by the government, simply by saying that 
these have no public importance. 
6 . SOME GUIDELINES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND RIGHT POLITICS 
6.1. The problem of public services 
It is partly due to the theory of New Public Management that more atten-
tion is paid to the efficiency of public services, and the service character of 
public administration.34 Citizens are not subjects, nor - we may add - are they 
34 The main means and methods of administration are the following: the Scandinavian model of 
One Stop Shop, neighbourhood decentralisation, the charter movement, which started from England, 
but also appeared in Belgium and France, then - since the mid-nineties - the Service First pro-
gramme, the Best Value movement, and the Value for Money initiative. Also the institution of the 
Citizen's Jury, the consensus conference, community forums and consumer panels have to be men-
tioned here, as well as the self-governmental sociological surveys. Z . JÓZSA, Onkormànyzati szervezet, 
funkció, modemizàció (Budapest - Pécs, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2006), pp. 143-162. 
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mere customers of public services, but members of the body politic. They are 
citizens, not merely electors, and they want to participate in the managing of 
public affairs.35 The state is not an inventory of common goods that have to 
be distributed to private persons and made accessible according to the para-
meters of market efficiency {New Public Management)36 or of distributive jus-
tice (welfare state) exclusively. The state is a politicai community as well, but in 
order to be a proper one, it has to be built on participation and make its 
citizens participate in the shaping of public law by way of public policy. As 
we mentioned, it is not only the efficiency and quality of public services 
but mainly the substantial participation of the citizens in the determination 
of the common good that legitimise the government and/or governance and 
make it 'good' in a substantive sense. As a consequence there have to be clear 
and narrow limits for the organisation of certain public affairs by private pub-
lic-service enterprises, under a strict and well-established communal and legai 
control, since private enterprises providing public services do not necessarily 
have any communal or - particularly - politicai responsibility. Certain justi-
fied and considerable interests of the citizens, and particularly those of per-
sons in a disadvantaged social situation, cannot be neglected and ignored only 
because they cannot be assessed with efficiency parameters or because they 
are not profitable, nor can they be rejected by claiming that the private or 
business sphere providing the public services cannot be influenced by public 
policy. The state is not a business company since it is not only the market ac-
tors and owners who are its citizens. Public services - whoever provides them -
are public affairs and therefore they need a politicai strategie guidance 
through public policy as well as politicai and communal control. We may 
make the general claim that citizens are ali members of the body politic 
and have equal dignity, so they have to participate actively in the general de-
termination of the common good - in this case the public services (and this 
also applies to the less wealthy, who have no power and cannot articulate their 
interests). The limits of the 'politicai' in the normative sense do not coincide 
with the limits of public power, and even less so with the limits of private 
power or politicai or economie influence, but with the limits of the common 
35 In Germany, the motto is the 'renewal of politics from below': {Die Emeuerung der Politik 
von Un ten). The corresponding means are the following: counselling service (Advoka t e n p l a nun g ) , 
district administration (Bezirksverwaltung), community work (Geme i nw e s e n a r b e i t ) , planning council 
(Planungsbeirat), planning celi (Planungszelle), citizens' forum (Biirgerforum). Z. JÓZSA cit., pp. 145-
148. 
36 Cf. K . KÒNIG, "On the Critique of New Public Management", Speyerer Forschungsbericbte, 
nr. 155 (1996); C. POLLITT - G. BOUCKAERT, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 
2nd expanded edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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good or the public affairs (res publica), which have to be observed as a guide 
for public policy-making. In the public sphere, market and private-law ele-
ments have to be organised, above ali according to reciprocai justice, for other-
wise they mean a mere rent-seeking to the detriment of the state. These ele-
ments cannot work against the common good represented - in a final analysis -
by the will-formation of the state, or otherwise they would harm third per-
sons, i.e. the politicai community. In the public sphere, a mere consensus be-
tween private and public actors cannot justify the existence and content of 
any contract per se, since these contracts have to observe both reciprocai jus-
tice and the common good; so the lack of these must result in invalidity, at 
least in grave cases. This has to be noted here, because according to the 
neo-liberal ideology, or at least one of its interpretations underlying the method 
of governance, it is the 'private' that prevails over public affairs,37 and a 
private-law(-like) contract is not a means to be justified by the goais of profit 
or the common good any more, but its content is justified by its mere exis-
tence.38 According to one leading theory, entrepreneurial structures of public 
services operating in private-public partnership accomplish governance in 
themselves.39 The contracts (social and other) underlying these are thus not 
mere means but ends in themselves.40 Yet according to a proper analysis, 
the logie of these public services needs - for the sake of the common good -
that politicai strategie guidance by the owner self-government on the one 
hand, and executive decisions by the management on the other (as well as 
the complex and systematic internai and external controlling functions and 
the personal spheres) be clearly defined and separated, also that they co-op-
erate so that a politicai strategie guidance can work while professional consid-
erations and those of profitability (within desirable limits) are not neglected 
either.41 In locai politics, a completely new culture of social and politicai con-
trol has to be developed in the field of public services in order that the service 
of the common good (strategie guidance and control) be guaranteed in this 
complicated domain of public policy. A change of attitude is needed in the 
entire field of public services, by re-thinking the limits of and relations be-
3 7 A. ANDRONICO cit., p. 256 . 
38 Cf. A. ANDRONICO cit., pp. 246-247. 
39 Cf. O.E. WILLIAMSON, The Mechanisms of Governance (United Kingdom, Oxford University 
Press, 1996) (Translated into Italian by Margherita Turvani, and reprinted by Franco Angeli). 
4 0 A. ANDRONICO cit., pp. 246-247. 
41 Cf. M. MULAZZANI, "Problemi di governance delle imprese dei servizi pubblici locali", in 
R. MELE - R. MUSSARI (eds.), L'innovazione della governance e delle strategie nei settori delle public 
Utilities (Bologna, il Mulino, 2009), pp. 235-256. 
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tween public and private more carefully. This has to be done in light of the 
insight that the functioning of (some elements of) the governance model im-
plemented in recent years has the consequence that the boundaries of the 
public and private spheres become dissolved. If the appearance of this model, 
or the elements of this way of governance is inevitable because of social and 
politicai demand, as some scholars claim, then the blurring of limits that is 
characteristic of this model should be addressed in the spirit of subsidiary 
governance. It is only through such a method of governing, it seems to us, that 
the paradoxes of regional policy-making42 can be overcome. Generally speak-
ing, one may state that right public policy-making cannot be achieved merely 
through the principles of decentralisation and/or participation in government 
and public administration by applying the above techniques and methods. 
The substantive principle of subsidiarity has to be implemented effectively, 
together with the other principles of the personalist social philosophy. We 
now discuss some of the consequences in terms of locai administration, regio-
nal development and locai governance. 
6.2. Problems of regional governance 
Regional governance beyond regional administration can be described, 
from a realistic perspective, with the slogan 'Europe with the regions' as op-
posed to 'Europe of the regions'.43 Considered this way, although the regions 
are organised partly across the borders, they become definitive actors of regio-
nal governance - not instead of, but together with or under the control of the 
nation state. We are living the period of macro-regions and euro-regions in 
Europe, which transforms the state borders into 'seams', by creating 'hinge 
zones'.44 One has to resist the temptation, however, of considering these 
forms of co-operation exclusively as part of the state competence of interna-
tional relation-building, which would thus need a centrai state control in ali 
42 First, the paradox of 1) multiple levels, which means that the institutions of regional politics 
start to move and gain a considerable amount of funcdons from the institutions of representative 
democracy. Second, the paradox of 2) vertical democracy, which makes the roles change: 'it is the 
technocrats who make strategie, definitive value decisions, while the role of locai politicians becomes 
marginai, limited to project management'. Third, the paradox of 3) economie democracy, as this model 
of financing 'supports the elite having considerable resources (and deprives the public of any pos-
sibility of control)'. Last, the paradox of 4) horizontal democracy, according to which an elite will 
be chosen from the too high number of contributing actors, thus diminishing transparency. I. PÀLNÉ 
KOVÀCS, Helyi kormànyzas Magyarorszdgon cit., p. 103. 
4 3 F . FERLAINO - P . MOLINARI, Neofederalismo, neoregionalismo e intercomunalità: geografia 
amministrativa dell'Italia e dell'Europa (Bologna, E Mulino, 2009), pp. 152, 165. 
4 4 F . FERLAINO - P . MOLINARI cit., pp. 1 6 8 - 1 7 2 . 
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respeets.45 The state has to provide the necessary competences and financial 
means in order that cross-border co-operation can develop at locai and regio-
nal levels in a bottom-up way. Finally, we would like to emphasise that the 
problems of the model of multi-level good governance should not be ad-
dressed primarily by organisational and structural reforms. Real good govern-
ance calls for the emergence of a new generation of politiaans,46 and the for-
mation of a civil society is also inevitable, which would participate in public-
policy processes of decision and control, hearing community values and inter-
ests. Subsidiary governance, which we consider as good and right governance, 
thus needs new people. 
7 . TOWARDS A NORMATIVE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTIONAL REALITY OF A 
GLOBAL POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
The politicai lessons of the recent financial crisis have shown that the glo-
bal financial system has to be regulated, but also - to a certain extent and in 
certain respeets - governed 47 This is important if humanity is not only to suf-
fer global interdependence in terms of the negative effeets of the financial sys-
tem, but also to do something actively, while observing the ethical imperative 
of fraternity, to achieve a more just establishment, which would serve the 
common good better 48 Regulation is also called for by the factual global in-
terdependence, as the effeets of the financial crisis cannot be stopped at the 
national borders in an age where the amounts and - speculative - financial 
produets transferred and sold every day between the actors of the global fi-
nancial system exceed the volume of real economy and international real 
transfers by far. Justice and solidarity too demand that the profit gained with 
speculative operations cannot be exempt from imposed contributions and re-
4 5 F . FERLAINO - P . MOLINARI cit., p. 172. 
4 6 J . OLSSON, Democracy paradoxes in multi-level governance, R S A International Conference, 
2001 (unpublished paper), Gdansk, Pàlné Kovàcs Ilona refers to some ideas formulated at this con-
ference: I. PÀLNÉ KovÀCS, Helyi kormànyzas Magyarorszagon cit., p. 104. 
47 The social doctrine of the Catholic Church has been urging the establishment of a global 
governance since long, with the aim of 'providing more justice, transparency and responsibility on 
the financial markets of the world'. A. LUCIANI, Etica, economia, finanza globale (Città del Vaticano, 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), p. 105. It may be interesting to examine the current reformist ideas 
of a European Financial Supervision through the work of the de Larosière group. This group is 
chaired by Jacques de Larosière, who was Governor of the Banque de France, President of the 
EBRD, and Managing Director of the IMF before. Thus, the suggestions of this group may rightly 
be considered as coming from 'inside of the system'. 
4 8 Cf. A. LUCIANI cit., pp. 94 -97 . 
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distribution, particularly where and when the overtaxation of work incomes 
jeopardizes the living standard of families. One should not forget that the per-
son and his/her good is the eternai measure for the evaluation of international 
financial and economie processes.49 This is why we think that speculative 
- negative and short-term - futures contracts that fundamentally and heavily 
jeopardize the cruciai actors and interests of national economies should be 
prohibited or at least strictly limited by law. One has to bear in mind that 
if the 'politicai' does not coincide with the 'state' any more, as it permeates 
the sub-state sphere as well, if it concerns the public good to a great extent, 
then governance cannot be limited to state government either. It has to com-
prise the whole dimension of the 'politicai' up to the global level, since it is 
there that those financial and economie processes that determine the common 
good to the greatest extent (and can therefore be considered as public affairs) 
take place. Thus, empirical and normative concepts of 'global governance' 
cannot be circumvented, neither in theory nor in practice. According to John 
Rawls, the concept of fraternity has, if it is to gain a normative content, to be 
transformed into a criterion of justice.50 While we do not think that this 
would be the ultimate and only meaning of fraternity (and it cannot be 
decided either whether the classical concept of 'politicai friendship' or the 
modernist concept of 'fraternity' fits the concept of good governance better) 
it seems certain that these concepts demand, in a contemporary procedural 
sense, at least the involvement of the citizens and their communities as part-
ners in the determination and the accomplishment of the common good, from 
locai relations up to the global level of governance. At any rate, participation 
and subsidiarity are the principles representing the essential - one might say 
fraternal - equality of the citizens in the functionally hierarchical governmen-
tal relations, in the active formulation and determination of the common 
good. Particular politicai communities, if based on politicai friendship, can 
4 9 A. LUCIANI cit., p. 106 . 
50 In the most influential work of Rawls, fraternity does not only mean civic friendship and 
social solidarity, but in order that it can set a definite standard, also the corresponding principle of 
justice has to be formulated. The 'difference principle' expresses one of the naturai meanings of 
the concept of fraternity, Rawls argues, i.e. the idea that we want our advantages to increase only 
if it is to the benefit of the least advantaged. J. RAWLS, A Theory of justice, originai edition (Cam-
bridge, Ma - London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 105. This means 
the expansion of a behaviour accepted in the family to the level of social organisation, as the prin-
ciple of 'maximal gain' is not acceptable for a family, and one wants to gain something only if it is to 
the benefit of the other members as well. Ibid. Fraternity, if it includes the requirements following 
from the 'difference principle', i.e. the possibility of preserving some kind of equality between dif-
ferent persons, may gain a politicai content, as Rawls puts it. J. RAWLS cit., p. 106. Fraternity, however, 
has other contents and references, too. Ibid., pp. 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 . 
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co-operate horizontally with other particular communities in the spirit of so-
lidarity and fraternity. On such a basis, also a global politicai community can 
emerge, as a universal community of politicai communities, in which ali these 
politicai communities have their respective common goods, while they are also 
committed to a more general common good.51 The great task of global govern-
ance is to harmonise these common goods, while observing the good of the 
whole of humankind and of the developing countries in particular. 
51 Cf. L. STURZO, "Opere scelte di Luigi Sturzo", IV, La sociologia fra persona e storia, A . AR-
DIGÒ - L. FRUDÀ (eds.) (Roma - Bari, Editori Laterza, 1992), XLIX, pp. 73-74; C. MILLON-DELSOL 
cit., pp. 9 7 - 9 9 . 
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G O O D A D M I N I S T R A T I O N I N T H E A G E O F G O V E R N A N C E 
The idea of buongoverno is centrai in Luigi Einaudi's politicai and eco-
nomical thought even if he "referred to good government more in an allusive 
manner than in theoretical-conceptual terms".1 This idea has gone through 
remarkable developments in the past decades; so much so that the leading 
paradigm behind it seems to have changed. In a somewhat schematic way 
one can contend that the XIX century slowly saw the demise of the anthro-
pological representation of a King as a good father wisely and prudently ad-
ministering the country and the people. The legai rational pattern of govern-
ment later theorised by Max Weber become prevalent in the Western world. 
In the past decades this law-centered model has come under attack by a new 
approach criticizing the narrow focus on formai institutions and expounding 
the perceived need to consider ali relevant social actors playing a role in the 
governance system. In this paper, after a few remarks on the pre-administra-
tive State approach to buongoverno, we will first focus on the legai rational 
government model and then analyse the emergent patterns to investigate 
how they have changed our understanding of 'good administration'. 
1. FROM THE PATER PATRIAE TO THE RULE OF LAW 
Even Roman Emperors characterised themselves as Pater Patriae, the 
Fathers of the Fatherland. The pretence implied in the formula served a legiti-
macy purpose which was strengthened by the Christian depiction of God as a 
Good and Loving Father. As such, the mythology of the Pater Patriae was in-
voked in the struggle led by Charles I Stuart against parliamentary forces 
1 P. SILVESTRI, "The ideal of good government in Luigi Einaudi's thought and life: between law 
and freedom", above p. 91. 
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poised to limit the king's powers. In this context, the king was portrayed as 
'good' and showing fatherly care over and affection to his subjects.2 
The Pater Patriae was not just a politicai metaphor. It could play a role 
- and possibly an unexpected one - in legai analysis. In England the Chancellor 
representing the king as parens Patriae could interfere in a father's right over 
his children in cases of mistreatment. In Eyre v Shaftesbury the Lord Chancel-
lor laid down the principle according to which "the care of ali infants is 
lodged in the King as Pater Patriae, and this care is delegated to this Court 
of Chancery".3 The 'Good King' and the Pater Patriae mythology were no 
more enough once the people started to claim the sovereignty of the nation 
States in the XIX century or at least to share it with the ruling monarch. 
At this juncture the nation State developed one very coherent approach to 
the issues of legitimacy and, albeit with lesser emphasis, accountability. Fol-
lowing the democratic revolutions, the primus motor is the people. In princi-
ple the people rule through the officials they have elected. The people legitimise 
the Parliament, responsible for making the laws, and the Executive, respon-
sible for their application through statutory instruments and individuai deci-
sions. Recurrent elections make the officials accountable to the people. Legiti-
macy and accountability are the prospective and retrospective components of 
the representative democratic cycle. This pattern, with minor variations, has 
become the paradigm of the western legai tradition in the past two centuries. 
France has possibly given the world the most coherent picture of the modem 
nation State. One people - or rather, a more mystical entity: la Nation 
- through the electoral process gives legitimacy to a legislative body whose task 
is to speak the general will (la volonté generale) through the statutes it enacts. 
The same Nation gives legitimacy to ali other public institutions, first and 
foremost to the executive power. Under the influence of Hegel and through 
living in a fairly authoritarian context stili characterised by the prominence of 
kingly - keiserlisch - power, German scholars preferred insisting on the State 
rather than on the people. The pattern, however, was quite the same: 
The aims of the state were made to coincide with the 'public interest'. Such aims, 
however, ali had to be defined by statute, insomuch as the state was no longer a body 
free to act 'arbitrarily' - so the argument went - the Polizeistaat of absoiutism. It was 
now a Rechtsstaat.4 
2 For discussimi and references see C. GUTTICA, " 'Adam and the King': The Fatherly Image of 
the State. Patriarchalism as Politicai Language in Early Seventeenth-Century England", available at 
www.ssm.com. 
3 24 Eng. Rep. 6 5 9 ( 1 7 2 2 ) , H.I. CLARKE, Social Legislatori (New York, Appleton, 1957 ) , pp. 2 1 8 ff. 
4 G. AJANI, "The Rise and Fall of the Law-Based State in the Experience of Russian Legai 
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The French revolution was intent on abolishing the old 'caste' system. Ali 
citizens were to be equal. The people - la Nailon - and by consequence the 
State are one, undivided, and indivisible. Statutes - la loi - became the instru-
ments of the volonté générale, inflexibly applied to ali and everyone in the 
same way (and so full circle back to equality). La loi is the instrument of 
choice to regulate society and as such is present in many provisions of the 
1789 Déclaration. Its characters are expressed in Article 6: "La loi est l'expres-
sion de la volonté générale [...]. Elle doit ètre la m'eme pour tous, soit qu'elle 
protège, soit qu'elle punisse. Tous les citoyens, étant égaux à ces yeux". Worship 
of the law spread widely in Europe. Einaudi himself was deeply steeped in 
this tradition, even if he became afraid of the possible tyranny of the major-
ity.5 The governing role of law was widely accepted even if Etat de droit, Re-
chsstaat, Stato di diritto and Rule of law do not mean the same. Indeed, under 
the English idea of Rule of law, parliamentary enacted law is not very much 
binding on ali administrative authorities. These are bound by the (judge-
made) common law and their decisions are therefore reviewed by the same 
ordinary courts acting as law givers.6 Max Weber gave a compelling theore-
tical model for this mechanism through the idea of the rule-based legal-ra-
tional bureaucratic State which was to have so much influence in Continental 
Europe.7 Accordingly, it has been claimed that "Weber's conception has be-
come the dominant account of modem government".8 
In essence, Weber identified administrative or bureaucratic government as a ra-
tional-legal regime in which groups of full-time, salaried officials, chosen on the basis 
of their credentials and placed within hierarchical organisations, conduct officiai busi-
ness according to established rules, within a defined jurisdiction, and for defined in-
strumentai purposes.9 
Scholarship", in D . D . BARRY (ed.), Towards the "Rule ofLaw" in Russia?: Politicai and Legai Reform 
in the Transition Period (New York, Armonk, 1992). 
5 For a discussion see P. SILVESTRI, pp. 63 ff. 
6 G . AJANI, p. 5 . 
7 See J . PONCE SOLÉ, "The History of Legitimate Administration in Europe", in M. RUFFERT 
(ed.), Legitimacy in Luropean Administrative Law: Reform and Reconstruction (Groningen, Europa 
Law Publishing, 2011), pp. 155 ff.; as to the diffusion of the model e.g. F. VELASCO CABALLERO, 
"The Legitimacy of the Administration in Spain", in M . RUFFERT (ed.), Legitimacy in Luropean Ad-
ministrative Law cit., p. 89 f. 
8 E. RUBIN, "It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative", Cornell Law 
Rev., 89, 2003, p. 99. 
9 Ibid., p. 98 f. 
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Even at a time when, as we will see, this model is well past its heyday, its 
attraction is stili strong enough to prod pleading for its adoption in the US. 
The mythology of the legai rational government failed to acknowledge 
that often enough the statutes are far from stringent in designing the condi-
tions for the exercise of authoritative powers. More or less wide margins of 
discretion are left for the benefit of officiai decision makers.11 Quite often, 
policy choices do not take place in democratically legitimised law-making. 
They happen when individuai decisions are taken, in an output phase of policy 
delivery far removed from legitimacy-giving elections. Courts ali over Europe 
carne to share the French position according to which 
discretion should not be eliminated as it is irreplaceable in allowing the administra-
tion to take decisions which cannot be foreseen ex ante by general regulations and 
similarly should not be fettered ex post by judicial review which could be too tight 
or too strict.12 
In the end it is the autorité administrative that is the one saying what the 
actual content of any legai provision is.13 And it is the autorité administrative 
the one deciding which conflicting general or private interest will prevail in 
any given instance.14 
2 . GOOD GOVERNMENT AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT 
The legai rational Weberian government model does not seem to be too 
concerned with 'good government': emphasis is on legitimacy, and legitimacy 
is given by the compliance with the legai requirement for taking the decision. 
It is also worth remarking that this model is inherendy formalistic in that it 
tends to focus on the legai measure adopted rather than on its actual - and 
factual - implementation. 
10 Ibid., p. 95. 
11 See the papers collected by S. PRECHAL and B . VAN ROERMUND (eds.), The Coherence ofEU 
Law. The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, and O, Es-
SENS, A. GERBRANDY and S. LAVRIJSSEN (eds.), National Courts and the Standard of Review in Com-
petition Law and Economie Regulation (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2009). 
12 E. PICARD, "The Public-Private Divide in French Law Through the History and Destiny of 
French Administrative Law", in M . RUFFERT (ed.), The Public-Private Divide: Potentialfor Transfor-
mation? (London, BIICL, 2009), p. 43. 
13 See G. DELLA CANANEA, "Beyond the State: The Europeanisation and Globalisation of 
Procedural Administrative Law", Eur. Public Law, 9 (2003), p. 566. 
1 4 R . CARANTA, " O n Discretion", in S. PRECHAL and B . VAN ROERMUND (eds.) cit., pp. 185 ff. 
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The emphasis laid upon the principle of legality completely overshadows 
ali other aspects that can be listed to describe efficiency in policy implemen-
tation. Especially when coupled with the margins of discretion allowed to de-
cision makers, the Rule of law means a focus on procedures rather than re-
sults, input, rather than output. The rule of law is therefore a quite weak 
base for accountability. In the Eingriffsverwaltung the citizens might very well 
be happy enough to have any mistake in the decision making process found 
out, with the final decision taken against their interests being in the end 
quashed. In the Leistungsverwaltung, however, the concern is about receiving 
the best quality services possible, and procedural niceties are of little interest. 
What is relevant is the result, the output. In many ways, ex ante legitimacy is 
much more a concern than ex post accountability in the traditional govern-
ment model. It is very much focused on the input oriented legitimacy mechan-
ism culminating in the passing of legislation. The legai rational bureaucratic 
Weberian model adds a sociological reconstruction to the model, but the 
model itself is stricdy legalistic and lawyers (from bureaucrats to judges) are 
its guardians.15 Effectiveness in policy delivery has been very low in priority. 
It is a bit like the institutional architecture of the nation State spending ali its 
efforts on giving ex ante, input legitimacy to policy design mechanisms 
(mainly Parliament and other policy setting institutions, the Government 
nowadays included). The system betrays a naive assumption that democratic 
representative institutions cannot but deliver efficiently according to the people's 
will. Public choice theory has shed light on the role of lobbies and special 
interests, which is unduly ignored by much of constitutional law thinking.16 
Be as it may, in the legai rational Weberian model, the policy delivery machin-
ery was not given sufficient attention, resulting in weak output legitimacy or 
rather ex post accountability.17 It is worth remarking that the insufficient at-
tention to output is to some extent shared by the US system which is not 
based on the legai rational Weberian model. The Administrative Procedure 
Act and case law mainly focus on the procedures to be followed in making 
decisions. Due process is the main preoccupation. As has been remarked, this 
15 A. VOBKUHLE, "The Reform Approach in the German Science of Administrative Law: The 
Neue Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft", in M . RUFFERT (ed.), Legitimacy in Luropean Administrative 
Law cit., p. 93 ff. 
16 See G.P. MILLER, "Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of But-
ter and Margarine", California Law Rev., 77 (1989), p. 83. 
17 For instance, in Italy S. CASSESE, "Le basi costituzionali", in ID. (ed.), Trattato di diritto am-
ministrativo. Parte generale, I, 2nd (Milano, Giuffrè, 2003), pp. 173 ff., has lamented the marginai 
position left to the public administration in the Constitution, which focuses much attention on 
the Parliament, the Government, and the Judiciary. 
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attitude ends up smuggling "incrementai, law-discovering, adversarial ap-
proaches into a comprehensive law-creating context which encumber the pro-
cess without providing any real control on its outcome".18 
3 . FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE 
Unsurprisingly, given its nonchalant attitude towards output, the legai ra-
tional Weberian government model fared quite poorly in the end. Results 
were even more meagre when the model was applied to the management of 
the economy, as was the case in planned or quasi-planned systems. This 
has led to much criticism, at times quite harsh. A distinction has been intro-
duced between input and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy is established 
when citizens are sufficiendy involved in policy choices ('government by the 
people'). Output legitimacy depends on serving the citizens' interests, other-
wise said, in public policies being effective ('government for the people').19 
The legai rational description of government has been characterised as sub-
stantially devoid of any link with reaUty, thus stigmatising "the distance which 
has grown up between law, as conceived in traditional legai theory, and gov-
ernance (administrative practices), and the consequent detachment of juris-
prudence from reaUty; and the rendering of jurisprudence as a 'form of eUte 
ignorance', or non-knowledge of the social".20 An alternative narrative has 
emerged in the social sciences, focusing on governance rather than on govern-
ment. It has been argued that 
the basic idea [referred to when talking of 'governance'] is that government, identi-
fied with the traditional hierarchical state form, has given way to a world of diffused 
authority in which the boundaries between pubUc law and private law are blurred. 
Governance seems to refer to the regulatory capacity of the whole gamut of organisa-
tions in the pubUc sphere, including govemments at aU levels, private firms, and as-
sociations 2 1 
1 8 E . RUBIN, p. 1 04 . 
19 F.W. SCHARF, Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 6 
ff. 
20 J SCOTT - D.M. TRUBECK, '"Mind the Gap': Law and New Approaches to Governance in 
the European Union"; Eur. L. Journ., 8 (2002), p. 8 f„ referring to P. GOODRICH, "Law-Induced 
Anxiety: Legists, Anti-Lawyers and the Boredom of Legality", Social and Legai Studies, 9 (2000), p. 150. 
21 M. KEATING, "Europe's Changing Politicai Landscape: Territorial Restructuring and New 
Forms of Government", in P. BEAUMONT, C. LYONS and N. WALKER (eds.), Convergence and Diver-
gere in European Public Law (Oxford, Hart, 2002), p. 13. 
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This can be otherwise stateci: 
Whereas a traditional concept of law looks for a unitary source of ultimate 
authority, new governance is predicted upon a dispersal and fragmentation of author-
ity, and rests upon fluid systems of power sharing.22 
'Governance' parlance has gained wide currency and has become a sort of 
catchword. As such it has been captured by politicians or institutions trying to 
establish themselves as being poised to innovate the institutional system. The 
otherwise modest 2001 White Paper on European Governance published by 
the (then) EC Commission is part of this league.23 This has led to a quite gen-
eric notion of governance. In a way it covers traditional government as well as 
ali the different institutional changes which have taken place in the past 
decades with the aim of making the State more efficient and responsive to 
the needs of the people. In this context a different development needs to 
be considered. The shortcomings of the legai rational model have been 
challenged from the point of view of managerial sciences. 
4 . LAW V S MANAGEMENT: THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE TO THE 
LEGAL RATIONAL PARADIGM 
The legai rational Continental European model failed at first to make 
major inroads into the US. After the American revolution, a sort of 'gentelmanly 
governement' was set up, substantially awarding administrative functions to 
amateur gentry who happened to be linked with the politicai party having 
won the elections.24 With the increase of functions at federai level linked to 
the westward expansion the need for a more professional approach to govern-
ment could not be any longer eluded. This led to the 1883 civil service reform. 
However, to avoid the feeling of any return to a 'gentelmanly governement'. 
The Civil Service Commission pointedly described the examinations that were re-
quired for civil service positions as practical in nature and pitched at a modest intel-
lectual level, not aimed at establishing a college-trained aristocracy. In adopting a civil 
service system, the United States was participating in an international trend towards a 
2 2 J . SCOTT - D . M . TRUBECK, 'Mind the G a p ' cit., p. 8. 
23 COM (2001) 428, at p. 7 £.; see the analysis by J.B. WIENER, "Better Regulation in Europe", 
above fn, pp. 447 ff. 
24 L.S. LUTON, "Administrative State and Society: A Case Study of the United States of Ame-
rica", in B . G . PETERS and J . PIERRE (eds.), Handhook of Public Administration (London, Sage, 2003), 
pp. 170 ff. 
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merit system; but in the United States such a system was a direct challenge to patron-
age and rotation. The patronage system had lost favour because of its participation in 
the general decline in morality found throughout American society. Stili, in order to 
succeed the merit system had to offer more than a return to morality; it had to offer 
new values that could counter patronage's claims to democracy and responsiveness. 
Merit's new values were derived from business - economy, efficiency and the ability to 
deal with the increasingly complex affairs of an industriai and urban society. Promo-
tion of the ideal of a 'businesslike' government in the drive for civil service reform 
may have been the most lasting impact of the Republican era on public administra-
tion. [...] it is this establishment of the business ideal that represents the historical 
origin of 'modem institutional politics in America'.25 
While in Continental Europe the legai rational tradition demanded public 
servants knowledgeable in the laws, in the late '800s and early '900s the US 
saw the rise of scientific management i.e. 'business-like' approach to adminis-
tration. This peculiar approach lost part of its allure in the New Deal era, 
when the tasks given to the administration grew considerably, only to re-
emerge again once the fiscal crises of the '1970 brought the efficiency impera-
tives back to the fore.26 In the past two decades, the advent of New Public 
Management (NPM) "has reoriented the rendering of public services towards 
efficiency by means of redefining governmental structures in resemblance to 
private sector enterprises", particularly through the enhancing of managerial 
freedom and the reducing of politicai interference.27 Once again the pendu-
lum has swung back to the business model in administration. "The NPM 
movement has sought to shift the bureaucratic nature of institutions towards 
entrepreneurial bodies with genuine corporate culture that embraces a consu-
mer-sensitive approach".28 The managerial approach to governance has seen 
an evolution from quantity (management by objectives MBO) to quality (total 
quality management TQM). Customers have also been involved in defining 
quality (the public choice component of new public management NPM has 
been developed).29 
25 L . S . LUTON, p. 172. 
26 See A. ROBERTS, "Harris' Mirage: The Positive Service State", available at www.ssm.com. 
27 J.M. AZPÙRUA ALFONZO "Consumerism, Marketization, New Public Management and the 
Citizen-State Relationship", in www.ssm.com. 
28 Ibid. 
29 C.J. HEINRICH, "Measuring Public Sector Performance and Effectiveness", in B.G. PETERS 
and J . PIERRE (eds.), Handbook of Public Administration (London, Sage, 2003), pp. 27 ff. 
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5 . GOOD GOVERNANCE AND EVALUATION 
Evaluation is clearly criticai for assessing the quality of any governance 
system. "Accountability - to legislative bodies, taxpayers and program stake-
holders - is a primary goal of public sector performance measurement".30 
Governance is often said to be output oriented rather than input oriented. 
If this is so, the outputs need to be measured. "To dissect how the implemen-
tation process operate and to what extent the expected impact has been rea-
lised is food for thought for evaluation".31 Evaluation studies have grown in 
the past decades. Indeed, "The accountability and transparency of the public 
sector is one of the driving forces behind this".32 Actually evaluation should 
start before any measure is taken (so called ex ante evaluation) as decision-
makers strive to divine which means would be conducive to the ends they have 
in mind. Somewhat of a bridge between ex ante and ex post evaluation is orga-
nisation evaluation. This should be performed when considering the means 
available, but also when evaluating the strengths and the weaknesses in the 
actual delivery of the chosen policy. From an output based perspective, how-
ever, the more significant tools are process and impact (effectiveness) evalua-
tions. The former focuses on the question whether policies have been imple-
mented in the way they were intended to, while the latter is used to ascertain 
whether the goals have been attained.33 Of course, classification may diverge. 
According to a different view, one must distinguish between different cate-
gories of performance information including: 1) inpuc info (e.g. resources 
and staff); 2) process information (e.g. workload and job complexity); 3) effi-
ciency info (e.g. productivity and unit costs); 4) output (products and services 
delivered); 5) outcomes (in relation to intermediate or end goals), including 
quality assessment; 6) impact.34 It goes without saying that impact evaluation 
is the more relevant one when assessing whether a system conforms to a good 
governance pattern. In time, emphasis has shifted from mere output, mainly 
focusing on costs on the lines dictated by an ideology demanding the rolling 
back of the borders of the State, to outcomes, which encompass quality. The 
UK experience on managing locai services is quite significant. While the Tories 
30 Ibid., p. 25. 
3 1 F . L . LEEUW, "Can legai research benefit from evaluation studies?", Utrecht L. Rev., 1 (2011), 
p. 53. 
32 Ibid, p. 54. 
33 Ibid. 
34 C.J. HEINRICH, "Measuring Public Sector Performance and Effectiveness", p. 26. 
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under Margaret Thatcher pushed compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) 
mainly as a way to reduce costs, Blair's Labour shifted the emphasis 
on quality through Best Value. This shift, of course, made evaluation much 
more complicated, requiring the setting of a large number of standards and 
the need for ad hoc audit commission.35 With the reforms recently intro-
duced, Italy seems very much going down the same path of measuring and 
standards.36 
6 . CONCLUSIONS WITH AN EYE TO THE E U 
The past decades have seen a shift of interest from legality and input to 
performance and output. A well-functioning democratic society probably 
needs a combination of both, with evaluation becoming a relevant tool for 
voters' choices. How can the 'goodness' of government be assessed at EU level? 
Before answering the question, the peculiarity of the EU institutional frame-
work needs to be recalled. A number of seminai judgements by the European 
Court of justice starting from Van Gend & Loos dispelled the initial recon-
struction of the (then) EEC as one more instance of intergovernmental coop-
eration.37 The problem then become: what was indeed the (then) EEC? Say-
ing that it was a sui generis organisation failed to mask the absence of a clear 
view of the new phenomenon:38 
35 For a mixed review see PH. JAMES, P. HIGGINS and I. ROPER, "Best Value: Is It Delivering", 
Public Money and Management, 24 (2004), p. 251. The new Tory government is working on a new 
evaluation system. 
36 The main texts are L. 4 marzo 2009, n. 15 - "Delega al Governo finalizzata all'ottimizzazione 
della produttività del lavoro pubblico e alla efficienza e trasparenza delle pubbliche amministrazioni 
nonché disposizioni integrative delle funzioni attribuite al Consiglio nazionale dell'economia e del 
lavoro e alla Corte dei conti", and d.lgs. 27 ottobre 2009, n. 150, in "materia di ottimizzazione della 
produttività del lavoro pubblico e di efficienza e trasparenza delle pubbliche amministrazioni". See 
F.G. GRANDIS, "Luci ed ombre nella misurazione, valutazione e trasparenza delle performance", 
Giornale di diritto amministrativo (2010), p. 23, and V. TALAMO, "Pubblico e privato nella legge de-
lega per la riforma del lavoro pubblico", Giornale di diritto amministrativo (2009), p. 468. 
37 Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1; see A.J. MENÉNDEZ, "The European Democratic Challenge: The 
Forging of a Supranational Volontà Generale", Eur. Public Law, 15 (2009), p. 281; M . DANI, "Con-
stitutionalism and Dissonances: Has Europe Paid Off its Debt to Functionalism?", Eur. Public Law, 
15 (2009), pp. 329 ff. 
38 The now vanished prospect of a 'Constitution' has led to much debate as to the nature of the 
new EU: among many contributions see M. POJARES MADURO, "The Importance of Being Calied a 
Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism", Int. Journ. Const. 
Law (2005), p. 336; A. VON BOGDANDY, "The Prospect of a European Republic: What European 
Citizens are Voting on", C.M.L.Rev., 42 (2005), p. 913. 
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We are seeing in Europe the creation of a new form of politicai order and [...] the 
tendency to interpret it using existing categories, whether as a state, a federation, a 
confederation or an international organisation, represents another instance of the statist 
fixation in social sciences.39 
The peculiarity extends to the way the EU is actually 'administering' the 
law. This is the aspect on which good government/governance mostly focuses. 
Even if the number of European agencies is on the increase, only rarely are 
European institutions charged with the administrative execution of EU 
rules.40 This task is normally given to administrations in the Member States 
or is performed through collaborative procedures involving both European 
and national or sub-national institutions 41 There are two consequences to 
this. On the one hand, European institutions mostly enact rules, quite often 
primary rules in the sense both that they take precedent over national rules 
and that national rules might be needed to implement EU rules. When we 
are talking of EU administrative law, we are encompassing what in its sub-
stance is primary or secondary rule-making as well as adjudication.42 This is 
a departure from traditional administrative law, which rather focused on in-
dividuai decisions (possibly extending to secondary rule making in some jur-
isdictions). On the other hand, Member States stili retain some procedural 
autonomy in choosing the rules applicatile to the procedures - or procedural 
phases - taking place at national or sub-national level. As has been remarked, 
EU administrative law is 
a system which combines the particularities of the functional unity of administrative 
tasks undertaken by actors separated organisationally (or perhaps structurally) but 
which is engaged in often intense procedural cooperation. The intense procedural co-
operation in turn often leads to the creation of new organisational forms 4 3 
39 M. KEATING, "Europe's Changing Politicai Landscape: Territorial Restructuring and New 
Forms of Government", in P. BEAUMONT, C. LYONS and N. WALKER (eds.), Convergence and Diver-
gence in European Public Law (Oxford, Hart, 2002), p. 11. 
40 E. CHITI, "Towards a Model of Independent Exercise of Community Functions", in R. CA-
RANTA, M. ANDENAS and D. FAIRGRIEVE (eds.), Independent Administrative Authorities (London, 
BDCL, 2004), pp. 205 ff. 
41 P. CRAIG, EU Administrative Law (Oxford, OUP, 2 0 0 6 ) , p. 5 7 f.; R . MEHDI, "L'autonomie 
institutionnelle et procèdutale et le droit administratif ' , in J . - M . AUBY et J . DUTHEIL DE LA ROCHÈRE 
(dirs.), Droit Administratif Européen (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2 0 0 7 ) , pp. 6 8 5 ff. 
42 To this some soft law instruments giving indication as to how the Commission intend to use 
its discretionary powers must be added: see H.C.H. HOFMANN, "Negotiated and Non-Negotiated 
Administrative Rule-Making: The Example of EC Competition Policy", Common Market L. Rev., 
43 (2006), pp. 158 ff. 
43 H.C.H. HOFMANN, "Seven Challenges for EU Administrative Law", in K.J. DE GRAAF, J .H. 
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In some ways, the peculiar task (regulation) normally given to EU institu-
tions is the target for the modernising trend going under the label of better 
regulation. This trend was given impetus by the 2001 White Paper on Eur-
opean Governance which acknowledged the need for better quality regula-
tion.44 In this context, regulatory impact assessment and cutting red tape 
are relevant avenues for improving governance.45 When we come to more tra-
ditional administrative activities - such as the adoption of individuai measures 
- the approach is more linked to the traditional legai rational Weberian pat-
tern. Review of these measures is legality review, that is mainly input oriented. 
This approach is confirmed by other rules. Art. 41 of the Charter of funda-
mental rights enshrines a 'Right to good administration' which include, apart 
from the right of access and the duty for the decision maker to give reasons, a 
further duty to act 'impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time', and a 
right to be heard for those potentially affected by an individuai measure. 
We are thus confronted with some sort of doublé speed approach to good 
governance. Regulatory measures, besides complying with legality rules, must 
undergo evaluation tests, while individuai measures only comply with the for-
mer. In the first pages of a leading book on public administration we read: 
With some exaggeration it could be argued that while previously legitimacy was 
derived from the public and legai nature of the public administration, legitimacy is 
currently (and to an increasing extent) contingent on bureaucracy's ability to deliver 
customer-attuned services swifdy and accurately.46 
If this is so, the good administration principle as enshrined in Art. 41 of 
the Charter seems a bit out of sync with more recent developments. It is fair 
to remember that policy implementation is rather the task of Member States 
in the EU. However, it would be sensible to update the provisions on good 
administration into a more comprehensive - and more modem - good gov-
ernance. 
JANS, A . PRECHAL and R . J . G . M . WIDDERSHOVEN (eds.), European Administrative Law: Top-Down 
and Bottom-Up (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2009), p. 42 f. 
44 COM (2001) 428, p. 7 f.; see the analysis by J.B. WIENER, "Better Regulation in Europe", 
Current Legai Problems, 59 (2006), pp. 447 ff.; H. XANTAKI, "The Problem of Quality in EU Leg-
islation: What on Earth is Really Wrong?", in Common Market L. Rev. (2001), p. 651. 
4 5 See J .B . WIENER cit., p. 5 0 6 . 
46 B.G. PETERS - J . PIERRE, "Introduction: The Role of Public Administration in Governing", 
in B.G. PETERS and J. PIERRE (eds.), Handbook of Public Administration (London, Sage, 2003), p. 3. 
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L E G A L C O N T R O L O F A D M I N I S T R A T I O N : 
P R E M I S E O F G O O D G O V E R N M E N T 
1. DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW AND MECHANISMS OF CONTROL OVER PUBLIC 
POWER 
One of the common European beliefs is that no power can be exercised 
without control. The two main roots of control are represented by the prin-
ciples of democracy (and politicai control based on participation) and of rule 
of law (also known as constitutionalism, rechtstaat, legality and expressed by 
legai control). Democracy as a historically bound (or singular) component and 
rule of law, combined with observance of personal (human) rights and free-
doms (as universal substance) are theoretically appropriate instruments of 
good government. If we have a look at the politicai and legai situation of pre-
sent Europe, deficiencies of democracy and legality should be considered. 
The growing impact of the European Union - often described as functioning 
without proper democratic control - makes parliamentary legislation - and 
parliamentary sovereignty - more and more imaginary: Parliaments of Eur-
opean states function rather as secondary rule-makers than primary deci-
sion-makers.1 The Treaty of Lisbon aims at a more palpable democratic con-
trol, but it's only just coming into force, and its real effects have not been 
apparent yet. However, formai ways of control can be as exhaustive as possible, 
for most of the individuals in Brussels (or Strasbourg) and ali of its institutions 
and instruments are (and will be) too far away. Locai questions are to be 
answered by locai institutions. On national (state) and sub-national (territorial 
and locai self-governments in Hungary) level democratic representation and 
1 See opinions of A. Tomkins, C. Harlow and M. Loughlinn in N. BAMFORTH - P. LEYLAND 
(eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layerd Constitution (Oxford - Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 
2 0 0 3 ) . 
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its politicai instruments of control can be considered to be stable.2 Thus I will 
pay less interest to them. Without under-estimation of importance of demo-
cratic control we will focus on alternative instruments of legai control of ex-
ercise of public powers, because problematic situations of everyday life have 
more and more been handled as legai questions; consequently their solutions 
need easily accessible legai instruments. This consideration is based on the 
permanently growing number and extent of statutory and non statutory 
regulations.3 There is no doubt that judicial review plays a cruciai role in legai 
control of executive power either regarding rule making (controlied by 
constitutional courts or institutions with the same competence) or concerning 
effective administration (controlied by regular or administrative courts). The 
role of courts can be underpinned by certain supervision tools (appeal, other 
forms of internai remedy) within the system of administrative bodies.4 Even if 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights has an important and 
substantive effect on judicial procedures and jurisdiction of European states,5 
judicial review and inner administrative supervision have stili been too rigid 
and formai. Some of their limits are as follows: 
a) These ways of remedy are effective if substantial rules or principles of 
legality are affected or personal rights are breached seriously, but they cannot 
serve as appropriate instruments for minor (and everyday) faults of adminis-
tration. If private bodies are involved in performance of public duties (and the 
target of public bodies is governance instead of effective administrative deci-
sion-making) the conventional judicial review is not applicable. 
b) Similarly, administrative abuses favorable for individuals can remain 
in force; hence the affected party is not interested in contesting them. 
c) Even if administrative justice is applicable, judicial review may redress 
erroneous administrative acts, but cannot serve to award damages or to 
compensate pecuniary or personal losses. 
One is not far from the truth when thinking that traditional instruments of 
legai remedy should be completed for some situations with less formai, for 
2 See N . CHRONOWSKI - T . DRINÓCZI (eds.), Európai kormànyformàk rendszertana ('System of 
the European Forms of Government') (Budapest, HVGORAC, 2007). 
3 See P. CRAIG, Administrative Law ((V edition) (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008). 
4 Principles of Administrative Law Concerning the Relations Between Administrative Authorities 
and Private Persons, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, Directorate of Legai Affairs, 1996. 
5 See R. SEERDEN - F. STROINK, Administrative Law of the European Union, Its Member States 
and the United States. A Comparative Analysis (Antwerpen - Groningen, Intersentia Uitgevers, 2002) 
and M. ELIANTONIO, Europeanisation of Administrative Justice? The Influence of the ECJ's Case Law 
in Italy, Germany and England (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2009). 
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other aims with special institutions and procedures. Ombudspersons,6 public 
prosecutore7 and ordinary civil proceedings of courts8 could have important 
roles in effective legai control of administration and could lead to a better gov-
ernment. 
2 . T w o E X A M P L E S P O I N T I N G A T S I T U A T I O N S W H E N F O R M A L C O N T R O L IS N O T 
S U F F I C I E N T 
2.1. City-parking and formai legai control 
Long lasting and unsolved damage was caused in the Hungarian Capital 
by the administration of city-parking delegated to private companies.9 The 
regulation supervised by the Constitutional Court,10 was amended several 
times,11 and one of the last re-regulations made the role of private companies 
in maintenance of parking places exclusive.12 The maintainer companies 
started an enormous number of civil lawsuits against persons accused of 
parking without paying, most of them years after the real parking events. 
The first court-decisions were uncertain regarding the nature of legai relations 
in the cases. Some courts considered that fee-pretensions can be sequestrated 
as taxes {public law execution), others considered the civil law procedure in-
evitable {civil law execution). Finally the Supreme Court decided in 2005, that 
civil law execution is the acceptable way since parking is a fact featuring in 
civil law. However, some questions remained open, like the gap between 
the accountability of the owner and that of the real driver of the car in the 
case.13 Amalgamation of elements of public law and civil law relations lead 
6 See A. Zs. VARGA, "The Efficiency of the Ombudspersons' Actions in Hungary", Jahrbuch fiir 
Ostrecht, 1 (2009), pp. 119-126. 
7 See ID., Reflection Document on Prosecutori Competencies Outside the Criminal Field in the 
Member States ofthe Council of Europe, CPGE (2005), 02, Strasbourg, CoE, 2005, and Report on the 
Role of the public prosecution service outside the field of criminal justice, CCPE-Bu (2008), 4 rev., 
Strasbourg, CoE, 2008. 
8 See CRAIG cit., and T. CORNFORD, Towards a Public Law of Tort (Hampshire - Burlington, 
Ashgate, 2008). 
9 Decree 38/1993. (XII. 27.) of the Capital Council on City-parking. 
10 Decisons 958/H/1993. AB (ABH 1994, 781, 783.), 31/1996. (VII. 3.) AB (ABH 1996, 285), 
1256/H/1996. AB (ABH 1996, 789), and 1538/B/1996. AB (ABH 2001, 1198). 
11 Decree 19/2005. (IV. 22.) of the Capital Council on City-parking. 
12 Decree 24/2009. (V. 11.) of the Capital Council on City-parking. 
13 See the Civil Law Resolution for Uniformity of Jurisdiction No. 2/2006. on parking and 
parking fee. 
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to the defencelessness of the private person who lowers him/herself by park-
ing in a city and commits some minor faults (exceeding with minutes of the 
paid time, losing the ticket, etc.). Due to outsourcing of the basically public 
duty the private persons lose the protection granted by public law but they 
are not placed in the equal position of a civil law contractor. This anomaly 
was managed by the Constitutional Court which annulled the decree on 
city-parking14 that led to a new - this time statutory - regulation by the 
Parliament.15 This new act does not change the previous situation: due to 
the amalgamation of public and private law relationships, no formai revision 
by administrative law courts could apply against the administration of city-
parking, in essence against a duty of public bodies outsourced to private 
companies. 
2.2. Politicai disturbance and polke attacks 
It is not questionable that police actions against the 'regular' politicai dis-
turbances since autumn 2006 were an effective exercise of public power. One 
of the peculiarities of anti-demonstration actions of the police is that these 
measures are not formai, written and contestable (or appealable) acts of an 
administrative body. Since these measures are orai and immediately executa-
ble there is no efficient form of control which could stop the legai force of an 
occurring breach of rights. However, there is a kind of legai relation between 
the individuai affected and the police, and within this legai relation any harm 
caused to the individuai must be considered. The Supreme Court was aware 
of this aspect16 when it ruled that even if the orai instruction of the police 
cannot be contested on the site a later decision on a claim (allowed by law) 
to the chief of police can be supervised by the administrative court. The 
police-decision on claim focuses only on legality (reasonableness and propor-
tionality certainly within it) and judicial review may be asked only if the police 
decision is itself illegai. Consequently formai redress on administrative and 
judicial 'ways' is not appropriate to eliminate personal inconvenience. The 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights could complement these instru-
ments with its special point of view. If we take only one event, the police 
attack on the evening of l l t h of Aprii 2008 at Chain Bridge - Adam Clark 
14 Decision 109/2009. (XI. 18.) AB (ABK XVIII. 11.). 
is Acts XLVI and XLVII of 2010 on amendment of acts regardig parking. 
"> See A. LAPSÀNYSZKY, A hatósàgi dòntések ('Decisions of Administrative Authorities'), in 
A. PATYI (ed.), Kózigazgatàsi hatósàgi eljàràsjog ('Administrative Procedures') (Budapest-Pécs, Dia-
lóg-Campus, 2009), p. 287. 
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Square, the Parliamentary Commissioner discovered some grievances pointing 
to deeper problems than formai legality/illegality: 
The behavior of the Police was deceptive because the former demonstrations 
[with the same aims, explanation by the Author] were not prohibited or the notifica-
tion of demonstrations by the organizers were not rejected, no written or verbal ob-
jections were formulated regarding them. [...] Police attacked people - who did not 
commit any violent act - who were not participating in that moment at the demon-
stration but only were tending to join demonstrators [...] before starting the attack 
the organizer was not informed that the demonstration had been considered to be 
illegal [...], calling to stop the demonstration not perceptible for every participant 
cannot be considered to fulfill [...] legai prescriptions [...] time left before the attack 
was not enough to allow them to leave the location voluntarily.17 
The final remedy for persons harmed by police attacks was given not by a 
formai review (of the police decision on claim) but by a civil lawsuit aiming for 
indemnity or recompense for damages and injuries caused by the exercising of 
public power. Thus the Metropolitan Court18 ruled that police shooting with 
rubber bullets on 23rd October 2006 hurt human dignity and the right to per-
sonal integrity of the affected person. The Court considered 3 000 000 Ft 
(about 10 000 EUROs) and its interests to be adequate to compensate the 
harm having been caused. In its judgment the Court stated that "harm was 
caused by officers of a public body whose duty was precisely to protect the 
personal integrity of the injured individual" (the plaintiff of the litigation). 
3 . ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF CONTROL I - PROTECTION OF RIGHTS BY OMBUDS-
MAN-LIKE INSTITUTIONS 
Alternative forms of control can be reasoned in a simple way by the role of 
ombudsmen. Dissolution of boundaries between the fields of public and civil 
law, public services taking the traditional place of public administration roles 
back the role of classical instruments of legai redress since these tools do not 
apply in the corporate and private sphere. On the other hand traditional civil 
lawsuits are long and expensive, thus it is not a perfect instrument for quick 
17 B. HAJAS (ed.), Gyiilekezési jogi projekt ('Project of Right to Assembly') (Budapest, OBH, 
2009), pp. 75-76. 
18 Decision No. 37.P.21.610/2009/6. of the Metropolitan Court was approved by Decision 
2.Pf. 21.608/2009/4. of the Budapest Court of Appeal, see: http://www.birosag.hu/engine.aspx? 
page=anonim 
12 
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elimination of the faults and maladministrative acts of the executive. Thus le-
gai protection by ombudsman-like institutions is gaining more and more im-
portance, and its focus is moving from the formai administrative decision-
making process to the less controlied activity of private companies working 
in the sphere of public services. Ombudsmen by their flexible proceedings 
may concentrate on the relation between an individuai and public or private 
body being effective in a powerful position, while leaving out of interest the 
origin of this power. Ombudsmen are helped by the stabilization of the sub-
stantial content of rights by international documents. If we complete our 
starting point with the indeterminate scope of courts whether their duty is 
to protect individuai rights against the power of state or only' to rectify par-
ticular encroachments of rights,19 then we have a clear role of ombudsmen. In 
ali those situations when an individuai (standing in a public-law-relation di-
rectly with a body of the executive branch or indirectly with a private body 
ensuring public services and receiving its power from the executive) has 
his/her rights violated, and legai redress could be excluded or accessible only 
with unreasonable costs or efforts, then the individuai has a sole support: the 
ombudsman. Consequently, although the institution of ombudsmen is not 
considered to be an avoidable function of the constitutional state (by theore-
tical thinking),20 it is necessary in the public law relations of the 21st century. 
European legai literature defines ombudsman-like institutions by their basic 
peculiarities (irrespective of the special forms of their legai regulations in 
different countries). The first group of peculiarities consists of independence 
and mandate from Parliament. The second group regards the criteria of 
proceeding: control of public bodies and those who can offer public service, 
protection of the personal rights of individuals. Fulfilling its duties the 
ombudsmen cannot avoid a glance to legality, reasonableness and due process 
of the controlied activity and they are empowered with a large scale of 
inquiry-instruments and rights. Finally the following special measures 
make up the third group of characteristics. Ombudsmen cannot emit legally 
binding decisions, their 'way of speaking' is criticism and recommendation (in 
special cases ombudsmen also may initiate criminal, disciplinary, administrative 
and law-making proceedings of the competent authorities). The Hungarian 
ombudsman (there were four elected officials for civil rights, for national 
and ethnic minorities rights, for data protection and ensuring freedom of in-
1 9 J . MILES, Standing in a Multi-Layerd Constitution, in BAMFORTH - LEYLAND cit., pp. 4 0 7 -
4 1 2 . 
20 See Principles cit., p. 34. 
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formation and for rights of the next generations since lst January 2012 there is 
only one ombudsman) is elected for six years, may control ali the public and 
public-service bodies. The instruments of investigation - based on a claim or 
initiated ex officio - are extremely wide, any file may be inspected, and any 
officer may be questioned. His/her proceeding is guided by very few rules 
- their investigation is not a formai but a 'personal' one. 
4 . ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF CONTROL I I - PROSECUTORS OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL 
LAW FIELD 
4.1. Position of prosecutors and public administration 
Hungarian prosecutors have certain tasks regarding administrative pro-
ceedings. If the legality of a decision of an administrative body not super-
vised by administrative courts is questioned, prosecutors may investigate it 
and take certain measures. The position of a prosecutor when controlling 
the legality of an administrative act is external, he or she does not enter into 
the legai (administrative) relationship between the individual party and the 
public body (authority). If the prosecutor formulates an objection against 
an administrative act the public body has a single duty: to answer the ob-
jection. In other words, objection is not legally binding. If the public body 
agrees with the prosecutor's position and decides to amend or cancel its for-
mer administrative act, this is its own decision. If not, the prosecutor has 
the opportunity to ask the Court to rule on the objection and its refusai. 
On the other hand if the objection of the prosecutor is initiated by the in-
dividual party he or she has only the right to obtain an answer from the 
prosecutor, but it is not legally binding to enforce a positive act on behalf 
of the prosecutor. 
4.2. Possible actions of prosecutors 
The most - but as was mentioned, stili without a legally binding force - e 
powerful actions of the prosecutor are the objection and the legai action, since 
these may affect the administrative decision in the case (if the public body 
agrees with the objection or the Court rules to accept it). There is a less strong 
'version' of objection, the so called notice to public bodies if an act or nonfea-
sance is illegai but the 'level' of illegality is low. Besides the formai measures of 
control prosecutors may initiate criminal, disciplinary or special administra-
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tive proceedings. Another important power of prosecutors is that any warrant 
of apprehension and irregular perquisitions (during the night or without 
presence of the (convicted person) in an administrative procedure is executable 
only with the consent of the competent prosecutor. Corning back to objection 
as the most important measure; it has two main legai effeets, one of indirect 
substantial and one of direct procedural nature. The direct procedura! effect 
is the compulsory and unconditional suspension of execution of the objected 
administrative act, if the prosecutor initiates it. The other, indirect but sub-
stantial effect is conditional; this effect depends on the timing of the objec-
tion. If the objection is formulated within three years from the issue of the 
administrative act in case, its consequences (amendment or cancellation of 
the objected administrative act) may be applied irrespective of bona/mala fide 
of the individuai parties and of vested rights. Vested rights cannot be touched 
if the objection is submitted after three, but within five, years. Within this 
period consequence of objection may be only a favourable decision to the 
individuai party or a new sanction if it was illegally omitted. After five years 
objection may have de facto effect only if the objected administrative act was 
influenced by a crime judged by a court. In any other case objection is virtual 
('matter of principle'), without direct effect, aiming only at pronouncement of 
illegality of the objected administrative act (virtual rectification of the violated 
order of law). Of course, objection leads to substantial effect only if the 
administrative body agrees with it and reconsiders its formai decision or 
the Court orders it to do so. 
4.3. Non-penal tasks of prosecutors in Europe 
Although jurists think that prosecutors have almost only criminal law 
tasks, administrative and civil law competencies are not unknown in Eur-
ope.21 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October 
2000 has adopted Recommendation to Member States - Ree (2000)19 - on 
the Role of Public Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System. This Recom-
mendation specifies the situation of the public prosecutors and public prose-
cution services in the criminal justice system and their basic principles of op-
eration as well, but it does not deal with the role of the prosecutors beyond 
the criminal justice system. In several European countries public prosecution 
service tasks outside the criminal field are similarly of fundamental impor-
See VARGA, Reflection document cit., and ID., Report cit. 
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tance. If we have a look at tasks outside the criminal field in the Member 
States, it can be seen that the tasks of the prosecutor could basically be clas-
sified into two main groups. Civil law tasks - including commercial and labor 
law competencies as well - belong to the first group, while the second group 
consists of administrative law tasks. The second main group of prosecutorial 
tasks outside the criminal field includes different measures of the prosecutor 
which serve a special control on the legality of the administration's operation 
from a constitutional point of view. Many possible measures could be taken 
by the prosecutor in connection with this area: in some countries the super-
vision of decisions of several administrative authorities, appeals, and other 
forms of legai remedy could be used. Moreover such important powers are 
provided for prosecutors as the supervision of constitutional requirements 
of domestic law and of course the power of initiating constitutional court pro-
cedure. In other countries there are prosecutorial competencies connected to 
disciplinary measures against the members of administrative authorities, 
judges, prosecutors, police officers and other persons working in public ser-
vice. Reference to the state interest is the most obvious among the legai bases 
(causa). This appears when the prosecution of the member state has shown 
competence in enforcement of (defending) the claim of the state - first of 
ali its claims relating to property. The protection of public interest is another 
characteristic referential base for prosecutors in the cases of competences out-
side the criminal sector. It has more significance when reiating to the regula-
tions for prosecutors. It is a synonym of legality in some cases and, accordingly, 
the prosecutor should intervene in some procedure of administrative or civil 
law if the laws of the given country were violated importandy, e.g. if an un-
lawful administrative decision is made, an invalid contraction is bound by 
the otherwise private parties or if a court decision violates the law in a way 
that cannot be left without (legai) remedy. In other cases the protection of 
public interest is close to the protection of human rights and this serves as 
a legai base for explication of prosecutorial intervention in the case of certain 
separated social groups. If we make an overview on prosecutors' activities, 
their main types, possible measures, competencies and tasks outside the crim-
inal field in the different member states of the Council of Europe, then we 
would be able to give an answer to the question whether it is inevitable 
and correct that prosecutors - in addition to their outstanding role in criminal 
jurisdiction - have also tasks in the civil and administrative law area. Compar-
ing the two groups of member states and the requirements on the prosecu-
tors' activities, it can be stated that prosecutors' non-criminal tasks are not in-
evitable, but if they were to exist they would be useful and reasonable. 
— 163 
ANDRAS ZS. VARGA 
If prosecutors are provided with such competencies outside the criminal area, 
states have to ensure the rule of law and within that framework, the respect of 
other basic principles and human rights governing ali democratic societies. 
Some of these are applications of the principles regarding organizational 
structure of a modem and constitutional state under the rule of law (separa-
tion of branches of power, sovereignty of the legislature, accountability of the 
executive and independence of the judiciary); others concem legai grounds 
and the extent of the prosecutors' competencies (exceptionality, subsidiarity, 
specialty, legality, public interest, interests of state, protection of human rights 
and consultative co-operation); finally some principles are of procedural 
nature (equality of arms, non-discrimination and impartiality). 
5 . ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF CONTROL I I I - COURTS PLAYING ALTERNATIVE ROLE 
5.1. Forms of legai protection 
It was markedly underlined previously that judicial control (supervision) 
of public (administrative) bodies has cruciai importance in a constitutional 
state. Hence it could be strange when - from another point of view - judicial 
control is defined as its own alternative. The reason for judicial control being 
its own alternative can be discovered after a short overview of changes in leg-
islation and jurisdiction over the last decades. 
Article 8 of the more than 60 year old Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights declares the right for everyone to have an effective remedy by the com-
petent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted 
them by the constitution or by law. The Universal Declaration is not a legally 
binding document, but the International Covenant on Civil and Politicai 
Rights (New York, 16 December 1966) repeats the formula of Arride 8 in 
its Article 2 para 3a. as follows: "[Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes:] To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an officiai capacity". 
The Covenant is legally binding. Joint interpretation of these two rules of 
22 Unfortunately the list of principles is only reflected in the officiai opinion of the competent 
consultative body of the Council of Europe, see: Opinion N° (2008) 3 of the Consultative Cornai of 
European Prosecutors on "Role of Public Prosecutors outside the Criminal Law Field", adopted by the 
CCPE at its 3rd plenary meeting, CCPE (2008) 3, Strasbourg, CoE, 2008. 
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the Covenant leads to the conclusion that the right to justice covers two differ-
ent judicial paths. One of them is the right to (formai or procedural) review 
(legai redress) of a decision by different instruments of the procedural law (ap-
peal to a higher forum, judicial review). On the other hand the right to justice 
means the opportunity to start a new, usually civil-law procedure in order to 
have the consequences of an incorrect public-law decision materially 
repaired.23 In our thinking a civil law trial aiming at material reparation is a 
form of alternative legai control, since it is not a way of reviewing the admin-
istrative acts - it is launched because an administrative act causes material or 
personal damage but the outcome of the trial does not affect the validity of the 
act in the case. This substantial reparation in the context of international legai 
documents is a special instrument of 'effective remedy' and at the same time a 
particular fundamental right. This formulation highlights its importance: on 
the one hand substantial reparation is a particular fundamental right while 
on the other hand it is a basic guarantee of other fundamental rights. Our Civil 
Code offers two claims (titles) for material reparation of harms caused by pub-
lic bodies. One of the claims is indemnity due to violation of personal rights, 
the other is recompense for damages caused by public (administrative, judicial, 
prosecutorial) bodies. Civil law regulations regarding the two different claims 
are partly convergent since rules of recompense for damages should also be ap-
plied if the plaintiff asks indemnity due to violation of his/her personal rights. 
5.2. Indemnity due to violation of personal rights 
Protection of honour and good faith goes back to "ancient laws", origin-
ally closely linked to iniuria, lately known as a special tort in English law. Sub-
sequendy it was transformed into a general principle of law and - as a legai 
abstraction of personality - lost its former attachment to property and com-
mercial relations 24 In Hungary - even if tort of defamation has been known 
by the Civil Code since its adoption in 195925 - defamation could not be ap-
plied against public bodies until the democratic transition since it had a previous 
criminal (or at least disciplinary) conviction as a condition. In recent years the 
popularity of defamation torts (and other torts protecting personal rights) is a 
23 See M.P. SINGH, Gemati Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective (Berlin - Heidel-
berg etc., Springer, 2 0 0 1 ) , pp. 2 4 4 - 2 7 0 , CORNFORD cit. 
24 L. SÓLYOM, A személyiségi jogok elmélete ('Theory of Personality Rights') (Budapest, K J K , 
1983), p. 128 and 131, on Defamation-tort: p. 166, on Privacy: pp. 213 and 229. 
25 Which does not mean that the socialist officiai legai thinking considered this regulation to be 
non-problematic, see SÓLYOM cit., pp. 1 6 - 2 1 . 
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consequence of the favourable position of claimants: in these trials the burden 
of proof is reversed. The defendant (the public body) has to prove that its act 
is not contra legem (civilis). Defense of the public body is aggravated by formu-
lation of the Civil Code. Its text does not contain the term of illegality for-
mally. (While in trials for damages an unsuccessful proof of illegality of the 
act of the public body leads to a rejection of the claim by the Court. In trials 
for protection of personal rights (based on defamation or similar torts) liabi-
lity of public bodies is not excluded automatically if the defendant refers to its 
legai mandate. It has to prove that the whole administrative procedure is reg-
ular. Claims protected by these torts (e. g. utterance of violation of right by 
the Court, order of the Court to stop violation, prohibition of next activity 
presupposed to cause violation of rights, public gratification, restoration of 
the situation ex ante) are results of the objective liability of the offender 
(the public body in our case). At the same time objective liability does not 
lead automatically to indemnity. Indemnity should be paid only if the offender 
(the public body) is not able to prove that it has acted in a manner that can 
generally be expected in the given situation, its behavior is culpable (subjec t ive 
liability). Only two special claims are exempt: compensation for expropriation 
or detention without conviction is paid by the State without probing the sub-
jective 'componenti of liability. Peculiarities of defamation torts give impor-
tance to one of the changes in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court stating 
that "facts and evidences of a case can be observed only within the respective 
procedures of authorities. ReaUty of facts and appropriateness of legai posi-
tions cannot be challenged based on defamation (or similar) torts in civil 
trials".26 
5.3. Recompense for damages 
One important and quite palpable peculiarity of civil trials against admin-
istrative bodies exercising public power is that - contrary to formai judicial 
review of administrative acts - in civil trials the defendant administrative body 
loses its specific position of being entrusted with state power and in the civil 
lawsuit has exactly the same autonomous position than the (individuai) plain-
tiff has.27 The objective side of civil liability is illegality of the challenged ad-
26 Decision No. Pfv.IV.20.582/2007/4 of the Supreme Court. 
27 This consideration was not questioned even in the socialist era. See G . EÒRSI, A polgàrijogi 
felelosség kézikónyve ('Handbook on civil liability') (Budapest, K J K , 1966), p. 29, see also SÓLYOM 
cit., p. 83. 
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ministrative act hence it is the intrinsic conceptual component of damage. 
Only illegal behavior may lead to damage; onerous consequences of an objec-
tively legai behavior cannot be considered being 'damage' even if harm was 
caused; these consequences are legai inconveniences.28 Objectively illegal 
behavior and its casual relation to the harm caused receives special emphasis 
when civil liability of public bodies is tried. It should be recognized that legality/ 
illegality in connection with the activity of public bodies is never an abstraction, 
it should be considered as based on legai regulations. The exercising of public 
power is strictly regulated by law. Public bodies are created, their competen-
cies are given, their goals are fixed, their instruments are granted and their 
rules of proceeding are prescribed by legislative acts. Thus - based on the 
same reasons than it was mentioned regarding defamation torts - it may be 
considered that civil lawsuit for liability of public bodies may not serve as for-
mai remedy instrument of the administrative act in the case. Illegality as a con-
dition of civil liability must be analyzed separately irrespective of administra-
tive law validity of an administrative act. If illegality is the objective 
component of civil liability, then culpability is its subjective side.29 Correlation 
between illegality and culpability is tight but asymmetric. Lack of illegality ex-
cludes culpability (or rather it makes uninterested) but from illegality culp-
ability does not follow;30 on the contrary, lack of culpability is a way of escap-
ing from civil liability for the defending public body even if its act is illegal. 
5.4. European aspects of civil liability 
As we can see, joint interpretation of the two rules of the Covenant lead to 
the conclusion that right to justice covers two different judicial ways of formai 
review and of material remedy. Formai (or procedurali review affects validity 
and execution of the supervised decision, while material remedy does not 
have such an effect.31 However, although material remedy does not affect 
the validity of decisions it eliminates material damages or moral inconvenience 
caused by maladministrative acts. While formai (or procedurali review has a 
long history in legai theory and practice32 material remedy (or civil liability of 
2 8 EORSI cit., pp. 107-108. 
29 Ibid., p. 124. 
30 Ibid. cit., p. 126. 
33 See CRAIG cit., pp. 866-870. 
32 See H. BARNETT, Constitutional & Administrative Law ( 7 * edition) (London - New York, 
Roudedge - Cavendish, 2 0 0 9 ) , pp. 6 5 - 6 7 ; CRAIG cit., pp. 2 5 7 - 2 7 3 , 3 7 1 - 7 1 4 ; SINGH cit., pp. 119 -
2 4 2 ; M . KUNNECKE, Tradition and Change in Administrative Law (Berlin - Heidelberg - New York, 
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those exercising public power) is less 'chiselled'33 even concerning public law 
acts in general. Grounds of formai review in different legai families are mosdy 
common: the traditional grounds are those known as Lord Diplock' trilogy: 
illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety. A fourth ground is the less tra-
ditional non-proportionality and - in some special cases - violation of funda-
mental rights or breach of legitimate expectations.34 If we try to link the special 
grounds to legai principles, we can say that non-consideration of the ultra 
vires principle (substantive illegality), procedural faults or errors of substan-
tive law35 may lead to invalidity of an administrative act. While errors of sub-
stantive law are well known factors that make an administrative act void in the 
Continental practice,36 in Britain "Judicial review has traditionally dealt not 
with the correctness of the findings as such, but with their legality".37 However 
- mosdy as a consequence of the Human Rights Act (1998) - the importance 
of facts is growing.38 The picture is less clear if we look at civil liability and 
material remedy. One of the first detailed international documents in this 
topic is Recommendation No. R (84) 15 of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe to Member States relating to Public Liability.39 It is a 
disadvantage of the Recommendation from our point of view that one of its 
definitions, article 5 excludes its effect regarding acts performed in the exercise 
of & judicial function 40 Consequendy incorrect acts of courts are certainly not 
within the effect of the Recommendation. It could be a topic of another con-
ference to discuss about the question whether activity of prosecutors in courts 
do is or surely is not judicial function. However, reasons of the text can be 
considered without answering the question of status of prosecution. The heart 
of the Recommendation 15 is a list of 8 principles. The most important from a 
Springer, 2007), pp. 11-137; R. ERRERÀ, "Dicey and French Administrative Law: A Missed Encoun-
ter?", Public Law ( 1 9 8 5 ) . 
33 Hilaire Bennett dedicates only one paragraph to this question in her more than 800 pages 
long monograph, see BARNETT cit., p. 258 ; see also SINGH cit., pp. 244-270. 
3 4 KONNECKE cit., pp. 3 1 , 9 3 - 1 0 5 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 4 and 1 2 4 ; SINGH cit., pp. 122 , 1 3 6 and 1 7 5 , CRAIG 
cit., pp. 3 8 2 and 6 4 7 , see also L.N. BROWN - J . S . BELL, French Administrative Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2 0 0 3 ) , pp. 2 1 4 - 2 1 5 and 2 3 9 - 2 4 9 . 
3 5 CRAIG cit., p. 4 6 6 , BARNETT cit., pp. 6 6 and 7 1 8 - 7 2 0 . 
3 6 KUNNECKE cit., p. 1 33 . 
3 7 CRAIG cit., p. 4 3 7 . 
3 8 KONNECKE cit., p. 75 , CRAIG cit., pp. 2 4 and 475 -476 . 
39 Recommendation No. R (84) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States relating to 
Public Liability (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 September 1984 at the 375th meeting 
of the Ministers' Deputies) (Strasbourg, Coe, 1984). 
4 0 See also CRAIG cit., p. 998. 
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theoretical point of view are the first two. Principle I ensures reparation for 
damages "caused by an act due to a failure of a public authority to conduct 
itself in a way which can reasonably be expected from it in law in relation to 
the injured person. Such a failure is presumed in case of transgression of an 
established legai rule". Principle II dilates right to reparation - at least in cer-
tain categories of acts established by the Member States - "if it would be 
manifestly unjust to allow the injured person alone to bear the damage, having 
regard to the following circumstances: the act is in the general interest, only 
one person or a limited number of persons have suffered the damage and 
the act was exceptional or the damage was an exceptional result of the 
act". Professor Tom Cornford has recently dedicated a complete volume to 
comments on the Recommendation.41 His opinion is that the trial opportunities 
of an injured person are influenced by the fact that public authorities are em-
powered by law to exercise their powers even if the effeets are contrary to the 
interests of private persons. Consequently the litigant can be successful mosdy 
if the act of a public body is ultra vires or in other words unlawfulness is a 
fundamental element of civil liability.42 A third possible definition can be de-
duced from the German Civil Code: no liability without fault 43 Simple negli-
gence gives enough ground to liability of a public body even if a private party 
in the same situation would be liable 44 Practically it means that a serious level 
of negligence - abuse of discretion45 - is necessary, only an erroneous consid-
eration of facts in a case is not sufficient. The last important element of liabi-
lity is related to burden of proof. since the injured person has to prove that the 
public body acted in an illegal way or was seriously negligent, public bodies 
are protected by a presumption against their liability 46 This presumption is 
maintained by the consideration of legislators and judges that public bodies 
act in favour of the community 47 through fear of the courts and of the con-
sequences of opening doors before a more favorable ruling48 and through 
4 1 CORNFORD cit. 
42 Ibid. cit., pp. 3 and 4 7 . BROWN - BELL cit., p. 1 8 1 , Compendio di Diritto Processuale Ammi-
nistrativo, 3TH edn., F . DEL GIUDICE (ed.) (Napoli, Simone, 2 0 0 5 ) , pp. 1 9 0 - 1 9 2 ; A . IORGOVAN, Tratat 
de drept administrativ. Voi. I I , 4 e d n . (Bucuresti, A L L Beck, 2 0 0 5 ) , pp. 4 5 7 - 4 7 6 . 
4 3 SINGH cit., p. 2 4 7 , CORNFORD cit., pp. 10 -12 , BROWN - BELL cit., p. 185 . 
4 4 CORNFORD cit., pp. 77 , 139 and 142, CRAIG cit., pp. 9 5 8 and 977-978 . 
4 5 See KUNNECKE cit., p. 37 . 
4 6 CORNFORD cit., p. 198, see also KUNNECKE cit., pp. 144 and 2 1 2 . 
4 7 CRAIG cit., pp. 7 9 4 - 7 9 5 and 852 , CORNFORD cit., p. 198 . 
4 8 CORNFORD cit., p. 196 . 
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fear of an objectionable defensive approach of public bodies threatened by 
being responsible in a civil trial.49 
6 . WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN? 
If we look at the actuality of governments, we may see that democratic 
decision making is less and less autonomous. Politicai decision making is 
non-transparently 'polygonal' in the local-regional-national-(federal-)Eur-
opean-international fields of force and its efficiency is influenced by bureau-
cratic administration outspreading like a spider's web. As a consequence lib-
erty of action guaranteed by law, and even fundamental rights of the 
individual (even if not considered to be a human being who is 'merely' the 
subject of legai regulations) cannot be applied. Complexity and meticulous-
ness of regulations, proliferation of administrative procedures make classica! 
ways of remedy deficient. The law assures that judicial control of administrative 
acts is in vain if harm to the individual party is not caused by manifest 
substantive illegality or procedural fault. However rigidity of administrative 
structures, non-perspicuity of legai regulations or their consequence, bypass 
the proper carrying out of governmental decisions. It cannot be left out of 
consideration that formai judicial review is an exceptional remedy and its 
inevitabile attention to detail makes it efficient only if its execution is excep-
tional. If it is used as a daily, general and ordinary instrument of remedy, it 
will brake the administrative decision-making, consequently it will brake 
the effectiveness of the government. The Hungarian Act on General Rules 
of Administrative Procedures is a good example for our consideration. Either 
its originai text or the novelistic amendments were basically failures. Neither 
effectuation of the interests of individual parties nor quick decision making 
by administrative bodies is promoted by the act. The Act redects art-for-art 
points of view of drafters. It reflects a merely theoretical concept of law as 
construction of abstract norms rather than the living rules of behavior.50 
Some of its regulation seems to be client-centric but it is only hypocritical.51 
4 9 KUNNECKE cit., p. 2 1 1 . 
50 Only for example: there is an article in the Act, which enlists those intermediary and proce-
dural decisions of an authority which can be directly appealed (and not only in the appeal against the 
final decision on merits). This regulation can be helpful the drafter and for the law-students, but for 
authorities and their private parties it could be much more important the opportunity of appeal 
regulated just in the same article with the decision in question (e.g. rejection of a claim, cessation 
of the case, suspension of the procedure and so on). 
51 For example: it is stated in the Act that an administrative procedure should be closed within 
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The enormous number of pedantic procedural regulations predestinates a 
great number of procedural faults which may lead to annulment of the final 
decision with the burden of re-starting the whole procedure. Finally in order 
to properly serve as 'general' rules the Act should generalize the excessively 
detailed rules that make it flounder when it meets the different substantive 
regulations. This situation is balanced by the opportunity - given in the same 
Act - of having special procedural rules for the certain substantive rules, 
which produces a strange picture: virtually only one feature is really general 
within the General Rules: that of the opportunity of creating exceptional 
rules. An important conclusion can be observed: more and more mechanistic 
administrative procedures require alternative forms of control. One of the 
alternative forms observed in this essay is the civil trial for liability (indemnity 
or damages). The permanently growing number of such lawsuits strengthens 
so that administrative bodies proceed with rather high levels of faults. This is 
certainly not acceptable for those who suffer inconvenience without real 
reasons but at length - by the ruling of the Courts that indemnity or compen-
sation has to be paid from public moneys of the state budget - the harm is 
spread over the whole society. Such an improper situation of public adminis-
tration can be corrected by Parliamentary Commissioners who have the duty 
to give effective protection to the individuai against depersonalized adminis-
trative structures. Parliamentary Commissioners could be effective, if they 
abandon the often-found ambition of having more legai power, of becoming 
a super-authority, and if they focus instead on solutions of problems not 
perceptible for formai legai remedies. On the other hand prosecutors control-
ling on the grounds of common weal and by public law exercising of public 
powers by administrative bodies may help in bringing down the improper be-
haviour of the authorities. A legai system using some or many alternative 
forms of control will not make a government fail-safe, but it could be considered 
a great achievement if the number of formai judicial reviews and those of civil 
law trials against public bodies is sensibly decreasing. Leastwise it would make 
government and its control more equilibrated. 
22 working days, which is less than 30 days of the former regulation. But in fact these 22 working 
days mean almost nothing, since it is understood by the Act as a net and not gross period of time 
inasmuch as another article of the law enlists those sub-periods of time which should not be taken 
into consideration when the 22 working days are counted (e.g. communication within authorities). 
Consequendy the private party cannot forecast the date of the final decision. 
• • • • • . • • " . 
ALESSANDRO CIATTI 
F R E E D O M O F C O N T R A C T A N D G O O D G O V E R N M E N T * 
1 . SOCIAL USEFULNESS AND THE RESTRICTIONS ON FREE COMPETITION AMONG 
ENTERPRISES 
Einaudi repeatedly criticized the third title of the Italian Constitution, 
which, like the second, "proclaimed aspirations, desires, pathways, promises", 
arguing that the rights of the individuai "have lost their importance in com-
parison with the rights of the social man".1 In particular, he believed that the 
limits imposed by the Constitution on the private economie enterprise - based 
on the presupposition that it would not be developed in discordance with 
social usefulness (art. 41, subsection 2) - had been based on a false assumption: 
that social usefulness was a known concept, with its clear semantic delimita-
tion.2 
Yet, any elementary book will show us that there "does not exist" a scientific de-
finition of social usefulness. Social usefulness is not that of the "individuals" of a 
society, - social usefulness does not amount to the arithmetical sum of the usefulness 
of the individuals belonging to the society. It results from a chemical and somewhat 
spiritual combination from which something originates without being measurable. If 
we could admit for an instant the absurd hypothesis that the social usefulness of 
everything is equal to the sum of the usefulness of the individuals, we would find our-
selves face to face with one of the most famous pons asinorum of economie science.3 
* English revision by Sylvia Hakopian and Rachel Barritt Costa. 
1 L. EINAUDI, "Questo titolo terzo", Corriere della sera, 21 May 1947, now in II buongoverno. 
Saggi di economia e politica, ed. by E. Rossi (Bari, Laterza, 2004), p. 304. 
2 Italian Constitution art. 41 [Freedom of Enterprise]-. (1) Private economie enterprise is free; 
(2) It may not be carried out against social usefulness or in a way that may harm public security, 
liberty, or human dignity; (3) The law determines and conttols appropriate planning so that public 
and private economie activities may be directed and coordinated towards social ends. 
3 L . EINAUDI, Questo titolo terzo cit., p. 3 0 5 . 
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Einaudi then feared that such a provision - like ali those which, in his 
view, were supposedly characterised by "supreme wisdom" but which effec-
tively represented the outcome of "fighting for months to reach, in this third 
tide, an empty compromise" - could turn into a dangerous tool in the hands 
of some parliamentary majority, invading, in name of the common will, the 
"indispensably sacred territory" of the rights of individuals. 
At the time, naturally, he could not express this conception through the 
specific terminology to which the Italian interpreter is now accustomed 
(although the expression "social usefulness" has apparendy never been used 
in EU legislation). Italian case law makes ampie use of it with regard to a num-
ber of different issues. It has been invoked for the decision with regard to the 
legitimacy of restrictions on the opening hours of business and commercial 
premises4 and of the varied regimes of authorization that impede a wide array 
of disparate activities5 such as those which either block transfer from one 
place to another,6 forbid their expansion,7 or prevent the opening of a sec-
ondary entrance.8 It has also been invoked for assessment of the legitimacy 
of measures that set a tariff for goods and services9 as well as for justification 
of the prohibition against gambling10 and measures against prostitution on 
the Street.11 In the name of social usefulness, the equal protection clause 
4 Corte costituzionale, 2.4.2003, n. 27, Foro amministrativo-CDS, 2003,439; Consiglio di Stato, 
Sez. V, 5.5.2009, n. 2808; Consiglio di Stato, Sez. V, 12.15.2005, n. 7141; regarding TV sales, see 
Cassazione, 9.1.1997, n. 8313. 
5 With regard to private surveillance activity, subject to authorization according to art. 134 Te-
sto unico delle leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza, see, for example, Consiglio di Stato, sez., VI, 10.4.2005 
n. 5282; 11.15.2005 n. 6351; 3.14.2006 n. 1309; Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la Liguria, 
Sez. II, 2.3.2009, n. 153; Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la Puglia, Lecce, Sez. I, 4.27.2006, 
n. 2334; with regard to the "commerce of articles associated with funeral services", see Consiglio di 
Stato, Sez. V, 10.18.1996, n. 1244, Foro amministrativo (1996), 2890, as well as Tribunale amministra-
tivo regionale per la Lombardia, Milano, Sez. Ili, 11.6.2002, n. 4263; advertising of cigarettes and 
cigars, su Cassazione, 14.9.2004, n. 18431; Cassazione, 3.23.2001, n. 4183, Foro italiano, 2001,1,2219. 
6 Consiglio di Stato, Sez. V, 23.11.2007, n. 6013 (with reference to officiai pharmacies); Cons. 
Stato, Sez. IV, 30.4.2003, n. 2327, Rassegna giuridica farmaceutica (2004), pp. 79, 44. 
7 Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio, Roma, Sez. II, 3.2.1995, n. 310, Rivista giu-
ridica della circolazione e dei trasporti, 1995, 1084, with reference to vehicle gasoline stations. 
8 Consiglio di Stato, Sez. IV, 6.4.1999, n. 965. 
9 Like those established for the services of airport handling: Tribunale amministrativo regionale 
per la Lombardia, Milano, Sez. I, 1.19.1998, n. 57, I tribunali amministrativi regionali, I (1998), 
p. 908; for the service of the private surveillance services: Corte d'appello di Ancona, 5.15.2004, Di-
ritto del lavoro delle Marche (2005), p. 69 and the tariffs for the transport of goods: Cassazione, 
9.1.1997, n. 8313. 
10 Consiglio di Stato, Sez. VI, 05/06/2007, n. 2978. 
11 Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio, Roma, Sez. II, 22.12.2008, n. 12222, Gior-
nale di diritto amministrativo, 4 (2009), p. 420. 
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has been understood in accordance with the discipline of bankruptcy voi-
dance of contract,12 the transfer of risk in sales law,13 the dismissal of employ-
ees caused by the cessation of economie activities of the enterprise14 and, on 
the other hand, illegitimate the lack of a provision limiting the responsibility 
of road hauliers and truckers.15 In these examples, the list of which could be 
vastly extended, the clause has been used either to overcome the resistance 
exerted by the public powers against free competition among enterprises, 
or to legitimize the persistence of the distorted mechanism of competition 
within the market. As Einaudi had expected, the Constituent Assembly thus 
left the interpreters with the task of understanding the constitutional clause in 
terms of the idea that a certain moment may more appropriately reveal the 
"popular conscience". The figure that does not exist has assumed a semblance 
that looks like a "matter soft as wax and pliable like rubber".16 It is known 
that Einaudi's economie Weltanschauung expected the State to be responsible 
for carrying out strong intervention "intended to maintain unbroken the ac-
tion of competition, the one true force that does guarantee observance of the 
common interest through composition of opposing interests".17 Accordingly, 
he struggled unsuccessfully to include in the Constitution an express prohibi-
tion on the passing of statutes intending to form an "economie monopoly", 
and, wherever these existed, he believed there should be a requirement for 
the legislator to impose "public control on them either by direct or delegated 
public administration". This would thwart the tendency of competition to 
hurtle fiercely towards self-destruction,18 as the latter would usher in a mono-
poly, which perhaps Proudhon today would recognize as a "theft", when sub-
stituting the term with his idea of property. In seeking to devise a politicai 
framework that can oppose the tendency towards monopoly, it is of interest, 
metaphorically speaking, to divide politicians into two ranks: those of the 
12 Corte costituzionale, 7.27.2000, n. 379, Banca borsa e titoli di credito, II (2001), p. 257, an-
not. Nivazza; Corte costituzionale, 4.6.1995, n. 110. 
13 Corte costituzionale, 11.19.1992, n. 465. 
14 Cassazione, 5.30.1995, n. 6083, Giurisprudenza italiana, I, 1 (1996), p. 194, in Orientamenti 
di giurisprudenza del lavoro, 1996, p. 193 and Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro, II (1996), p. 698, 
annot. Pilati. 
15 Corte costituzionale, 11.22.1991, n. 420. 
16 With regard to public order, see P. MALAURIE, L'ordre public et le contrat, Etude de droit civil 
compare France-Angleterre - U.R.S.S. (Reims, Mato-Braine, 1953), p. 4: "Tous les juristes se servent 
de cet mot magique pour rendre acceptables les règles et les solutions les plus diverses". 
17 L. EINAUDI, "Economia di concorrenza e capitalismo storico. La terza via fra i secoli XVIII e 
XIX", Rivista di storia economica (giugno 1942), p. 64. 
1 8 ID., "Chi vuole la libertà", Corriere della sera (13 aprile 1948 ) , in II buongoverno cit., p. 105 . 
13 
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"short road", who look to the State as the impetus capable of driving men in 
their economie conduct and forcing them to operate in favour of the collective 
good, and those whom experience has made deeply sceptical of the workabil-
ity of economie planning. Men in the latter category are bitter enemies "of the 
idea that the whole of the economie mechanism should be taken over by the 
State leviathan" and do not believe that the real world is far from the abstract 
diagram of full competition.19 The interventions that Einaudi expected from 
the public powers were not limited in the quantum but rather were character-
ized by the quomodo. Namely, individuals were not to be told what they 
should or should not do: but rather, the limits should be set within which they 
would be able to move freely at their own risk.20 Einaudi did not believe that 
the ideal society could be one "of equal persons", but rather "of different 
men, who discover their reciprocai limits within their diversity".21 
2 . SOCIAL USEFULNESS AND THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
Several concepts can be put forward, beginning with the idea of social 
usefulness, in order to understand the way in which the imposition of the ma-
jority could be achieved and obtained either direcdy by the proper statutes or 
indirecdy by case law. In the latter instance, the court would feel free to ad-
dress not so much the people "in the name of which it ought to declare the 
sentence" (art. 101), but rather that part of the population to which it feels 
the need to do so (breaching its duty to assume full responsibility over the 
decision). Moreover, the court could address those who it feels would support 
its power or at least defend its prerogatives. Einaudi wrote that hindrances to 
the power of the majority 
are the extension of the will of the dead, who teli the living: you will not be able to 
operate at your own libitum, you will not be able to bve the life that you like; under 
penalty of perjury, you must observe the rules, which we deem essential for the pre-
servation of the State we founded. If you seek to change the aforesaid rules, you must 
first profoundly meditate over the issue, obtain the approvai of the majority of your 
peers, tolerate the fact that a portion of this majority might persistendy refuse to ap-
prove the deliberate changes you pian to make.22 
1 9 L . EINAUDI, "Liberismo e comunismo", Argomenti (dicembre 1941 ) , in II buongoverno cit., 
p. 2 4 6 . 
20 Ibid., p. 252. 
21 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale (Torino, Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1949), p. 230; see also 
ID., "La società pianificata", in II buongoverno cit., p. 289. 
22 ID., "Major et sanior pars", Idea (1945), in II buongoverno cit., p. 90. 
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The idea of economie freedom corresponds unavoidably, in its juridical 
implication, to a given conception of the legai tool intended to achieve the 
negotiation, that is to say, the idea of the contract itself.23 The law of contracts, 
like that of the market, can become as extensive as the need for a public in-
tervention on the market. On the basis of a single quantitative criterion, one 
could conceive a law of contracts restricted to the rule, pacta sunt servartela, or 
the mere reception of the agreement in the judicial system. Conceived and 
comprehended freely by individuals, this reception would determine a legai 
rule, which the parties would be obliged to observe and could not evade. 
In such a way, the public powers would therefore convey to the contracting 
parties: "The limits that you have deliberately planned to your freedom are 
equivalent to the law". Such a situation is nevertheless difficult to achieve, 
and brings into play the fundamental and tight - meshed law of contracts: 
should the agreement be conceived as a fact or rather as a value of law?24 
In other words, is the contract binding because it is the expression of the in-
dividual's will,25 or does it find its legai dimension because it is regulated by 
the public powers, in which case this would be recognized as "the monopoly 
of juridicity"?26 That is, would "the law be the track by which the movement 
of the private will remain efficienti'? 27 At this point, it is understood that the 
legai system does not content itself with assisting negotiation, but aims to go 
further. Indeed, the agreement conceived by the parties, or their will subli-
mated in the agreement itself, plays an unavoidably secondary role and is 
reduced to "a fact expected from a legai rule conditioning a legai relation that 
would draw from the rule, and from that rule only, its legai qualification".28 
23 Also see T. KRONMAN - R . POSNER, The Economics of Contract Law (Boston - Toronto, Little 
Brown, & Co., 1 9 7 9 ) , pp. 2 ff.; but see A. SUPIOT, Homo juridicus, Essai sur the fonction anthopolo-
gique du droit (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 2 0 0 5 ) , pp. 144 ff. 
24 B. DE GIOVANNI, Fatto e valutazione nella teoria del negozio giuridico (Napoli, Jovene, 1 9 5 8 ) , 
p. 6 3 , see also A . MANIGK, Die Privatautonomie im Aufbau der Rechtsquellen (Berlin, Franz Vahlen, 
1 9 3 5 ) , pp. 6 , 3 7 . 
2 5 E . DANZ, Die Auslegung der Rechtsgeschàfte, Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Rechts- und Tatfrage, 2. 
Aufl. (Jena, Fischer, 1 9 0 6 ) , pp. 6 ff., and the considerations of A. MANIGK, Die Privatautonomie cit., 
p. 1 0 5 . 
2 6 ID., Die Privatautonomie cit., p. 41; A. PASSERIN D'ENTRÈVES, Il negozio giuridico. Saggio di 
filosofia del diritto (Torino, Giappichelli, 1934), pp. 42 ff., repr. by N. Irti with remarks of the Editor 
(Torino, Giappichelli, 2006) (see also Rivista di diritto civile (2007), pp. 49 ff.). 
27 F. VASSALLI, Sommario delle lezioni sulla teoria dei negozi giuridici, A. Bozzi (ed.) (Roma, 
Società Editrice H Foro Italiano, 1934), p. 9. 
28 See again A. PASSERIN D'ENTRÈVES, Il negozio giuridico cit., p. 37; F. VON HIPPEL, Das Pro-
blem der rechtsgeschàftlichen Privatautonomie, Beitràge zu einem Natùrlichen System des privaten Ver-
kehrsrechts und zu Erforderung der Rechtstheorie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Tiibingen, Mohr (Siebeck), 
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In developing this assumption one could deny the parties any remaining 
autonomous ability to create legai relations, so that the contract would receive 
its force from the public powers only. Such force, in addition, would neces-
sarily be of a "secondary and derived" nature.29 The effectiveness of the con-
tract, in the usuai reconstruction, would therefore depend on the "will of the 
law and not (on the) will of the person".30 Those who have tried to overcome 
this approach have either been inclined towards the search for a "supreme 
rule of qualification" or a rule of authorization - an "Ermàchtigungsnorm"31 -
that would allow them to assign the will of the individual a true legai value,32 
or they have found themselves compelled to look towards an objective order 
which, although variable according to circumstances and places, nevertheless 
leans strongly toward a transcendent order of justice. As a result, its observa-
tion simultaneously becomes its implementation. Without a doubt, the judi-
cial order hence cannot admit that the individual's power of self regulation 
- that is, the freedom of contract itself - can be liberated from the condition-
ing of such rules as those of legai origin. This is consistent with Einaudi's at-
titude toward legai intervention in establishing the limits within which indivi-
duals can freely exercise their individual choices. Nevertheless politicians (and 
therefore also jurists) of the "short road", who believe the State should drive 
men in their economie conduct (compelling them to operate in favour of col-
lective usefulness), have not limited themselves to the search for a foundation 
of contractual freedom that would allow it to be coordinateti by means of gen-
eral regulation. Instead they have tried to surpass the threshold, with the 
result that social usefulness may go so far as to play the dangerous role of 
the arbiter of admissibility in the individual choices expressed by contractors. 
1936), p. 51 and R. SCOGNAMIGLIO, Contributo alla teoria del negozio giuridico (Napoli, Jovene, 
1950), p. 14 f. 
2 9 A . PASSERIN D'ENTRÈVES, Il negozio giuridico cit., p. 89. 
30 B. WINDSCHEID, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 9 Aufl., I (Frankfurt, 1906), p. 265; the 
exemplary attempt - with little success according to B. DE GIOVANNI, Fatto e valutazione nella teoria 
del negozio giuridico cit., p. 56 f. - to overcome the assumption was made by Vittorio Scialoja (Negozi 
giuridici, Corso di Diritto romano nella R. Università di Roma nell'anno accademico 1892-1893, col-
lected by Doctors Mapei and Giannini, Rome, 1933, p. 1 f.) "Much is disputed on whether or not 
the productive cause of the legai relation is an accomplished fact or a rule of the law that attributes 
those legai effeets to that fact itself [...] we believe that the only opinion that does not contrast this 
logie is the following: neither of the said elements can be considered the exclusive cause of the legai 
relation: rather both of them adapted together". 
31 See A. MANIGK, Die Privatautonomie cit., pp. 119 ff. and ID., Das rechtswirksame Verhalten, 
Systematischer Aufbau und Behandlung der Rechtsakte des Bùrgerlichen und Handelsrechts (Berlin, W. 
de Gruyter, 1939), p. 37, and also M . WEBER, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1. und 2. Halbbd., hg. von 
J. Winckelmann (Kob, Kiepneheuer & Witsch, 1956), pp. 523 ff. 
32 B. DE GIOVANNI, Patto e valutazione cit., p. 107. 
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Hence, the existence of the freedom of contract has been recognized as a 
power enabling individuals to develop their personality by means of social 
connections, which some scholars of law would include in art. 3, second sub-
section, of the Constitution;33 that is to say, it has been demanded that the 
compulsoriness of the rules given by individuals for achieving the legai rank 
of juridical relations should not be in contrast with "social usefulness", which 
ought to work as an "external limit on the freedom of contract".34 Therefore 
public power should ensure that the contractual rule devised by private indi-
viduals is endowed with concreteness, while also regulating in detail the for-
mation of contract and equipping it with compulsoriness by means of 
adequate remedies. Nevertheless the aforementioned interventions should 
avert the risk that the exercise of freedom of contract could prove to be in 
contrast with social usefulness, and they should mould the contractual rules 
to uphold those social or economical policies that the majority is willing to 
pursue at any given moment. Before invoking Art. 41 Const., it would be 
worth asking at this point whether or not contractual freedom could have a 
genuine foundation in the present Italian and European economie Constitution. 
3 . FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The link between contractual freedom and the constitution is another 
tricky issue of present legai science that cannot be completely solved. Yet it 
is astonishing that the books from which students build up their legai knowl-
edge dedicate little, or merely sporadic attention to the problem. It involves 
asking the question: (In order to allow freedom of contract to be driven to 
pursue social usefulness) is the basis of the freedom of private individuals 
to allocate rules to their economie choices really found in Art. 41 Const.? 
A number of general studies have been conducted that provide comparisons 
between the solutions given by Italian doctrinal and legai jurisprudence and 
by German legai scholars and courts.35 The Grundgesetz of Bonn and the Ita-
lian Constitution do not reproduce Art. 152, Abs. 1, of the Constitution of 
33 C.M. BIANCA, Diritto civile, 3, Il contratto, 2nd ed. (Milano, Giuffrè, 2000), p. 30. 
34 See G . B . FERRI, Ordine pubblico, buon costume e la teoria del contratto (Milano, Giuffrè, 
1967), p. 221, as well as M. Nuzzo, Utilità sociale e autonomia privata (Milano, Giuffrè, 1975), 
pp. 87 ff. and passim. 
35 See, among ali, L. RAISER, "La libertà contrattuale oggi" and "Funzione del contratto e liber-
tà contrattuale", in ID., Il compito del diritto privato. Saggi di diritto privato e di diritto dell'economia 
di tre decenni, C.M. MAZZONI (ed.) (Milano, Giuffrè, 1990), pp. 51 ff. and 73 ff. 
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Weimar,36 which some have (wrongly) interpreted as a protection expressing 
favour toward contractual freedom despite the fact that it only asked legisla-
tion to take any necessary step to eventually achieve that goal.37 At first glance 
one could assume that such a setup has not hindered the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht from recognizing, at least implicidy, a guarantee for the freedom of 
contract, especially with regard to Art. 2 Abs. 1, GG, which quite reputably 
expresses an individuals right to develop a personality freely.38 Moreover, de-
parting from the idea that private law has the duty to resolve conflicts of in-
terest arising between individuals who find themselves on a legai pian of 
equality,39 it is important to note the way in which the very famous Liith 
case40 has correcdy emphasized the fact that Art. 2 GG does not offer abso-
lute protection of legai positions, but rather seeks a comparison between and 
a balance of opposing interests, "nach dem Grad ihrer Schutzwiirdigkeit" 41 
This provision therefore protects the economie freedom of juridical traffic 
and contractual freedom only to the extent to which they do not contrast with 
fundamental rights 42 
In addition, contractual freedom has been understood partly as a compo-
nent of protection of Berufsfreiheit (Art. 12 GG), in terms of that which con-
cerns contracts of employment and contracts of service and the constitutional 
guarantee of the right of property as well as that which concerns contracts of 
36 "IM Wirtschaftsverkehr gilt Vertragsfreiheit nach Mafigabe der Gesetze", see CH. GUSY, Die 
Weimarer Reichssverfassung (Tubingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1997), pp. 349 ff. 
3 7 M . RUFFERT, Vorrang der Verfassung und Eigenstiindigkeit des Privatrechts, Eine verfassungs-
rechtliche Untersuchung zur Privatrechtswirkung des Grundgesetzes (Tiibingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 
p. 286; L. MENGONI, "Autonomia privata e Costituzione", Banca borsa e titoli di credito (1997), pp. 1 
ff.; H. STOLL, "Die Vertragsfreiheit", in Die Grundrechte und Grundpflichten der Reichsverfassung, 
hg. von H.C. Nipperdey, Bd. 3. (Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1930), pp. 175 ff. and more recendy 
M . BÀUERLE, Vertragsfreiheit und Grundgesetz, Normativitàt und Eaktizitàt individueller Vertragsfrei-
heit in verfassungrechtlicher Perspektive (Baden Baden, Nomos, 2001), p. 113. 
38 See again M. RUFFERT, Vorrang der Verfassung cit., p. 288, note 6. 
39 BVerfGE 30, 173 (199). 
40 BVerlGE 7, 198. 
41 BverlGE 47, 285 (318 ss.); BVerlGE 89, 214 (231) (also known among scholars as 
Burgschaltsentscheidung): "nach der standigen Rechtsprechung des Bundesverlassungsgerichts ist 
die Gestaltung der Rechtsverhaltnisse des einzelnen nach seinem Willen ein Teil der allgemeinen 
Handlungslreiheit. Art. 2 Abs 1 GG gewahrleistet Privatautonomie als Selbstbestimmung des einzel-
nen im Rechtsleben". 
42 BVerlGE 8 , 2 7 4 ( 328 ) ; see E.-U. ERICHSEN, "Allgemeine Handlungslreiheit", in Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, hg. von J. Isensee, P. Kirchhol (Heidelberg, C.F. 
Muller, 1 9 8 9 ) B. IV, pp. 1 1 8 5 ff.; B. PIEROTH - B. SCHLINK, Grundrechte. Staatsrecht II, 14 . Aull. 
(Heidelberg, C.F. Moller, 1998) Rn. 370 and Papier H.-J., "Grundgesetz und Wirtschaftsordnung", 
in Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, hg. von E. Benda, W. Maiholer, 
H.-J. Vogel, 2. Aull. (Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1994), pp. 883 ff. 
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sale and contracts of hiring and leasing (Art. 14 GG).43 One may therefore 
assume that freedom of contract is recognized and protected under the 
Grundgesetz, even though freedom itself is to be moulded by statutes.44 Thus, 
given the impossibility of eliminating it as a whole (due to the Sozialstaasprin-
zip),45 freedom of contract should be subject to restrictions and limits based 
on socially or economically justifiable reasons in accordance with the equal 
protection and proportionality clause.46 The protection of freedom contract 
insured by Art. 2 Abs 1 GG corresponds to a parliamentary duty to provide 
individuals with adequate space to create self-regulations via contracts of self-
determination (Selbstbestimmung). Nevertheless, according to Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, contractual freedom lacks a naturai basis: on the contrary, it pre-
sumes its fulfilment via state intervention.47 This vision of contractual free-
dom rests upon a certain ambiguity between a stricter liberal doctrine - as 
far as control of the legai limits imposed on contractual freedom is concerned -
and a social consideration of juridical relationships that calls for severe con-
trol by the legislature in order to accomplish the final goal of economie soli-
darity 48 Up to now, the Italian Constitutional Court has shown litde interest 
in constitutional protection of the freedom of contract.49 Among the reasons 
43 See M. BÀUERLE, Vertragsfreiheit und Grundgesetz cit., pp. 285 ff. and G. DURIG, in Grund-
gesetzkommentar, hg. von Th. Maunz, G. Durig, R. Herzog, R. Scholz (Munchen, Beck, 1994) sub 
Art. 2Abs. 1, Rn. 53 ff. 
44 "Privatautonomie besteht nur im Ralimen der Grundgesetze, und diese sind ihrerseits an die 
Grundrechte gebunden. Das Grundgesetz will keine wertneutrale Ordnung sein, sondern hat in sei-
nem Grundrechtsabschnitt objektive Grundentscheidungen getroffen, die fiir alle Bereiche des 
Rechts, also auch fiir das Zivilrecht gelten": BVerfGE 81, 242 (253) (also known among scholars 
as Handelsvertreterentscheidung); the theory is in contrast with the traditional view (see among others 
H.C. NIPPERDEY, "Freie Entfaltung der Persònlichkeit", in Die Grundrechte, hg. von K.A. Bette-
rmann, H.C. Nipperdey, Bd. 4., 2. Halbband (Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1962), pp. 741 ff. Nipperdey 
recognized in Art. 2 Abs 1 the foundation of contractual freedom, without which a real market eco-
nomy could not have been conceivable, and considered it as a fundamental right of the person; 
others (W. FLUME, Allgemeiner Teil des Biirgerlichen Rechts, Zweiter Band, Das Rechtsgeschàft, 4. 
Aufl. (Berlin - Heidelberg - New York, Springer, 1992), pp. 17 ff.) argue that it is the duty of standard 
legislation to determine the limits of freedom of contract. 
45 J . ISENSEE, "Das Grundrechts als Abwehrrecht und als Staatliche Schutzpflicht", in Hand-
huch des Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland cit., Band V, Allgemeine Lehren der Grundrechte 
(C. Heidelberg, F. Muller, 1992), 143 ff. 
46 BVerfGE 8, 274 (329); 60, 329 (339), for further reference, see M. BÀUERLE, Vertragsfreiheit 
und Grundgesetz cit. 
47 Ibid, p. 292. 
48 See the "institutional" theory of freedom of contract by P. HÀBERLE, Die Wesengehaltsgaran-
tie des Art. 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz, 3. Aufl. (Heidelberg, C.F. Muller, 1983), pp. 96 ff. 
49 Assuming that "our own Costitution does not provide, either directly or indireedy, a protec-
tion of the freedom of contract like that normally presupoposed in German Grundgesetz", see 
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underlying this attitude one may cite the lack in the Italian judicial system of 
such a tool as the Verfassungsbeschwerde, regulated in Art. 93 I Nr. 4 GG. 
This article grants persons the right to trial in cases involving a fundamental 
breach of rights by the public powers.50 Quite often the Verfassungsbesch-
werde has given the Court of Karlsruhe the chance to reconsider interventions 
in cases where courts and Parliament have directly or indirectly hindered free-
dom of contract by. As a result, German Constitutional Court has been able 
to elaborate upon the judicial theory of the freedom of contract. Many Italian 
scholars assume that Art. 2 of the Italian Constitution may refer only to the 
freedoms of contract that are directed towards the accomplishment of such 
"social formations" as the family, when based upon marriage (see Art. 29), 
associations (see Art. 18), trade unions (see Art. 39) or politicai parties (see 
Art. 49), which receive express constitutional recognition. Meanwhile, in 
the field of the economie relations, freedom of contract would receive only 
indirect constitutional protection, as a tool by which the freedom of enterprise 
and the right of property can be exercised.51 This vision of the problems 
reflects the politicai and economie attitude of the Constitution.52 However, as 
has been pointed out, "private autonomy moves via market influence itself, 
and should be reconsidered in the context of the market"; within that con-
text, "the contract holds primary significance: because freedom, and even 
P. RESCIGNO, "Introduzione", in Autonomia privata individuale e collettiva, a cura di P. Rescigno 
(Napoli, Esi, 2 0 0 6 ) , p. xvi and L . MENGONI, Autonomia privata e Costituzione cit., pp. 1 ff.; Corte 
costituzionale, 3 . 2 1 . 1 9 6 9 , n. 3 7 , Foro italiano, I ( 1 9 6 9 ) , colonna 7 8 1 ff., has judged that "freedom of 
contract does not (receive) direct protection from the Constitution. Instead, it is indirecdy protected 
in Arts. 4 1 and 4 2 " ; see also Corte costituzionale, 2 . 1 1 . 1 9 8 8 , n. 1 5 9 , Giurisprudenza costituzionale 
( 1 9 8 8 ) , pp. 5 5 3 ff.; Corte costituzionale, 5 . 1 5 . 1 9 9 0 , n. 2 4 1 , ibid., 1 9 9 0 , pp. 1467 ff.; Corte costitu-
zionale, 6 . 3 0 . 1 9 9 4 , n. 2 8 , ibid., 1 9 9 4 , p. 2 1 8 8 . 
50 Aside from the breach of fundamental rights, they provide the Court with direct access to 
the violations of Art 20 Abs 4,33,38, 101, 103 and 104 GG by the public powers, see among others 
D . DÒRR, Die Verfassungsbeschwerde in der Praxis (Kòln - Berlin - Bonn - Munchen, 1990), Ch. 
GUSY, Die Verfassungsbeschwerde. (Voraussetzungen und Verfahren) (Heidelberg, C.F. Miiller, 
1988) and, in Italian, M. CAPPELLETTI, La giurisdizione costituzionale delle libertà. Primo studio sul 
ricorso costituzionale (Milano, Giuffrè, 1955) and ID., "Il ricorso costituzionale nel sistema delle im-
pugnazioni", Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile (1968), pp. 1056 ff., now in ID., Processo e 
ideologia (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1969), pp. 531 ff. 
5 1 L . MENGONI, Autonomia privata e Costituzione cit., pp. 2 ff.; C. CASTRONOVO, "Autonomia 
privata e costituzione europea", Europa e diritto privato (2005), pp. 29 ff.; L . DI NELLA, Mercato e 
autonomia contrattuale nell'ordinamento comunitario (Napoli, Esi, 2003), p. 17; G. ALPA, "Libertà 
contrattuale e tutela costituzionale", Rivista di diritto privato (1995), pp. 35 ff.; A. DI MAJO, Libertà 
contrattuale e dintorni, ibid., pp. 5 ff.; S. RODOTÀ, Le fonti di integrazione del contratto, new edition 
(Milano, Giuffrè, 2004), pp. 45 ff.; it has even been assumed that "the Costitution does not deal with 
private autonomy": P . BARCELLONA, Diritto privato e società moderna (Napoli, Jovene, 1996), p. 388. 
5 2 E . BAFFI, Limiti all'autonomia contrattuale nel pensiero economico e filosofico contemporaneo, 
Rivista critica del diritto privato (2004), pp. 631 ff. 
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economie freedom, is protected as a fundamental value in the Constitution. 
Moreover, this freedom expresses itself in terms of private autonomy of which 
contract is at least historically the most important epiphany".53 Since the 
Treaty of Rome, the present-day politicai scenario - disrupted in recent 
decades by epoch-making changes54 - has provided individual States with 
the one and only hypothesis under which a judicial system could succeed in 
expressing an economie constitution that is sufficiendy determined and pre-
cise.55 In this politicai context, Art. 3, subs 3, of the Treaty on the European 
Union aims to establish an internai market for the sustainable development of 
Europe based "on balanced economie growth and price stability, a highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social pro-
gress". In addition, Art. 119 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eur-
opean Union declares that the activities of the Member States and the Union 
shall include, as provided in the Treaties, the adoption of an economie policy 
that would be based on dose coordination of Member States' economie po-
licies on the internai market and on the definition of common objectives, "and 
would be conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition". But far from being considered a mere pro-
grammata statement of principles, the logie and course of such a clause hin-
ders not only the adoption of contrasting legai regulations, but also the adop-
tion of "politicai orientations" which, without being legally defined, to some 
extent conflict with the model so plainly and precisely outlined in the second 
paragraph. 
Even if freedom of contract is not expressly considered in EU legisla-
tion,56 it necessarily constitutes a fundamental component for accomplish-
ment of the Union's public goals with respect to the fundamental freedom 
embodied in the common European market and state law. This is particularly 
53 G. BENEDETTI, "Tutela del consumatore a autonomia privata", Rivista trimestrale di diritto e 
procedura civile (1998), p. 21; see also F. GALGANO, "Negozio giuridico (dottrine generali)", Enciclo-
pedia del diritto, XXVII (Milano, Giuffrè, 1977), p. 948. 
54 N. IRTI, Il dibattito sull'ordine giuridico del mercato (Roma - Bari, Laterza, 1999). 
55 See for further references L. Dì NELLA, Mercato e autonomia contrattuale cit., pp. 103 ff. 
56 It does not seem that freedom of contract could be based on art. 16 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union, which recognizes the freedom to conduct a business in accor-
dance with Union law and national laws and practices; as has been insightfully pointed out, the 
whole legai system should be considered along with directives and case law of the Court of Justice, 
see G. VETTORI, "Carta dei diritti e codice europeo dei contratti", in Fonti e tecniche legislative per 
un diritto contrattuale europeo, P . PERLINGIERI and F. CASUCCI (eds.) (Napoli, Esi, 2 0 0 4 ) , p. 5 6 and 
A. JANNARELLI, Il diritto contrattuale europeo: le radici politiche di un dibattito, ibid., p. 71; see also 
G. VETTORI, "Carta europea e diritti dei privati (diritti e doveri nel nuovo sistema delle fonti)", Ri-
vista di diritto civile ( 2 0 0 2 ) , p. 6 6 9 ff. 
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true for directives, in which the limits of freedom regarding transparency and 
fairness in trade can be noted.57 Nevertheless, it does not rise to the rank of 
fundamental freedom and should rather be considered a tool for the accom-
plishment of European Union's goals. 
The case law of the European Court of Justice shows this very clearly: it 
assumes that freedom of contract constitutes a "rule",58 which cannot be hin-
dered whenever any tool for accomplishment of the same goal is available. 
Otherwise, it is considered a "principle" that cannot be "limited by an EU 
statute that specifically intends to introduce restrictions" 59 and consequendy 
would need to be moulded into the context "of the national applicable 
law".60 One could conclude that in the Italian system, freedom of contract 
should be presupposed rather than attributed to individuals as representative 
of the power granted to citizens to develop their own personality through the 
establishment of social connections. 
4 . THE GOOD GOVERNMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
If it is true that contractual freedom has a genuine constitutional founda-
tion that rests on the freedom of individuals to develop their personality 
under conditions of equality, then it becomes implausible to admit that the 
law (case law or statute law) could constrict that freedom when invoking social 
usefulness. In contrast, the good Government of contractual relationships lies 
in the quest for healthy economie competition between contractual rules and 
legai rules, as individuals are free to regulate their own relations according to 
reciprocai suitability. This remains valid as long as it does not destroy compe-
tition itself, which, at this point, needs protection and must be safeguarded. 
Hence, arbitrary legislative interventions that constrict contractual freedom 
for reasons of social usefulness should be distinguished from interventions 
that are designed to safeguard free competition and which are considered 
57 L. Di NELLA, Mercato e autonomia contrattuale cit., pp. 3 1 1 ff.; G. ALPA, "Nuove frontiere del 
diritto contrattuale", in 11 diritto privato dell'Unione europea, ed. by A. Tizzano (Torino, Giappichelli, 
2001), p. 707; see also C.-W. CANARIS, "Verfassungs- und europarechtliche Aspekte der Vertragsfrei-
heit in der Privatrechtsgesellschaft", in Festschrift fiir Peter Perche (Miinchen, Beck, 1993 ) , pp. 873 ff. 
58 Trib. I gr., 9.18.1992, c. 24/90, Automec, Raccolta della giurisprudenza, 1992-92, pp. 2223 ff. 
59 EU Court of justice, 10.5.1999, c. 240/97, Spain v. Commission, Raccolta della giurispruden-
za, 1999-91, pp. 6571 ff. (conclusion Léger). 
60 EU Court of justice, 9.7.2006, c. 125/05, VW-Audi Forhandlerforeningen, Raccolta della giu-
risprudenza, 2006-11, pp. 4539 ff.; EU Court of justice, 4.27.1999, e. 69/97, SNUA s.r.l., Foro ita-
liano, IV (1999), c. 338 ff. 
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to be indebted to public power. A first example of arbitrary intervention is 
provided by legai limitations on the power to withdraw or sell real estate that 
has been let or rented out for residence or cultivation. With regard to the act 
of letting or renting out, there has been much debate on the dimensions that 
should be recognized in favour of the interests of the lessee as regards the sta-
bility of the contractual relation. The issues are typically summarised in the 
formula of the "right to housing", a concept that continues, as has been noted 
in one of the most recent and in-depth essays on this topic, to be marked by 
an "unsolved complexity".61 Overall, the whole question stili requires further 
elaboration in order to allow the interpreter to evaluate and balance it in com-
parison with other subjective positions of indisputable leading rank such as 
property. Not only are there very weak indications in the Constitution that 
would allow an individual to claim the right to a place of abode, but the Con-
stitutional Court itself has not been willing to make actual reference to that 
right in order "to criticize or reconfigure the relations between the parties 
of renting contracts" 62 An astonishing example of the compression of con-
tractual freedom for reasons of social usefulness is given by the regime of 
"renting restrictions", which lasted from the late post war period up to the 
nineteen-seventies. During this time the duration of the contract was post-
poned legally and prevented the landlord from withdrawing the contract 
and reacquiring possession of the rented estate. Notably this rule was later 
changed (Law 27 July 1978, n. 392) and at the same time a legislative price 
cap on rental rates was introduced. Consequently. it affected the rental mar-
ket for twenty years. 
The Italian Constitutional Court realized that the initiative taken was not 
irrational, and that the discretionary power of the legislator could determine 
an extension of the contracts already subject to postponement as well as main-
tain or re-introduce a free regimen for the renting contract based upon the 
evaluation of a different and subsequent economie trend: The social function 
of property (see art. 42, subs. 2 of the Constitution), can justify a regime of 
pegging rent as long as it is a contingent measure and not an ordinary tool 
for moulding the property law; however, it does not require adoption of 
the same regime by the Parliament, which is free to achieve at its own libito 
61 E. BARGELLI, Proprietà e locazione, Prelazione e valore di scambio (Torino, Giappichelli, 
2004), p. 19 and M. TRIMARCHI, La locazione abitativa nel sistema e nella teoria generale del contratto 
(Milano, Giuffrè, 1988), p. 9 ff.; F. MARINELLI, "Funzione sociale della proprietà e natura delle cose 
dall'avere all'essere", in I rapporti patrimoniali nella giurisprudenza costituzionale, M. TAMPONI and 
E. GABRIELLI (eds.) (Napoli, Esi, 2006), p. 19 ff. 
62 E. BARGELLI, Proprietà e locazione cit., p. 17. 
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the social and economie goals imposed by Constitution.63 A somewhat differ-
ent approach concerns the way in which EU law seeks to protect (and there-
fore affect) the contractual positions of consumers toward businessmen. This 
law does not find its justification in claimed social requirements of usefulness, 
but rather constitutes a tool for the accomplishment of a "strong competitive 
market" (as stated in art. 3, subs 3, of the Treaty on European Union and in 
art. 119 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; see above). 
The weakness of the consumer unavoidably becomes a source of distortion 
and hinders the development of a truly competitive market. Thus it must 
be fought and overcome as far as possible. The opinions of scholars who tend 
to justify consumer protection on the basis of social usefulness or of the equal-
ity clause cannot be shared. It is quite evident that no such approach consid-
ers the protection of the overall market as the first and exclusive goal of that 
legislation. Protection of individuals is, rather, a possible consequence of the 
legislation itself but not a necessary one. Finally, the best example of direct 
State intervention in restricting contractual freedom involves the fixation of 
the interest rate when in debt. Justinian himself not only reduced the amount 
of money a creditor could demand from a debtor64 from twelve to six per-
cent, but also made great efforts to respond to those who believed that the 
Constitution could not be applied to loans already in existence when the 
statute was passed. 
De usuris quarum modum iam statuimus, pravam quorundam interpretationem 
penitus removentes iubemus, edam eos qui ante eandem sanctionem ampliores, quam 
statutae sunt, usuras stipulati sunt, ad modum eadem sanctione taxatum ex tempore 
lationis eius suas moderari actiones, illius scilicet temporis, quod ante eandem fluxit 
legem, prò tenore stipulationis usuras exacturos.65 
To those who complained that his intervention was "authoritarian" and 
"excessive" 66 it is easy to respond that a "prohibitive" law of this kind finds 
63 Corte costituzionale, 16 January 1976, n. 4, Ammistrazione italiana (1976), pp. 1043 ff.; Ar-
chivio civile, 1976, pp. 341 ff.; Consiglio diStato, II (1976), p. 21; Foro italiano, I (1976), c. 5 ff.; 
Giurisprudenza costituzionale, I (1976), pp. 23 ff.; Giurisprudenza italiana, 1,1 (1976), c. 876 ff.; Giu-
stizia civile, III (1976), pp. 114 ff.; Rassegna dell'avvocatura dello Stato, I (1976), p. 4 and Rivista 
giuridica dell'edilizia, I (1976), pp. 185 ff.; on which see, recendy, F. MARINELLI, Funzione sociale 
della proprietà cit., psp. 21 ff. 
64 C. 4, 32, 26. 
6 5 C . 4 , 3 2 , 2 7 ; see C.F. GABBA, Teoria della retroattività delle leggi, 3 edn. (Torino, F.lli Bocca, 
1 8 9 1 ) , I V , p . 3 4 9 . 
6 6 K.A. VON VANGEROW, Lehrbuch der Pandekten, geb. Ausgabe, Nachdr. d. 7 . Aufl. (Marburg, 
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simple justification in serious economie reasons of order and ethics, and as 
such deserves to be applied even retroactively to contractual relations pending 
among creditors and debtors at the time.67 No one could seriously doubt the 
reliability of similar indications: the ethical implications of usury and heavy 
distortions of the correct mechanism of healthy and loyal competition be-
tween individuals are largely sufficient to justify similar interventions by pub-
lic power in the loans market. Jean Domat wrote, "Usury is a crime [...] that 
ruins the same foundation of the social order".68 At this stage, it is possible to 
foresee a workable settlement between freedom of contract and its antithesis, 
namely, social usefulness. When it can be admitted that the latter is malleable 
in itself and should be read not as a means to restrict the economie freedom of 
individuals but, rather, as a concept pointing towards a well stated goal, then 
it will achieve good Government of contractual relations. In this manner, pro-
tection of the freedom of contract would not depend upon the absence of reg-
ulations, but rather upon the good law that governs the market. Freedom of 
contract does not remain outside the law, but should be conceived as a func-
tion of the law itself. Indeed, the quality control of products and the guaran-
tee of competition among men engaged in business are forms of protection of 
the individual against the planetary power of enterprises.69 In this sense, Art. 
41 Const. - and social usefulness - are not in opposition with a truly market-
based economie system. 
The market cannot be left to itself. We who elect lawmakers know that the mar-
ket can be distorteci by monopolies. [...] And we can and must make the market use 
its ability to regulate the production and distribution of wealth within certain limits, 
limits that we consider fair and that act in accordance with our ideals of a society, in 
which ali men have a chance to develop their potential in the best way possible and in 
which excessive inequalities of wealth and income do not exist - without arriving at 
an absolute equality, compatible only with the life of the ant colony and the beehive, 
which for humans are called tyrannies, dictatorships, totalitarian regimes. 
Elwert, 1 8 6 3 - 1 8 6 9 ) repr. Keip, Goldbach, 1 9 9 8 , § 2 5 , p. 6 ; see also G.F. PUCHTA, Lehrbuch derPan-
dekten, 12. Aufl. (Leipzig ,J.A. Barth, 1877) § 111. 
6 7 F . LASSALLE, Das System der erworbenen Rechte. Bine Versòhnung des positiven Rechts und 
der Rechtsphilosophie. Die Theorie der erworbenen Rechte und der Collision der Gesetze unter beson-
derer Berucksichtigung des Rómischen, Franzosischen, und Preufiischen Rechts, hrsg. von L. Bucher 
(Leipzig, K.F. Pfan, 1880), p. 279. 
68 Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel (Paris, Veuve Cavelier, 1766), p. 59. 
69 N. IRTI, "Autonomia privata e forma di Stato (intorno al pensiero di Hans Kelsen)", in Co-
dice civile e società politica (Bari, Laterza, 1995), p. 96. 
70 L. EINAUDI, "Lectures on the Market", in Selected Economie Essays, L. EINAUDI, R. FAUCCI 
and R. MARCHIONATTI (eds.) (Basingstoke - New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 65. 
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T H E D A R K S I D E O F G O V E R N A N C E * 
1. A WORD WITHOUT SENSE 
It is difficult to say whether the world is changing, or whether, simply, what 
is changing is our way of interpreting it. It is certain, however, that for some 
time now, an entire conceptual architecture, the one that made the modem his-
tory of international legai thought, appears to be increasingly struggling to 
keep a hold on reality. The use (and abuse) of a term like governance is a telling 
symptom of this struggle, especially in Italian language. Perhaps it is also an 
attempt to provide an answer. And this, paradoxically, is taking place by virtue 
of its indeterminacy and untranslatability, whether claimed or inevitable. Gov-
ernance is, as we will see, a nonsense word. Or rather: a concept whose sense 
resides in not having one. It is a concept which, rather than ordering reality, 
appears to be cultivating the claim that it should adapt to a social situation 
where what is missing is the resilience and firm hold of the terms which have, 
for centuries, been at the center of philosophical (and not only philosophical) 
reflection. Here are two among many such terms: law and order. 
Now, because there is something mysterious at play in it, a short story by 
Kafka can help us approach this topic. The title of the story is "The Cares of a 
Family Man"; it talks about a strange object.1 This object can be found in the 
attic, on the stairs, and in the hallways. It appears to be made of wood. It 
speaks, laughs and answers. Yet its sounds are similar to the rustling of fallen 
leaves. It says its name is Odradek, and that it has no abode - at least if the 
father of the family, who treats the object as a child, is to be believed. The 
object does no harm to anyone. It neither has a goal, nor practices an activity. 
* Translated by K.E. Battig von Wittelsbach. 
1 See F. KAFKA, "The Cares of a Family Man", in ID., The Complete Stories (New York, 
Schocken Books, 1995), pp. 427-428. 
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Nevertheless, the father of the family confesses that he is almost pained at the 
idea that the object could continue to climb up and tumble down the stairs, 
falling amid his children's feet, and then the feet of their own children - even 
when he, the father, is no longer around. In brief, Odradek is there: this is ali 
that can be said. There is no concept that can grasp it, or enclose it within a 
definition. It does, of course, have a name. But the origin of its name is un-
known: it is Slavic or German? It is a name, literally, without sense. By the 
same token, what it designates is without sense: the Odradek. 
Very well, then: governance is a little bit like Odradek. One does not 
really know what it is. Nor, really, where it comes from: from English, surely, 
but that is not enough. It has no sense. Yet it is there. And we talk about it 
more and more frequendy. So frequendy that it has even become irritating. 
But perhaps it is precisely within the folds of this irritation that its secret is 
concealed. As Kafka would have it, it is found in the pain that we experience 
by seeing this strange concept amid our feet, and by thinking that it may con-
tinue to tumble down amid our children's feet, and then amid their own chil-
dren's feet. We, fathers to our families, orphans of that father figure which for 
centuries has been called the State. Perhaps this is exacdy where we should 
start. But not before saying a few words about the life of words and the func-
tioning of concepts - no small endeavour. 
2 . TOWARD A PEDAGOGY OF THE CONCEPT 
Philosophical problems are often, if not always, problems of language. 
They are about, literally, being attentive with words. And in particular with 
those words that take on the role of concepts. The reason is quite simple: 
we use concepts to order our world, to understand that which surrounds 
us. Etymology comes to the rescue. The word 'concept', as is known, comes 
from cum capere: to put together, grasp, collect. Concepts, then, are like 
drawers which thought uses to put things in their proper place. And to signal 
its distance from that which purely and simply happens. Ali this in order to 
open, among other things, the space for criticai reflection. Yet these drawers 
are never to be taken for granted once and for ali. They have a life; they are 
born and they die, just like the words used for designating them; and at times 
they are transformed, even despite the apparent identity of these same words. 
Let us look at an example from among the most frequendy quoted: the de-
mocracy of the Greeks is not our democracy. The word is the same, or rather, 
there is no other way of translating it, but the concept changes. It changes for 
— 190 
THE DARK SIDE OF GOVERNANCE 
the simple reason that ali three - the reference context, the order in which the 
concept assumes meaning, and the problem which it faces - likewise change. 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in a book with a provocatively popular 
title, explained this in the best possible fashion: every concept refers back to 
other concepts, it gives a form to a problem, and precisely because of this it 
has its history.2 Three points, then. First: simple concepts do not exist, which 
is the same as saying that every concept is made up, in turn, of other con-
cepts and refers back to an order of discourse within which it can find its 
meaning. Second: every concept refers back to a problem, or is always 
created as a function of a specific problem to be solved. Third: precisely 
because it is created as a function of a problem, each concept has its history 
- not to be confused with that of its word - and therefore its becoming. These 
are the points to keep in mind when one begins to speak about any concept 
whatsoever. And in particular when speaking about a concept like that of gov-
ernance, which, as we pointed out at the outset, seems tò renounce at least its 
capacity to put things in order, and any sense that can be called 'defined'. 
The concept of governance, ali things considered, risks being a paradox-
ical concept. A concept without a concept, one might be tempted to say, if 
this did not sound too provocative. A concept that does not claim to reduce 
a multiplicity to a unity, but rather to show the complexity of the world in 
which it is created, and the lack of any possible (and simple) unity. And, in 
fact, the problem of governance is nothing but this: understanding how it 
is possible to govern a complexity. This is where the attempt to elaborate a 
new style of government comes from, distinct from the traditional model of 
hierarchical control and characterized by a higher degree of cooperation be-
tween public and private subjects:3 governance, to be precise. Except that 
what is at stake in this curious concept is not simply a new style of governing 
but, much more radically, a new concept of governing. A concept basically 
irreducible to the idea of government (and of social regulation) handed down 
to us by modem tradition, if only because it is inscribed within the order of a 
profoundly changed discourse. In sum, an order of discourse which no longer 
finds its keystone in the state. 
2 See G. DELEUZE - F. GUATTARI, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? (Paris, Minuit, 1991). 
3 See R. MAYNTZ, "New challenges to governance theory", in H. BANG (ed.), Governance as 
social and politicai communication (Manchester - New York, Manchester University Press, 2003), 
pp. 27-40. Within the wide literature on Governance, among the most recent publications, see also 
M.R. FERRARESE, La governance tra politica e diritto (Bologna, D Mulino, 2010). 
14 
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3. T o o BIG AND TOO SMALL 
Every concept is createci as a function of a problem to be solved, or at 
least, to be given a comprehensible shape, so Deleuze and Guattari suggest. 
We should perhaps, then, ask ourselves what problem lies beneath this 
strange concept we are investigating. And the answer, at least in its essential 
terms, can be condensed into a brief answer: the world can no longer be 
measured in terms of states. It is too big. And at times also too small. It is too 
big when it comes to the universalization of markets, ecological challenges and 
threats linked to the spread of international terrorism. It is too small when lo-
cai claims, last regional belonging, collective identities different from national 
identities (claimed or real) etc., enter into play. In brief: to speak of govern-
ance means, whether we like it or not, speaking about the crisis of the nation-
state. As is well known, the body of literature written on this subject is, to say 
the least, immense. And this crisis definitely has its roots in the acceptance of 
the impotence of the formation called state - the true keystone of the concep-
tual architecture of the judicial and politicai thought of modernity, it is worth 
repeating - faced with the social problems mentioned above. These are the 
problems that demand solutions which the state, closed within its confines 
(which, however, are becoming increasingly permeable), is not capable of of-
fering. Governance, then: what else is it but the attempt to solve this crisis, by 
elaborating new forms of social regulation capable of governing this 'new 
world', big and small at the same time? Once again: unity and multiplicity. 
It is certainly not by chance, in fact, that rather than speaking of globalization, 
we more and more frequendy speak of 'glocalization', in order to emphasize 
that the other side of the globalization, as paradoxical as this may appear, is 
precisely the birth of various 'localisms'. Here is a journalistic example, and a 
story from a home turf: the increasingly heated debate on the appropriateness 
of reforming the state into a federation, is one of the signs pointing in this di-
rection, albeit stili developed within an institutional grammar that seems to be 
out-of-date.4 
Two documents have become decisive in this framework. The first dates 
from 1995, the result of the work by an ad hoc U.N. commission known as the 
Commission on Global Governance. Its tide is Our Global Neighbourhood. 
The second, from 2001, is The White Book of the European Commission 
devoted stricdy to the question of governance.5 This paper is certainly not the 
4 COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, Our Global Neighborhood (New York, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1995). 
5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, European Governance: A White Paper (Brussels, C O M , 2001), p. 428. 
— 192 — 
THE DARK SIDE OF GOVERNANCE 
place to analyze them in detail, or even to underline their ambiguity, present in 
particular in the second document.6 Nevertheless, it may be useful to recali that 
both texts stem from an awareness of the inability of state governments to 
respond to regulatory challenges today, both on the level of international relations 
and as far as community dynamics are concerned. The recipe is the same: to 
widen the sphere of the government in order to include the participation of pro-
cesses and actors, even of a private nature, which so far have been simple objects 
of regulation.7 Both in its supra-national dimension, be it transnational or com-
munity-oriented, and inside individuai state communities, the key word is: par-
ticipation. It concerns the 'opening' of the governing process in such a way as to 
involve in the formulation and implementation of public policies - and even 
prior to this, in the choice of the goals to set and of the problems to be solved -
ali potentially interested parties, and not simply more (and only) states. 
The problem remains, therefore, that of the governance. It is important to 
emphasize this. But governance is nowadays no longer interpreted as an exclu-
sive prerogative of the organizations institutionally delegated to it, or the states. 
And it is no longer translated in terms of planning (from above), which de-
mands nothing other than to be implemented (at a lower level), but it is rather 
interpreted as a dialogue and continuous learning among (and with) ali compo-
nents of that civil society which once consisted of simple recipients.8 According 
to the dynamics that we have already seen at work in the transition from the 
Fordist factory to a network of companies, here too there is a shift from the 
verticalization to the deverticalization of management. Restated in terms much 
in vogue in scholarly literature: new forms of bottom-up regulation thus take 
the place of the traditional top-down forms. Governing is no longer done from 
above, ali things considered, but it continues. Or at least that is the idea. 
4 . THE FUNCTION OF MANAGEMENT 
Understood properly, as has been expertly emphasized, governance is not 
synonymous with "government".9 But one should add, only as long as we 
6 See A. ANDRONICO - A. Lo FARO, "Defining Problems: Open Method of Coordination, Fun-
damental Rights and Theory of Governance", in O. DE SCHUTTER - S . DEAKIN (eds.), Social Rights 
and Market Forces. Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social 
Europe? (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2005), pp. 41-96. 
7 See R. SAPIENZA, "Governance", Aggiornamenti sociali, 7-8, 2002, pp. 697-700. 
8 See H . P . BANG (ed.), Governance as Social and Politicai Communication cit. 
9 See J . N . ROSENAU - E . O . CZEMPIEL (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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continue to construe the concept of governance within the order of discourse 
typical of modernity. From this point of view, in fact, governance undoubtedly 
marks a disparity. However, and this must be reiterated, it concerns a dispar-
ity between two different levels of immanence: on the one hand, the juridical 
and politicai level of modem state systems; and on the other, the technocratic 
level of glocalisation itself. If the immanence level is changed, then, as a con-
sequence, the translation of the question of government changes: it is now, in 
fact, construed in terms of governance. Furthermore, the goal of the state, and 
of the law intended as the expression of the sovereign's will, was to instali 
social order within a defined territory, while leaving behind it the debris of 
disorder (religious wars, for example). The goal of governance, on the other 
hand, is simply to keep an open channel of communication among the various 
components of the social fabric and, at the end of the day, to guarantee the 
continuity of a process whose main regulator is the technocratic imperative. 
That is to say, it is a process, as we have seen, which does not appear to have 
any other goal except that of its own perpetuation. In brief: it is no longer a 
question of putting things in order, simply because things no longer have their 
place. Yet we will return to this question of order at the end of this paper. For 
now, we should look more closely into the main features of transformation of 
the governance problem, which appears to be one of the decisive points of the 
concept of governance itself. 
At the beginning we noted that the history of concepts is not the history of 
words. Yet at this point, even the history of the word 'governance' may have 
something to teach us. Let us begin with the English language, where 'govern-
ance' is distinguished from 'government'. While the latter term indicates the 
institutions formally appointed to the function of governing, the former refers 
to the activity of governing, its manner of operation and its effects. Nonethe-
less, it is rarely pointed out that the word 'government' originally was the 
translation of the French word gouvernement which, in tum, is a translation 
of another term, which has recendy made an appearance in English, but much 
older, which - coincidentally - is governance. In sum, the present shift that 
leads from government to governance hides an originai trait that should not 
be neglected. Dante himself, by using the term governazione in his Convivio 
(the fourth treatise, IX, 10) also appears to be re-echoing the medieval lemma 
which is once more in the limelight today.10 So from the Greek kybernàn, on 
to the Latin gubernare, through French with gouvernment, then on to English 
10 See S. MAFFETTONE, La pensahilità del mondo. Filosofia e governanza globale (Milano, D Sag-
giatore, 2006), p. 38. 
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with government, the Italian governo - until we get to governance - the root of 
the meaning is the same: directing, controlling or "piloting", whichever one 
prefers, either single minds or a single ship, an enterprise or a company in 
its entirety.11 
Government as management and control - that is the problem. Moreover, 
the term in use in Germany when talking of governance is in fact, Steuer-
ungstheorie: theory of management. It may be useful here, in order to look 
even more closely at the concept of governance, to open a text published 
in 1938, not by a philosopher of law or politics, but by a high-level director 
of Bell Telephone, Chester Barnard. Its tide is The Function of the Executive. 
In these pages he talks, obviously, of company organization - but that is not 
ali. In Barnard's work, ali forms of organization (understood nowadays as 
"cooperative systems") are present, whatever their form or function may 
be: economie, politicai, social, religious, military or recreational. The starting 
point is rather simple: it concerns understanding what motivates different in-
dividuals, with different life plans, and different subjective preferences, to col-
laborate in achieving the goals of the organization to which they belong. And 
the answer is to be found in the search for a delicate balance between the 
goals of an organization and the personal motives of its individual members, 
whose satisfaction cannot be achieved merely with economie incentives. But 
this is not really the point that we would like to emphasize here. Rather, 
we are interested in the way in which Barnard addresses the problem outlined 
in his text: the executive management, to be precise. 
Here Barnard's idea assumes a paradoxical tone: The good executive is a 
person who knows the art of not deciding. The refined art of executive deci-
sion consists, namely, in not deciding on problems that are not relevant now, 
not deciding prematurely, not making decisions that cannot be effectively 
made, and not making decisions that others could make".12 In sum, Barnard 
suggests the following: a good executive, in order to be such, rather than 
being capable of decision-making, must be able to communicate, mediate, co-
ordinate and, above ali, offer motivation sufficient to expand the zone of will-
ingness-to-collaborate in every individual member of the organization. The 
more extensive that zone is, the more effective will the management be. 
The authority is, then, now re-interpreted as a function of the satisfaction 
of individual motives. Thus rather than continue to study organizations as 
11 See S. VACCARO, "Il dispositivo della Governance", in A. PALUMBO - S. VACCARO (eds.), Go-
vernance. Teorie, principi, modelli, pratiche nell'era globale (Milano, Mimesis, 2007), p. 121. 
12 C. BARNARD, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Ma, Harvard University Press, 
1938). 
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if they were rational machines that proceed according to pre-established pro-
grams, Barnard - and before him the so called "School of Human Relations", 
established in Chicago between the 1920s and 1930s - conceive of these or-
ganizations as systems influenced both by the subjects that compose them, 
and by the surrounding environment.13 Indeed, companies, just like ali other 
organizations, are no longer measured by the standards of rigorously hierarch-
ical bureaucratic organizations, where the only thing demanded of the indivi-
duals is to obey the rules imposed from above, and carry out the role they are 
supposed to adhere to. Instead, now they begin to be analyzed as real "organ-
isms", whose correct functioning closely depends on the "human factor", and 
thus on harmony and dialogue among different components of the company, 
and between the company and its environment. 
In this framework, there are three main functions singled out by Barnard 
as typical of executives. First - to assure an efficient system of communication, 
given that communication among people is the first requirement for the exis-
tence of an organization, of whatever type it may be; second - to guarantee a 
Constant flow of resources, in terms of human resources within and insofar as 
concerns the organizations relations with its suppliers, clients, shareholders, 
and so on; third - to establish the goals of the organization, understood, how-
ever (and it is important to emphasize this), not as the product of a solitary 
decision, but as the result of a process where ali members of the organization 
are involved at different levels. In short, precisely to the extent to which an 
organization is now considered as a cooperative system, its functioning cannot 
ignore the consensus of its members. And this consensus cannot disregard, 
first and foremost, the choice and definition of the goal to be pursued. The 
key word thus becomes: participation. Coincidentally, this is same key word 
found in the documents on global and community governance mentioned 
earlier, and which would see the light of day a good few years after these pre-
dictions were made by Barnard, originally dealing with the dynamics present 
in companies. We should, however, be careful here: Barnard stili continues to 
discuss the functions of the management. From his perspective, the problem 
is how to understand under what conditions executive decisions can be effec-
tive. These conditions, he believes, are the following: in order to be effective, 
an order should be understood; it should not appear to be in contrast with the 
goals of the organization; and it should be compatible with the interests of the 
people to whom it is directed, and who carry it out. This means that the con-
sensus and participation of those receiving the order come into play. Here we 
are no longer looking at the verticalization of management, and no longer 
13 See BONAZZI, Come studiare le organizzazioni cit., pp. 58 ff. 
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talking of a hierarchical structure similar to the bureaucracy of the Weberian 
kind. But the fact remains - and this is worth emphasizing - that management 
(and command) is stili the focus of debate. But this is clearly also the case in 
the U.N. and the European Commission documents. Participation, by ali 
means - but stili as a function of an effective governance. 
5 . BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE MARKET 
Barnard, as we have seen, wrote at the end of the 1930s. He was con-
cerned, at least at the outset, with problems related to company organization. 
And yet his predictions have proved to be precious for situating in a frame-
work the events which carne about, on a politicai and legai level, in the 
mid 1970s. These were the years in which we were confronted with the failure 
of the planning of public policies typical of the early post-World War II per-
iod: at the level of their elaboration, as much as on the level of their "imple-
mentation", or their real capacity of effectively leading social and economie 
development toward their established objectives. The idea that one can gov-
ern change from above slowly entered into crisis. Also, there was a growing 
realisation that the failures of public policies derived not so much from the 
alleged errors of planning, as from the lack of understanding of the role 
played by those on the receiving end, of their possible resistance, and their 
capacity to obstruct these policies, even to subvert them. The attention up 
to then exclusively reserved for the "subject" of politicai management (first 
among ali: the state), moved progressively toward the "object" of public con-
trol, or toward the dynamics of internai regulation of the company itself - the 
field of private interests. From the concept of government, then, we move on 
to governability. the analysis of the recipients' willingness to be managed. As 
in Barnard, the problem now became one of assuring the effectiveness of reg-
ulation by taking into consideration the necessary involvement of the "orga-
nization's" members. Using, this time, Bauman's terminology, we can briedy 
say: from "heavy modernity", in which it was assumed that a development 
model could be designed that would be applied (later) to social reality, atten-
tion subsequendy moved to "liquid modernity", where the process of learning 
becomes decisive, as does the role played by the individual contexts within 
which the rules are inscribed, and therefore the dynamics of interaction 
(and retroaction) in the so-called "civil society". This takes us back to the pas-
sage already discussed in the context . of the crisis of the idea according to 
which it might be possible to govern society from above, by recourse to "a 
model", and a "pian". 
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This having been said, it should be remembered that the planning crisis 
was followed, in the 1980s, in an almost pendular movement, by recourse 
to the pure and simple dynamics of the market, considered by many, in those 
years, to be a solution to the problem. From the apologia for state intervention 
in the economy (the era of great planning having revealed itself to be increas-
ingly inefficient), there followed an apologia for the market, understood as a 
system capable of self-regulation. The choice appeared clear: either the state 
or the market. Having established the inefficiency of the former, one was left 
with the latter. This is how the era of so-called "neo-liberalism" began: the era 
of deregulation, privatization and devolution, where what was contested was 
precisely the efficiency of politicai control over the economie dynamics, sud-
denly considered to be an obstacle to development of the economy. The "pri-
vate" triumphed over the "public". These were the years of Reagan in the 
United States and Thatcher in England, of course. Even this pure and simple 
recourse to the market, however, progressively began to reveal its cracks. One 
among many was the potential contradiction between the market principles, 
on the one hand, and democracy and the demands of social justice on the 
other. What re-appeared was the demand for politicai control, although no 
longer in the form of regulation or planning from above, given the by now 
irreversible crisis of public institutions, both at the state and international 
level (or, in any case, at supra-national levels: the case of the European Union 
is emblematic here). And this is how we return to the problem of governance. 
Faced with the contrast between the state and the market, the concept of 
governance intends to offer a solution - literally, a 'complex' one: it is not 
about choosing one or the other, but about re-thinking their links and their 
interconnections. Once again, it is worth emphasizing the point discussed 
earlier: namely, the problem is stili that of the management of social and eco-
nomie dynamics. In short, less state certainly does not mean pure market. But 
at the same time, less state certainly does not mean less government. On the 
contrary: it is about finding a form of management and control truly capable 
of affecting a situation which has by now become too complex to be governed 
from above and from a single center of power. Governance is thus proposed 
as the only feasible present-day possibility of governing the market from a 
social standpoint, capable of accommodating both the limits of centralized 
planning, and the structurally inherent anarchy of economie exchange. And this, 
it is argued, can be achieved through a more extended involvement of the var-
ious components of so-called "civil society" in the dynamics of government, 
not only at the time of choosing public policies, but also during their concrete 
realization (or "implementation", if you wish). There is no longer any rigid 
opposition between the "public" and "private", but rather a possibility of co-
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ordination. Rather, there is the unity (of the public) and the multiplicity (of 
the private sector). Not the unity against the multiplicity. Fundamentally, this 
is a quest for common strategies of intervention related to the objectives of 
general interest, and in function of effective government at diverse levels: lo-
cai, national, international, supranational and global. 
6 . TRANSFORMATION OF THE LAW 
Having said this, we need to ask: what will become of the law? Before giv-
ing the answer, the question needs to be explained, and this takes us back to 
the beginning. At the beginning of this paper, we suggested that what govern-
ance reveals, and what it seeks, in some way, to answer, is the loss of resili-
ence, and hence the loss of grasp on social reality, affecting an entire concep-
tual architecture, an architecture typical of the legai and politicai thought of 
modernity, whose keystone consisted in the nation-state, with its people, its 
territory, and a centre of power easily identifiable by a reference to the figure 
of a sovereign. We also noted that precisely because concepts are never sim-
ple, but always live in relation with other concepts, the crisis of the keystone 
of this architecture inevitably brings with it the transformation of a whole series 
of concepts constructed within it. In the simplest way possible: the loss of 
the centrality of the state (an effect of the progressive weakening of its regu-
latory capacity) implies a revision, not only of the concept of 'government' but 
also, as a consequence, of other related concepts. If this is true, then the chal-
lenge that legai science is today called upon to face appears, in effect, to be 
that of how to 'inventi new concepts or, at least, to re-structure the traditional 
ones. A new way of conceiving of the law is being implemented with govern-
ance.14 A way which, in order to be truly understood, demands new cate-
gories. There is nothing that can be done to prevent this. The new setup in-
volves considering an order of discourse which has radically changed 
compared to that which is part of the history of modem thought. And this 
is anything but easy, if for no other reason than the strong temptation to in-
corporate the new into the same concepts whose holding power and grasp on 
reality is being questioned. Yet in order to understand why such a temptation 
14 See, in particular, J . LENOBLE - M . MAESSCHALCK, Démocratie, droit et gouvemance (Sher-
brooke, Les Ecfitions Revue de Droit de l'Université de Sherbrooke, 2011) and the last chapter in 
J. LENOBLE - M . MAESSCHALCK, Toward a Theory of Governance. The Action of Norms (The Hague -
London - New York, Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp. 265-329. 
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arises, it is necessary quickly to rewind the tape of history, obviously without 
any claim to exhaustive detail, and focus attention, in particular, on the two 
concepts mentioned at the outset: law and order. 
One need only recali that the modem representation of the law, up until 
Kelsen, was closely connected to that two-fold and convergent process de-
fined by Norberto Bobbio as the "statualizzazione del diritto" and the "giuri-
dificazione dello Stato",15 which has been a cruciai strand of various different 
modem theories of the state and the law, at least from Hobbes onward. Suf-
fice it to open the Pure Theory ofLaw by Kelsen to become aware of the force 
of this conception.16 Stating, as does Kelsen, that the law is nothing but "a 
judicial system" means, in fact, seeing it as a set of norms referring to units 
inasmuch as they are set and imposed by a single and definable power, sover-
eign if it is legitimate and effective. The judicial system and the state are, in 
short, two sides of the same coin: what is at play is the centralization of power 
and its secularization. This is where territorial boundaries and the hierarchy of 
sources meet: once the universalist tension of the Holy Roman Empire had 
been reduced, power carne to be defined as the capacity to instali order in 
one's own territory, which was possible only by gradually centring the legai 
ownership of the normative production. In short, in order for the sovereign 
to be effective, he or she must be unique, and to be unique the sovereign must 
hold a monopoly over the sources of the law. Ali sources of the law must be 
traceable, direcdy or indirectly, back to the same foundation, be it the will of 
the sovereign, according to Hobbes (and in part Schmitt), or a norm that le-
gitimizes it, as Kelsen would have it. Now, it is precisely this picture that ap-
pears today to have entered into a terminal decline. And with it the idea that 
the law, thought of essentially in the form of the set of rulings embodied in the 
legai tradition, is an instrument which the sovereign can use in order to 
restore order into an originally disordered society. 
The law that enters into play when we speak of governance is stili certainly 
an instrument: in short, a means. But it is a means which at this point should 
be re-read within an immediately technocratic pian of immanence. It is a 
means whose aim is no longer the constmction of social order, but the main-
tenance of that communicative process which, as recalled (among others, ob-
viously) by Barnard, is the condition itself for the existence of any organiza-
tion, be it public or private. It is, then, not a means that the legitimate 
15 See N. BOBBIO, Contributi ad un dizionario giuridico (Torino, Giappichelli, 1994), p. 80. 
16 See H. KELSEN, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik 
(Wien, Verlag, 1934). 
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power uses to achieve the goals already outlined at the conference table, but a 
technique that should guarantee both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of 
power, through an increasingly extended participation of individuals inter-
ested in the choice of public policies, and in singling out the problems which 
need to be addressed. In this framework, the ability to stimulate and keep the 
collective learning processes continuously open becomes decisive. The collec-
tive learning processes are about deciding together, and above ali deciding to-
gether when and what is to be decided. A system of norms is therefore no 
longer conceived as a crystallised immutable system: instead, it is a process 
capable of singling out, within itself, the objectives to pursue, by learning 
- reflectively - also from its own failures, and treasuring these lessons. Herein 
resides an authentically "revolutionary", but rarely emphasized, character of 
governance. A small parenthesis on the concept of revolution can, therefore, 
be surprisingly useful as we approach our conclusion. 
7 . THE NEW ORDER 
Let us begin with this: talking about a revolution means, literally, to be 
talking about an "upheaval". Things must change. And they must change 
in a radicai way: from here to there, as one would say, making a gesture of 
turning one's hand over. In short, everything must change. Reality must be 
overturned like the palm of the hand. Ali revolutions have claimed to be in-
stalling a "new order". And if one inquiries into the difference between the 
order sought by the revolution, and any other order contested by it, the answer 
is rather simple. Vittorio Mathieu masterfully explains it: "The new 'order' 
that which the revolution wishes to instali, it is an order no longer external 
to ordered reality. It is an order which does not distinguish itself from 
reality, in contrast to a 'form' which is applied to a 'content', or an extrinsic 
arrangement that regulates the elements laid out, but an order which identifies 
itself with that which it is ordering".17 What is at play in any revolutionary 
claim worthy of its name, therefore, is the passage from an extrinsic to an in-
trinsic order. The order wished for by the revolutionaries of ali times is an or-
der of a new kind, and not simply a different order. It is an order capable, 
finally, of filling the gap between reality as it should be and reality as it is. 
And it should no longer be conceived in terms of a model (to take up a term 
by now familiar to us) to be applied to a social reality, conceived as similar to a 
17 V. MATHIEU, La speranza nella rivoluzione (Milano, Rizzoli, 1972), p. 81. 
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material that can be moulded at will, according to a politicai initiative coming 
from the top, from a center of power. Here form and content coincide. Just as 
to he and ought to be coincide. And, by the way, who knows: it may not be 
coincidental that the European Court of Justice in 1963 spoke precisely of 
a "new legai order of international law", referring to the juridical community 
order.18 But this path could take us too far. Let us, then, remain on the sub-
ject of revolution. Hence, the first point that needs to be emphasized is this: 
revolutionary intolerance has as its object any kind of order extrinsic to the 
reality that needs to be put in order, and extrinsic to the wills subjected to 
it. But there are another two points that need to be borne in mind, again fol-
lowing Mathieu's analysis. Having stated the first, here is the second: the struc-
tural incompatihility of revolution with the law, and in particular with the form 
itself of the law. In the revolutionary framework, the law inevitably ends up 
being oppressive, especially as a manifestation of a structurally external order 
as compared to the one which needs to be ordered. The case of the law is em-
blematic. The law is by its nature "external", since it is a measure of the 
behaviours that it intends to regulate. It is also "external" with respect to 
the will of the subject who has created it, and who detached himself/herself 
from it in the moment it constituted itself as a general rule. It is clear, then, 
why any revolution cannot but be (also, and maybe above ali) a revolution 
against the law. Yet there is another point on that deserves attention - the 
third point: contrary to a reform, which intends to improve single aspects 
of reality, a revolution cannot be transformed into or reduced to a technique, 
and certainly not if by the technique we continue to mean a set of instruments 
used for the achievement of a determined end. If the intention is to overturn 
everything (as is the aim of revolutionary action), the world which will follow 
will only become known once the revolution has taken place and not before. 
In other words: one will never be able to predict the goal - or even foresee it, 
in fact. The revolution, if anything, will be a technique able to for single it out, 
but not to achieve it. We now dose the parenthesis on the revolution. 
8 . SHADOWS 
Order (external), law and techniques. The revolutionary spirit, as we have 
seen, contests ali three of these terms. And curiously, these same terms are 
called into question by governance. This should by now be clear, but it is 
18 Case 26/62 (1963) ECR 1; (1963) CMLR 105. 
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worth reiterating it, given that we are nearing the conclusion. Let us, once 
again, proceed point by point. First: the order of governance, just as desired 
by the revolution, is not external but (claims to be) inside the regulated will. 
Second: what governance intends to solve is the crisis of the idea that a society 
can be regulated from above, following a model, whatever it may be, and thus 
following the law of modem thought understood as a privileged instrument of 
any project of governing society. Third: governance - once again, like a revo-
lution - does not lend itself to being framed as a technique instrumentai in the 
achievement of an already determined goal, but if anything, as a continuous 
process of learning through trial and error, functional to individuation of such 
a goal. 
Now, if this is true, then it is not hard to understand why, until now, those 
studying governance have predominandy (albeit not exclusively) come from 
the ranks of sociologists, economists, scholars focusing on the organization 
of companies, politicai philosophers, and not philosophers of law. And the 
reason is the following: in speaking of governance one is not speaking of 
the law. Or at least, not of the law as we are used to speaking of it. In short: 
the focus of discussion is not the law understood as an external measure of 
action. But, and this is the point: the fact of no longer speaking of the law 
as modernity has habitually made us speak about it by no means signifies that 
we cannot talk about it in a different way. On the contrary. The challenge that 
governance appears to propose is precisely that of how to construct a new 
grammar, different from the modem edifice, which like ali orders of discourse 
has a history, a life, a development and an end, perhaps precisely the one we 
are witnessing today. Moreover, it is certainly not by chance that on many 
sides there is talk of a paradoxical "return to the future": as if our future 
(and in certain aspects, already our present) were destined to be similar to 
our remote past rather than our recent past. Provocatively speaking, in fact, 
the suspicion may arise that if confronted with a phenomenon like that of gov-
ernance, a medieval jurist would be better equipped than one of our contem-
poraries: if for no other reason than because tracing ali sources of law back to 
the legai tradition was not part of his conceptual baggage, not to mention the 
convergence between the law and the state described earlier, following up on 
Bobbio's analysis. Just as foreign to his oudook was the idea that the law was 
an instrument functional to the construction of a social order. This the focus 
of debate, in that era, did not center on an "artificial" order to be constructed, 
but on a "naturai" order to be preserved and guaranteed. And the law was 
thought of as being designed for precisely this purpose: to preserve the con-
ditions of a social order regarded as already given - be it metaphysical, divine 
or cosmic. Yet precisely this last train of thought allows us also to understand 
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the limits of this counterfactual hypothesis. The order of governance, in fact, is 
anything but transcendental. Admittedly, it is not laid out at a conference 
table, and neither is it achieved through the law, but it is stili radically immanent 
and artificial. In brief: it is indeed artificial, but it is spontaneous. It is not an 
ancient or a medieval order, therefore, and neither is it modem. But if any-
thing, it is literally post-modem. 
Ali things considered, it is an order of the technological age. Or better, as 
we have already said, of technocracy. structurally devoid either of an origin or 
of a subject that can be considered its author. An order, therefore, that does 
not depend on anyone. And for which nobody appears to be responsible. But 
it is precisely here that a shadow falls. It is worth recalling that what we said 
earlier about management: governance is not a synonym of government, but 
neither is it the absence of government. The problem is stili one of control, 
orientation and the regulation of social and economie dynamics. But if this 
is true, one may easily begin to harbour a suspicion that this broader system 
of governing has no sense, ultimately, other than presenting as intrinsic an or-
der destined always to remain extrinsic. Thus the participatory structure risks 
obscuring the way in which power continues to be exercised, and the capacity 
of a limited number of subjects to direct its dynamics. Let us be clear: the fear 
is that the "executives" have not disappeared, but are only hidden. And that 
they are hidden among the folds of a process which, presenting itself as purely 
horizontal and void of any management from above, actually makes it possible 
to evade any charge of politicai responsibility, any question of legitimization of 
the actors involved in it. Furthermore, and this must be emphasized: the 
private actors called to take part are typically without any type of formai or 
democratic legitimization, and their involvement certainly does not constitute 
a solution to this problem. There has been talk, in this regard, of a democratic 
deficit. And those who raise this kind of alarm may not be wrong. That which 
risks being hidden is precisely the element of choosing the actors to be 
included in the dynamics of governance. And, as a consequence, the problem 
of their legitimization likewise remains shrouded from view. Yet perhaps, 
when one looks at it carefully, the problem raised by governance is even more 
radicai, and more delicate. In an era such as ours, where the dominating prin-
ciple appears to be technocratic, we really need to ask ourselves if it is stili 
possible to govern technology, or if it is simply technology that governs. A truly 
monumentai question, and a disturbing one. For in the latter case, not only 
are rights, the law, order, the state, and politics at stake, but most of ali -
our freedom itself. And the possibility of being actors in our own destiny. 
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C O M P L E X S O C I E T I E S A N D I N D I V I D U A L D I F F E R E N C E S 
1 . COMPLEXITY AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
The expression 'good governance' suggests the idea - which I find well 
represented also in Ambrogio Lorenzetti's fresco "Effetti del Buon Governo" 
(1338-1339) - of a politicai arrangement in which a kind of 'harmony among 
differences' has been achieved, to the extent that the highest possible number 
of social conflicts can be avoided, at the same time granting each and ali in-
dividuals the highest possible degree of freedom in expressing their differ-
ences when interacting with each other. On the other hand, and whatever 
its definition may be, 'governance' always entails a reference to the interven-
tion in the social arena on the part of the politicai power, even when such in-
tervention consists only in providing some basic rules to peacefully and effec-
tively interact.1 In this sense, governance can be considered a strategie tool at 
the politician's disposai that can be used in very different manners. But what 
is most important in the idea of 'good' governance is the reference to a con-
ception of the good, or rather to the best conception of the good. Conse-
quently, the idea of good governance implies that such a conception of the 
good does exist which is able to provide the group-members, and especially 
the most powerful among them, with the best set of guiding principles to shift 
from a given politicai order to a more satisfactory, and in this sense 'better' 
one. I find that this is just the problematic side of the notion of 'good govern-
ance', given the impossibility to discover the best conception of the good, 
which is rather constructed by a number of individuals high enough to impose 
it upon ali the group-members. This is of course only the politicai implication 
1 For a recent Italian work on the issue of governance see G . FIASCHI (ed.), Governance: oltre lo 
stato? (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008). 
15 
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of the question. Anyway, I will try to show that there is also an epistemological 
ground for refusing the idea of good governance, consisting in the fact that 
human societies are complex systems, and that this prevents us from collect-
ing information enough to evaluate what conception of the good, among the 
infinite possible ones, ought to be considered the best. To be sure, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to give one single definition of 'complexity'. Here I 
will refer to the understanding of it suggested by radicai constructivism, 
dating back to Heinz von Foerster2 among others, and by contemporary com-
plexity theories, which can be summed up in John Cohen and Ian Stewart's 
statement according to which "we may tentatively define the complexity of 
a system as the quantity of information needed to describe it".3 The term 
'complexity' refers to the circumstance that a human individual has no ability 
to completely describe the environment in which it is collocated, that is to say 
to simultaneously 'compute' ali the needed stimuli and data in order to repre-
sent reality as it is. As a consequence, human individuals cannot help but se-
lect only a certain number of them, the ones they subjectively consider as re-
levant for them.4 Moreover, thinking about complexity implies more or less 
immediately a reference to the notion of 'system', to the extent that complex-
ity theories and systems theories appear as stricdy intertwined. 
This comes as a consequence of the general definition of 'system' as an 
'organized complexity', that is to say as something that does not originate 
from the simple sum of its components, but that also includes ali of the pos-
2 See H. VON FOERSTER, Ohserving Systems, 2nd edn. (Seaside, CA, Intersystems Publications, 
1984). For an introduction to radicai constructivism, see B. POERKSEN, The Certainty ofUncertainty. 
Dialogues Introducing Constructivism (Exeter- Charlottesville, VA, Lmprint Academic, 2004); 
A. RIEGLER, "Towards a Radicai Constructivist Understanding of Science", Foundations of Science, 
voi. 6 (2001), pp. 1-30; see also E. VON GLASERSFELD, Radicai Constructivism. A Way ofKnowing 
and Learning (London - New York, Routledge - Falmer, 2002); F. MONCERI, Pensiero e presente. 
Sei concetti della filosofia (Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2007). On complexity theories see M . WALDROP, Com-
plexity. The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992); 
J . GLEICK, Chaos. The Amazing Science of the Unpredictable (London, Vintage, 1998); R. LEWIN, 
Complexity. Life at the Edge of Chaos, 2nd edn. (London, Phoenix, 2001); more generally see N. RE-
SCHER, Complexity. A Philosophical Overview (New Brunswick - London, Transaction Publisher, 
1998); L.T. KING, Social Science and Complexity. The Scientific Foundations (Huntington, New York, 
Nova Science Publishers, 2000); M.C. TAYLOR, The Moment of Complexity. Emerging Network Cul-
ture (Chicago - London, The University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
3 J. COHEN - I . STEWART, The collapse of Chaos. Discovering Simplicity in a Complex World 
(London, Penguin, 2000), p. 20. 
4 Especially Niklas Luhmann, stresses the relevance of selection in defining complexity, see 
N. LUHMANN, Soziale Systeme: Grundrif einer allgemeinien Theorie (Frankurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 
1984). Although Luhmann's theory is one of the most important attempts to transfer some features 
of complexity theories into the investigation of social systems, a deeper discussion of his position 
exceeds the aims of this article. 
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sible interactions among those components. As a result, the system as a whole 
cannot be described and explained without any reference to the relationships 
connecting its elements, since it can be conceived as a 'totality' in which not 
autonomy, but interdependence among the parts is the rule. In short, 
although a specific set of 'complexity sciences', especially within the hard 
sciences,5 does exist, there are clear connections between systems theories 
and complexity theories, at least when it comes to their core aspects.6 As is 
well known, the term 'system' is frequendy used in the social sciences to in-
dicate an 'aggregate' of human individuals, for instance in expressions such 
as 'social system', 'politicai system', 'economie system', etc. Before applying 
one or more complexity theories to 'human systems',7 the sense should be 
clear in which they can be labeled as 'complex', as well as the fact that the 
application of complexity theories to social sciences presupposes some mod-
ifications of the originai models coming from the hard sciences. In a word, we 
might state that human systems are complex in the sense that they address 
problems to which a 'computable solution' is not to be found. But this is 
not the mainstream position within social sciences, which generally consider 
complexity as overlapping with 'difficulty'.8 As a result, they keep on search-
5 Such complexity sciences are "nonlinear dynamic systems theory, non equilibrium thermody-
namics, dissipative structures, the theory of self-organization, catastrophe theory, the theory of self-
organized criticality, antichaos, and chaos theory" and they "ali purport to offer fresh perspectives 
on the centrai problems in the specific domain from which they emerge" (K.M. MATHEWS, M.C. 
WHITE and R . G . LONG, "Why study the Complexity Sciences in the Social Sciences?", Human Re-
lations, voi. 52, n. 4 (1999), pp. 439-462: 439). Despite the differences in theoretical approach, "a 
unifying theme is a focus on systemic change, an attempt to understand the temporal behavior of 
both spatially simple and complex systems. Beyond this admittedly broad area of convergent interest, 
however, much variation and uncertainty is attached to the usage of these perspectives" (ibid., 
p. 443). 
6 For an introduction to systems theory see L. VON BERTALANFFY, General System Theory (New 
York, Braziller, 1968); E. LASZLO, The Systems View of the World. A Holistic Vision for Our Time 
(Cresskill, NJ, Hampton Press, 2002). G. MIDGLEY, "Science of Systemic Intervention: Some Impli-
cations of Systems Thinking and Complexity for the Philosophy of Science", Systemic Practice and 
Action Research, voi. 16, no. 2 ( 2 0 0 3 ) , pp. 77-97 states that there is an overlapping between complex-
ity theories and systems theories (see esp. n. 2), whereas R.D. STACEY, D. GRIFFIN and P. SHAW, 
Complexity and Management: Fad or Radicai Challenge to Systems Thinking? (London, Routledge, 
2000), takes the opposite posidon. 
7 According to L . BIGGIERO, "Sources of Complexity in Human Systems", Nonlinear Dynamics, 
Psychology, and Life Sciences, voi. 5, no. 1 (2001), pp. 3-19, "human systems are characterized by the 
presence of ali sources of complexity, and therefore are the most complex systems we face with. This 
perspective shads an anthropomorphic light on the entire issue of complexity, which we address as 
observed irreducible complexity (OlC)" (pp. 4-5). 
8 There is a clear difference between complexity and difficulty. As Biggiero states, "many 
problems are difficult, and therefore few are predictable. In this sense, complexity is a question 
of degree, and specifically the degree of our ignorance. An object is more or less complex depending 
on the ignorance (quantity of information) we have about it, and depending on our ability to make 
— 209 — 
FLAVIA MONCERI 
ing for an 'ultimate' solution to whatever problem such systems may pose to 
theoretical investigation, ending up, just for this reason, by considering sys-
tems in a more 'traditional' or 'classic' sense, and definitely not as complex 
systems. This implies that human systems, and the 'institutions' in which they 
articulate, are defined and described more often than not according to the as-
sumption that they are static and isolated structures aiming to organize reality. 
They are stili conceived as closed entities able to represent the 'status', 'situa-
tion' or 'configuration' of the set of phenomena they refer to. As a conse-
quence, they are granted the ability to correcdy represent the 'real' situation 
and to give a reliable description of it. However, the main problem with this 
picture of human systems is that it assumes that ali of a system's components 
can be collected and described, as well as their interactions, that is to say that 
it takes for granted the possibility to 'compute' the system as a whole because 
its components are known, as well as their patterns of interaction. Further-
more, as we shall see, such a position does not take into account the role 
of a system's emergence. On the contrary, a complex system can be defined 
as a set of elements, but not as an 'aggregate'9 of finite and discrete parts 
whose sum would give birth to the system, as happens in the case of 'classic 
systems'. A complex system emerges from the sum of its parts plus their inter-
actions and relationships. Thus, a system is a complex one if describing its 
components does not suffice to describe it as a whole, so that we need to also 
consider the interactions occurring among the parts. In its turn, the notion of 
'emergence' is very difficult to define because it cannot be described in the 
terms of traditional science's 'linear' language. John Holland, one of the lead-
ing figures of the 'theory of emergence', describes its substance as "much 
coming from litde".10 More generally, this difficulty hints to the fact that tra-
ditional scientific tools are not (completely) adequate to investigate complex 
systems, because their analytical character prevents them from considering 
distinctions, that is, to perceive differences and therefore get information" (L. BIGGIERO cit., p. 5). 
However, "current debate in naturai sciences and epistemology is (more or less explicitly) claiming 
that there is a qualitative difference in meaning between complexity and difficulty", with complexity 
referring "to objects which are predictahle only in the short run and that can he faced only with heur-
istic and not optimizing strategies" (ibid., pp. 5-6). Consequendy it can be stated that "when difficulty 
is close to infinity, it becomes complexity: the explanation of such transformation lies in the criteria 
established to create a threshold in the continuum between zero difficulty (certainty, perfect order, 
perfect predictability) and complexity" (ibid., p. 6). It is my contention throughout this article that in 
human systems the possibility of a 'zero difficulty' is never given. 
9 On the notion of 'aggregativity' see W.C. WIMSATT, "Emergence as non-aggregativity and the 
biases of reductionism", Foundations of Science, 5 (2000), pp. 269-297; ID., "Reductionism and Its 
Heuristics: Making Methodological Reductionism Honest", Synthese, 151 (2006), pp. 445-475. 
10 J. HOLLAND, Emergence: From Chaos to Order (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1998), p. 1. 
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the surplus of stimuli and data emerging from the interactions among the 
parts. 
Whereas classic static systems stress the notions of autonomy and inde-
pendence of the parts, complexity and complex systems stress the idea of in-
terdependence both at the level of the constituting parts, and of the relation-
ship among different systems considered as 'totalities'. But the most 
important consequence of shifting to the notion of complex systems is that 
a joint consideration of the notions of complexity, system and interdepen-
dence leaves room to focus on diversity, difference, and diversification. The 
role of diversity for complexity and systems theories is paramount because in-
ternai diversification is one of the substantial features of a complex system, 
within which a high number of elements interact with each other according 
to very different and unpredictable modalities. Moreover, complex systems' 
internai diversification is also the engine of its quite pronounced dynamism, 
as opposed to the statics of classic systems. Complex systems are always highly 
dynamic, be they conceived as 'open systems' (as is the case with von Foer-
ster), or as 'closed systems' in accordance with an 'operational closure' (as 
is the case with Humberto Maturana and Niklas Luhmann).11 Finally, it 
should not be forgotten that dynamic processes occur not only among the 
parts, but also among parts, systems and environment (the broader context 
in which parts and/or systems are situated). The notion of dynamics is linked 
to those of interaction and relationship, among which however a distinction 
should be drawn. Whereas interaction underlines the dynamic character of 
the exchange processes occurring among parts, systems and environments, re-
lationship is more static in character. Interaction is the originai phenomenon 
by means of which ali of a system's constitutive features mutually transfer sti-
muli and data under the condition of systemic interdependence. From the in-
finite interactions among parts (or among systems through their constitutive 
elements) relationships do emerge whose basic feature is the recurrence of 
particular transfer or exchange patterns crystallizing in static, though highly 
provisionai and fluid, entities. In short, the distinction between interaction 
and relationship amounts to the circumstance that interaction is a process, 
while relationship is a product of such a process, which implies selecting par-
11 The concept of an 'operational closure' directly refers to that of 'autopoiesis' originally intro-
duced by H.R. MATURANA - F J . VARELA, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the living 
(Dordrecht, Reidei, 1980), and then by N. LUHMANN cit., as the basis of his theory of social systems. 
For a deeper discussion of autopoiesis as applied to social systems see J. MINGERS, "Can Social Sys-
tems Be Autopoietic? Assessing Luhmann's Social Theory", The Sociological Review (2002), pp. 278-
299; ID., "Can Social Systems be Autopoietic? Bhaskar's and Giddens' Social Theories", Journal for 
the Theory of Social Behaviour, voi. 34, no. 4 (2004), pp. 403-427. 
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ticular features of the interaction at the expenses of others. A relationship 
consists in a reduction of complexity based on a selection performed in the 
course of an interaction. As should be clear by now, there are good reasons 
to state that human systems can be conceived as complex systems, but the di-
rect application of complexity theories within the field of social sciences seems 
not possible for two main reasons. Firstly, because complexity theories are not 
a unitary and clearly outlined body of knowledge, and this implies that what 
can be transferred would be either a particular complexity theory of choice 
(e.g. self-organization theory), or a selection of features extrapolated from 
two or more theories (e.g. from chaos theory and the theory of emergence). 
Secondly, because complexity theories have been originally formulated to ad-
dress and investigate the questions and difficulties posed by specific complex 
systems, no one of which is a human system. Social scientific discourse is 
about human institutions emerging from the interactions among human indi-
viduals, and giving birth to patterns of order constructed by and for human 
individuals. The possible analogies with patterns of order elaborated by other 
species of living beings cannot be thought of as a model of 'social behavior', 
because such analogies are not given by nature, but constructed by human 
beings who believe they see some similarities in structure, behavior and aims 
in the arrangements emerging from the interactions occurring among the 
members of other species. However, this conclusion is mistaken for two main 
reasons. The first is that the role the (human) observer plays in elaborating the 
relevant analogies is not taken into account. The second has to do with the 
mistaken assumption according to which (human) observers would be able 
to properly understand other species' structures, which are instead 'rationally' 
inaccessible unless by conferring an anthropomorphic character to non-hu-
man systems. 
In the field of human institutions complexity can have two different 
meanings. On the one hand, complexity is what characterizes the context, si-
tuation and environment in which institutions emerge from the interactions 
among human beings. This kind of complexity points to the fact that any 
human individuai is situated within a context that it is unable to entirely describe 
because of the limits of its computational abilities, with the consequence that 
any concrete interaction is unavoidably conditioned as well as limited in space 
and time. On the other hand, complexity has a meaning more direcdy linked 
to institutions. They can be considered as complex phenomena, although they 
emerge from the interactive exchange of reductionist descriptions of the con-
text, which are subjectively constructed. Each human individuai elaborates 
- computes - a set of patterns of order to survive within a complex environment 
and to solve a similar problem - effectively reducing environmental complex-
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ity. But each individual set of patterns is different from ali others, because the 
interactions with the environment (including living and non-living 'beings') 
are uniquely shaped for each single individual, and cannot overlap with each 
other. At the 'aggregate' level, institutions emerge from a reiterated exchange 
of subjective descriptions of the environment among human individuals, as in-
tersubjective patterns of order on which an explicit or implicit agreement has 
been reached. Anyway, before institutions can establish themselves, a further 
selection is needed, that is to say a further reduction of complexity aiming to 
establish that some of them are the 'correct' or 'true' ones for ali group-mem-
bers. As emergent phenomena, institutions are complex systems, but in that 
their task is to provide us with applicable patterns of order, their complexity 
must be further 'simplified' to let them become effective at the intersubjective 
level. Therefore, shifting from the subjective to the intersubjective dimension 
implies a further level of complexity, which has no longer to do with the direct 
confrontation between a single individual and the environment, but the one 
between that same individual and the infinite and different descriptions of 
the environment elaborated by ali other individuals. 
2 . GOOD GOVERNANCE AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
Contemporary societies can be surely conceived as complex systems, 
whose internai interdependence, dynamism, and diversification are clearly evi-
dent, although the social sciences stili keep on investigating them as if they 
were classic systems, maybe also because they lack adequate conceptual tools, 
stili to be elaborated. Their complexity should prevent us from thinking it 
possible to describe and control them, especially by means of interventions 
aiming to direct them, to change them 'for the better', in a word to 'govern' 
them. Indeed, the notion of 'governance' hints at interventions within society 
with the aim of causing a modification for the better, but its outcome is un-
predictable because a complex system is highly dynamic, and it is impossible 
to gather sufficient information on its initial configuration as a whole. This im-
plies that any expectation concerning the result of intervening on the initial 
conditions in order to modify them in the desired direction entails a high mar-
gin of error. Moreover, such modification might also be for the worse, without 
any possibility of knowing it in advance, and this is the main reason why the 
very idea of governing complex systems should be refused in advance. On the 
other hand, refusing any governance (or any government, for that matter) is 
also impossible, due to its being a social institution, that is to say something 
spontaneously emerging from interactions as a tool to simplify complexity by 
means of an intersubjective agreement on some patterns of order and organi-
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zation. Therefore, elaborating a model of order for human systems without 
any reference to some kind of governance is also impossible because in any 
one of them patterns of governance do emerge as necessary tools to reduce 
environmental complexity. What we can do is to acknowledge that no theo-
retical models or pragmatic strategies of governance would be able to effec-
tively reduce the inherent complexity of a human system to the extent that 
it could be exhaustively observable, describable, predictable and controllable. 
As a social institution, governance shares with ali other institutions their pro-
visionai and fluid character, for they are bound to change according to the 
modifications occurring at the level of the individuai interactions from which 
they emerge. The usuai discourse about governance stili considers social and 
politicai systems in terms of classic system theory - that is to say as static sys-
tems - , even when it tries to take into account their internai dynamics, and 
ends up by adjusting the theoretical models already at our disposai to com-
plex systems, giving up the possibility to elaborate 'new' ones. This attempt 
to apply old theoretical tools to 'new realities' overlaps with the typical and 
unavoidable operation through which the observer intervenes in reality in 
the very moment of observation, by selecting a number of stimuli and data 
from the flux of becoming and moving from the already constructed assump-
tions of the preferred theoretical approach. A relevant form of intervention 
upon initial conditions has been already discussed in the field of quantum the-
ory by Werner Heisenberg,12 and should be further investigated by social 
scientists especially in its consequences and potentially 'catastrophic' effeets. 
The point is that any selection depends on an evaluation judgment stating that 
the stability of the system should be preserved by holding to the pattern of 
order that the chosen theoretical model provides for reality. In contemporary 
politicai theory and philosophy such a model coincides with liberal democ-
racy, which seems to be stili unquestionable, though it is surely possible to 
wonder about its actual viability under current conditions. 
In its turn, the idea of stability has no correspondence with 'reaUty', being 
rather constructed in the process through which the complexity of becoming 
is reduced to something human individuals can grasp - a being. At the end of 
the day, the stability of a politicai order conceived as a static system consists in 
the assumption of its being articulated in finite and discrete sub-structures 
(i.e. institutions) aiming to confer meaning to interactions, by virtue of the 
self-referential character of the system itself. The illusory character of stability, 
12 See W. HEISENBERG, Physics and Philosophy (London, Penguin Books, 2000). The reference 
is here primarily to the notion of 'relations of uncertainty' or 'principle of indeterminacy'. 
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and the idea of preserving it through intervention, more generally depend on 
the structural impossibility of the human constitution to grasp diversity in real 
time, unless by reaching an adequate threshold of perception. As Gregory Ba-
teson clearly demonstrated, the human mind - which is surely to be conceived 
as a complex system - has no ability to perceive continuous and graduai dif-
ferences, and although in each 'thing' or 'eventi infinite differences are poten-
tially contained, only very few of them are elaborated in information, that is to 
say in 'differences producing a difference'.13 In short, diversity is a substantial 
feature of complex systems, but the inability to perceive it 'in real time' is a 
substantial feature of human structure. Diversity is constandy present in hu-
man systems - it is what properly is there - but it can be perceived by human 
individuals only when it manifests itself in such a way that it becomes acces-
sible to human cognitive structure (with different modalities and at different 
moments). It is just for this reason that the becoming evident of a difference is 
not the sign of a ongoing change, but of an already occurred one, and therefore 
perceivable using the tools at a human individual's disposai. To take just one 
example: the circumstance that so-called cultural diversity currendy manifests 
itself in ali its relevance does not mean that it was not there before, and that it 
will have a relevance only from this moment on urging us to take it seriously. It 
means that the fact that human systems are essentially multicultural, and that 
this character must be adequately considered, is at last evident, and therefore 
explicidy addressable. This leads to the importance of time for human systems 
and institutions. They change continuously because their substantial features 
are continuously renegotiated in the infinite interactions among individuals, 
who use them as criteria, norms, or rules to construct effective pragmatic stra-
tegies. However, individuals cannot perceive such change in 'real time' and 
react to it at different moments according to their individual 'perception 
threshold', so to say. And since institutions are the emergent outcome of re-
current interactions, such a gap in the individual processing of differences re-
sults in their quite slow change, because in order for institutions to be re-
placed it is necessary that a high enough number of individuals perceive 
the relevant 'differences that make a difference'. Moreover, further time is 
also needed in the successful case, because at the systemic level the change 
in even a single institution implies a modification of the system as a whole, 
given the interdependence of its parts. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the request for institutional change is at first usually doomed or rejected, often 
13 See G. BATESON, Steps to an Ecology ofMind (San Francisco, CA, Chandler, 1 9 7 2 ) ; ID., Mind 
and Nature: A Necessary Unii (New York, Bantham Books, 1 9 7 9 ) . 
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provoking the attempt to compel the individuals who no longer recognize the 
legitimacy of a particular institution to retreat and conform. This move is un-
derstandable, at least initially, because the system tries to eliminate the 
menace by ali means at its disposai, in order to preserve its 'equilibrium', that 
is to say to survive in its current configuration. This form of systemic interven-
tion is only partially effective, because it moves from the mistaken idea that 
the change is taking place and not already occurred, and the intervention 
should consist in an attempt to restore the initial conditions, whose effeets 
however might lead just to that same self-destruction which the system in-
tends to avoid. 
Due to the need to remain within the 'linguistic game' of traditional think-
ing, which lacks a language more adequate to the concrete becoming, until 
now I have considered human systems as if they were 'something' having their 
own existence beyond their parts and their mutuai interactions. On the con-
trary, such assumed existence must be considered as a self-deception, for a 
system exists only by virtue of the interactions from which it emerges. A sys-
tem's emergence and reconstruction in a particular configuration result from 
the activity of human beings, and this implies that it would be mistaken to 
assume that a system has a separated 'individuality'. Such a statement implies 
that there is a responsibility on the part of the individuai in constructing, pre-
serving and modifying the single institutions and the system as a structure of 
order and organization, with which no other can be entrusted, especially not 
the system as if it had its own will and tools, independent of those of indivi-
duals. The circumstance that a system is addressed as a 'thing in itself simply 
depends on its complexity, since not even the system as a 'constructed order' 
can be completely reduced to a single description by the part of the indivi-
duals, too many steps being needed to compute it. I find that also multicul-
turalist theories end up by being trapped in this misunderstanding, although 
they try to elaborate a model of politicai order moving from the correct as-
sumption that 'diversity matters'.14 They fail because diversity is never consid-
ered in its own terms, being instead defined with reference to the identity dis-
course, and through it to the traditional conception of systems. Also identity is 
a social institution aiming at conferring stability to the interactions by means 
of elaborating a set of 'norms' or 'rules' to minimize the impact of individuai 
differences. In multiculturalist discourse, individuating the relevant 'cultural 
14 For a deeper discussion of multiculturalismi in the light of complexity theories and radicai 
constructivism see F. MONCERI, Ordini costruiti. Multiculturalismo, complessità, istituzioni (Soveria 
Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008). 
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identities' for a multicultural politicai system is a preliminary step toward the 
definition of its borders: not ali differences matter, but only the set of them 
that can be 'categorized' on the basis of selected affinities or similarities. 
Moreover, reducing (a selected number of) differences to clearly definable 
identities seems not to be the first step toward the elaboration of a new model 
of order, but the attempt to more or less deeply modify the previous model 
for it to better fit the achieved awareness that diversity matters. This process 
is evident in multiculturalist theories, because in ali of them the more or less 
explicit aim is to introduce some 'correctives' within the model of liberal de-
mocracy to make it more dexible to cultural diversity, by means of individu-
ating and stressing one of the elements already present in traditional formula-
tions. For instance, Will Kymlicka underlines the role of citizenship, which 
should be understood as 'differentiated citizenship' in order to let it include 
the particular diversity that matters (that is to say, national and ethnic diver-
sity).15 Seyla Benhabib focuses on the discursive and deliberative aspects of 
democracy, which end up by overlapping with a communicative process in 
the light of a discourse ethic with the aim to allow the free manifestation of 
the infinite 'narratives of the (cultural) self.16 As for Bhikhu Parekh, he stres-
ses the relevance of multicultural dialogue within a society in which some 
minimal (but in any case 'liberal') rules should be accepted by ali members. 
Such dialogue could give birth to a generalized consensus about principles, 
favored by the targeted action of basic institutions, especially education.17 
As a whole, multiculturalism seems quite unable to think radically of diversity 
because at the end of the day concrete differences always dissolve within a 
number of identities, also because of an assumed need to protect the 'tradi-
tion' of politicai thought as well as its achievements (liberalism and democracy 
as models of the best politicai order). A further problem is that institutional 
change results from the activity of 'identity groups', which negotiate the struc-
tural modifications with the system. However, such reference to a 'group' as if 
it were an individual obscures the circumstance that groups cannot negotiate: 
only the concrete individuals identifying with such groups can do it. Subscrib-
ing to the idea that only groups can negotiate has the potentially dangerous 
consequence that only those requests are legitimate for which a single indivi-
1 5 W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship: Liberal Theory ofMinority Rights (Oxford, Claren-
don, 1995). 
16 S. BENHABIB, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 2002). 
17 B. PAREKH, Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Politicai Theory, 2" edn. 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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dual is able to find an 'identity group' ready to promote and struggle for them 
in the context, but with which he is compelled to identify. In fact, renegotia-
tions of institutions occur at the level of individuai interactions, in which some 
of their aspects or features are unceasingly put under question, until the mo-
ment in which it becomes evident that an institution as a whole is no longer 
able to work as a legitimate pattern of order. Institutions change only by 
virtue of such renegotiations, assuming a different shape that individuals 
show to find more adequate by gradually shifting to the modified institution, 
while gradually discarding it in its previous configuration. 
To sum up, it can be stated that diversity matters in and for itself because 
it is an essential feature of interactions, if only as the 'background noise' that 
no complex system can eliminate since it is the 'tank' from which novelty and 
innovation emerge. Furthermore, diversity and novelty overlap in the sense 
that the latter emerges any time we are able to perceive a degree of diversity 
higher than the existent models are capable of including, with the result that 
we try and modify them according to such perception, instead of simply and 
automatically discarding the surplus of diversity. The Constant and continuous 
innovation of the models of order through diversity and the systemic com-
plexity it induces is mandatory for every human system. However, this does 
not mean that institutions, including governance, might be modified to the 
extent that they could include ali differences present within the context, that 
is to say to the extent that they were no longer necessary, and could therefore 
disappear. This is impossible because human beings cannot help but resort to 
them to reduce complexity. If things are so, we can assume that there is an 
inescapable conflict between the need to elaborate a reductionist model of po-
liticai order and to preserve the internai dynamics of the complex system, that 
is to say between the drive to maintain and to change the complex system. In 
our present case this means that there is an inescapable conflict between gov-
ernance and individuai differences. On the one hand, at the systemic level the 
exercise of power through governance cannot reach a point at which indivi-
duai differences are so controlied that the system is tendentially motionless, 
since this would lead to its implosion and self-destruction. On the other hand, 
at the individuai level the exercise of the power to 'break the rules' cannot 
reach a point at which interacting becomes too dangerous, due to the impos-
sibility to elaborate expectations. In short, the dynamics between governance 
and individuai differences is an engine of the system as a whole, from which 
unpredictable patterns of 'harmony between differences' do emerge, but al-
ways 'at the edge of chaos'. Of course, the interplay between governance 
and individuai differences is an unbalanced one. While individuai differences 
are not organized and often peripheral, governance as a social institution can 
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rely on the consensus, if not of ali, at least of the part of a majority of group-
members. In this sense, the power of governance over individual differences 
mirrors the power of the insiders over the outsiders in a group, and this is 
surely an obstacle to the free interplay of individual differences within a sys-
tem. But what is most important is the fact that governance presupposes a hu-
man type, a model of the human being that is at the same time the starting 
point and the target of its interventions within the system. There is no politicai 
notion, which could not be based upon some anthropological assumptions, 
because politics and its tools are constructed by and for human beings, and 
this is true also for governance, the action of which is informed by a concep-
tion of what a human being should be and is targeted at such a human being. 
The perverse effects of the (unavoidable) reference to an ideal type of 'human 
being' fall on the different types of 'abnormal' human beings - among them 
sexually different people, 'disabled' people, and even 'strangers' - , whose cat-
alogne is at the members' disposai in any given cultural context. What is clear 
from the body of work by old and recent authors, among them especially Mi-
chel Foucault,18 is that the set of tools we label 'governance' intends to 
achieve that kind of 'good society', in which each member more or less per-
fecdy resembles the 'good human being' as expected by the chosen anthropo-
logical model. Therefore governance, if unwittingly, is also a means to trans-
form ali members of the society into good human beings through its practices, 
so forcing individual differences to come as near as possible to the ideal type 
of human being - in a word, to 'normalize'. And so it happens that the idea of 
resorting to governance to accomplish the 'good society' results in the perfor-
mance of 'bad' actions in order to achieve the 'good human being' as the only 
fitting member in such society. Anyway, as I hope to have shown, from the 
standpoint of complexity and systems theories the idea could well disappear 
according to which governance should be 'good', or lead to a good society if 
not to the best politicai order. Governance is no more than a set of strategie 
tools to reduce complexity by attempting to preserve and maintain the already 
established order through targeted interventions. We should try to reduce our 
use of it, at the same time being very careful as to its consequences for indi-
viduals, because each component of a complex system has just the same rele-
vance as ali the others, this being true for any individual, including the one 
1 8 M . FOUCAULT, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London, Penguin, 1 9 7 9 ) ; ID., 
The Will to Knowledge. The History of Sexuality, 1 (London, Penguin, 1 9 9 8 ) ; Ethics Suhjectivity and 
Truth. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, P. RABINOW (ed.), voi. I (New York, The New Press, 
1 9 9 7 ) . 
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labeled as 'abnormal' and/or 'deviant' by the ruling majority. This implies ac-
knowledging that ali individual differences should be granted the possibility 
to freely perform their role of irritating the system to make it change, without 
any restriction on the basis of already elaborated models of order, which 
should be rather continuously modified and replaced by more fitting ones. 
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POLICY IN COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
If we object that historicizing, psychologizing and 
sociologizing are not the business of economics, then 
we must conclude that the objector thinks that the 
long term growth theory is not the business of eco-
nomics. 
HERBERT SIMON 1 9 8 4 , 2 2 1 
1 . THE ECONOMISTS' HUBRIS 
Even after disenchantment with the beneficiai and efficient properties of 
the self-organization of market, economists have trusted their abilities in con-
trolling the economy. The idea of intervening in the economy when it fails to 
adjust spontaneously or when there is the need of steering it toward a (poli-
tically) given direction has dominated economics in the last century indepen-
dendy of the prevailing theoretical background. In fact, the various schools of 
economie thought differ mainly in the prescribed control tools (e.g. monetary 
vs. fiscal policy), sharing unfaltering confidence in the idea that the economies 
work as machines and that 'equilibrium' is the key to their functioning. By 
'control' I mean the possibility of adjusting, according to the prescriptions 
of the various economie theories, some given variables such as public expen-
diture or the quantity of money with the aim of obtaining full employment 
and stable prices. Implicitly, control requires the possibility of forecasting 
both the trend and the turning points of economie systems. Sadly enough, 
the history of control and prediction of economie phenomena is beset with 
failures.2 The record of failures is as long as the discussion concerning their 
1 H. SIMON, "On the Behavioral and Rational Foundations of Economie Dynamics", Journal of 
Economie Behavior and Organization, 5 (1984), pp. 35-55. 
2 For an account of policy failures in the United Kingdom see D. SIMPSON, Rethinking Economie 
Behaviour. How the Economy Really Works (London, MacMillan, 2000). 
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causes. Switches in policies are the consequences of this debate: theories used 
by economists have been held responsible for the ineffectiveness of their ap-
plications. A classical example is the discussion generated by the Lucas cri-
tique (1976)3 on large-scale macro-econometrie models. He raised a cruciai 
issue: the parameters of those models vary with the undertaken policies (they 
are structural) and therefore their predictions are likely to be misleading. Lu-
cas' suggesdon was to model the micro parameters of the models, that is to say 
preferences, technology constraints and so forth, in order to understand what 
the agent would do as a consequence of a policy. The aggregation of indivi-
dual responses would have generated the macroeconomic impact of the 
change in policy. Kidland and Prescott (1977)4 developed Lucas' thesis by 
opening up the search for micro foundation of macroeconomic models. Dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models constitute the most re-
cent development of this line of research. With respect to previous efforts 
they try to include historical time and random events. However, in order to 
assure solvability and simplicity DSGE usually neglects part of the economie 
systems such as the financial markets and the banks whose importance has 
been remarkably highlighted by the last economie crisis. In the wake of the 
recent financial crisis and subsequent recession that models - especially 
DSGE - have failed to capture, the discussion concerning the need for new 
economie theories has gained new vigor. This essay participates in this debate 
by observing the issue from a different perspective. I formulate the hypothesis 
that the cause of the policies failures is not to be found in theories rather it 
resides in their underlying ontology. It is the assimilation of the economy to 
a machine ruled by equilibrium that deceives economists. 
2 . A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE5 
Starting from the late 80s, economies has witnessed the increasing intìu-
ence of complex system analyses. According to this literature, economies 
are complex adaptive systems that exhibit five essential features. First, com-
3 R. LUCAS, "Econometrie Policy Evaluation: A Critique", in K. BRUNNER - A. MELTZER (eds.), 
The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets (New York, American Elsevier Pub. Co., 1976). 
4 F. KIDLAND - E. PRESCOTT, "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency in Optimal 
Plans", Journal of Politicai Economy, 85 (1977), pp. 473-491. 
5 The topics discussed in this paragraph are covered at length in M. FONTANA, "Can Neoclas-
sica! Economies Handle Complexity? The Fallacy of the Oil Spot Dynamic", Journal of Economie 
Behavior and Organization, 76 (2010), pp. 584-596. 
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plex systems are comprised of many morphologically diverse parts. Econo-
mies consist of a huge number of individuai agents, organized in a great vari-
ety of groups and institutional structures. These parts are morphologically di-
verse. Removal of one part leads the system to self-reorganize and arrive at a 
series of changes aimed at compensating for the gap in the system. These 
agents are heterogeneous. Second, complex systems exhibit a variety of non-
linear dynamics. This is due to the fact that the different components operate 
on different temporal and spatial scales. In turn, this implies that aggregate 
behavior cannot simply be derived from the summation of the behavior of in-
dividuai components. Even when a catalogue of the activities of most of the 
participating sub-components is available, an understanding of the effect of 
changes on the whole system is far from achieved. Third, complex systems 
are open, dissipative systems that maintain themselves away from thermody-
namic equilibrium. Indeed the large fluctuations we observe in economie time 
series seem to indicate that economies tend to operate in a criticai state, way 
out of balance, where minor disturbances may lead to events (avalanches) of 
ali dimensions. Such state is what the literature on complexity refers to as self-
organized criticality.6 Fourth, complex systems can respond adaptively to 
change, in ways that tend to increase their probability of persisting. Their in-
teracting parts adapt by changing their behavior (even in innovative ways) as 
conditions change and experience accumulates. In turn, the environment of 
any adaptive element largely consists of other adaptive parts. Therefore, a 
portion of any individual's efforts at adaptation is spent adapting to other 
adaptive individuals. This feature is a major source of complex temporal pat-
terns. Fifth, complex systems have irreversible histories. In nature, each indi-
viduai organism is the unique result of the interaction between its genetic 
code and the environment; in social phenomena each epiphany is the product 
of individuai actions, under a given institutional setting, in precise circum-
stances of time and space.7 The complexity perspective implies a radically dif-
ferent perception of the nature of economie phenomena (as compared to the 
mainstream view) that relies on heterogeneity, processes and evolution. This 
attitude, as far as theorizing is concerned, results in the rejection of the perva-
siveness of linearity, of the perfect rationality postulate, of the centrality of 
equilibrium, and of reductionism; when it comes to modeling, it results in 
6 P. BAK, HOW Nature Works (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997). 
7 J . BROWN, "Complex ecological systems", in G. COWAN - D. PINES - D. MELTZER (eds.). 
Complexity: Metaphors, Models and Reality (Reading, Massachusetts, Perseus Books, 1994). See also 
S. KAUFFMAN, The Origins of Order. Self organization and Selection in Evolution (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
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the refusai of the view of economies as a purely mathematical science. The 
view of economies as complex adaptive systems breaks the logicai link that 
supports the relation between economies and policy: the ability to predict fu-
ture outcomes. According to complexity theory, economies often exhibit 
chaotic behavior. There are several definitions of chaos, the common under-
lying concept, however, is the randomness or irregularity that arises in a 
deterministic system. The intuitive notion is that of a time evolution with 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions - that is, arbitrarily close initial 
conditions display independent evolution as time proceeds. Sensitivity to in-
itial conditions implies unpredictability; the system exhibits path-dependence, 
and although in principle it should be possible to predict future dynamics as a 
function of time, this is in fact impossible because any error in specifying the 
initial condition, no matter how small, leads to an erroneous prediction at 
some future time. Therefore, it seems that from the complexity perspective 
policies should renounce prediction. Is it feasible? At first sight, adhering 
to this ontology promises a better understanding of the functioning of eco-
nomie phenomena but seems to imply the stali of economie policy, a sort 
of cogent laissez faire that is not supported by normative statements on wel-
fare. The scarce literature on the topic8 tends to assimilate complex adaptive 
systems to spontaneous orders9 implicidy endorsing my conjecture. On a closer 
inspection, however, it might be possible to reject the nihilist hypothesis and 
figure out methods and ambits of viable intervention. 
3 . O N THE ECONOMIC MAN 1 0 
The models sketched in the previous paragraph share a common feature: 
individual behavior is assumed to be rational. The traditional conception of 
economic man is deeply rooted in positivism and relies on Benthamian utili-
tarianism to create a theory based on a logicai mathematical language that ap-
plies to an individual (referred to as homo oeconomicus)n that pursues his 
8 D. COLANDER (ed.), The Complexity Vision and The Teaching of Economies (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 2000). 
9 N . J . VRIEND, "Was Hayek an A C E ? " , Southern Economic Journal, 6 8 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , pp. 8 1 1 - 8 4 0 . 
10 The issues regarding cognitive psychology are thoroughly covered in S. RIZZELLO, L'econo-
mia della mente (Roma - Bari, Laterza, 1997). The psychological themes discussed in this paragraph 
are inspired by and rely on his research. 
11 J.S. Mill has introduced the concept of homo oeconomicus in his essay "On the definition of 
politicai economy and on the method of investigation proper to it", appeared in the London and 
Westminster Review of October, 1836. 
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own welfare by spending as less resources as possible. Homo oeconomicus 
chooses in accordance with a preference ordering that is given, complete, 
and subject to perfect information acquired without incurring any cost. He 
always chooses the alternative that leads him to the preferred consequences; 
in other words he maximizes his own utility12 subject to the constraints of en-
dowments. This is known as the rationality postulate which figures as a pre-
mise in almost every traditional economie argument. In this ambit a choice 
is a mere internalization of the only possible choice and the decision making 
process takes place in a deterministic way. This system, well depicted in the 
general equilibrium theory, is a logie of choice13 rather than a theory of 
human action. Criticisms of this mono foundational approach are numerous. 
For instance, Daniel Kahneman has set forth sources of irrationality in which 
humans systematically overestimate or underestimate risk. However, I believe 
that the search for micro foundations should not be conducted by opposing 
rational to irrational behavior. That is to say that non-maximizing behavior is 
not necessarily irrational. It is better understood as rational behavior under 
limited cognitive and computational skills. Complexity theory stresses the role 
of learning and adaptation and introduces heterogeneity in features of agents 
and in their decision making process. The latter is supposed to be path depen-
dent, that is to say that action is influenced by individuai specific traits, ex-
perience, and feed back with the environment.14 On these issues, F. Hayek 
and H. Simon have preceded complexity theorists. On the one hand, Hayek 
(1937) questioned the traditional assumption according to which agents have 
perfect knowledge that is given without effort. Moreover, in The Sensory Or-
der,15 he formulated a theory according to which knowledge is acquired 
through a process, partly neurological, that has been shown to be strongly 
path dependent.16 Simon, on the other hand, elaborated the concept of 
bounded rationality17 that concerns the limits of the computing and cognitive 
12 Where there is uncertainty about future outeomes, he maximizes his expected utility, i.e. the 
utility of an outeome multiplied by the probability of its occurrence. See J . VON NEUMANN - O. MOR-
GERSTERN, Theory of games and economie behavior (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944). 
13 F . VON HAYEK, "The use of knowledge in society", American Economie Review, 35,4 (1945), 
pp. 519-530. 
14 A . NEWELL - H. SIMON, Human problem solving (Englewood Cliffs, N J , Prentice Hall, 
1972). 
15 F . VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology 
(London, Roudedge and Keagan Paul, 1952). 
" S. RIZZELLO (1997) cit. 
17 H. SIMON, "Theories of Bounded Rationality", in C.B. MCGUIRE and R. RADNER (eds.), 
Decision and Organization (Amsterdam, North Holland, 1972). 
— 225 — 
MAGDA FONTANA 
ability of the human mind. He also emphasized the potential of the human 
mind by setting forth that individuals use a kind of rationality in their decision 
making process that he defines as being 'procedural'. In short, when facing 
problematic situations, individuals apply already experimented routines. Si-
mon and Hayek's theories have a common core in the statement of an inter-
active relationship between the environment and the individual. The latter in-
teracts with the external world through the feedback mechanism thanks to 
which both the agent and the environment change continuously.18 The sub-
ject adjusts his behavior on the basis of the information that he receives from 
the external world. Information is perceived and elaborated in order to 
provide an interpretation of the outer environment. These operations are ruled 
by interpretative schemes that are innate (hereditary) and dynamic. These mod-
ify themselves through adjustment and assimilation. When an individuai per-
ceives elements that have already been experimented the interpretative 
scheme is applied without any amendment (assimilation), whereas when there 
are elements of novelty, the new elements are associated with what was al-
ready known but the interpretative scheme changes to embody them (adjust-
ment). It is worth noting that the interpretative schemes are not rigidly sepa-
rateti from one another for they can combine to produce new ones. Every 
individual accumulates different experiences and creates a different system 
of connections. It follows that "if two people have been exposed to different 
experiences in the past, with resulting differences in the stock of conceptual 
representation they have formed, may act on the same data differendy".19 
Consequendy, it is very unlikely that different individuals would perceive 
the same phenomenon in exacdy the same way.20 The process that transforms 
information into knowledge is path dependent. This line of reasoning does 
not end up in solipsism: there are shared mental models that permit commu-
nications and behavior in accordance with shared rules. This point of view 
must be taken into account when managing social systems since heterogeneity 
in perception is a primary cause of non-linearity that profoundly affects the 
effects of policies. Knowledge of the (mechanism of change of the) prevailing 
mental models becomes indispensable. Freeman Dyson alleges that mental 
models reverberate on the structure of societies. These have levels that exhibit 
18 This cognitive aspect further clarifies the notion of co-adaption of complex adaptive systems. 
1 9 B . ARTHUR, On Learning and Adaptation in the Economy (Santa FE Institute Working Paper 
92-07-038, 1992), p. 8. 
2 0 A . DENZAU - D . NORTH, "Shared mental models: ideologies and institutions", Kyklos, voi. 
47(1) (1994), pp. 3-31. 
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different rates of changes. The mix between fast and slow levels is responsible 
for the resilience of the system. The former carry innovation and the latter re-
tain the memory of a system and provide stability. Policy intervention should 
regard the faster levels that are more reactive. The completion of the Eur-
opean Single Market can be interpreted along these lines. The artificial crea-
tion of an area of free trade required about 260 directions approved by the 
European Union. Among them only 26 regarded property rights. It seems 
that property pertains to the slower level while changes are better conducted 
by rules of governance and rules of exchange. 
4 . ON COMPARISON 
DSGE models embed individuai behavior in equations that do not inter-
act. The policy effeets are computed for each agent and then aggregated. Con-
versely, complexity theory stresses the role of connections and interactions. In 
an economie system these are the formai and informai rules, the institutions, 
which establish what can be done within the system and 'how' this can be 
done. Even a superficial observation of the world outside the window will 
convince the reader that institutions differ across countries. Therefore, the 
overall configurations of economies vary as well. It follows that considering 
the economies as complex adaptive systems implies the need for a better un-
derstanding of the effeets of institutions on economie performance. Compar-
ison is an important tool at hand. As naive and banal this statement can ap-
pear it is however ripe with implications. First, in order to compare, 
economists must admit that economies are different from one another. Sec-
ond, economists must learn about institutions, culture and history. These 
are major departures from the traditional approach in which ali actors and 
ali systems are the same and in which transactions take place in a social va-
cuimi. Let me make this point clearer with an example borrowed from Dou-
glass North.21 At the beginning of the XVT11 century, Spain and England were 
facing different situations. The former was emerging as a non-unified country, 
from the period of Moorish domination on the Iberian Peninsula, while the 
latter had developed, since the Norman Conquest, a unitary feudal system. 
Both countries had to solve a similar problem: they had to raise funds in order 
to finance the increasing expenses of warfare. The fiscal crisis had led in both 
2 1 D . NORTH, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economie Performance (Cambridge, M A , 
Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1990). 
— 227 — 
MAGDA FONTANA 
countries to the emergence of some form of representativeness such as the 
Parliament in England and the Cortes in Spain. In both countries the main 
sources of income derived from the trade of wool. The evolutionary path that 
starts from these initial conditions is well known. In England it led to the so-
lution of the fiscal crisis but also to the birth of an economic empire. In Spain, 
it revealed itself inefficacious in the solution of the fiscal crisis and produced 
insecure property rights, confiscation of assets, and three centuries of relative 
stagnation. In England the state was organized in a highly hierarchical way 
while in Spain it was decentralized but densely connected. Connective com-
plexity implies that a network with many nodes is less adaptive, so we must 
conclude that Spain had a lower degree of adaptability than England. Con-
nective and computational complexity stresses that the act of transforming in-
formation (increasing expenditures) into useful knowledge (fiscal policies) 
takes place according to mental models grounded on experience and culture. 
In England, there existed a consolidateti culture that favored the protection of 
property rights, while, in Spain, the culture was mainly grounded on Christian 
values and pushed towards cooperation and sharing. If in England the sacri-
fice of property rights seemed an absurd solution, in Spain the confiscation of 
private goods seemed viable. Finally, dynamic complexity shows the reason 
why in Spain - once it had been acknowledged (there were a lot of complaints 
sent to the junta de reformation) that the development path was inefficient -
the government was not able to make a change. Complex systems are path-
dependent: the state of a system at time t depends on the state of the system 
at time t-1. It follows that it is impossible to conceive of an abrupt shift from 
one trajectory of development to another. I strongly believe that history and 
comparison are powerful tools gready underestimated in models that rely ex-
clusively on economic variables. 
5 . O N HISTORICAL TIME 
In discussing path dependence I have introduced the role of historical 
time in policy making. This consideration implies a simple, self-evident effect: 
change induced by policy takes place in time, therefore it is not sufficient to 
have the reasonable certainty that a given intervention will drive the economy 
toward a new, possibly more desirable, state. It is necessary to appreciate the 
length of the transition. This has been a major problem in pre-DSGE macro-
economic models. In models grounded on equilibrium time had a purely lo-
gicai dimension: adjustments descended from initial assumptions without any 
attention to the actual time needed to accomplish them. Explorations of this 
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question have led to (un)surprising results. Epstein and Hammond22 demon-
strate that the time necessary to reach a fixed point (an equilibrium) in a very 
simple setting is increasing in the number of the agents participating in it. This 
statement implies that the high number of agents operating within an actual 
economy should result in a long - probably too long to be of any help to pol-
icy makers - transition to equilibrium. It follows that transients are more im-
portant than the final states. However, there are more profound philosophical 
and methodological implications deriving from the inclusion of time in eco-
nomie policy making. The idea of engineering the economies through policy 
reflects a notion of time that characterizes modem societies. Time is an arrow 
pointing toward a better future. According to this view, there is a sort of lad-
der and each step leads societies to an irreversible progress. This view rever-
berates on economie policies that constitute repositories for hope and re-
assurance: once a crisis has been solved it will not reoccur. From this 
perspective, crises do not only produce economie damages in themselves 
but also fear since they represent a failure of the ability of science and tech-
nology to win over uncertainty. There is a less familiar, but probably more 
realistic conception of time that would result in a different role for economie 
policies. If time is circular then being out of a crisis does not imply that it will 
not show up again in the future. Ali the states of the economy are possible. 
The effect on policy is strong and well expressed by Keynes in an article re-
garding war: 
Our power of prediction is so slight, it is seldom wise to sacrifice a present evil 
for a doubtful advantage in the future. [...] It is the paramount duty of governments 
and of politicians to secure the well being of the community under the case in the 
present. There is this further consideration that is often in need of emphasis: it is 
not sufficient that the state of affairs which we seek to promote should be better than 
the state of affairs which preceded it; it must be sufficiendy better to make up for the 
evils of the transition.23 
Let me tum to the methodological side of the argument. The passing of 
time is relevant only if we admit that it has some effect on the economy, that 
is to say that time brings changes. Therefore logie compels us to state that if 
the economy changes in time then theories describing them should change 
22 J . EPSTEIN - R. HAMMOND, "Non explanatory equilibria: an extremely simple game with 
(mostly) unattainable fixed points", in J . EPSTEIN, Generative Social Science. Studies in Agent-Based 
Computational Modeling (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 75-85. 
23 J.M. KEYNES, Burke's Timidity on Embarking on War ( 1 9 0 4 ) , reproduced in R SKIDELSKY, 
John Maynard Keynes: Economist, Philosopher, Statesman (London, Macmillan, 2 0 0 3 ) , p. 9 7 . 
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too. Thus, if economies and theories change to accommodate the effects of 
time then economic theories are not general. It also follows that any solution 
found by policy makers on the ground of a changeable society is spatially and 
temporarily bounded in its application.24 
6 . O N INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
My discussion has slighdy shifted the analysis from 'control' to 'change'. 
While in traditional economies policies are intended to drive economies to-
wards a given objective, in complexity theory the awareness of the ubiquity 
of path dependence and the relevance of mental models suggest a warier ap-
proach to the topic. It is cruciai to get acquainted with the 'levels of society' 
that carry change and when possible to take advantage from the ongoing dy-
namics. Among those levels institutions are the most prominent. Change, as I 
have already pointed out in the Spain versus England example, needs to be 
incrementai. D. North25 argues that institutional change can be influenced 
by the presence of increasing returns in imperfect markets characterized by 
high transaction costs. Moreover, he alleges that the process that yields the 
emergence of these institutions is strongly dependent on history and on the 
self-reinforcing mechanisms typical of complex adaptive systems. As a new in-
stitution appears, the fixed costs that individual and organized agents have to 
face to adapt to the new rule are high. Over time agents learn how to adjust 
their actions in order to reap the benefits from environmental change. Thus, 
the institutional framework affects organizational and individual change. Such 
an influence is enhanced by the presence of coordination and network extern-
alities in interaction. These, in turn, favor the emergence of informai con-
straints that marginally amend and extend the formai rules. These relations 
support the idea that institutional change is a complex phenomenon that is 
further complicateti by interpretation at the individual level. Individuals inter-
pret environmental complexity in the light of their experience filtered and in-
tegrateti by the prevailing culture; their cognitive processes are path depen-
dent. 
2 4 J . PADGETT - C. ANSELL, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434", The Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, 98, 6 (1993), pp. 1259-1319. 
25 Ibid., pp. 1259-1319. 
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7 . O N METHODS 
One of the more radicai aspects of conceiving economies as complex 
adaptive systems is that their analysis often escapes mathematical treatment. 
The Santa Fe Institute has catalyzed the emerging application of simulation 
techniques, namely agent-based, to social systems and has provided a naturai 
tool to deal with policy in complex systems. Agent-based economies aims at 
analyzing 
fundamental social structures and group behaviors as emerging from the interaction 
of individuals operating in artificial environments under rules that place only 
bounded demands on each agent's information and computational capacity. We view 
artificial societies as laboratories where we attempt to grow certain social structures in 
the computer [...] the aim being to discover fundamental locai or micro mechanisms 
that are sufficient to generate the macroscopic social structures and collective beha-
vior of interest.26 
This idea is close to that of the economic phenomena as the unintended 
result of decentralized interaction of individuals with the inclusion of the 
more recent ideas of Simon's bounded rationality and of Hayekian incomplete 
knowledge. Technically this is implemented by programming on three inter-
acting levels. First, the model needs agents (firms, consumers...) that can have 
the desired levels of heterogeneity (technology, endowments, gender, age...). 
Second, agents populate an environment that is separate from them and with 
which they interact. Finally, the model needs rules that govern agents' and en-
vironmental behavior as well as the interaction between the two. For instance, 
imagine a population of agents living on a lattice gathering and exchanging a 
resource necessary for survival. There will be individual rules of movement, 
gathering and trade for the agents and rules of reproducibility of resources 
for the environment. The computer will place the agents on the grid and 
let them behave according to the rules without any intervention on the 
researcher side. The behavior of the system will be observed at the micro level 
(the story of each agent can be tracked) and at the macro level as an aggrega-
tion of the behavior of the individuals. In agent based modelling, social 
science is interpreted as an experimental science: models are laboratories in 
which one can make different hypotheses upon the phenomenon under study 
and observe the output: i.e: observations of regularities emerging from micro 
26 J.M. EPSTEIN - R . L . AXTELL, Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom up 
(Cambridge, MA., MIT Press, 1996), p. 4. 
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rules and the robustness of such regularities. As in biology the results are in-
terpreted in terms of candidate explanation (sufficiency of rule to generate a 
given regularity) and not in terms of general laws. 
8 . O N POLITICS 
Beinhocker notices that economie ideas have been always linked to the 
world of politics:27 
paradigm shifts in economie theory have led to reconfigurations of the politicai land-
scape. Adam Smith's ideas helped inspire a dramatic expansion in free trade in the 
nineteenth century. Karl Marx theories provided the impetus for cataclysmic changes 
in the twentieth century. The Neoclassical paradigm laid the intellectual foundations 
of Western capitalist economies, while Keynesianism tempered that orthodoxy with a 
role for the state. 
He then poses an important question of how will the ideas of complexity 
will affect politics? Continuing along Beinhocker's lines we must ask if com-
plexity sides with left or right ideas. I have already anticipated that by stres-
sing the impossibility of controlling the economies and forecasting their out-
comes it seems to favor a non interventionist orientation, however by insisting 
on non-optimal market results it opens up an active role for the state that re-
calls the ideas of the left. Beinhocker concludes that complexity economics is 
a third way that remains distinct from the received dualization of politics. The 
detailed discussion of this issue falls beyond the scope of this essay, however I 
can derive a general statement that regards the link between politics and pol-
icy. I believe that the link between politicai ideas, economie theory, and policy 
solutions works in both directions: it is circular. Once an ideology is backed 
by an economie theory it starts to generate policies that are instrumentai to 
the ends of that given ideology. According to complexity theory, policy solu-
tions change according to the different states and configurations of econo-
mies: for instance, a liberalization policy would be detrimental in a given 
country and helpful in another. I believe that economists should have a more 
nuanced ideological color. 
27 E. BEINHOCKER, The Origins of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity and the Radicai Remaking of 
Economics (New York, Harvard Business School Press, 2006), p. 415. 
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9 . CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Policy making in non-linear systems must be open to learn from neighbor-
ing endeavors in order to open up the black box of economies. In the past, 
economic theorists have attempted at over simplifying the functioning of eco-
nomic systems with the aim of extracting fundamental principles. Complexity 
economies re-discovers Marshallian wisdom: "The forces of which economies 
has to take into account are more numerous, less definite, less well known, 
and more diverse in character than those of mechanics; while the material cn 
which they act is more uncertain and less homogeneous"28 and stands to profit 
from new mathematical and computational methods. Economic policy is 
going to free itself from the rigid categories that have entrapped it so far. Ac-
cording to complexity theory, in the face of the same objectives (steady 
growth, low unemployment, stable prices) tools are not predefined and defi-
nitive. Any aprioristic position must be reconsidered in the light of the 
uniqueness of economies in time and space. 
2 8 A . MARSHALL [first edition 1890, eight edition 1920], Principles of Economies, 2 vols. (voi. I 
Text, voi. I I Notes), C.W. GILEAD (ed.) (London, Macmillan, 1961), p. 772. 
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M I N D , M A R K E T A N D O P E N S O C I E T Y I N H A Y E K ' S T H O U G H T * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The present article underlines the linkages between Hayek's politicai phi-
losophy and his theory of mind. As Cubeddu1 pointed out, one of the most 
originai contributions of the Austrian author is the fact that he defended the 
subjectivist theory of values and its politicai implications on a neurophysiolo-
gical basis. This aspect of Hayek's work has probably been less studied than 
others. The paper aims to contribute to filling this gap. It analyses this issue by 
comparing the Austrian scholar's work with some recent contributions from 
the field of cognitive science, namely the neurophenomenological paradigm of 
the self-organization of mind as intended by Maturana and Varela.2 The article 
is structured as follows. Section two provides an overview on Hayek's cog-
nitive psychology. It stresses the fact that according to him knowledge has an 
interpretative nature. Section three focuses on the Austrian scholar's idea that 
the mind is a complex self-organized system. Section four underlines the ana-
logy between the functioning of the mind and that of the market that is high-
lighted in Hayek's thought. Section five explains his theory that the subjective 
theory of value is justified by neurophysiological presuppositions and the logie 
of self-organization which govern sensorial knowledge. The last section - sec-
tion six - analyses the politicai implications of Hayek's cognitive psychology. 
Following Maturana's and Varela's approach, it argues that the kind of theory 
of mind which has been developed by the Austrian scholar justifies, from a 
* I wish to express my gratitude to Philip Ghirlando for having made my English more under-
standable. 
1 R. CUBEDDU ( 1 9 9 5 ) , Friedrich A. Von Hayek (Roma, Boria), p. 6 2 . See also P. HERITIER 
( 1 9 9 7 ) , Ordine spontaneo ed evoluzione nel pensiero di Hayek (Napoli, Jovene), pp. 3 1 ff. 
2 See F . J . VARELA (1989b), Connaìtre les sciences cognitives. Tendances et Perspectives (Paris, 
Seuil). 
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neurobiological point of view, Gadamer's idea of the "historical finitude" of 
man by offering arguments in favor of pluralism and an Open Society. 
2 . THE INTERPRETATIVE NATURE OF THE SENSORY KNOWLEDGE 
Hayek developed his theory of the mind on the basis of an intuition he 
had in the twenties when he was a young student torn between his passion 
for economies and that of psychology. The Sensory Order exposes one of 
the first connectionist theories of perception. Few people know that Hayek 
made a very important contribudon to psychology and the cognitive sciences, 
as has been acknowledged by eminent neurophysiologists such as the Nobel 
Laureate Gerald Edelman.3 In addition to the employment of his theory of 
self-organization for the explanation of the market, he applied it to the func-
tioning of the brain. According to Hayek, ali knowledge is interpretation. For 
him, the mind is not the mirrar of nature: the sensory qualities are construc-
tions depending on a priori categories; differing from Kant's categories, 
Hayek's categories are not invariable, but depend on biological and personal 
memory: "Every sensation [...] must [...] be regarded as an interpretation of 
an event in the light of the past experience of the individual or the species".4 
Since perception is based on a priori categories, the mind reproduces only 
partially and imperfecdy the external world. Perception by categories is based 
on the fact that the mind is able to link typical sets of stimuli to typical mean-
ings. Hayek5 expresses this concept in terms of "Primacy of Abstract" (he 
3 See J.-P. DUPUY ( 2 0 0 0 ) , The Mechanization of Mind. On the Origins of Cognitive Science 
(Princeton - Oxford, Princeton University Press); G.M. EDELMAN (1987), "Through a Computer Darkly: 
Group Selection and Higher Brain Function", Bulletin-The American Academy ofArts and Sciences, 
XXXVI ( 1 ) , pp. 2 0 - 4 9 ; ID. ( 1 9 8 7 ) , Neural Darwinism: The Theory ofNeuronal Group Selection (New 
York, Basic Books); J. FUSTER ( 1 9 9 5 ) , Memory in the Cerehral Cortex: An Empirical Approach to Net-
works in the Human and Nonhuman Primate (Cambridge, M A , The MIT Press); P.R. MACH ( 2 0 0 1 ) , 
"Préface", in F . A . HAYEK, L'ordre sensoriel. Une enquète sur les fondements de la psychologie théo-
rique (Paris, CNRS Editions); B. SMITH ( 1 9 9 7 ) , "The Connectionist Mind: A Study of Hayeldan Psy-
chology", Hayek Economist and Social Philosopher: A Criticai Retrospect, S.F. FROWEN (ed.) (Lon-
don, McMillan). 
4 F . A . VON HAYEK ( 1 9 5 2 ) , The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical 
Psychology (London, Roudedge & Kegan Paul Ltd.), p. 6 6 . See also R. AGONITO ( 1 9 5 7 ) , "Hayek Re-
visited: Mind as a Process of Classification", Behaviorism: A Forum for Criticai Discussions, voi. 3, 
no. 2, pp. 162-171; W.N. BUTOS - R.G. KOPPL (2006), "Does the Sensory Order Have a Useful Eco-
nomic Future", Advances in Austrian Economies, E. KRECKE - K . KRECKE (eds.), voi. 8 (Oxford, 
JAI Press). 
3 F . A . VON HAYEK ( 1 9 8 7 ) , New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economies and the History of 
Ideas (London, Roudedge & Kegan Paul), p. 35. 
— 236 — 
MIND, MARKET AND OPEN SOCIETY IN HAYEK'S THOUGHT 
also talks about pattern recognition or rules of perception). In other words, the 
author of The Sensory Order agrees with his fellow-citizen and friend Popper: 
"ali we know about the world", he writes, "is of the nature of theories and ali 
'experience' can do is to change these theories".6 Consequendy, Hayek holds 
that the tendency to order phenomena in typical categories or classes is not a 
purely rational and conscious ability.7 It is first and foremost a tacit or meta-
conscious capability; a property of categories through which the mind oper-
ates: "the richness of the sensory world in which we live [...] is not - Hayek 
states - the starting point from which the mind derives abstractions", but "the 
product" of meta-conscious abstractions.8 Those classification (or categoriza-
tion) processes generating perceptions are not procedures of simple classifica-
tion: they are, instead, modes of "multiple classification".9 Firstly, this implies 
that, in spite of what is assumed by behaviorism, they never concern a single 
stimulus, but always groups of stimuli or events. Secondly, it means that 
knowledge never presupposes the use of only a single a priori category, but 
it always demands the use of several a priori categories. The detailed analysis 
of the functioning of this logie of multiple classification does not constitute 
part of the scope of the current work. It is sufficient to specify that this par-
ticular classifying activity constantly tends to rectify the interpretations, to 
which it leads according to the continuous flow of new experiences. More-
over, it allows the experience of a large abundance of sensory qualities. This 
is in accordance with the fact that it allows the overlapping of several abstract 
schemes of meanings. This is the reason why by observing a certain object, we 
can simultaneously gather a large number of particular characteristics. We can 
realize, for instance, that this item is a house, that it is a yellow house, that it is 
a house in an art nouveau style, that it is a house with three floors, that it is a 
house with a garden and so on.10 Hayek makes a distinction between the sen-
sory order and the objective or physical order. He defines the sensory order as 
the order of analogy and difference relations amongst the sensory qualities (in 
terms of dimension, color, weight, etc.). It is the way through which these 
qualities, and not the objective or physical facts, differ from each another. 
It is also the whole set of meanings of the phenomenal reality. The difference 
6 ID., The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology cit., p. 143. 
7 ID., New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas cit., p. 44. 
8 Ibid., p. 44. 
9 F . A . VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychol-
ogy cit., p. 50. 
10 ID., New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas cit., p. 44. 
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between the sensory order and the physical or objective world is shown by 
naturai sciences. Naturai sciences tend to "revise" and "correct" our sen-
sorial categorizations in order to grasp the features of the physical world. 
While, for instance, we visually perceive water and ice as different things, 
they classify them as the same thing by considering their chemical structure. 
The methodology of naturai sciences helps us to understand the relativity 
and the theoretical nature of our sensorial knowledge. Even if the metho-
dology of naturai science can be considered thus as "objectivist", Hayek 
stresses that this does not imply that naturai sciences analyze a world that 
is more real, that the physical world is an "abstract" or theoretical construc-
tion, and that even this world is built in a selective way from a particular 
perspective and is linked to our adaptive needs.11 It is the outcome of an 
alternative classification compared to the mental one that produces new 
meanings and operates according to experimental theories.12 For Hayek, 
it is impossible to conceive neutral and purely objective knowledge. Conse-
quendy, Hayek does not conceive scientific knowledge as based on different 
presuppositions from ordinary knowledge.13 Hayek proposes a connection-
ist explanation of the neurophysiologic processes which allow the sensory 
categorization or classification. For him, ali sensory qualities depend on 
the way impulses are channeled through the neural networks. The latter 
are the connections amongst neurons that the impulses are able to activate. 
For every kind of perception there is a peculiar kind of channeling of the 
impulses: 
[M]y theory maintains that the sensory (or other mental) qualities are not in some 
way originally attached to, or an originai attribute of, the individual physiological im-
pulses, but that ali of these qualities are determined by the system of connection by 
which the impulses can be transmitted from neuron to neuron; that it is thus the po-
sition of the individual impulse or group of impulses in the whole system of such con-
nections which gives it its distinctive quality.14 
11 ID., The Sensory Order. An lnquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology cit., 
p. 143. 
12 Ibid., pp. 145-146. 
13 See C. HERMANN-PILLATH (1992), "The Brain, its Sensory Order, and the Evolutionary Con-
cept of Mind: On Hayek's Contribution to Evolutionary Epistemology", Journal of Social and Evolu-
tionary Systems, no. 15 ; T . J . MCQUADE ( 2 0 0 7 ) , "Science and Market as Adptive Classifyng Systems", 
Cognition and Economies. Advances in Austrian Economies, E. KRECKE, C. KRECKE and R.M. KOPPLE 
(eds.), voi. 9 (Oxford, UK, Elsevier Ltd.). 
1 4 F . A . VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order. An lnquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychol-
ogy cit., p. 53. 
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According to this connectionist approach, the way neurons work is not 
controlied by a centrai unit, but is simply based upon certain "rules" which 
define the modalities and the conditions for their activation. So whether or 
not a neuron becomes part of a chain of connections, carrying nervous im-
pulses, depend solely on these rules. This means that perceptions emerge ac-
cording to a logie of self-organization.15 This process of self-organization is 
continuously nourished by the flow of new experiences. These new experi-
ences are able to partly modify the structure of neuronal connections. Hayek's 
connectionist approach presupposes that a learning process is incessandy run-
ning, developing under a trial and error fashion. This process consists in a sub-
stitution of classification modalities, inbred or acquired, with new classifica-
tion modalities.16 This explains the way an individuai, after a time lag, can 
perceive the same fact or object differently. Hayek rules out a complete iden-
tity of human minds for two reasons. The first relates to the fact that the struc-
ture of neuronal connections is partly modified by experience; the second 
concerns biological evolution. This logie makes the perfect correspondence 
of the individual's anatomie structure rather impracticable. From these two 
presuppositions it follows that a perfect identity of the perceptive modalities 
is in turn impossible. Human minds will in fact be sufficiendy similar to allow 
the mutuai comprehension amongst individuals, but "they will not be identi-
cal".17 According to Hayek, the modalities of categorization (the "rules of 
perception") allow us to single out typical problematic situations. They incor-
porate, in the meanings they create, information about the modalities of ac-
tion (the "rules of action") that are useful to face them. Both perception 
and action rules can be defined as "abstract" because they can be applied 
to abstract classes of events. A trivial example of this principle is represented 
by the consequences that a driver who perceives a red traffic light knows what 
he has to do.18 Another very important aspect of Hayek's connectionism is 
that consciousness is only the tip of an iceberg. According to the Austrian 
author, there is a tacit or implicit dimension of knowledge.19 This tacit dimen-
15 Ibid., pp. 64, 114. See also F . J . VARELA, Connaìtre les sciences cognitives. Tendances et per-
spectives cit. 
1 6 F . A . VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Toundations of Theoretical Psychol-
ogy cit., pp. 98 ff. See also J . - M . BESNIER (2005), Les theories de la connaissance (Paris, Puf), pp. 75-79. 
17 Ibid., p. 110. 
1 8 F . A . VON HAYEK, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas cit., 
pp. 35 ff. See also P. NEMO (1988), La société de droit selon Hayek (Paris, Puf). 
19 Ibid., p. 4 5 . See also M . POLANYI ( 1 9 5 8 ) , Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philo-
sophy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press); H.L. DREYFUS - S.E. DREYFUS (2000), Mind Over Ma-
chine. The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of Computer (New York, Paper Back). 
17 
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sion allows us to use certain skills (such as that of gestalt perception) without 
being able to verbally explain what exactly entails the capability to use them. 
Hayek's connectionism lets us comprehend that the mind is not limited to the 
sole capabilities of logie deduction. The tacit dimension of knowledge pro-
duces the necessary assumptions for rational choice. It defines the basic 
framework of the process of conscious decision. Namely, it selects a basic set 
of meanings and possible alternatives for action which is the foundation of 
the rational reasoning.20 
3 . THE MIND AS A COMPLEX SELF-ORGANIZED SYSTEM 
Hayek specifies that the theory of the presuppositions of consciousness 
that he proposes represents a mere "explanation of principle".21 It only takes 
into account the general logie of the functioning of mind. The Austrian sdra-
iar excludes the possibility for the mind to eventually arrive at a comprehen-
sive self explanation. Namely, Hayek denies the possibility for an explanation 
of detail of its running that would permit "to substitute a description in phy-
sical terms for a description in terms of mental qualities".22 Consequendy, he 
rules out the possibility to precisely forecast the results of its operations. He 
considers that the mind belongs to the "complex phenomena" category.23 Gi-
ven that, it is impossible to know ali the interdependent variables contributing 
to determining such a complex order. Since the mind is an open and self-or-
ganized system, these variables change in a continuous and unforecastable 
way. Moreover, this kind of order, employing a concept used by Maturana 
and Varda, it is endowed with "autonomy".24 As increasingly clarified by 
the connectionist and anti-objectivist cognitive scientists, the behavior of a 
self-organized order is neither determined by a program introduced from 
the outside and followed mechanically (the behavior of a self-organized order 
is not comparable to that of a machine that has been previously programmed, 
20 F.A. VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order. An lnquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychol-
ogy cit., pp. 132 ff. 
21 Ibid., p. 182. 
22 Ibid., p. 1 8 9 . See also R. NADEAU ( 2 0 0 1 ) , "Friedrich Hayek et la théorie de l'esprit", in J.-P. 
COMETTI - K. MULUGAN (eds.), La philosophie autrichienne de Bolzano a Musil. Histoire et actualité 
(Paris, Vrin). 
23 F.A. VON HAYEK (1967), Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economies (Chicago, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press), p. 55. 
24 H.R. MATURANA - F.J. VARELA (1980), Autopoiesis and Cognition. The Realization of the Liv-
ing (Dordrecht, D., Reidei Publishing Company). 
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such as a computer), nor by the effeets applied by the surrounding environ-
ment. Basically an order of this kind does not passively undergo such effeets 
(its behavior has nothing to do, for instance, with that of a pool ball that is, on 
the contrary, entirely determined by the external forces acting on it). The 
cause behind the behavior of a self-organized order is not to be sought outside 
it.25 An order such as the mind actively employs random novelties that appear 
in the environment in a continuous and unpredictable manner, to constantly 
self-reprogram itself. Its logie is to safeguard its autonomy from the outer en-
vironment and thus its capability to operate. An order of this kind is not pre-
determined as it is not possible to foresee the random novelties affecting 
neither its behavior, nor the way they will impact on the outeomes of its pro-
cesses of self-organization and upholding of autonomy.26 By virtue of its 
working modalities, a self-organized order is the "cause of itself'. 
In addition, Hayek considers a logicai limitation which rules out the pos-
sibility to precisely forecast the results of the mental operations - he explicitly 
speaks of a Goedelian limit. Since knowledge is based on categorization, it is 
logically impossible to fully explain the presuppositions of our knowledge. No 
categorization can be completely explained. "There is on every level, or in 
every universe of discourse, a part of our knowledge", he writes, "which, 
although it is the result of experience, cannot be controlied by experience, be-
cause it constitutes the ordering principle of that universe" 27 To get around 
this problem a classifying apparatus of a higher complexity compared to that 
of the human mind would in fact be required - an apparatus that, moreover, 
would in turn be, for the same logicai reasons, unable to exhaustively explain 
its functioning.28 For this reason, too, we cannot completely explain in phy-
sical terms the functioning of mind ruling out any reference to mental quali-
ties. 
Given these three limits, an explanation of principle of the sensory order is 
the only feasible route. From that it follows that it is impracticable to reduce 
the social sciences to physics.29 Moreover, other important consequence de-
2 5 F . A . VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychol-
o g y cit., pp. 122-127. 
26 See also H . ATLAN (1979), Entre le cristal et la fumèe. Essai sur l'organisation du vivant (Paris, 
Seuil), pp. 157 ff.; J.-P. DUPUY (1990), Ordres et désordres. Enquète sur un nouveau paradigme (Paris, 
Seuil), pp. 109-124. 
2 7 F . A . VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychol-
ogy cit., pp. 169-170. See also ID., Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics cit., pp. 60-63. 
28 Ibid., pp. 184-190. See also P. NEMO, La société de droit selon Hayek cit., pp. 60-61. 
29 Ibid., p. 191. 
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rives from Hayek's theory of perceptions. As the mind is a system based on 
autonomy, as intended by Maturana and Varela, and as it is impossible to fully 
comprehend the way it functions, the idea that states that cognitive processes 
can be conceived in deterministic terms needs also to be ruled out. This al-
lows us to criticize the behaviorist approach in psychology. Moreover, it al-
lows a claim for methodological individualism. By reason of the mind's com-
plexity and the fact that such order is the "cause of itself', the "data" for the 
explanation of the action cannot be external to the individual. This conclu-
sion, Hayek stresses, "is, of course, of the greatest importance for ali the 
disciplines which aim at an understanding and interpretation of human 
action".30 The Austrian author regards the explanation for action as 
necessarily resulting in a reconstruction of the ideas motivating the indivi-
duals: he maintains that the "data" of social sciences are internai to the ac-
tors.31 Hayek considers the thesis of sociological holism according to which 
the sense the action has for the individual is irrelevant as wrong and mislead-
ing. "Unless we can understand what the acting people mean by their actions 
any attempt to explain them [...] is bound to fail".32 The possibility to apply 
such interpretative procedure calls for the existence of a quid common to the 
researcher and social actors. Hayek states that such an element does exist by 
virtue of a genetic predisposition.33 It depends on the universality of the lo-
gicai structure of human mind and its perceptive basic categories.34 Accord-
ing to Hayek the error of conceiving cognitive processes in deterministic 
terms is plainly illustrateti in Karl Mannheim's approach: "In particular, it 
would appear that the whole aim of the discipline known under the name 
of 'sociology of knowledge' which aims at explaining why people as a result 
of particular material circumstances hold particular views at particular mo-
30 Ibid., p. 193. 
31 See F. Dì IORIO (2009), "Hayek's Connectionist Psychology as a Defense for the Sociology 
of Good Reasons", Raymond Boudon. A Life in Sociology. Essays in Honour of Raymond Boudon, 
M. CHERKAOUI and P. HAMILTON (eds.), 4 vols. (Oxford, UK, The Bardwell Press); ID. (2010), "The 
Sensory Order and the Neurophysiological Basics of Methodological Individualism", The Social 
Science of Hayek's 'The Sensory Order', W.N. BUTOS (ed.) (Bingley, UK, Emerald); P. HERITIER 
(1997), Ordine spontaneo ed evoluzione nel pensiero di Hayek cit., pp. 31 ff. 
3 2 F . A . VON FIAYEK (1952), The Counter-Revolution of Science Studies on the Abuse of Reason 
(Indianapolis, Liberty Press), p. 53. 
33 ID., The Sensory Order. An lnquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology cit., pp. 99-
103. 
34 See also W.N. BUTOS - R.G. KOPPL (2006), "Does the Sensory Order Have a Useful Eco-
nomic Future?", Advances in Austrian Economics, voi. 8, E. KRECKE and K . KRECKE (eds.) (Oxford, 
JAI Press). 
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ments, is fundamentally misconceived".35 In opposition to Mannheim Hayek 
reaffirms that, given the sensory order's characteristics, the causes of actions 
can not be traced back to the influences coming from the external contest: 
"To us - he writes - human decision must always appear as the result of the 
whole of a human personality - that means the whole of a person's mind -
which, as we have seen, we can not reduce to something else".36 
4 . THE ANALOGY BETWEEN MIND AND MARKET 
As we pointed out, according to Hayek's connectionist paradigm the way 
neurons work is not controlied by a centrai unit, but is simply based upon 
certain "rules" of activation.37 It follows that perceptions emerge according 
to the logie of self-organization.38 Due to the above, some authors have cor-
reedy underlined that an analogy does exist between Hayek's theory of the 
mind and his conception of the market. Both these phenomena are for him 
spontaneous and knowledge-generating orders.39 It is possible to schematically 
summarize the analogies which exist between mind and market according to 
Hayek: 
1) Both are adaptive classifying systems which generate knowledge by a 
sort of categorization. As Butos and McQuade point out, while the mind cre-
ates by classification the meaning of reality in order to allow an adaptation of 
the behavior, the market generates a classification which concerns the goods 
35 F.A. VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychol-
o g y cit., pp. 192-193. 
36 Ibid. See also P. HERITIER, Ordine spontaneo ed evoluzione nel pensiero di Hayek cit., pp. 31 ff. 
37 Hayek does not illustrate in depth the activation modalities of neurons. He goes so far as to 
agree with Hebb, who was the first to analyze this issue in detail. See F.A. VON HAYEK, The Sensory 
Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology cit., note 1, p. 64 and note 1, 
p. 114. Also sess D.O. HEBB (1949), The Organization of Behavior; a Neuropsychological Theory 
(New York, Wiley). 
38 See F . J . VARELA, Connaitre les sciences cognitives. Tendances et Perspectives cit., pp. 6 0 - 6 1 . 
39 See W.N. BUTOS - T. MCQUADE (2002), "Mind, market and istitutions. The knowledge 
problem in Hayek's thought", F.A. Hayek as a Politicai Economist. Economie Analysis and Values, 
J . BIRNER, P. GARROUSTE and T AIMAR (eds.) (London - New York, Routledge); W.N. BUTOS -
T. MCQUADE ( 2 0 0 5 ) , "The Sensory Order and Other Adaptive Classifyng Systems", Journal ofBioe-
conomics, voi. 7 , pp. 3 3 5 - 3 5 8 ; T. MCQUADE ( 2 0 0 7 ) , "Science and Market as Adptive Classifyng 
Systems", Cognition and Economics. Advances in Austrian Economics, E. KRECKE, C. KRECKE 
and R.M. KOPPLE (eds.), voi. 9 (Oxford, Elsevier Ltd.); B. SMITH (1997), "The Connectionist 
Mind: A Study of Hayekian Psychology", Hayek Economist and Social Philosopher: A Criticai Ret-
rospect cit. 
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and their prices.40 Giving a specific price to every good, it allows the coordi-
nation of the economic activities and the cost minimization. Consequendy, it 
works like a cybernetic system, based on feedback regulation, just as the mind 
does. While in the mind the transmission of information and the categoriza-
tion are based on chains of neurons, in the market they are based on chains of 
41 
prices. 
2) Both are complex systems based on the logie of self-organization. 
They do not have a single locus of control, but are polycentric. Their func-
tioning depends only on the existence of general rules that bind the behavior 
of the parts. It does not depend on a centrai calculation. Hayek himself un-
derlines this similarity. Commenting on the nature of market society, he states: 
"the brain of an organism which acts as the directing centre for that organism 
is itself in turn a polycentric order, that is, that its actions are determined by 
the relation and mutuai adjustment to each other of the elements of which it 
,, 42 
consists . 
This fact has important epistemological consequences. As Varela under-
lines, self-organization is a necessary attribute of complexity.43 The perfor-
mance of complex self-organized orders would be inconceivable as the out-
come of centrai direction. Both the idea of considering the mind as a 
computer and the idea that it is possible to centralize the direction of econom-
ic activities are fallacious for systemic and cognitive reasons. No computer or 
centrai planner can use the distributed and tacit knowledge which mind and 
market can use.44 
3) As self-organized orders, both adapt themselves to continuing and 
unpredictable changes and both have consequendy a dynamic structure. In-
side these systems, order always coexists with a certain degree of disorder be-
cause they re-adapt themselves continually. In this way they can preserve their 
functioning.45 In the case of the mind the re-adaptation that results from new 
experiences concerns the systems of connections, while in the case of the mar-
4 0 W . N . BUTOS - T . MCQUADE, The Sensory Order and Other Adaptive Classifyng Systems cit., 
p. 345. 
41 B. SMITH, "The Connectionist Mind: A Study of Hayekian Psychology", Hayek Economist 
and Social Philosopher: A Criticai Retrospect cit., p. 113. 
42 F.A. VON HAYEK, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economies cit., p. 73. 
43 F.J. VARELA, Connaitre les sciences cognitives. Tendances et Perspectives cit., pp. 61 - 77 . 
44 See J . PETITOT (2002), "Vers des lumières hayekiennes: de la critique du rationalisme cons-
tructiviste à un nouveau rationalisme critique", Friedrich Hayek et la philosophie économique, A. LE-
ROUX and R. NADEAU (eds.) (Colloque de Cerisy, no. 2). 
45 See J . - P . DUPUY, Ordres et désordres. Enquète sur un nouveau paradigme cit. 
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ket the re-adaptation concems the structure of production and division of 
labor. As Atlan points out, the time of this kind of system is indeterministic.46 
Their future is not inscribed in their past. It depends on the way in which 
future changes influence their capacity of self-organization - it is unforeseeable. 
This phenomenon has been well analyzed concerning the market by O'Dris-
coll and Rizzo who criticize the theory of general equilibrium because of the 
fact that it is based on a Newtonian time, underlining that to understand the 
market it is necessary to use a "dynamic conception of time" as intended by 
Bergson.47 
4) Both are emergent phenomena. Mind emerges from the brain and 
especially from the activity of neurons in conformity to the rules that regulate 
their functioning. The market emerges unintentionally from the intentional 
actions of individuals who follow specific ethical principles and civil laws. 
As we will analyze further, a fundamental characteristic of the emergence lies 
in the fact that it creates systems that are endowed with attributes irreducible 
to the attributes of their basic components. The mind cannot be reduced to 
the brain. Similarly the market cannot be reduced to the intentions of indivi-
duals.48 
5) Both are evolutionary orders, the outcome of a long process of trial 
and error.49 These orders developed in an indeterministic way by adaptation 
to unforeseeable facts or conditions. This fact is one of the sources of Hayek's 
criticism of the constructivist mentality. "Man" - he states in the epilogue of 
Law, Legislation and Liberty - "is not and never will be the master of his fate: 
his very reason always progresses by leading him into the unknown and un-
foreseen where he learns new things".50 
5 . THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASICS OF THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF VALUE 
Hayek's theory of the sensory order, in addition to legitimizing the inter-
pretative method, is relevant for another reason. As Cubeddu stresses, it es-
46 H. ATLAN ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Entre le cristal et la fumèe. Essai sur l'organisation du vivant (Paris, Seuil). 
4 7 G . P . O'DRISCOLL - M . J . Rizzo ( 1 9 9 6 ) , The Economics ofTime and Ignorance (London, Rou-
dedge), p. 51. 
48 See R. NADEAU (2003), Cultural Evolution True and False: A dehunking of Hayek's Critics, in 
Acts of 7th ESHET Conference, Paris. 
49 See B. SMITH, The Connectionist Mind: A Study of Hayekian Psychology cit. 
50 F.A. VON HAYEK (1979), "The Politicai Order of a Free People", voi. 3 of Law, Legislation 
and Liberty (Chicago, University of Chicago Press), p. 176. 
— 245 — 
FRANCESCO DI IORIO 
tablishes the subjectivism of values from a neurophysiologic viewpoint.51 
Hayek's cognitive psychology claims that value is not an objective feature of 
things, but a mental construction. Moreover, it excludes the possibility of a 
complete identification of the ways individuals build it. According to Hayek, 
human minds will be sufficiendy similar to allow mutuai comprehension and 
interaction amongst individuals, but "they will not be identical".52 First, a per-
fect anatomical correspondence of human minds is impossible; second, an 
identity of personal experiences which influence the mental processes of 
self-organization must also be ruled out. Consequendy, it is necessary to ex-
clude a perfect matching of the individual assumptions of subjective evalua-
tions. Also for this reason, the relation between the action and the environmen-
tal context is more complex compared to what is maintained by those 
advocating the objectivistic and collectivistic approach in social sciences. More-
over, the relation between The Sensory Order and the Austrian theory of value 
allows a better understanding of why Hayek maintains that knowledge is dis-
perseti in society. This does not only depend on the fact that there are particu-
lar circumstances of time and place which change in a continuous and unfore-
seeable way. It also depends on the fact that the individual evaluation of these 
circumstances is based on tacit presuppositions which are partly personal. One 
individual who knows a particular circumstance disposes of a kind of informa-
tion which is not shared by others first and foremost because his mind can in-
terpret this circumstance in a way which is partly unique.53 In addition, since 
the mental presuppositions of evaluation are linked to personal experiences, 
the continuous change of the particular circumstances of time and place in turn 
partially modifies the individual presuppositions of evaluation. This fact con-
tributes to making the social process non-deterministic and unforeseeable. 
6 . MIND, HISTORICAL FINITUDE AND OPEN SOCIETY 
As is well known, according to Hayek politicai liberty is justified by the 
limitations of human knowledge. The Austrian scholar thinks that totalitarian-
51 R. CUBEDDU, Friedrich A. Von Hayek cit., p. 62. 
5 2 F . A . VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order. An lnquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychol-
ogy cit., p. 110. 
53 See F. Dì IORIO (2006), Dalla teoria della dispersione della conoscenza alla cibernetica econo-
mica: l'auto-organizzazione del mercato secondo F.A. von Hayek (Roma, Quaderni del centro di me-
todologia delle scienze sociali della Luiss); G . P . O'DRISCOLL - M.J. Rizzo, The Economies ofTime 
and Ignorance cit.; S. RIZZELLO (1999), The Economies ofMind (Northampton, Ma, Edward Elgar). 
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ism is the product of a cognitive conceit.54 The analysis of the epistemological 
implications of his theory of mind helps us in understanding his politicai phi-
losophy. Three considerations should be made on this point. First, due to the 
fact that Hayek's cognitive psychology rules out the possibility of explaining 
action by using a holist and mechanistic approach, it defends the principle of 
responsibility. In other words, it allows one to argue in favor of the value of 
individual choice by showing that the latter is the outcome of self-determina-
tion. Since sociological collectivism denies that the individual is responsible 
for his own acts, it paves the way for the politicai collectivism. It plays down 
the importance of free choice. The Sensory Order provides arguments to cri-
ticize this perspective.55 As Hayek states, "though, logically, methodological 
collectivism and politicai collectivism are distinct, it is not difficult to see 
how the former leads to the latter and how, indeed, without methodological 
collectivism politicai collectivism would be deprived of its intellectual 
basis".56 The second point which has to be stressed concerns the idea of spon-
taneous order. For Hayek, the replacement of the latter with an organized or 
controlied order erasing individual freedom prevents individuals from using 
the knowledge distributed in society. It implies negative unintended effects. 
As we pointed out, the impossibility of mastering ali the variables of the social 
process and controlling it - the impossibility which explains the non-inten-
tional consequences of politicai constructivism - depends, among others, 
on neurobiological causes. According to the Austrian scholar, the ignorance 
which justifies the spontaneous order is first and foremost based on the un-
iqueness of the personal presuppositions of perception.57 Hayek's theory of 
mind provides a neurophysiological foundation of the subjective theory of va-
lue and contributes to explaining the distribution of knowledge. It helps us in 
understanding the impossibility of an effective economic and social planning. 
The third consideration of the politicai implications of The Sensory Order con-
cerns the incompatibility of an objective ethics and the Open Society. The un-
iqueness of the personal basics of the mental interpretations and the fact that 
54 See F.A. VON HAYEK (1988), The Fatai Conceit. The Errors of Socialism (Chicago, The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press). 
55 See F. D Ì IORIO, Hayek's Connectionist Psychology as a Defense for the Sociology of Good 
Reasons cit.; ID., The Sensory Order and the Neurophysiological Basics of Methodological Individual-
ism cit. 
5 6 F . A . VON HAYEK, The Counter-Revolution of Science Studies on the Abuse of Reason cit., 
p. 154. 
5 7 R. CUBEDDU, Friedrich A. Von Hayek cit., pp. 62 ff. 
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they are linked to the effeets of a biological and cultural evolution contri-
bute in defending the pluralism of values and democracy.58 From the stand-
point of the Austrian author, ethical choices are indispensable. However, 
they are historically and personally variable preconditions of the objective 
and controllable knowledge. Differently from what constructivists maintain, 
they cannot be rationally and unequivocally founded. Hayek's theory of the 
sensory order combines well with Hume's law. According to the Austrian 
scholar, a perfect and rational agreement on ethics is impossible. He defends 
the ethical relativism of the Open Society.59 The relationship between 
the pluralism of values and the self-organization of mind has also been 
pointed out by Varela and other cognitive scientists which have recently im-
plemented and improved the kind of connectionist and non-objectivist the-
ory of mind Hayek has sketched in The Sensory Order. These authors - who 
usually do not quote the Austrian scholar - have underlined that the Haye-
kian-like theory of mind matches well with Gadamer's and Vattimo's her-
meneutical approach and the idea of the historical finitude of man. If our 
knowledge depends on our common sense and if our commonsense in 
nothing more that our biological and cultural tradition, we have to come to 
the conclusion, they argue, that foundationalism is wrong: "what we took to be 
solid ground is really more like shifting sand beneath our feet".60 This re-
quires not only that we give up with a certain philosophical tradition "but 
that we learn to Uve in a world without foundations".61 According to this 
view, the logicai implication of the mind's self-organization and the criti-
cism of the objectivism is the defence of what Vattimo calls "weak thought 
(pensiero debole) - that is, a kind of thought that would give up the mod-
ernist quest for foundations, yet without criticizing this quest in the name of 
another, truer foundation".62 The only politicai system which is compatible 
with this theory of knowledge is the one that is open to alternative points of 
5 8 F . A . VON HAYEK, The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychol-
o g y cit., pp. 251-252. 
59 See E. Dì NUOSCIO (2006), Il mestiere dello scienziato sociale. Un'introduzione all'epistemo-
logia delle scienze sociali (Napoli, Liguori), pp. 177 ff. See also ID. (2004), Epistemologia delazione e 
ordine sponeo. Individualismo ed evoluzionismo in Herbert Spencer (Soveria Mannelli, Rubettino), 
pp. 171-172. 
6 0 F . J . VARELA, E . THOMPSON and E . ROSCH (1991), The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and 
Human Experience (Cambridge, MA, The Mit Press), p. 217. 
81 Ibid, p. 218. 
62 Ibid., p. 229. See also D . ANTISERI (1993), Le ragioni del pensiero debole. Domande a Gianni 
Vattimo (Roma, Boria). 
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views. In Varela's opinion, the processes which govern the world of life and 
the emergence of consciousness "should teach us that the true and ultimate 
foundations of knowledge are tolerance and pluralism, that is the capacity 
to see the relativity of our perceptions and values which allows us to respect 
others".63 
6 3 F.J. VARELA (1989), Autonomie et connaissance. Essai sur le vivant (Paris, Seuil), p. 3 1 . 
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ENZO DI NUOSCIO 
T H E L A I C C H O O S E S C R I T I C A L R E A S O N * 
God is teaching us that we must live as men who can 
get along very well without him 
D . BONHOEFFER 
'Trial and error', the possibility of making an at-
tempt and being mistaken; freedom of criticism 
and opposition; these are the characteristics of free 
regimes. 
L . EINAUDI 
1. LAIC, PRECISELY BY VIRTUE OF BEING CRITICAL 
I believe that there is no better way to define laicity than to make it coin-
cide, on the one hand, with free choice and the exercise of criticai reason and, 
on the other, with the acknowledgment that the legitimacy of the State is not 
conditional on respect for principles of a religious nature. Hence both the in-
dividuai who chooses criticai debate as a means for conflict resolution and the 
State that enables every citizen to enjoy the freedom and the right to criticize 
ali people and ali ideas must be regarded as laic. The same holds for any in-
dividuai who recognises the legitimacy of the State and its decisions as being laic 
even when they are governed by rules that do not coincide with our own reli-
gious heliefs. By the same token, a State will be laic if it draws its legitimacy 
not so much from subscribing to fixed religious principles, but rather from 
pre-established rules that safeguard rights, liherties and open public debate. 
Laics are neither fundamentalists nor missionaries: they do not regard 
other persons either as subjects upon whom to impose their own point of view 
or as the faithless to be converted. Instead, a laic is always open to criticism 
and self-criticism and, having chosen criticai reason, is a jealous custodian of 
* English revision by Rachel Barritt Costa. 
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individuai liberties.1 The laic State itself respects inviolable conscience and 
thus free personal convictions, while at the same time guaranteeing the ideal 
of a public arena where no individuals, institutions, knowledge or viewpoints 
are exempt from criticism. Laicity is therefore a peculiarity of democracy:2 no 
dogmas are prohibited, nor does laicity impede individuals from regarding 
ethical or religious principles as either absolute or negotiable. Rather, unlike 
the tradition that has evolved historically in the Catholic Church and which 
continues to be the case in some parts of the world with various religions, lai-
city makes no attempt to transfer these dogmas into the public sphere and to 
adopt them as the favoured perspective for solving problems affecting the 
whole community. Moreover laicity, given its nature as a forum for debate, 
offers no refuge that would allow dogmas to be shielded from criticism 
- and from self-criticism - and in some cases to be imposed on others. Laics 
thus do not confuse private dogmas (of any nature) with public truths. They 
are well aware that the truths of faith are the outcome of testimonies while 
scientific truths are demonstrated. Laics who are believers - but equally, those 
who are not - are conscious that there exist no empirical or rational demon-
strations showing that the actual facts do, or do not, constitute "the whole". 
Laics who are believers are not afraid of debasing their beliefs by admitting 
that the latter are not based upon demonstrative reason. On the contrary, 
in their perspective the belief system they have espoused becomes ali the more 
authentic as they become increasingly conscious that faith is the answer to ra-
tional doubt (or to the failure of reason more geometrico). Moreover, they ac-
knowledge that the quest for an explanation which science cannot provide 
does not necessarily imply seeking a religious answer. They never fail to 
remember that there is always an individual choice behind a decision to adhere 
to the precepts of a certain religion. On the other hand, laics who do not be-
lieve are far from attempting a rational rebuttai of transcendence, and do not 
regard confidence in the explanation provided by religion as revealing a weak-
ness of reason or yielding to irrationality. Galileo's distinction between 
science: "how the sky goes", and faith: "how we rise into the sky" sits well 
with them; as does Wittgenstein's warning: "even if science could supply 
replies to ali our answers, the most important issues of our life would not even 
be touched on". Laics who believe are well aware of the risk of opening the 
1 G. BONIOLO, "Introduzione", in ID. (ed.), Laicità. Una geografia delle nostre radici (Torino, 
G. Einaudi, 2006), p. xx. 
2 G.E. RUSCONI, Come se Dio non rifosse. I laici, i cattolici e la democrazia (Torino, G. Einaudi, 
2000), p. 7. 
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floodgates to fundamentalism if the meaning of life is identified by its religious 
sense. By the same token, laics who do not believe know that whoever relies 
on science to cope with the problem of the meaning of human existence will 
suffer the same fate as Ivan Karamazov, who, during moments of despair, 
would insult the great scientist Claude Bernard, for whom science was of 
no assistance in tackling the drama of his life. Therefore any laic, whether a 
believer or not, is a gnoseological fallibilist and an ethical relativist who nur-
tures the "ethics of doubt" in public discussions: a laic, precisely by virtue of 
being such, is conscious that even the most diverse values are neither devoid 
of sense nor absolute.3 A laic realizes that the never ending quest for answers 
is an anthropological condition from which man will never be able to free 
himself, because "from the very beginning the Gods have not revealed every-
thing to the mortals" (Xenophanes of Colophon). It follows that it is "not the 
truth an individuai possesses or claims to possess, but rather the sincere en-
deavour he has endured to attain it that represents the genuine value for 
man" (Lessing).4 However, in contrast to an argument frequently put for-
ward, laicity cannot coincide with a pure and simple choice of method, 
namely the method of criticai discussion.5 It is inevitably and, primarily, a 
choice of values: whoever is engaged in practising this methodology considers 
the pluralism of ideas, individuai liberties, protection of the human person, 
free subjective determination and the solution of problems as values to safe-
guard and implement through the laic behaviour of the individuai person and 
thus of the State.6 Consequently, it is not until such a choice has been em-
braced, circumscribing the boundaries of criticism, combating intolerance 
and safeguarding a place for public and free debate, that State becomes truly 
3 G . ZAGREBELSKY, Contro l'etica della verità (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2 0 0 8 ) , pp. 8 7 - 9 0 . 
4 G . GIORELLO, Di nessuna chiesa. La libertà del laico (Milano, Cortina, 2005), pp. 23-25. 
5 With regard to the latter I share the arguments expressed by G. Fornero who, after having 
distinguished between a "weak laicity" and a "strong laicity" (Bioetica cattolica e bioetica laica 
(2005), Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2009), focuses in a subsequent work on "the strength of weak 
laicity", showing that the latter cannot be reduced to a mere "proceduralism", which is a neutral 
sample of operational rules. It also substantiates itself in a set of values linked to such rules, which 
are the same principles of democracy and of the Western World" (G. FORNERO, "Due significati ir-
riducibili di laicità", in E. D'ORAZIO (ed.), La laicità vista dai laici (Milano, Egea - Università Bocconi, 
2008), pp. 61-74). I also share Fornero's attempt to delineate a criticai locality, able to markedly 
depart from any fundamentalism, including that of laics. See also, in addition to the mentioned 
works, the third part of Fornero's, Laicità debole e laicità forte. Il contributo della hioetica al dibattito 
sulla laicità (Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2008). 
6 C. MAGRIS, "Laicità e religione", in G. PRETEROSSI (ed.), Le ragioni dei laici (Roma-Bari, La-
terza, 2005), p. 110. U. SCARPELLI, Bioetica laica (Milano, Baldini & Castoldi, 1998), pp. 5-8; S . RO-
DOTÀ, Perché laico (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2009), pp. 56-60. 
— 253 — 
ENZO DI NUOSCIO 
laic, and thus "neutral".7 Any presumed ethical or religious truths of the 
State, or any privileged approach to an interpretation of life, are thus relin-
quished. No primacy is assigned to a specific concept of the world that would 
require the State to abide by the principles of laicity, for which the State itself 
would be the guarantor. 
2 . FOR THE LAIC NOT EVERYTHING IS POSSIBLE... HOWEVER 
Having identified laicity with liberty, with the exercise of criticism and le-
gitimacy construed as respect for the State and the Rule of Law, defining the 
role that religion can fulfil in a laic State becomes easier. If laicity substantiates 
itself in the choice of criticai reason, then it cannot be considered as a form of 
supreme phase of non-confessionalism, which imposes a reduction of the re-
ligious presence in public debate or of religious expression in civil society. 
Nor, least of ali, can laicity be interpreted as a denial of the value of transcen-
dence or as the enlightened self-sufficiency of reason, with the latter becoming 
the sole source for the solution of every single existential problem. On the 
contrary the laic, being aware of the boundaries of human reason and of 
the impossibility of constructing an ethics applicable erga omnes, deems the 
religious point of view to be a precious reference point for individual and 
social issues. The laicity of the State consists in "neutrality" in terms of the 
visions of the world that are compatible with the Rule of Law and, above ali, 
it resides in the fact that the legitimacy of decisions and institutional roles is 
uniquely connected to respect of established rules and not to the espousal or 
rejection of religious or philosophical principles. Once this approach has been 
embraced, it is clear that even religion, like any other vision of the world, can 
indeed profitably nourish public debate.8 Laicity - which should, however, be 
on its guard against the danger of contradicting its own principles - does not 
force believers to take part in the public disputation on etsi deus non daretur, 
7 When Bobbio states that "laicity expresses a method rather than a content", since "the laic 
attitude is not a new culture in itself, but a condition for the cohabitation of ali possible cultures", 
this distinction (between method and content) cannot be followed too closely since the laic, who 
assesses "the cohabitation of ali possible cultures extremely positively", has already implemented an 
ethical choice, and consequendy seeks to create and uphold the conditions for such cohabitation. 
N . BOBBIO, "Perché non ho firmato il 'Manifesto laico' ", in E . MARZO - C. OCONE (eds.), Manifesto 
laico (Roma - Bari, Laterza, 1999 ) , p. 1 27 . 
8 J . HABERMAS, "La religione nella sfera pubblica", in ID., Tra scienza e fede ( 2 0 0 5 ) , Italian 
translation (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2 0 0 8 ) , pp. 1 9 - 2 1 and J . RAWLS, Politicai Liberalism (New York, Co-
lumbia University Press, 1996), pp. 90-95. 
— 254 — 
THE LAIC CHOOSES CRITICAL REASON 
just as it does not impose upon non-believers the requirement of behaving etsi 
deus dare tur.9 It demands, instead, that ali persons, believers and non believ-
ers, fully accept the established procedures for creation of consensus and for 
reaching decisions (starting with the majority principle), which could be de-
fined as rules of composition of the several visions of the world. In contrast, 
a religion that seeks to be able to operate overtly and occupy a public space 
(as is currendy the case in Europe with Islam and other religions) does not 
need the consensus of others, but rather requires its followers to abide by 
the rules that are to be recognised independendy of personal beliefs of any 
nature. Hence it is the rules and not the contents that allow such a religion 
to be manifested, and consequendy they have to be accepted etsi Deus non 
daretur. A religion or a politicai ideology which - for any reason - denies 
the legitimacy of such principles would automatically place itself outside 
the laic State.10 In other words a laic cannot follow the message that Paul ad-
dressed to the Christians in ancient Rome: nulla potestas nisi a Deo (Letter to 
Romans, 13,1). The status of being a citizen, enjoying rights, having a dignity 
and a morality, abiding by the rules, cannot be subordinated to the worshipper 
status, which obeys the dogma and the authorities of a certain church. For 
laics, in a public space there are no criticism-free zones, but this by no means 
leads them to the conclusion that in the absence of absolute values, "anything 
goes". The same applies to faith: the laic cannot accept the idea put forward 
by Dostoevskij' that "if God does not exist, then everything is possible", since 
only God could inspire moral actions. To forestali man's temptation to act as 
God, the laic, precisely by virtue of being laic, need not necessarily think in 
the manner of Ivan Karamazov;11 on the other hand, a hybris of reason that 
has led to fanaticism has been nurtured not only by various strands of philo-
sophy and by atheistic and materialistic ideologies, but also by religious con-
cepts. Etsi deus daretur ed etsi deus non daretur, freedom of religion and free-
9 A striking violation of the principle of laicity can be found in the A Letter Concerning Tolera-
tion by J. Locke, according to whom in a laic and tolerant State there can be no place for the non 
believers. "Those denying the existence of God, he writes, cannot be tolerated by any means, be-
cause for atheists neither promises, nor the contracts or oaths, that are constrains of the civil society, 
can be regarded as inviolable and sacred; moreover if the belief in God is banished, everything in the 
world would be corrupted"; J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) (London, Routledge 
1991), p. 53. 
1 0 G . SALVEMINI, "Libertà ideologica" ( 1 9 4 8 ) , Opere, voi. V , Scritti sulla scuola (Milano, Feltri-
nelli, 1966), p. 129. 
11 This argument, as pointed out by Zagrebelsky, can evidently be tumed on its head: "if we 
believe in God, we can believe he is with us, Gott mit uns, and, upon this principle, we can place 
ourselves beyond good and evil, since God is beside us"; G. ZAGREBELSKY, Contro l'etica della verità 
cit., p. 83. 
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dom from religion are two principles that have equal dignity in the laic State,12 
under the condition that whoever adopts them acknowledges the non reli-
gious nature of the legitimacy of the State itself.13 
3 . THE ADVOCATES OF LAICITY AND OF CONFESSIONALISM ARE NOT LAICS 
Both believers and non believers can thus be laic. This notwithstanding, 
one can hardly consider as laic the set of believers and non believers who 
do not respect freedom of individual conscience, or those who aim to ensure 
a privileged position in the public arena for a particular religion or vision of 
the world. Such groups interpret the legitimacy of the State not in terms of 
compliance with the Rule of Law, but of conformity to religious principles 
or values of another nature, thus confusing, in the most extreme cases, reli-
gious principles with the main politicai goals, or sacred scripture with the 
Constitution or a politicai agenda. Despite holding diametrically opposed po-
sitions, the advocates of laicity and the confessionalists nevertheless share a 
violation of the principle of laicity. But let us briefly review their respective 
positions. Those regarded as advocates of laicity argue that the distinction be-
tween God and Caesar acts as a divide which hinders criticism or participa-
tion in public discussion on religious grounds. In the public sphere, they 
do not grant equal dignity to the positions inspired by religion; they aim to 
relegate the religious dimension to a basically private arena, or markedly limit 
public expression of one or more religions, even if the religion or religions in 
question abide by the Rule of Law. Moreover, they demand that believers as 
such should be in some sense penalised, maintaining that the paramount con-
dition for access to public discussion must be that of thinking and acting "as if 
God did not exist"; they ascribe to the State the task of taking the place of 
individual choice of conscience, and they endeavour to use religion as instru-
mentum regni. In short, advocates of laicity attempt to assert some privileged 
truth, in an anti-religious manner, or deem the non-religious perspective to be 
12 On this, see G. FORNERO, Laicità debole e laicità forte cit., pp. 261-265, which carefully warns 
against an ideological use of the principle etsi Deus non daretur. 
13 Rousseau wrote: "in present times, where there is no longer, nor can there never be, an ex-
clusive national religion, it is necessary to tolerate ali the religions that tolerate the others, as long as 
their dogma have nothing contrary to the duties of the citizens. On the other hand, whoever dares to 
state that: "Outside the church there is no salvation" has to be expelled from the State, except in the 
case where the church represents the State and the pope is the prince. Such a dogma can only be 
applied to a theocratic State; in any other State it is dangerous"; J.-J. ROUSSEAU, Social Contract 
(1763) (Kila, MT, Kessinger Publishing, 1998), p. 149. 
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the most favourable.14 But any such approach ends up attributing, in different 
forms and degrees, an ethical task to the State. In this context it is hardly sur-
prising that one of the most uncompromising theorists of the ethical State, 
Giovanni Gentile, did not hesitate to remark that "the ethical State is a fairy-
tale".15 Acting analogously, yet from the opposite perspective, a confessional 
State ensures more favourable treatment for the disciples of a given religion, 
non-believers being penalised in the public arena; by the same token, it does 
not assure ali religions the same public support (with regard to taxation, for 
instance, or the school system).16 Equally, a confessional approach is mani-
fested by believers who do not acknowledge that the legitimacy of the State, 
its institutions and politicai decisions are not dependent on respect for reli-
gious principles. Such believers tend not to abide by the rules whenever 
the latter depart from their own principles of faith (an exception should be 
made, in this case, for the extreme case of a conscientious objector, a right 
perfecdy in line with the laic principle and legally safeguarded), attributing 
greater moral force to respect for the precepts issued by a religious authority 
compared to the respect that should be due to the rules of the State. They 
demand that the State should choose a religion (almost always their own) 
as the officiai or the preferred creed, and they do not recognise that the sense 
of life may not coincide with the religious interpretation. They firmly believe 
that there is no alternative between God and Nothingness. 
4 . W E HAVE TO BE LAIC BECAUSE WE ARE FALLIBLE AND "IGNORANT" 
The conception of laicity embodied by the heading of this section is one 
based on freedom and possibility of criticism. It can be supported by two 
lines of argument. There is a gnoseological argument: laicity understood as 
personal behaviour, and the State based upon postulates of a cognitive nature, 
14 This is what E. Lecaldano does with great clarity, seemingly to consider as not authentic a life 
inspired by religious principles, when he writes: "atheism is the most favourable intellectual frame 
for the establishing of a morality", since, "only when human beings have put aside - and buried -
God will they be able to live and fully follow the demands concerning their lives and follow them in 
the right directions"; E. LECALDANO, L'etica senza Dio (Roma - Bari, Laterza, 2006), p. xi. 
15 G . GENTILE, Genesi e struttura della società (1930) (Firenze, Sansoni, 1975), p. 37. 
16 Salvemini wrote in a famous essay on laicity: "the laic school should not impose upon stu-
dents religious, philosophical or politicai behefs, according to authorities that have been removed 
from the control of reason. It should instead allow the students to create for themselves, with 
complete freedom and consciousness, their own politicai, philosophical and religious beliefs"; G. SAL-
VEMINI, "Che cos'è la laicità" (1907), in ID., Il programma scolastico dei clericali (Firenze, La Nuova 
Italia, 1951), p. 34. 
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versus a sociological argument, which holds that laicity itself finds its best 
guarantee in the "open society", and in allowing more effective satisfaction 
of the "feeling of religiousness". 
Let us start with the gnoseological argument. Laicity, taken as fully open to 
criticism and willing to contemplate self-criticism, is a principle inherent in 
the very idea of an "open society" (open to the largest possible number of 
visions of the world and closed only to intolerant minds). It can be defended 
according to three theories, analysed in depth elsewhere, which we will briefly 
recali here: 
a) the "fallibility of human knowledge": as stressed by Karl Popper 
and, as already highlighted by Alfred Tarski in his Semantic theory of truth 
(which demonstrates that it is logically impossible to demonstrate the defini-
tive truth of any theory), any claims of infallibility - and thus of having abso-
lute knowledge - are totally disrupted; 
b) the "dispersal of human knowledge": as demonstrated by Friedrich 
von Hayek: the greater portion of knowledge is linked to "situations that are 
peculiar in time and space" and is produced "on the spot", only when a pro-
blem needs to be solved; therefore this implies that it is impossible to centra-
lise ali knowledge. It follows that any claims for omniscience supposedly cap-
able of planning for the whole of society are demolished at their very roots; 
c) the "Hume law": it is not logically possible to derive values from 
facts. Thus there can be no objective ethics based on an empirical foundation 
which can be applied erga omnes; the moral choices derive from conscience 
and not from science. The latter assists us in moral choices, but cannot re-
place it. 
If in science it is not possible to establish with certainty what is true - for 
stricdy epistemological reasons - then nobody can own the entire knowledge 
base that would make it feasible to draft ah imis a society; furthermore, if in 
the ethical sphere there is no rational methodology for assessing the objective 
superiority of a value, then criticai discussion between fallible individuals be-
comes the only tool for dealing with and attempting to solve common 
problems. This is the "open society", where there is scope for the widest possible 
number of visions of the world, philosophical conceptions, ideologies, politi-
cai ideas and also religious beliefs - for the majority, but not for ali. In the 
"open society" only the intolerant are denied the right to citizenship, since 
they aim to impose their viewpoint with brute force, thereby contravening 
the tenets of the Rule of Law. These are individuals who have the presump-
tion of possessing absolute truths. If laicity coincides with the adoption of a 
criticai attitude, with the rejection of fundamentalism, and embodies a contin-
uous approach of doubt and research, then we have to be laic because we are 
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fallible, since knowledge is necessarily dispersed and there is no objective 
criterion for determining what is right and what is not right. 
5 . W E HAVE TO BE LAIC IF WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE THE BEST SATISFACTION OF RE-
LIGIOUS SENTIMENT 
Here we present a threefold sociological argument. Insofar as the commu-
nity of criticai discussion represented by the "open society" is a laic space 
freed from privileged viewpoints, it represents the most adequate environment 
for satisfying the "demand for religiousness". Three arguments can be put 
forward in support of this approach: 
a) What is important is to promote continuous dialogue among fallible 
individuals who have in common the attempt to solve problems by putting 
forward alternative solutions. Admittedly, the laic principle holds that un-
questionable dogma is denied the right of citizenship in the public arena, 
and it is certainly true that criticai discussion presumes the absence of infall-
ible people. However, it contributes to the elimination of human absolutes 
from the historical world. That is to say, criticai discussion is a tool that tends 
to eliminate indubitable knowledge, thereby reducing the possibility that rea-
son might become the Goddess of Reason and averting the risk that the 
sphere of faith may be inappropriately occupied by mortai absolutes. Human 
knowledge that is not absolute and a historical world that is not sacred saves 
the space of transcendence: absolutes must be sought outside this world. 
b) Religion represents a private choice, pertaining to an individual's 
conscience. In a laic State, the cruciai principle in force holds that conscience 
is the judge of power rather than the opposite state of affairs. Compared to 
the States characterised by laicity and confessionalism (leaving aside theocra-
cies and totalitarian States), the laic State ensures the inviolability of con-
science and refrains from judging the morality or immorality of private 
choices, insofar as religious matters are concerned. It safeguards, on the 
one hand, the autonomy of politicai power vis-à-vis religious power, and on 
the other, individuals and their freedoms, while including freedom of worship 
without State interference. As stated by Guido Calogero, laicity "is not, in its 
innermost essence, a protection of the State from the church. It is the defence 
of every man from the intrusiveness of bad States and churches.17 Religions 
17 G. CALOGERO, Filosofia del dialogo (Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 1962), p. 125. The main 
path, according to Calogero, for avoiding this intrusiveness is to refrain from considering the Church 
and the State as superior entities with respect to the individuals that compose them; ibid., p. 130. 
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are free to instil transcendental elements into our daily lives, to proclaim sal-
vation and revealed knowledge, provided they do not use force or appeal for 
the support of the coercive power of the State to eliminate the dimension of 
the choice of conscience. 
c) If a religion is private in its specific choice, it is public in its public 
expressions. A laic State not only guarantees private freedom to worship, 
but also ensures the potential wider public expression of religions, provided 
they are compatible with the regulations of the Rule of Law and, in particular, 
with the legitimation of institutions and their decisions. As noted earlier, citi-
zens are free to take part in public discussion even in the name of religious 
values (on the human person, life, etc.). What is not granted in a laic State 
is to adduce any value (religious or otherwise) in order to challenge the legiti-
macy of decisions and institutional roles. Now, if on the one hand the laic 
State does not judge morality in private life and the religiousness of citizens, 
on the other it can create conditions - as has occurred over the course of his-
tory - for the widest public expression of religious ideas, while upholding two 
cruciai principles: ali creeds should be treated in the same manner, and steps 
must be taken to prevent the establishment of such conditions from having a 
negative impact upon non believers. Any attempt at introducing a hierarchy, 
supporting one specific religion over others, or promoting a religion that pe-
nalises non believers or, on the contrary, granting favourable treatment to non 
believers, implies, as we have seen, a violation of the laicity principle. 
Given these three remarks we may conclude that inasmuch as the laic or-
der of the "open society" allows a broad offer of "competing" religious the-
ories, i.e. the most widespread expression of the largest possible number of 
religious principles compatible with the Rule of Law, it can be characterised 
as the one that best satisfies the demand for religiousness. Just as scientific 
theories constitute the answers to scientific problems, equally, religious beliefs 
offer the answers to religious issues. At the same time, just as deeper insight is 
gained into the problems of science when there is an increase in the number 
of schools and theories competing to achieve the most advanced results, by 
the same token the momentous issues of religion (the meaning of life, the ul-
timate explanations on the universe, etc.) can be given more appropriate 
answers as the spectrum of religions becomes wider and richer. It is certainly no 
coincidence that empirical research shows the highest rate of believers in the 
United States, where there is the largest number of religious faiths.18 
18 R. BOUDON, Declin de la morale? Declin des valeurs? (Paris, PUF, 2002), pp. 34-36. 
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T H E E C O N O M Y O F I M A G E S , O R T H E S Y M B O L I C A L H O R I Z O N 
O F S O C I A L E X C H A N G E * 
1. Sending to press his collection of essays entided II Buongoverno [Good 
Government],' Einaudi chooses to insert in the body of the text some details 
about the Sienese fresco by Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Effeets of Good and Bad 
Government on Town and Country [Effetti del Buon e del Cattivo Governo 
nella campagna e nella città] (1338-1340). The exact intention of this gesture 
is not fully apparent. However, it makes one think that this is not just a dec-
orative decision, but that it has something to do, in a profound way, with the 
theoretical objectives of the volume and, more generally, of the statesman's 
thought. Now, faced with Einaudi's decision two interpretive lines are open 
to us. The most immediate one is that of reading and decoding the image 
in its relationship with the text; of analyzing the content of the fresco, the his-
torical reconstruction of the environment and the sources of the painting; and 
eventually comparing how much more or differently (with respect to the 
ideal of good government) the image can express something that the essays 
contained in the collection do not. Going in this direction one might find 
the analysis of Lorenzetti's work by P. Schiera, N. Rubinstein, Q. Skinner use-
ful. These scholars have highlighted the merging of politics and theology in 
the painting.2 There is, however, a second reading, more radically philosophi-
cal, which consists not so much in an interrogation of the painting, but in the 
interrogation of the gesture of putting the artistic image in a collection of 
* Trans, by Marika Josephson. 
1 L. EINAUDI, Il buongoverno. Saggi di economia e politica (1897-1954), E . Rossi (ed.) (Bari La-
terza, 1954). 
2 Cf. P. SCHIERA, "H bonum commune fra corpi e disciplina: alle radici della politica nel medio-
evo", Democrazia e Diritto (Sept.-Dec. 1991), pp. 31-51; N . RUBINSTEIN, "Politicai Ideas in Senese 
Art: The Frescoes by Ambrogio Lorenzetti", Journal of the Warburg and Contauld Institutes, XXI 
(1958), pp. 179-207; Q. SKINNER, Vision of Politics. II. Renaissance Virtues, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
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essays that work on one register (namely an economic-political one) apparently 
far from that of imagery and the aesthetic experience. This is the interpretive 
direction that I would like to propose, reading Einaudi's choice as an occasion 
for opening reflection on the role images play in the social construction of 
sense and, more generally, the comprehensive symbolical frame of living-in-
common. In a perspective such as this, artistic images inhabit every discourse, 
even those which are economic-political, in a demanding way, more so than 
merely as an exposition of determinate contents, because they work with that 
which, in words, remains "off the field". They allude - outside of what they 
concretely demonstrate - to the relationship that society establishes with its 
own self-representation, offering a cue for reflecting on how philosophy 
can reckon with the symbolical matrices that contribute to constructing social 
identity.3 On this point the question that Paolo Silver stri poses in his recent 
study dedicated to the theme of good government in Einaudi becomes parti-
cularly interesting:4 Can Lorenzetti's fresco, outside of its contents, claim to 
have an intrinsic communicative-normative scope, or better, can this image 
of art not only represent an ideal form of society which escapes u-topically 
into the various reductionisms in which it develops the concrete conduct of 
human affairs, but also have a performative function for the spectator, guiding 
him toward a different view of reality? It is clear that replying to the question 
posed by Silvestri involves a deviation from the specific Einaudian legacy to a 
discussion that includes more about the anthropological and politicai signifi-
cance of images. It seems to me nevertheless that to attempt a reading in this 
sense could contribute to clarifying the mythical-ideal dimension of good gov-
ernment and offer us a series of elements which the simple decodification of 
Lorenzetti's fresco, as an illustration of the Einaudian text, simply could not. 
There are at least two stages of such a reading that seem to me inescapable: in 
the first place there is the comprehending of sense in which images have an 
intrinsic truth-telling capacity even in registers of knowing that are less aesthe-
tically minded-thanks to their symbolic potential of putting forward some-
3 A fundamental contribution to rethinking the role of the aesthetic in the social sciences and in 
particular in law is offered by the "dogmatic anthropology" of P. Legendre. See for example what is 
said in P. LEGENDRE, Della società come testo. Lineamenti di un'antropologia dogmatica, trans, it. and 
ed. P. Heritier (Torino, Giappichelli, 2 0 0 5 ) , pp. 1 2 7 - 1 6 7 ; ID., Dieu au miroir. Etude sur l'institution des 
images (Paris, Fayard, 1 9 9 4 ) , pp. 9 1 - 1 7 8 . For a synthetic portrait on this aspect of the philosophy 
of P. Legendre see P. HERITIER, "Legendre e la fondazione antropologica dell'estetica giuridica", in 
P. LEGENDRE, L'occidente invisibile, trans, it. and ed. P. Heritier (Torino, Giappichelli, 2 0 0 9 ) , pp. 8 9 -
118 . 
4 P. SILVESTRI, Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi, o del buon governo (Soveria Mannelli, Rubettino, 
2008), pp. 17-24. 
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thing that, if different, would remain unsaid; that is, indicating allusively to 
what is otherwise unavailable to us. The second stage would be comprehend-
ing in what sense the aesthetic-symbolic element could claim to have a norma-
tive dimension, that is, could have a constitutive role in the general economy 
of exchanges of sense that constitute the bond of a society, or better, that 
which keeps people together in a common identity even if that identity sepa-
rates from their constitutive differences. 
2. Before going direcdy into these two questions, an introduction is neces-
sary: to reach the anthropological and social significance of the production 
and the use of images one must have some distance from the "logocentric" 
system that characterizes the vast majority of our social knowledge (in as 
much as it claims to be an expression of Science). This does not so much sub-
stitute a knowledge of images but rather implements it, critically recognizing 
the capacity that images have to put different planes into relation with one 
another, to create identity and ties, and to establish belonging. And this is pre-
cisely the point: if we think about being able to saturate the social transmis-
sion of sense with the word, indecting it in many texts of juridical, politicai 
and economic doctrines, we remain impotent in understanding what is at 
work within the mechanisms of representation of the identities in which indi-
viduals recognize each other as subjects and collect themselves into a commu-
nity. If only logie is valuable, every experience that brings the iconic back to 
the scene should be removed or classified as irrational, but doing so impedes 
us from understanding the depth of its sense. 
The history of the relationship that the West has built with images risks 
being a history of this continuai removal. One sees it from the Platonic suspi-
cion of art through today's theories of visual communication. We have faced 
this paradox for millenia, in which we believe that it is necessary to remove 
images from our knowledge, in order to see better, as if we could see right 
there where there is nothing visible, as if the intelligible did not have anything 
to do with concrete forms. For this reason we tend to think of images preva-
lently on the register of aesthetic pleasure and not according to the epistemo-
logica! register of truth and the anthropological one in which we construct 
identities. This is what Plato's myth of the cave, for example, teaches us: Plato 
rejects images not in order to distance the concept of vision from knowledge, 
but in order to radically subjugate the knowledge of a different vision, purely 
intellectual, that has nothing to do with concrete visibility. This myth brings 
us to the heart of the Platonic trait of Western rationalism: the conviction, 
that is, that precisely that which cannot be seen with the bodily eyes is intel-
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ligible for the eyes of the mind, because only these are not disturbed by the 
impurity of passion and the ambiguous materiality of the body. 
This suspicion toward images which the West carries in its genetic code is 
properly articulated in a series of apparendy different registers, which, even in 
their differences, exhibit the same difficulty of thinking about this dimension 
in depth. I review three succincdy, as they are useful for the discussion that 
follows: 
a) The first register is stricdy tied to the Platonic model which attributes 
an insufficiency to artificial images with respect to truth because they are not 
real objects, but imitations of appearance rather than truth (Republic , X, 598 
b). In the mimetic trait that characterizes every image made by man there is a 
fictional dimension that is intrinsically illusory and that impedes looking into 
the face of what is really valuable.5 Said briefly: the image cannot teli the truth 
because it is ontologically empty, it doubles the real, building imaginary 
worlds and touching dimensions rendered opaque by sentiment and desire. 
If I want to know, I must distance myself from images, from appearances, 
from passions, as does the prisoner of Plato's cave, who, unshackled from 
his chains, is not contented by the shadows [skias], but "looks toward the 
light" [pros to phos anablepein] (Republic VII, 515 c). 
Even admitting that already in Plato and then in another way much more 
clearly in Neoplatonism, images can also have a positive role, in as much as 
they are copies that maintain some relationship with the originai,6 it yet 
remains true that the legacy of Platonism, as is underlined by Francois 
5 On the suspicion of images in Plato there are some classic places other than book X of the 
Republic, in which imitative art is defined as far from the truth because it produces illusory copies 
of objects, including the passage of the Sophist, 265-268 in which Plato classifies the art of imitation 
in the copy [eikastike techne] and in appearance [phantas t ike] . The first generates copies that are 
homologous to their models "such that their internai proportions are maintained", while the second 
produces images that are homologus to their models in an apparent way because "the craffsmen 
nowadays dismiss what's true and work at producing in their images not the proportions that are 
but those that seem beautiful" (Sophi s t , 236a). 
6 Accordingly, the position of Plato's images is ambivalent because, on the one hand, the ana-
logical dimension of mimesis is thought of in degrading terms, from which we get the condemnation 
of imitative art as incapable of reaching the truth, on the other hand, it is thought of in relational 
terms (cf. Timaeus 28a-29b) for which the empirical reality as a manifestation of the ideal world 
is valued. Cf. A. VASILIU, Du Diaphane. Image, milieu, lunmière dans la pensée antique e médiévale 
(Paris, Vrin, 1997), pp. 208 ff. The positive aspect of the analogical dimension of the iconic will be 
particularly developed in Neoplatonism, where the essential cosmological function of putting the dif-
ferent ontological planes of reality into relationship with one another is attributed to the image. 
"Every sphere of being", explains E. von Ivanka, "tends to generate an image of itself in an inferior 
sphere, which creates a relationship with the first like a ray of sun to a luminous source", cf. E. VON 
IVANKA, Platonismo cristiano. Ricezione e trasformazione del Platonismo nella patristica, trans, it. by 
E. Peroli (Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1992), p. 50. 
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Dagognet in his Philosophie de l'image, "decides what follows" in as much as 
it opens the path to devaluing the illusory trait of images, of their mixture of 
res factae and res fictae, as a result of which one risks "no longer knowing 
where the real is situated".7 
b) The second register instead sees in the image an uncontrollable sur-
plus, an intrinsic idolatrous quality determined by the fact that the image in-
corporates what it represents, and imposes it to sight. This is the Jewish 
legacy, by means of which we try to confront the power of images through a 
system of prohibition. The archetype of this position is found in Exoduc 
20:4-6, the Biblical commandment which prohibits the production and adora-
tion of images.8 What should be noted about this, however, is that the Old 
Testament prohibition is not based on the ontological insufficiency of the 
image, but on its oversufficiency - its surplus - of the tendency that images 
have to shackle the gaze, to eliminate liberty, and to impose themselves as 
idols to adore without any possibility of criticai distance.9 
With prohibition, the Hebrew Bible brings to the fore a position that 
returns every time the relationship with visual communication is in crisis: when 
the idolatrous risk of images is made ali too evident, it discards the purifying 
system of iconoclasm, founded on the conviction not only that one should, 
but that one must do without images. We discover a secularized residue of 
this attitude of radicai rejection in the apocolyptic-iconophobic rhetoric of 
certain criticai theories of mass communication that are not able to do other 
than denounce the invasion of the image - politicai propaganda, trash TV, 
etc. - but do not know how to get outside of that denouncing, when instead 
the problem is the good government of visibility and the criticai relation 
which one must learn to have with regard to it. 
c) The third system, finally, is tied to the fear of impurity, of the rational 
non-transparency of the image. The image, much more than the word, is 
stricdy connected to desire because it doesn't go along the path of formaliza-
tion, but exposes, without mediation, forms to our passion. This is the originai 
sin of the image, which has its archetypal figure in the sin of Ève, who "saw 
how beautiful the tree was and how good its fruit would be to eat" (Genesis 
7 Cf. F. DAGOGNET, Philosophie de l'image (Paris, Vrin, 1984), p. 25. 
8 A portrait of the principle problems posed by the Jewish prohibition of Exodus 20 can be 
found in K.-H. BERNHARD, Gott und Bild. Ein Beitrag zur Begriindung und Deutung des Bilderverbo-
tes im Alten Pestamente (Berlin, Evangelische Verlangftalt, 1956). In more synthetic terms, see 
G . SED-RAJNA, "L'argument de l'iconophobie juive", in F . BOESFLUG - N . LOSSKIJ (eds.), Nicée II 
787-1987. Douze siècles d'images religieuses (Paris, Cerf, 1987), pp. 81-88. 
9 Cf. M.-J. MONDZAIN, Le commerce des regards (Paris, Seuil, 2003), pp. 29 ff. 
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3,6).10 The image brings bodies to the fore and says that the intelligible is not 
directly accessible, but only indirectly, passing through the pulsating opacity 
of the flesh. Images cannot be controlied by the mind, they have everything to 
do with an incessant phantasmic production and lust. Tertullian, already in 
the second century, denounced the fact that they aroused a perverse and car-
nai fantasy11 and this sentence would return as a refrain in every puritanical 
persecution of images. 
In the contemporary epoch it is psychoanalysis which picks up this link 
between the image and desire, but, even in this case, it has not done so 
without ambiguity. After having recognized that the unconscious is played out 
fully upon images, and that therefore these play a fundamental role in the con-
struction of identity, Freud ends, however, by claiming that the iconic 
material should be translated into a conscious language,12 otherwise its effect is 
pathological. This because the associative logie of images does not permit a 
correct transmission of sense in as much as it is governed by a libidinal energy 
that appears irrational and that blocks communication of the subject with 
himself. 
3. How can we, however, overcome the logocentric system that we have 
inherited? How is it possible to critically confront these different registers 
of suspicion that are often transformed into a clear negation and destruction 
of images? I will try to respond to these questions through a genealogy of 
Western tradition to see if what founds the suspicion or refutation might 
not dialectically transform itself into an opportunity to negotiate a positive 
iconic thought, which recognizes in images the role that they have in the in-
dividuai and social construction of the human. To start with, a terminological 
clarification is useful because if we want to reinstate the anthropological func-
tion in the iconic we must see what is fully at stake in the experience of images 
and not just look at them as objects which interest us merely from an aesthetic 
point of view. Along this path the Greco-Hellenic philosophical genesis of the 
concept of the image proposed by M.-J. Mondzain13 will help. For one thing, 
10 For more on this, see R . DEBRAY, Vita e morte dell'immagine. Una storia dello sguardo in Oc-
cidente, trans, it. A. Pinotti (Milano, Il Castoro, 1999), p. 65. 
11 Cf. TERTULLIAN, De Virginibus velandis and De spectaculis. See further interesting observa-
tions by P. GOODRICH in Oedipus rex. Psychoanalysis, History, Law, London, University of California 
Press, 1995, pp. 56-57. 
12 Cf. what he says about J . - M . FERRY, Les grammaires de l'intelligence (Paris, Cerf, 2 0 0 4 ) , 
pp. 21-39. 
13 The observations that follow are from M. FISEROVA, "Image, sujet, pouvoir. Entretien avec 
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the Greek term eikon is not just a noun, but the residue of a verbal form of 
the present participle: when Plato or the Christian thinkers of the first millen-
ium speak of eikon they do not designate a thing, an object, but a "mode of 
appearance in the visible spectrum".14 When speaking of visible objects, the 
figurative works, the neuter eikonisma is in fact used in Greek. The more cor-
rect translation of eikon would therefore be "the similar": a reality that acts by 
resembling what is other than itself, which appears and makes itself appear as 
the form of "as if', that is, an illusion which imitates, but is not that which it 
represents. What interests us is not therefore the objective dimension of the 
image, but its operational force, its capacity to generate ties to what is other 
than itself, a capacity that is precisely of the image in a different and more in-
tense way from what is of the word, because the image exhibits its own con-
tent not through abstract codification, but through the reproduction of a visible 
similarity. In this sense, the Greek term shows as image both, first of ali, a 
system of analogous relation, and then only successively an object, as a specific 
modality through which this system acts on the person who produces and 
uses it. This dimension - both fictional and analogous - of the image is a 
weakness for Plato because it is not possible to construct a knowledge on that 
which seems, on that which appears to be other, but is not in and of itself. In 
this way, the image has a derivative ontological consistency which, along the 
lines of the copy, resembles, but is not what it resembles, and has scarce noe-
tic value, because it tends toward illusion (Republic, 598c). It happens differ-
endy in Christianity: in Christian thought, hinging on the doctrine of the in-
carnation, according to which God himself becomes the visible image in the 
Son, this functional and analogical dimension transforms itself into an oppor-
tunity. The incarnation represents the fundamental theoretical system for a 
general justification of visibility as a place of grace, therefore as a place of 
presence and as a figure of the immanence of truth in its image, because the 
Son, in the moment in which he is eikon tou Theou, image of God (Colossians 
1:15), he is also the only way given to man to see God, since in Him and only 
in Him the Father rendere himself visible (John 14:9): "Whoever has seen me 
has seen the Father".15 Instead of constructing an obstacle, in Christianity, 
Marie José Mondzain", Sens public. Revue électronic intemationale, 1 (2008), available at http:// 
www.sens-public.org. 
14 Ibid., p. 4. 
15 Note that "Whoever has seen me has seen the Father" from John 14:9 is Christ's answer to 
Philip's request "Lord, show us the Father, that is ali we need". It should not be surprising, there-
fore, that the concept of the image would be thought of in early Christianity in relation to complex 
theological questions on the nature of intratrinitary relations, because it is in the particular relation-
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the analogical nature of the image becomes the indispensable instrument for 
rendering visible and therefore experimentable that which is absent and invi-
sible. In it the resemblance of the form does not simply instali the simulation, 
but the space of a play of forces which hinges on the symbolical exchange. In 
such a perspective the difference between the image and its model does not 
represent a loss and a consummation of the originai truth, but the horizon in-
side of which a return to what is outside of simple visibility is established. 
This symbolical quality is an element that allows a Christian theory of 
images to confront, in a different way, the other two registers of suspicion 
which share a fear of the power of the image. From this point of view the em-
blematic moment in which they jettison the bases for a valorization of images 
is the iconoclastie crisis of the 8th and 9th century, where an encounter with 
the legitimacy of icons becomes an occasion to build a general theory of 
visible representation, valid not just for sacred images. The object of contention 
in such an iconoclastie encounter is the idolatrous risk that inhabits not only 
the cult use of images, but also their politicai use and their social relevance. 
The iconophiles win their battle because they are in a position to demonstrate 
that the image is not an impure object which magically incorporates the proper 
model, and in doing so produces a fusion with the spectator, but is a tran-
sitive space which refers outside of itself and therefore constructs a reserve of 
freedom offered to sight to negotiate a sense of the visible world. Only in this 
horizon, as many contemporary authors have highlighted,16 can one compre-
hend the fundamental role for ali thought, following from the dialectic which 
is established between idol and icon. Idols do not allow one to distinguish be-
tween representation and that which is represented - whether it be God, or 
some sovereign power - for which outside of imagination there is nothing: the 
image is simply swallowed by the gaze, consumed, because it wholly coincides 
with its sense. Even in this case that which iconophile theologians cali eikon, 
icon, is not first of ali a particular type of religious image (a meaning that we 
today attribute to the word), but rather the particular transitive quality that 
every image must have in order not to produce idolatry. As we read in a pas-
sage of Basii of Caesarea, among the most cited in the inconoclastic encoun-
ship of identity in the difference between Father and Son that a positive idea of the iconic relation-
ship matures. On this, cf. G. LADNER, "The Concept of the Image in the Greek Fathers and the By-
zantine Iconoclastie Controversy", DOP, 7 (1953), pp. 1-34. 
16 Other than the work of M . - J . MONDZAIN, Image, Icon, Economy: the Byzantine origins of the 
contemporary lmaginary, trans. Rico Franses (Stanford, Stanford University, 2 0 0 5 ) to which we will 
return, the analysis of the idol/icon pair offered by J.-L. Marion is fundamental, The idol and 
distance: five studies, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (New York, Fordham University Press, 2 0 0 1 ) ; ID., 
God Without Being (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1 9 9 1 ) . 
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ter: "The honor given to image rightly passes over to the prototype"17 that is, 
the anological dimension of the image permits an analogical path that takes 
one from visible reality to the invisible reality of the represented. 
That said, the question becomes how images can acquire this iconic qual-
ity? To say that an image capable of generating a difference - a margin be-
tween the representation and that which is represented - is iconic might 
not be enough to redeem it from the ancient testamentary prohibition, or 
to counter the suspicion with the opaque "materiality" of images. The econ-
omy opened by the incarnation of Christ requires negotiating an inseparable 
link between the visible and the invisible for which, once the difference has 
been given, must also describe their relation. For a Christian, thinking of in-
carnation means not being able any longer to conceive of the invisible as in-
telligible, as such, without passing through the mediation of corporal reality, 
nor simply condemning images made by the human hand as intrinsically ido-
latrous, or as simply produced from carnai fantasy. If God chose to render 
himself visible, then the visibility of bodies (in their materiality)18 is a space 
for the manifestation of truth, and artistic images are an instrument for ren-
dering visible Christ, the Mother of God, and the Saints. It is not possible 
here to reconstruct how Christianity - Patristic first, then Byzantine - would 
have been able to apply the notion of eikon elaborated in the Christological 
and trinitarian debates, without a solution of continuity for artificial images. 
It should, however, be remembered that this passage has never signified a 
total triumph of visibility, but has generated an inseparable dialectic between 
the iconic dimension and the idolatrous dimension of sacred images and as 
a consequence of the images tout court. This dialectic makes it such that 
the image is never far from the risk of idolatry and that, rather, it needs a pre-
cise canon that regulates the production and individual and communitary use 
of it. To combat idolatry means to combat the simple submission to images 
and to make the symbolical exchange generate a difference not just between 
1 7 BASIL OF CAESAREA, De Spiritu Sancto, 18, 4 5 (S. Ch. 17bis, p. 4 0 6 ) . Note that Basii refers in 
this case to the image of the emperor and not to a sacred image. 
18 See for example what John of Damascus says about the positivity of the material: "Is not the 
thrice-precious and thrice blessed wood of the cross, matter? Is not the holy and august mountain, 
the place of the skull, matter? Is not the life-giving and the life hearing rock, the holy tomb, the 
source of resurrection, matter? Is not the ink and the all-holy book of the Gospel, matter? [...] Either 
do away with reverence and veneration for ali these or submit to the tradition of the Church and 
allow veneration of images of God and friends of God, sanctified by name and therefore oversha-
dowed by the grace of the divine Spirit". See JOHN OF DAMASCUS, Contra imaginum caluniatores or-
ationes tres, I, 16 (Berlin - New York, Ed. Kotter, De Gruyer, 1975, p. 90, eng. transl. by A. Louth, 
Three Treatise on the Divine Images, New York, Saint Vladimir Seminary Press, 2003). 
— 269 — 
GRAZIANO LINGUA 
what is seen and the invisible, but also between the spectator and the image. 
Only if man is not incorporated and seduced by the power of the image will 
he be able to cultivate a criticai sensibility and not be a servant of vain idols. 
But to do this he must not only recognize this difference, but also govern it. 
The most consistent legacy of this foundational moment for the theory of 
the image is this: the register with which one governs images and their role in 
society should not be one of simple prohibition, nor one of their ontological 
devaluing, nor one of puritanical condemnation. The aesthetic experience in 
its most full sense is a fundamental anthropological experience because it al-
lows the elaboration of a relationship with itself and with others, on the con-
dition that the images preserve a space for freedom in which it would be pos-
sible to construct a criticai gaze. This is how one enters into the heart of the 
problem of the anthropological and social function of images which can jus-
tify the affirmation according to which a work of art like Lorenzetti's fresco of 
good government is in a position to say something that would remain other-
wise unsayable. The suspicion of images is rooted in the incapacity to recog-
nize and govern this difference between that which is present, and that which 
is absent, between the user and the image, and, more fully, between society 
and its symbolical foundation. A re-evaluation of the iconic in social knowl-
edge comes from an awareness that this criticai difference is the construction 
site of the relationship between the symbolical relation and additional sense, 
or, to use an expression from Pierre Legendre, the space of a construction of 
relation to Reference,19 from which not only individuai life but also every 
social bond is established. 
4. It is necessary, however, to make one further step. If so far in the dis-
covery of the symbolical dimension, we stili have not reached the heart of the 
institutional dimension of images, then we have not, actually, responded to 
the question from which we started, that is, to what Paolo Silvestri defines 
as the communicative-normative dimension of the image of Lorenzetti. We 
have simply said that the image constitutes something additional to what 
the word can not say, because it is an advocate of symbolical exchanges. 
To say it has a normative function means that we affirm that its addition does 
not just happen without any great effect on sense, but that it is constitutive of 
the same discourse that is used in economy and in politics. What I am saying 
19 Legendre speaks both of the Reference and the Third symbolical to signify the unreachable 
place in relation to which "society is made". Cf. P. LEGENDRE, Della società come testo cit., pp. 133 ff. 
See what P. Heritier says in the introduction to the Italian edition cited, pp. 18 ff. 
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is that the mythological-symbolical function of the image does not serve only 
as an illustration of what the word cannot say, but that it is the basis of the 
institutional dimension, in a broad sense, a mechanism of imaginative con-
struction of the foundations of society. To explain this I borrow an intuition 
of Marie-José Mondzain that I find particularly interesting, related to the 
bond that, during the inconoclastic period, the Byzantine iconophiles con-
struct between the concept of eikon and the concept of oikonomia 20 The 
point of departure is the idea that Mondzain summarises in this way: "Who-
ever rejects the icon rejects the economy"21 that is, he who refutes the icon, 
does not refute just the image, but the entire economy. With this I do not 
mean just that he who negates the image negates the incarnation, as a provi-
dential economy of God, but also that he finds himself incapatile of compre-
hending the totality of human exchanges, "from the commerce and circula-
tion of signs to the commerce of things and the circulation of goods".22 To 
say that the image is the point upon which the economy rises or falls means 
therefore attributing to it a centrai role in the symbolical exchange that con-
stitutes society, actually, more radically, to affirm that without the image one 
does not have full access to a symbolical condition of the human. As Nike-
phoros of Costantinople, one of the most profound Byzantine iconophile 
thinkers, says, "It is not Christ, but the entire universe that disappears if there 
is no more [...] icon".23 
The term oikonomia, as others have noted, is not a Christian invention but 
is taken from classical Greek, and it is a notion largely utilized by Xenophon 
and Aristotle in Economy and Politics. In Christianity, however, it becomes a 
very full term that serves to explain both the intratrinitary relations and the 
intrahuman relations, whose plurisemanticity can be seen from the Latin 
translation of oikonomia which is rendered both as dispositio and dispensa-
rio.24 Dispositio, like the Greek word systema, means organization: from this 
point of view the great organizer is God, the orderer of the world through 
providence [pronoia], with organizer being whatever sovereign instantiation 
20 Cf. M . - J . MONDZAIN, Image, Icon, Economy : The Byzantine Origins of the Contemporary 
Imaginary cit. Further observations can be found in ID., Le commerce des regards cit., pp. 69-73. 
21 Ibid. cit., p. 14. 
22 M.-J. Mondzain in M. FISEROVA, Image, sujet, pouvoir. Entretien avec Marie José Mondzain 
cit., p. 9. 
2 3 NIKEPHOROS OF COSTANTINOPLE, Antirrhetici, I , 2 0 ( P G 1 0 0 , 2 4 4 D ) . 
2 4 A reconstruction of the concept of oikonomia can be found in G. AGAMBEN, The Kingdom 
and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, trans, by L. Chiesa (with 
M. Mandarini) (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011). 
19 
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acts as God's deputy on earth. The dispensato instead is the trait of the patris-
tic concept of oikonomia that is more properly Christian because it presup-
poses the idea that God spends something of himself, that he dispenses his 
own richness and invests the Son - that is, that which is most dear - in the 
world.25 The dispensario implies the complement and the historical unveiling 
of a divine pian. It therefore hinges on the idea of incarnation, that is, the idea 
that from the Christological event in advance, it is not possible to think of rea-
lity as an intramundane world, without understanding it as the place which 
God, the invisible, comes to inhabit (John 1:14). It is not the case therefore 
that the defense of images is founded direcdy on incarnation. The dispensario 
is the crisis of the simple disposirio, it is therefore that instance of transcen-
dence, that instance that challenges from the inside the reduction of the orga-
nization of the world as a simple intramundane order. The dispensario is the 
motive for which, in organization, the power should be legitimized from an 
authority that is always an invisible principle. The oikonomia therefore be-
comes the good governing of the relationship between that which is seen with 
its functional rules and that which cannot be seen, but that even not being 
seen is manifested in that which is seen, in the way that the Son in flesh 
manifests the Father who no one has seen. We understand it this way because 
the image is necessary for the oikonomia, since the image is the place where the 
relationship between the visible and the invisible is not opposition, but the 
inhabiting of the one in the other. And one can see how far we have travelled 
down that road from the texts of Plato's Republic with respect to the eikon. 
Here the invisible is not the abstracdy intelligible, but it is that which is articu-
lated to visibility and which constitutes authority, the exousia. The form of 
this relationship is the dispensario because there is no more separation be-
tween the invisible and the visible, but rather a correlation of one in the other, 
a reciprocai exchange. This entails spending; investment of the invisible in the 
visible. 
The Byzantines realize that it is not possible to separate the iconic register 
from the historical register of management and the administration of the 
world, but doing this noticeably they enlarge the paradigm of management 
which is implicated in the concept of eikonomia, for which the image becomes 
an essential system, irreducible when one speaks of how a community con-
structs and governs the relations that characterize it. Byzantium tells us that 
one cannot live without images, because the making of images is at the heart 
2 5 M . - J . MONDZAIN, "Préface", in NICÉPHORE, Discours contre les iconoclastes (Paris, Klinck-
sieck, 1989), p. 22. 
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of human existence, but at the same time, it recognizes that the image has its 
own economy, that is, it should be governed, it can transform itself into an 
idol, into falsity, into carnai temptation. This true and proper short circuit be-
tween eikon and oikonomia is revealed to be, thus, particularly fruitful with 
respect to the problem we are treating. The profound sense of the gesture 
of Einaudi can open us up in fact to a different consideration of the role of 
the aesthetic in human science and therefore also in economy. If the image 
is first of ali a system with which man governs the sharing of sense, this is 
not only important for its content, but perhaps more profoundly for its opera-
tive dimension, for the fact that it is an essential element in the human force of 
giving sense to experience. According to iconophile theology, the iconoclast is 
he who precludes himself from the instruments used to understand the sym-
bolical nature of exchanges, he who thinks of the exchange in terms of an 
equilibrium of calculations and who does not recognize that every exchange 
is an exchange of meanings in which what is gained is had only in as much 
as there is investment, when there is dispensario, that is, there is an economy 
of excess. He who precludes himself from a relationship with images pre-
cludes himself from the comprehension of economy, that is, is not able to un-
derstand the same mechanism by which both the identity of the subject and 
the identity of a society are constituted in relational terms in the same act in 
which one identifies with the same culture that one has constructed. That is 
why the system for governing images cannot be one of prohibition, but one of 
difference, because that which the visible tells us, in as much as it is lived from 
the operative dimension of the image, is the demand of constantly negotiating 
the apparition of that which is not seen, that is, of the incommensurable over-
abundance of that which is unavailable to us. And only by maintaining this 
difference can there be a good government of exchanges, that is, a good gov-
ernment of the city. 
5. The fact that precisely at the moment in which the images are at the 
origin of a conflict fought in blood - as was the iconoclastie Byzantine crisis -
does the nexus between image and economy become centrai in the debate, 
and economy comes to signal how, when Western thought has made the nat-
ure of images subject, it has made them as full as they will be from an anthro-
pological point of view. On the other hand, in the Christian thought of the 
first millenium the notion of the image was never thought of on the merely 
aesthetic-decorative level, but it always enters into play in cruciai theological 
questions of the intratrinitary relation between the divine persons, Christol-
ogy, and the set of relationships that tie the divine world and the cosmos. Par-
ticularly important, however, is that the stakes were not only theological or 
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generally epistemological, but their implications were immediately directed 
toward the politicai and social level. To say that the person who refutes 
images refutes in toto the oikonomia means to presuppose that the images en-
ter into play in the process of social identification and in the constitution of 
the bonds and the symbolical exchanges to such an extent that it is important 
whether the images are accepted or refuted. As Marie-José Mondzain has 
shown in his works, the iconophiles of the 8th and 9th centuries, while defend-
ing the images from iconoclastie attack, do not defend just particular cult ob-
jects but the system that is at their back. The idea is that the image is funda-
mental to the construction of identity, at the same moment in which it 
generates a difference between that which is present and its sense, between 
the visible and the invisible that serves as its horizon. And in doing this they 
take into account the fundamental ambiguity of the experience of doing and 
of using images, for which the images can be the place where our relationship 
with the human is constituted with the originary furthering of sense. But it is 
also the place in which this relationship can be negated, can be made radically 
less, at the same moment in which a fusional relationship is established with 
the images and cancels the constitutive difference of sense. The encounter be-
tween the idol and the icon that makes the cantus firmus of the iconoclastie 
debate - but that in diverse forms crosses ali of the Christian theology of 
images, even in modernity (one case above ali being the debate on the legiti-
macy of the religious images of the Protestant Reformation) - is the nucleus 
around which is gathered the acknowledgment that every image contains, at 
the very core, some contradictory potentialities about the construction of 
identity. 
An alternative route is an exploration of the suspicion by which the West 
has treated images and the dismissal which has excluded them from social 
knowledge. The particular nature of the iconic makes within them a place 
of essential reflection that sheds new light on a gesture, apparendy marginai 
like that of Einaudi, but that is in reaUty extremely fertile in the sense that it 
can contribute to the notion of "good government". 
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U S E L E S S N O N - P R E A C H I N G ? 
T H E C R I T I C A L P O I N T A N D T H E C O M P L E X A N T H R O P O L O G Y O F 
F R E E D O M I N L U I G I E I N A U D I * 
1. A PHILOSOPHICAL-LEGAL VIEW OF EINAUDI'S ANTHROPOLOGY OF FREEDOM 
The thinking of Luigi Einaudi is not easily systematised due to its very 
composition and form, divided up and articulated as it is among monographs 
and scientific articles, articles for popular readership, genuine politicai inter-
ventions regarding current topics, institutional notes, references to empirical 
questions, moral appeals presented as 'preaching',1 and much more. 
Perhaps what is lacking, and this is probably no coincidence, is a text that 
sums up and recapitulates the work as a whole, one capable of holding to-
gether in an overall way, from the point of view of theory, the various inter-
ests, the eclectic intuitions present in the multiplicity of contributions and 
typologies of the works, one that maintains a Constant connection to the his-
tory of Italian economic and juridical institutions, from the Bank of Italy to 
the Presidency of the Republic. 
In this sense, the result of Einaudi's theoretical itinerary is a thinking that 
is philosophically incomplete and open, as though suspended between theory 
and practice, between the ideal and the real, but, paradoxically, it may be pre-
cisely in this that his anthropological and theoretical relevance resides. This is 
what motivated my attempt at a partial re-reading, in light of the present eco-
nomic-financial crisis, as we will see in what follows. 
* Translated by Kim Williams. 
1 An attempt at providing a systematic picture, as far as this is possible, of Einaudi's thinking, 
has been made by the co-editor of this present volume, P. SILVESTRI, Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi o 
del Buongoverno (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008), with which I agree regarding the anthropo-
logical and juridical-aesthetic formulation, inspired by a notion of Enrico di Robilant's, concerning a 
theme that is centrai to the philosophy of law: the relationship between freedom and law. In parti-
cular, in what follows I share the explicit recourse to the Siena frescos of good and bad government 
by Lorenzetti as an explicative symbol for Einaudi's thinking. 
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Because of this lack of theoretical formulation, in the present article I 
would like to refer to a single text which, while not synthetic of the whole 
of Einaudi's vision, is at least emblematic of his entire anthropological con-
ception. The Lezioni di politica sociale2 are in fact lessons, in that they were 
conceived as a cross between a scientific essay, a predicatory newspaper arti-
cle and a university lecture, and discussed, in a tone that is colloquiai and con-
versational, at a wholly particular moment in European history, the end of the 
second world war and the beginning of a new era.3 I will analyse the book,4 
including its being created in an ideal historical non-epoch, in the ideal place, 
and in the atemporality of his exile in Switzerland (1944), and of the radicai 
transformation of a society and way of living (up to 1949, the year in which 
the book was published). Almost as a sign that the topics taken into consid-
eration by Einaudi in outlining a positive portrayal of his model for mankind, 
such as savings, sacrifice, the family, the land, and so forth, are far from irre-
levant in containing a nostalgie view of idealised life in a agricultural, rural and 
even premodern society, is the fact that they can be read today from another 
point of view, one that is specifically epochal-anthropological. It is possible 
for the anthropological and fundamental nature of this work to emerge once 
again precisely during a new global crisis, the period having passed in which 
post-war social climate and economie development progressively consigned to 
oblivion those 'rural' yearnings, by now considered premodern, substituting 
them with a 'metropolitan' culture of consumption and appearance consid-
ered to be liberal and modem. Today, however, when it is also possible to 
discern the anthropological and social limits of that vision, the very incapacity to 
maintain the vitality of a society, state, and institutions such as the markets, 
Einaudi's 'premodem' criticisms take on a completely different meaning, with 
echoes that are even 'post-postmodern'. 
Einaudi positions and the symbolism of the allusion to the fresco cycle by 
Ambrogio Lorenzetti (details of which the then President of the Republic in-
2 L . EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale (Torino, G . Einaudi, 1 9 4 9 ) . 
3 Useful with regard to the politicai relevance of this period immediately following the exile in 
Switzerland are the collection of contributions that Einaudi made to the debates about the nascent 
Italian Republic; see ID., Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia 1943-47, P. SODDU (ed.) (Firenze, 
Leo S. Olschki, 2001) see especially "Introduzione" by P. SODDU, pp. vn-xxvm, and the contribu-
dons "Il mito dello stato sovrano", " 'Major et sanior pars', ossia della tolleranza e dell'adesione po-
litica", "Il mito delle corri costituzionali", 'Della paura' and "E mito della sovranità popolare". 
4 This analysis will only touch on the anthropological question in a limited way, and with spe-
cific reference to the third part of the book, "Concetto e uguaglianza nei punti di partenza" (pp. 172-
246), which is the most reìevant one for our purposes here. 
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serted in the collection of essays entided II buongoverno. Saggi di economia e 
di politica, and which are discussed in various articles in the book) both con-
tain, to my mind, an implicit trans-historic trait, a kind of anthropological and 
social judgment - though one necessarily only sketched out - of the habits of 
various epochs and on the rise and fall of civilisation: the fulcrum of this is 
criticai point theory. 
In some of the passages, Einaudi even seems to refer to arguments that 
bear the stamp of the doctrine of naturai law, even if this naturai law or 
trans-historic trait always appears to be tied to a profound sense of the media-
tion between the ideal and the historical aimed at (good) government of 
human beings, generating a fertile contradiction, a theoretical tension between 
the foundational requirements of the social bond (and their symbolic repre-
sentation: consider the position that he takes regarding the role played by 
monarchy in the unity of the state) and the historical contingency, which 
can always be reduced to those requirements. 
In the article "Major et senior pars", in the course of analysing a theory of 
the élites and of the "restraints on the excessive power of the politicai class", 
Einaudi comes to ask himself about the 'aura of unimpeachability' of different 
foundational principles, making it clear that the defence of tolerance implies 
"intolerance towards of any kind of power of a majority, even one that is ex-
tremely strong, that dares to touch the fundamental rights of the human per-
son", this - fundamental rights - being an area in which "not even the unani-
mity of ali men living in a politicai society could justify the enactment of a 
coercive law that denies the fundamental freedom of the individuai".5 The 
economist then goes on here to refuse, by means of arguments that have over-
tones of naturai law, the myth of the sovereignty of the majority in the face of 
responsibility towards the future: what was described could not even be called 
'unanimity', "because men living today cannot negate the legacy of their 
fathers, which has the right to live on in children not yet born".6 
In other words, the reference to an ideal that has almost the character of 
naturai law is integrateti into a conceptual structure immersed in history and 
tied to the relationship between generations viewed in terms of moral respon-
sibility. Thus, in Einaudi, the position of a 'tradition', of the realm of the 
'ideal', is never separated from the concrete problem of the historical unfold-
5 L . EINAUDI, " 'Major et sanior pars"', pp. 9 3 - 9 4 . 1 am citing here the version published in the 
collection of essays II Buongoverno ( 1 9 5 4 ) (Roma - Bari, Laterza, 2 0 0 4 ) . The translations of this and 
ali quotations that follow are mine. 
6 ID., " 'Major et sanior pars'" cit., p. 94. 
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ing of that same 'tradition' and its projection towards the future. This is a fea-
ture that appears to imply the adoption of an evolutionistic concept of the hu-
man 'person', where liberalism has, to put it briefly, an anthropological des-
tination and meaning that concerns the actual ways of exercising and possible 
forms of human freedom: it is the "doctrine of those who puts the betterment, 
the elevation of the human person before any other goal"; it is therefore a 
moral doctrine, "independent of the contingencies of time and place".7 
Returning to the subject at hand, however, without indulging too much in 
the wandering among concepts and problems that are so very diverse and for-
mulations that are sometimes even contradictory that the fertile eclecticism of 
Einaudi's work inspires the reader to do under the speli of his prose, it would 
seem opportune, as mentioned, to concentrate on the Lezioni, in order to 
grasp what appears to me to be the centrai anthropological and theoretical 
point of this thinking - always inexorably divided between theory and prac-
tice, between the contingent and the historic - that is, the contradiction be-
tween the mythical-foundational exigencies of a conception shared by the 
anthropologist (the free human person as the instituting basis of society) 
and the sometimes brutal contingence of the politicai and economie struggle 
between the forces that are expressed in society. The hypothesis which 
provides the starting point is that this unresolved contradiction expresses a 
vision of the human being that provides interesting points for reflection in 
our own times, in which the much studied and declaimed twentieth-century 
theme of the decline of the West appears to reach its historic fall, due, 
paradoxically, to the worldwide spread of that market, tied to globalisation, 
that Einaudi used to preach as being fundamental to human liberty. 
Instead, according to Michele Salvati the defect of the Lezioni is that it 
talks about a 'small old world', nineteenth-century, one that has been idealised 
and perhaps never even existed, made up of small businesses and artisans, of 
agriculture and tenant farmers, one which never had anything to do with the 
world of Einaudi's day, expressive of an economie and social situation that 
was completely different that Einaudi himself didn't fully comprehend, lacking 
as he was in "the most powerful instruments for comprehending modernity".8 
Now, some seventy years after the Lezioni were written, and in entirely 
different moral, social and economie conditions, and just a few years after Sal-
7 ID., "Liberalismo", in Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia 1943-47 cit., p. 65; see also 
P. SODDU, "Introduzione", ibid., p. ix. 
8 M. SALVATI, "Introduzione", in L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale (Torino, G . Einaudi, 
2003). 
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vati's judgment - years which, however, seem remote to us, as if the criticai 
point of ali criticai points had been passed with the great economic crisis 
of the beginning of the millennium - what must be done is to understand 
whether that nineteenth-century world, those judgements on rural and family 
customs stili appear as exclusively nostalgie yearnings, conservative or reac-
tionary to a greater or lesser extent, for an ideal middle-class civilisation that 
never existed or a way of life that has by now either already disappeared or is 
on the way to extinction, or if it is something else, perhaps (at least a sketch 
of) a more precise judgment of the periods, the rise and decline of civilisation, 
which is capable of indicating, albeit only historically, typical anthropological 
tendencies that identify human beings.9 
A concept of the person and of laws that is evolutionistic and not based 
on the doctrine of naturai law was developed by the Torinese philosopher of 
law Enrico di Robilant, although without reference to Einaudi but rather to 
the pancritical view of rationalism of Bartley, Popper and Hayek, in which 
it is precisely the concept of the person that is the key that resolves, in evolu-
tionistic and liberal terms and not those of naturai law or the moral-religious, 
the conflict between the foundational exigencies of the social bond and the 
concreteness of the contingent.10 
In Einaudi's Lezioni, the fecundity of the tension between anthropologi-
cal-foundational requirements of a social philosophy and the frenetic evolutio-
nistic exigencies of the contingencies of the market can be gleaned from the 
9 For an exegetical conception of the notion of person, see E . DI ROBILANT, Diritto, società e 
persona. Appunti per il corso di filosofia del diritto 1998-1999 (Torino, Giappichelli, 1999). 
10 Although a discussion of this is beyond the scope of the present paper, Robilant shows him-
self to have fully grasped the point of the indirect relations between the doctrine of naturai law and 
liberal evolutionism, which can already be seen as tension in Einaudi, when he makes it clear that, 'In 
addition to finding himself faced with a law determined by the highest authority or by a legislator, or 
by men themselves in their activities, however, the person can also be situated in the face of a law not 
determined by men. The law not determined by men, over the course of the centuries, has mosdy 
been indicated in philosophical-juridical thinking by the term "naturai law". In light of the develop-
ment of criticai metatheory, and by the need for reflection on laws, the denomination "naturai law" 
does not appear to be necessary and can be misleading. It in fact refleets a certain conception of 
nature and of the order that, in the current context of scientific culture, appears reductive and gen-
eric, since it does not make it possible to take adequate account of the complex problems that the 
concept of law raises, or of its allusive potential', E. DI ROBILANT, Diritto, società e persona cit., p. 146 
(my trans). The point cannot be investigated here, but the entire aperture of the sphere of the con-
figuration of the aesthetic laid out by Robilant represents, in my opinion, an efficacious theoretical 
re-reading of 'aesthetic-figurative' intuitions that emerge in places, like splashes of colour, in the 
work of Einaudi. Finally, regarding Robilant's work, see P. HERITIER, Società post-hitleriane? Mate-
riali didattici di antropologia ed estetica giuridica 2.0 (Torino, Giappichelli, 20092), especially pp. 34-
75. See also Problemi di libertà nella società complessa e nel Cristianesimo, ID. (ed.) (Soveria Mannelli, 
Rubbettino, 2008). 
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long passages that constitute an ethics of sacrijice, dedicateci to the centrai role 
for a society played by savings, by the existence of the family, of enterprise, of 
the collective; ali economie issues that rest on arguments concerning freedom 
and situated in a global anthropological vision: are these nineteenth-century 
and anachronistic as well? The connection between the anthropologic and 
the economie also appears to have disappeared in our day, where there are 
daily discussions about the pre-announced and threatened default of the Eur-
opean nations because of an excess of public debt, without, however, ever in-
serting the economie analyses into a socially shared perspective "of the eleva-
tion of the person", not even along general lines. Is this not of greater 
importance to the 'nineteenth-century' thinker than a return to an 'agricultur-
al' society? Is ali of this truly outdated? 
This does not at ali mean to say that it is necessary to return to looking 
backwards, as Einaudi certainly does, but that perhaps what lay ahead no 
longer appears so promising, and this may lead to a reformulation of the judg-
ment on the third part of the Lezioni as well. 
The theoretical problem that is posed in Einaudi in this regard is classi-
cally philosophical-legal: state how it is possible, without falling back on a 
substantialistic conception of the common good proper to an approach that 
is close to 'naturai law', the ideal of a 'good government' situated between 
public and private, between freedom and tradition, between responsibility of 
conscience and ethics of institutions as a representation that, without denying 
the requirements of social evolution by relying on substantialistic objectivism, 
can produce cognitive statements, in a given historical situation, that are cap-
able of orienting behaviour by means of the mobilisation of the individuai 
consensus that is free and not only that threatened with punishment. 
Isn't this the centrai problem of law, a discipline that by definition already 
appears to be surpassed by competing disciplines that are more seductive and 
fashionable? This is the constitutive anthropological problem of law analysed 
starting from an anthropology of freedom, which had already been stated in 
terms of the contrast between law and liberty in the times of the episde of 
Paul of Tarsus to the Romans, and of which liberalism, aimed at making sure 
that attention is kept on the theme of the freedom of the person, and not only 
on the question of the maximisation of profit, is fully invested.11 In this pre-
sent article it is certainly not possible to outline the topic, but simply to show 
11 Regarding this aspect, I refer to what I have written elsewhere; see P. HERITIER, "L'uomo del 
diritto. D problema della conoscibilità del diritto naturale in San Paolo", in La vitalità del diritto na-
turale, F. Di BLASI and P. HERITIER (eds.) (Palermo, Phronesis, 2008), pp. 117-158. 
— 280 — 
USELESS NON-PREACHING? 
how in the depths of the anthropological vision expressed by the Lezioni, that 
question is already centrai, and how it has become a genuine 'anthropological 
emergency' in the face of the economic crisis of the West (and the political-
institutional crisis of Europe) at the dawn of the third millennium. There is no 
solution in Einaudi, but the problem is identified precisely in the impossibility 
of solving it theoretically, perhaps in the midst of a vision that is naive and 
idealistic, but certainly not only in its systematic removal, which is very fash-
ionable today. 
2 . THE RELEVANCE TODAY OF THE LEZIONI DI POLITICA SOCIALE 
Taking these question and precautions as a starting point, consider then, 
in Einaudi, the way in which is conceived the distinction between the kind of 
man who is a 'saver' and the kind who is a 'squanderer', analysed in too de-
tailed a fashion from the point of view of the conditions of life, even down to 
the details of the number of children as a sign of family prosperity and equi-
librium, or to the creation of a system of taxation aimed at penalising non-pro-
ductive and parasitic income in order to maintain the productivity of the eco-
nomic system and avoid income that is merely financial. These are policies to 
which are connected an idea of welfare conceived on the basis of the family 
rather than that of state, and which are becoming current once again in the 
face of the state financial crisis. 
On the other hand, the Lezioni di politica sociale contain an unquestion-
able criticism of collectivism in the name of freedom, referring to another 
great contemporary text, The Road to Serfdom,12 written by Friedrich Hayek, 
also an economist, who is much more drastic than Einaudi in his judgment of 
the Beveridge pian, which had just been devised. However, Einaudi's text ap-
pears to me to go beyond that of Nobel Laureate Hayek precisely in the posi-
tion that it gives to the centrai problems, which, far from being solved, are in 
any case clearly perceived and finely drawn within a perspective of the anthro-
pology of freedom, an aspect which in Italy might have received less attention 
than it deserved, in part because of the contrasting labels that characterised 
Einaudi as a 'liberalist' against Croce the 'liberal'13 and Keynes the 'interven-
tionist'. 
12 F.A. HAYEK, The Road to Serfdom (London, Roudedge, 1944). 
13 B. CROCE - L. EINAUDI, Liberismo e liberalismo, P. SOLARI (ed.) (Napoli, Ricciardi, 1957). 
Regarding this, see F . FORTE, " I liberalesimi di Einaudi e di Croce", in ID., L'economia liberale di 
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While for the economist writing the Lezioni the primary fundamental rea-
son for state intervention in the economy is the fight against monopoly, the 
second aim of social economie legislation is aimed at adjusting the starting 
points of its citizens by means of lowering the high points and raising the 
loto points, thus arriving at an approximation of that equality of opportunity 
which, in Western politicai philosophy, after Rawls, has been debated at 
length up to the present day. 
The lowering of the high points, conceived, for example, by means of a 
significant recourse to taxes, in particular inheritance taxes, thus requires as 
a buttress, needless to say, a precise visibility in the use of those taxes, "a very 
elevated sense of civic duty and a use of the taxes that is genuinely of benefit 
to the collective".14 This requisite is held to be indispensable for realising a 
great social harmony and a prosperity tied, not to destroying the profits deriv-
ing from competition, but to the contrary, to maintaining the incentive to pro-
duce them, avoiding the flourishing of advantages of position. However, the 
raising of the low points made possible by social legislation must never be 
confused with encouraging idleness: this risk, as Einaudi notes, is the restraint 
that must constandy been kept in mind in order to "avoid the danger of re-
creating something like the panem et circenses that lead to the ruin of the Ro-
man world".15 
It is interesting to note that these subjects were considered by Einaudi 
from the point of view of social legislation. That viewpoint, very traditional, 
must therefore be seen in reference to a perspective vision of man in which 
the objective of a minimum existence must not be conceived as a guaranteed 
point of arrivai, but as a point of departure that allows everyone to act, "an 
insurance given to ali men so that they can develop their aptitudes".16 
This basic idea is not without connections to an evolutionist conception of 
man, considered from the point of view of history and the judgment of society 
and the customs in various periods. In fact, very schematically, according to 
the author of the Lezioni, 
Luigi Einaudi. Saggi (Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, 2009), who notes that the debate is nested in a misun-
derstanding to which Einaudi was also liable: "Croce did not deny that, from the point of view of 
ethics, it was from the liberal principle that the principle of free initiative descended" (p. 208; my 
trans.), which was even held to be the instrumentai principle for the authoritarian regulation of 
human life; for his part, Einaudi "was irritated by being defined as a liberalist" (p. 211), identifying 
the crux of the matter in freedom of choice (which was, moreover, centrai for Croce as well). 
1 4 L . EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 5 2 . 
15 Ibid., p. 55. 
36 Ibid. 
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it wasn't the barbarians who caused the fall of the Roman empire; it was rather the 
empire itself that was rotten; and one of the causes of the internai decadence was that 
the Roman citizens disdained being soldiers, workers, because, maintained by the 
state, they preferred going to the forum to watch the spectacles, the wild animals 
chasing the Christians, etc., etc.17 
Far from constructing a detailed historic analysis, this passage clearly 
shows that Einaudi intended to propose a sacrificial anthropological model 
as the basis for the social life of the market and the institutions: a presupposi-
tion based on ethics and values without which every society, in the long run, 
would have to face the problem of its own decadence, related to the deca-
dence of its own customs and the family model that guarantees the prevalence 
of savings. Seen in this light, in these times of newly widespread panem et cir-
censes and of heavy immigration dows, the analysis of the third part of the 
book - the observations about the family and customs - take on a very differ-
ent meaning. These perhaps appear less naive and traditionalist now than they 
might have appeared in the early post-war years to a society in the midst of 
full economic development. 
In fact, the idea of social legislation is classically intended to provide an 
objective that is not a point of arrivai, but a point of departure that makes 
it possible for ali, and for young people in particular, to develop their own 
aptitudes and better their own conditions, to the benefit of the collective as 
a whole.18 Good government is certainly, also, or above ali, aimed at this, 
and is endowed with a sacrificial anthropological dimension, believed to derive 
from a religious concept, as shown by the final reference in the passage 
quoted by Einuadi to the expulsion of Adam and Ève from paradise, intended 
as a symbol of man's condition of fallibility as a result of originai sin. 
The ideal towards which civilisation should strive is thus to make possible 
the emanation of inventions created by scholars who, if employed so intensely 
as to absorb ali their own energies and resources in order to survive, would 
not be able to give them concrete form. It should not, however, be forgotten 
that "if bread is to become abundant for ali", then there would last in perpe-
tuity "the law by which men are forced to tear with toil from the avaricious 
17 Ibid. 
18 This does not appear so very different from the anthropological concept defended by Ronald 
Dworkin, independent of the ethical conclusions that the American philosopher of law draws from 
it, in his conception of human dignity as dictated by two principles: "that every human life is of in-
trinsic potential value, and that everyone has a responsibility for realising that value in his own life"; 
see R. DWORKIN, IS Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Politicai Debate (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 10. 
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ground the goods in which it is fertile":19 the possibility of elevating himself 
from a minimum standard of living is thus a situation of fact that can be im-
proved by various means, but is never a guaranteed right, which would neces-
sarily lead to a society that was collectivist, totalitarian and inhuman. If the 
king of the economie world in a free market is the consumer, then price is 
the 'faithful executor' of that world, counselling and punishing the entrepre-
neur who, if not careful in interpreting the present and future desires of the 
consumer, is sentenced to expulsion from the market because of the losses 
taken by his enterprise. Further, for Einaudi, the automatic and neutral 
mechanism of the market which is described by economists and is the fruit of 
the development of society as a whole, adapts itself to the most diverse kinds 
of societies, leaving unanswered the politicai question of what kind of distri-
bution of income is best. 
To this end there are various models of social organisation, such as the 
collectivist and communist, which lead to a totalitarian society, and another 
liberal concept which is not, moreover, at ali separated from precise ethical 
choices. If here the economist's intent is to criticise the collectivist model, 
as Hayek did in The Road to Serfdom, it is clear that the proposed solution 
is instead tied to an anthropological concept aimed at favouring innovation 
and production - and, consequently, the ideal of the self-made man that 
makes mobility possible in society - and does not perpetuate divisions into 
classes: not permitting the 'silly daddy's boy' to prosper in luxury and the 
'misunderstood genius' to lead a miserable life. Exactly this need for 'equality 
of starting points' appears to be inevitably tied, in Einaudi's thinking, to the 
specific anthropology of sacrifice and savings mentioned above, which postu-
lates that "the true social unit is not the isolated individuai but the family".20 
In section 107, emblematically entitled "Gli uomini egoisti individuali e gli 
uomini costruttori. Il medioevo e il concetto dell'eterno" (Men who are indi-
viduai egotists and men who are builders. The Middle Ages and the concept 
of eternity), Einaudi defines two typologies of man. The first is formed of 
"those who think about themselves and thus restrict their future intentions 
either to their own life or at most to that of their life's companion".21 For this 
typology of man, the maximum ideal result is having a pension for the rest of 
his life, not having any savings since this is destroyed each generation, but the 
result of this concept, when transposed to the level of the collective, is a 
19 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 5 6 . 
20 Ibid., p. 190. 
21 Ibid. 
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stationary society. It is correlateci to the squandering kind of man, for whom 
"the existing capital decreases, the earth is subject to exhaustive farming 
and considered of no value since this man doesn't look to the future".22 
He neglects the upkeep of his house, reducing both his abode and his life 
to a heap of rubble: 
These do not create savings, but deplete the savings of others: they are the heirs 
or the exploiters, not the creators of fortunes, of existing capital. They convert exist-
ing instrumentai goods into consumer goods; they do not give this up in order to con-
struct new capital goods.23 
Along with this kind of squanderer are others who, although driven by a 
wide range of different feelings, have the instinct for construction. Einaudi's 
description of this kind of man appears today to be as strongly out of date 
and anachronistic as it is perhaps useful, in its naive - for contemporary sen-
sitivities - simplicity, for understanding the current economic decline of the 
West. Let's follow this unusual 'preachifying' itinerary briedy, which will lead 
us straight from the private to the public, from a house kept in good order to 
the good government of a society, conceived as a line virtually without devia-
tions: it is a historic-economic itinerary as well, which makes it clear that the 
idea of good government is born anthropologically in the 'privatisti environ-
ment of the family and is transferred by analogy to collective concepts such 
as enterprise or state, with the model of the "good father of the family" as 
precursor to 'good government'. 
A first stimulus for savings is thus provided by the desire to found a 
family. 
The bachelor, the childless married couple can be content with a lifetime pen-
sion, which is paid up to the end of their lives; the father of a family saves as long 
as and if he believes himself to have founded something that is of support to the lives 
of his children and grandchildren. He enlarges the house so that it can host, at least 
for a few months of the year, the families of his children; he wants it to be capable of 
being divided up, so that each of the families that descend from him can stay there. 
He doesn't conceive of the house as an entity in itself... If the saver who founds a 
family had no hope of allowing his descendants to enjoy the fruit of the capital he 
had accumulated, that accumulation would not have occurred and the collective 
would be that much poorer. Those houses, those factories, those stores, those im-
proved lands would not exist.24 
22 Ibid., p. 195. 
23 Ibid., p. 200. 
24 Ibid., p. 202. 
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The second anthropological stimulus for savings is provided by the need 
to found an enterprise, another human activity that is 'instinctive' in that it is 
endowed with a sense of the future: for this, retirement is 
not a voluntary act, but imposed by the exorable legai norms regarding age limits [...]. 
For this kind of saver the motivation for action is instinct, the psychological necessity 
of making the most perfect enterprise, to which he dedicates his life. Usually these so-
called rich people live modest lives sparing in food and material enjoyments: the first 
to arrive to the workplace and the last to leave. Those who observe them, think: why 
so much work and fatigue? why not taste, as would be possible and right for them, 
some of life's sweetness? why remain, sometimes, rough and undereducated, the ob-
ject of the intellectuals' sardonie smiles? But let these speak of the enterprise they 
have created and they become as eloquent and inspired as priest and poet. Those 
who listen to them find themselves in front of men tested and wise, who have truly 
created something that without their work would not have existed.25 
The pride of the founders of families and enterprises is not only an ideal 
of the individuai, but, according to Einaudi, passes to the institutions them-
selves through a kind of contagion:26 
The instinct to save of man as a physical person is soon propagated to those com-
plexes of men that are called collective entities, anonymous societies, cooperative 
societies, semi-public entities. A notable part of new savings that are formed every 
day in modem societies is not individuai savings, but rather collective.27 
The reader's impression is that the reference to the centrality of savings, in 
a period in which the market economy is often configured on the pre-emi-
nence of consumption, is on one hand dependent on presumptions that do 
not at ali appertain to economie theory alone, but rather show themselves 
to have a religious root, which can be traced to a conception of life as sacrifica, 
on the other hand, however, it unquestionably sounds like a radicai criticism 
of a model of government capitalism that has produced the level of public 
25 Ibid., p. 204. It should be noted in passing that the same ideal applies to university research: 
in universities as well there are squanderers and builders (of ideas) and as types they are very differ-
ent: as Einaudi says, the same inner demon of the builders of enterprises and families "is obeyed by 
the scholar, who, well advanced in years, spends his days among books and grandehildren, while 
their visitors and families, amazed, wonder: why does he continue to study? what need has he to 
continue to read, tiring his mind, if he has already earned his degree and completed his career?" 
(p. 204). 
26 He conceives the centrality of the mechanism of contagion and of imitation as the fulcrum of 
mass dynamics, financial panie and the functioning of the market; see J.-P. DUPUY,Lapanique (Paris, 
Seuil, 2003). 
27 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 2 0 4 . 
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debt that is found today in ali Western nations. It would not be rash to state 
that the anthropological model that prevailed in the post-war is that of the 
generalised squanderer, which led to governments that forgot the fundamen-
tal principle of a balanced budget,28 reducing free man to a slave of consump-
tion. We will return to these two aspects further on. 
Now it is possible to comprehend the reference to the 'sense of the future' 
and time that Einaudi transfers from the anthropological type of the builder 
to a genuine historical category of interpretation of various periods, once 
again in connection with a transcendent dimension: "Perhaps in no other his-
toric period was the instinct for construction as evident as in the Middle Ages, 
when they built for eternity".29 In this case as well the description given spe-
cifies, with highly imaginative concreteness, the ideal of liberty towards which 
the economist strives: 
The casdes were fortresses, with walls of cyclopean thickness, and the houses 
were towers that dared the centuries. There was no talk of money loans with interest, 
reimbursable and thus consumatile within a few years, but of the constitution of per-
petuai earnings [...]. The deed of trust, the passing of estate to eldest son, contained 
the idea of perpetuity, of the continuation of generations. Those who had built the 
casde, the tower, the house, those who had cleared the unploughed or forested lands, 
wanted the casde, the house, the tower and farm to remain in the family forever.30 
This is not a question of exalting a specific historical period, nor of con-
cealing the ambiguities and problems out of which modernity grew; the point 
here is to show the centrality of the sense of time and the future for the pur-
poses of the economic edification of a 'non-decadent' society. 
For Einaudi, the instinct of the builders reveals a conception of the equal-
ity of starting points that is more elevated than the one which prescribes that 
the competition begins anew with each generation: the ideal of the garden city 
gave concrete form to the embryo of the family as "something distinct and 
superior to the physical persons in whom it is concretised in the present gen-
eration".31 It is in fact tied to the 'spirit of construction' and is composed of 
2 8 L . EINAUDI, Entrate pubbliche dello stato sabaudo nei bilanci e nei conti dei tesorieri durante la 
guerra di successione spagnuola (Torino, Paravia, 1907; rpt. Milano, Vitale & Associati, 2011), con-
taining comments on article 81 of the Italian constitution regarding the budget. See also ID., "Sull'in-
terpretazione dell'art. 81 della Costituzione", in ID., Lo scrittoio del Presidente (Torino, G. Einaudi 
1956), pp. 201-207. 
29 ID., Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 191. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p. 193. 
21 
— 287 — 
PAOLO HERITIER 
the material things that represent a genuine extension of the person: these 
are "the furniture, the books, the treasured objects, the little garden where 
flowers are cultivated and the cat and small birds are raised, the keepsakes 
of the ancestors that say 'you were born here, here you grew up, here you 
learned from the example of your elders'".32 Thanks to the house, the one 
receiving a salary is progressively freed, no long simply a mere slave to a 
master, but drawing from it a sense of autonomy, which constitutes a step 
towards the establishment of a society that is free and endowed with a sense 
of the future. 
These passages from the Lezioni inevitably appear today as a testimony to 
that idealised nineteenth-century rural time that no longer exists and can 
probably never exist again but which raises fertile questions, to my mind, con-
cerning the relationship between the anthropological and the economical. 
Above ali where we find that the ideal of the garden city, which is also the 
'privatist' and theoretical origin of good government represented in the Loren-
zetti fresco, is countered - in a vision that is almost Manicheistic that will have 
brought a smile to more than one of those intellectuals "who observe the 
world with the lens of the cinematographer, the fashionable beaches, the 
dance clubs and the places were idle or ambiguous people meet"33 - by 
the model of the beehive city of naked men, believed to be the antechamber 
of collectivistic society: 
The ideal of the garden city certainly goes beyond that of the beehive of the large 
city, where men don't know each other, where ali wear the same face, and to flee from 
the boredom of life in two rooms, a kitchen and a bath, they ali run to the same 
cinema, listen to the same radio, read the same newspapers and enthuse about the 
same matches between men who either punch each other or play lawn tennis; but 
the sons pay, as soon as they are able, an added pension to their mothers, and with 
what is left over they make a stash for themselves, spending it on cigarettes and silk 
trousers; only to begin ali over again, in unions either legai or open, in the usuai celi of 
the urban beehive, that levels and flattens everything.34 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., p. 200. 
34 Ibid., p. 193. A more complete description of the "life of naked men in the beehives" is 
found in section 135, "Le case alveari e la inesistenza della famiglia - Ivi è uguaglianza dei punti 
di partenza per uomini nudi" (The beehive houses and the nonexistence of the family - Therein 
is equality of the starting points for naked men), ibid., pp. 226-228, which will be quoted almost 
in its entirety shordy below. 
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Here the Einaudian tone seems to evoke the inevitabile detached irony of a 
world where the inhabitants of the city have become a majority, in the age of 
megalopoli and a capitalism ruled by the logie of speculation and consump-
tion, and certainly not savings, a world where the customs have evolved to 
such an extent that it might only be possible to place the word 'Einaudian' 
next to a tiny frame of retro photographs which, in the house in the city, per-
haps stili show the grandparents and the parents. It is precisely the reference 
to the issue of public debt, however, that makes Einaudi's language less naive 
and more relevant today, the West having experienced, in its decline, the eco-
nomic fruit of a capitalism that completely forgot about savings, forgot even 
its sacrificial anthropological matrix, and has grown accustomed to financial 
speculation. 
Perhaps today the family intended in this way, just like the garden city, is 
an ideal that is nostalgie if not reactionary, one that can be smiled at, for the 
obvious schematic quality of the analysis. However, it takes on, in the light of 
the economic crisis, an entirely different significance. 
For Einaudi the family is the pivotal institution on which society is based, 
but this observation is not so much dictated by a religious backdrop and 
Christian moral precepts to be defended ahistorically, as it is by the economic 
objective of maintaining a free society: the family is by no means possible in ali 
kinds of societies, but only in some. 
Thus, to my mind, what is constituted is a link between the sacrificial di-
mension of capitalism and the ideal anthropological bourgeois and dogmatic 
sacrality which the economist assumes.35 This point has been taken up again 
today in recent literature that analyses economic phenomena starting with 
Girard's theory of the sacred.36 
The dualism between men of the squandering type and those of the 
builder type thus becomes the contrast between the model of the family 
and the 'naked men' of the collectivist society. Where there are families, Ei-
naudi observes, 
35 Regarding this notion, I refer the reader to the works of P. LEGENDRE, De la société comme 
texte. Linéaments d'une anthropologie dogmatique (Paris, Fayard, 2001); Ce que l'Occident ne voit pas 
de l'Occident, Conférences au Japon (Paris, Fayard, 2004) and to my own works, Società post-hitleria-
ne? cit., and "Law and Image. Towards a Theory of Nomograms", in Lau>, Culture and Visual Stu-
dies, A . WAGNER and R .K . SHERWIN (eds.) (Heidelberg, Springer, fortheoming). 
36 Among the works that develop this line of reading, see for example, J.P. DUPUY and P. Du-
MOUCHEL, L'enfer des choses. René Girard et la logique de l'économie (Paris, Seuil, 1 9 7 9 ) ; ID., L'eco-
nomia dell'invidia. Antropologia mimetica del capitalismo moderno (Massa, Transeuropa, 2 0 1 1 ) . 
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there are also ranks, groups, neighbourhoods, friendships, communities, trades, pro-
fessions, free and open associations and closed, exclusive bodies. There exists a 
society that is differentiated, articulated, elastic, mobile, aware; there exists a people, 
and there is born and raised a state.37 
In contrast, where instead 
a man and a woman remain together for reasons of work and utility, there is neither 
house, nor neighbours, nor friends, nor bodies, but single individuals, classes com-
posed of individuals grouped by objective features of salary, wages, patrimon^or in-
come. Classes and not ranks; individuals and not men; atoms and not souls. 
The distinction could not be clearer and more evident. What are being 
contrasted, in the guise of polemical opposition, are two models, one seen 
in a positive light, the other negative. This is a feature that appears to be char-
acteristic of the genre of liberalism, where almost ali authors have identified a 
virtuous ideal in contrast to a pernicious one to be avoided. Consider the dis-
tinctions between true liberalism and false liberalism, between economie lib-
eralism and politicai liberalism, between libertarianism and liberalism, and so 
forth.39 In Einaudi, interest in this distinction lies in its anthropological des-
tination, which is not belied by the atemporal nature of the descriptions that 
he devises regarding characteristics that are socially outdated, such as the di-
vision of patrimony among sons (which does not take women into account), 
or the description of life in a city apartment. Here Einaudi's tone is certainly 
Manicheistic and might appear purposely out of time, and yet his analysis cap-
tures a development of the entire society which doesn't appear to have taken 
place as of yet, and which makes it possible to see clearly the economist's re-
ligious and sacrificial matrix (of a certain sacrifìcial concept of the sacred). It 
is worthwhile quoting this criticism of common living in its entirety - at least 
four points of it - , considering it as the textual equivalent of an image, the 
introduction of details from the Lorenzetti fresco of the effeets of good gov-
ernment, to which Einaudi refers more than once in this book. For this reason 
3 7 L . EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., pp. 225-226. 
38 Ibid., p. 226. 
39 It is impossibile to provide a bibliography of this evaluative dichotomy: almost ali authors, 
liberal, liberalist or libertarian, in economics or politics, have at a certain point in their lives and 
works, formulated this kind of distinction: it constitutes a genuine 'literary genre' of liberalism. 
40 '•§ i}Qt Le diseguaglianze ereditarie apparenti a danno delle femmine, dei sacerdoti e dei figli 
cittadini - Come nasce la diseguaglianza tra figli ugualmente dotati dal padre; § 131, La persistenza dei 
patrimoni nelle famiglie è dovuta a fattori morali; che soli possono sormontare l'ostacolo dell'imposta 
ereditaria avocatrice", L . EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., pp. 2 1 8 - 2 2 3 . 
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as well we will make ampie use of the originai passages, because these repre-
sent a 'verbal fresco', or better, a theoretical representation41 of a determined 
anthropological model: the long quotations that follow stand for, if you will, 
an ideal portrait of the garden city, representing a social modelling of customs 
that seems to me as though suspended between traditionalist conservatism 
and current anti-capitalist criticism of the standardisation and technicalisation 
of the society ruled by today's 'neurocapitalism' and of the society of the im-
age, technology and custom:42 
1) Life in couples: 
Here is the apartment house in the city. It is comfortable, well designed: the 
apartments are minimal, of one or two rooms, with a bath and kitchenette. Central 
hearing; in the kitchenette, three or four square metres, there is an icebox, electric 
or gas range, cold and hot running water at ali hours of the day and night. Radio, 
gramophone, telephone. On the ground floor are the centralised services [...]. In 
the kitchenette the lady of the house quickly prepares breakfast, with the milk that 
was delivered right on time from the centralised services on the ground floor. Then 
each goes to work: and the couple meets again at rive, for tea at the house of friends, 
or in a tea room. They have lunched, standing up or eating quickly, in the restaurant 
annexed to the factory where they work. They may perhaps pass the evening to-
gether, if the lady of the house is not too tired from preparing dinner, mostly with 
canned goods [...]. The house is almost a hotel where the services function automa-
rically. 
2) Social relations: 
It isn't necessary for the residents to know each other or spend time together. A 
nod of the head, a courteous gesture in the elevator and that's ali. 
3) Relations with children: 
What does a child do in an apartment house? Where does he play, run and fall, 
where are his little friends of the same age? There are no brothers, or at most only 
one. It is too much trouble to nurse and raise a lot of children. There wouldn't be 
any peace and quiet in that small apartment. Is the woman supposed to give up 
41 On the notion of figure in Robilant, see P. HERITIER, Società post-hitleriane? cit., pp. 51-61, 
186-188 and E. ROBILANT, "Libertà e figure nella società complessa e nel Cristianesimo", in Problemi 
di libertà nella società complessa e nel Cristianesimo, P. HERITIER (ed.) (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 
2008), pp. 163-191. 
42 B. STIEGLER, Economie de l'hypermatériel et psychopouvoir (Paris, Mille et une nuits (Fayard), 
2008). 
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her position and job, which make it possible to have conveniences, clothes, stockings, 
cinema and holidays? Sacrifice herself and for what? If a girl, at twenty years old she 
is destined to go, with a man, to live in another apartment, and they will only see her 
rarely and in a hurry. If a boy, work might take him to another city. A letter every 
now and then will remind them that they had a son, that he had become independent 
and probably considera his parents to be old-fashioned, with other tastes and no way 
of understanding him. Meanwhile, isn't there a nursery for infants, and a kindergar-
ten for children? Aren't there nuns, lavishing love on the children of others, nurturers 
and educationalists in special institutes, who are ready to take care of the children of 
people busy doing nothing or forced to work to earn a living? For prosperous people 
there are intelligent philanthropists ready to take the place of parents with the help of 
Catholic nuns, or protestants or laymen; the middle class and the poor are provided 
for by the state, the city and the charitable institutes. 
4) Scholastic education and the disappearance of the humanities: 
Since ali men are equal, there are some who keep watch to be sure that the same 
notions are offered equally to ali, with a single kind of middle school lasting at least 
three years after elementary school. Then some are allowed, with much repugnance, 
to learn Latin and Greek and philosophy; it would be better if everyone, as suggested 
by parents and teachers who get right to the point, attended first of ali to technical 
things, useful in everyday life, physics, chemistry, stenography, modem languages, ac-
counting, drawing, mechanics, relegating to horae subsicivae [spare time] those activ-
ities that the old folks called humanities and made the foundations of culture. Thus, 
at twenty or twenty-two years of age the young man is ready to enter into the race of 
life like any other young man or woman, ali equally trained physically and intellec-
tually, ali alike in their dress, shoes, and hairatyles. Ali destined to spend their work-
ing houra in the office or factory, public or private, where careers, given the equality 
of starting points, will vary in the diversity in the point of arrivai on the basis of 
merit.43 
Today changes of a nature completely different from the description of 
life in the beehive-city have penetrated our culture, but it may be that the text 
has taken on a naive character, constituting a criticism of postmodernity itself, 
as if Einaudi's words had entered a metalevel constituting a 'strange loop'44 
In our day criticism of humanistic culture appears to be the bureaucratic-nor-
43 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., pp. 226-228. 
44 A 'strange loop' is a figure that typifies complexity; see J.-P. DUPUY, Ordres et desordres: En-
quete sur un nouveau paradigme (Paris, Seuil, 1982); consider also the reference to the works of 
Escher in the celebrated book by D . R HOFSTADER, Godei, Escher, Bach: An Eternai Golden Braid 
(New York, Basic Books, 1979). 
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mative agenda, on the way to being realised, in a society that is becoming 
hostage to 'techno-science-economics'45 and 'neurocapitalism', to the controver-
sial times of 'globalisation'. The fourth point, which discusses the elimination 
of humanistic learning and the survival of the "attention first of ali to technical 
things" which is characteristic of 'naked men', seems to be drawn from the 
program of the 'modernisation' of knowledge. In Italy this took place pre-
cisely by means of going beyond the culture of the nineteenth century, such 
as the 'Einaudian' culture of his program for scholastic instruction, and this 
was hailed as progress. Regarding this, Salvati observed that Einaudi, given 
his very high cultural prestige and his highly active public involvement, ex-
erted a restraining influence that was far from negligible on the development 
of economies and social sciences in Italy, exacdy as Benedetto Croce did on 
the side of philosophy; as Salvati notes, it was no coincidence that Croce was 
Einaudi's "venerated maestro and friend. In short, the great moral and cultur-
al authorities of our twentieth century were [...] men of the 1800s".46 
In any case, while ali of these aspects clearly show the cultural distance 
that separates us from Einaudi's ideal of life in many respects (the role of 
women, the patriarchal and agricultural ideal of the family), reread today - at 
the beginning of the third millennium, a time that may be nearing a genuine 
criticai point (see § 3) with regard to the survival of Western society - these 
appear as criticism of changes in lifestyle that seem to us to go back, as if by 
magic, in a single step, to the most radicai moralistic criticisms of the capita-
listic ideal, although in a direction opposite to liberal criticism. In this tradi-
tionalist Einaudi there appears to emerge in other words a radicai criticism of 
the contemporary model of capitalism that is utilitarian and standardising. 
Naturally, the step is not ever taken, and Einaudi's tone always remains pre-
dicatory, but it is possible to sense in his texts a profound comprehension, 
completely relevant to the present, of the nexus between economies, the 
sacred, standardisation and violence as an issue that is centrai for understand-
ing the sacrai role of economies in today's society. There could be no clearer 
statement of the sacrificial nature of the discourse of the capitalist. 
The relevance for today of the Lezioni di politica sociale of the 1940s might 
then consist, paradoxically, in this: it appears here that Einaudi is, more than 
reflecting conceptually, using words to paint frescoes and worlds that today 
45 P. LEGENDRE, De la société come texte cit., pp. 79 ff. 
46 M. SALVATI, "Introduzione" cit., p. xni. From the philosopher Giovanni Gentile to the pro-
fessor Luigi Berlinguer and the lawyer Gelmini. Today in Italy perhaps we might say that Croce and 
Einaudi as missed, as was understood a long time ago in other countries where this process of tech-
nicalisation of culture has occurred! 
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can be read as a radicai criticism of contemporary capitalism. Here is cap-
tured in depth the theme of the ambivalence of economics, in the space that 
lies between the effeets of good and bad government; this is the role, as we 
shall see, of criticai point theory, to introduce the ambivalence of social e f f e e t s 
into reflections on economics and law. Criticai point theory places the effeets 
of good government and bad government side by side, in a register that is aes-
thetic and at the same time dogmatici1 as in a ritual dance, creating an effect 
of estrangement: a little as if Lorenzetti's Allegory of Good Government and its 
Effeets on Town and Country could, if you will, fall off the wall and instandy 
transform itself into its opposite, into a painting by Bosch, or into Brue-
ghel's Tight Between Carnival and Lent passing by way of Beuys.48 Thus we 
have the feeling that, from the aesthetic point of view, the space that distin-
guishes Einaudian criticism of modernity from criticisms of standardisation 
and the normalisation of a Foucault, a Deleuze a Zizek49 is, paradoxically, 
smaller than we might have supposed (consider the reflection on rebellion 
and heresy); this is a road travelled by some in one direction, and by others 
in the the opposite direction. However, this does not appear to be the place 
to say anything regarding this point, and not in any case before having ana-
lysed criticai point theory and its correlate: the ambiguity that typifies eco-
nomics. 
3 . ELNAUDLAN THEORY OF THE CRITICAL POINT AND THE FRESCO OF THE EFFECTS 
OF GOOD AND BAD GOVERNMENT: THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE POLITICAL AND 
THE ECONOMIC AND THE AESTHETIC-DOGMATIC ROLE OF FOUNDATION THEORY 
After sacrifice and savings, now comes the preaching. Einaudi's nine-
teenth-century tone is not so much one of condemnation with regard to 
changes, as much as 'preachings', acknowledged by the author as 'useless' 
but nevertheless written down: this is evident in the spirit that comes out 
in the preface to the Prediche, a series of writings composed during the first 
world war and published in book form in 1920. The future president prefaced 
47 Regarding this connection between aesthetics and dogma and the history of institutions, I 
refer the reader to my works on historian of law Pierre Legendre and the monograph Estetica giuri-
dica, in preparation. 
48 A painting by Beuys appears on the cover of F. MIGLIORINO, Il corpo come testo. Storie del 
diritto (Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2008). 
49 Among the many texts on this topic, see S . ZIZEK, First as Tragedy, then as Farce (London, 
Verso, 2009). 
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the work with these remarks (once again we will quote the passage almost in 
its entirety): 
I am republishing [the Prediche] with no alterations, not even those, which would 
be forgivable, of changing the numbers used to illustrate the concept demonstrated in 
the text. Today when the public debt exceeds 100 billion, it might sound silly to 
speak of 5 billion as a terrifying loss for the national economy [...] talking about 'high' 
wages of 3 lire a day, when today wages of 10 and 15 lire are paid, may seem like an 
anachronism. However, I have not changed the numbers [...] above ali because these 
[essays] of mine can righdy be called 'preachings' precisely because, as usually hap-
pens to the admonitions of the economist, they were not heeded [...]. Preaching is 
nevertheless a duty [...]. If the pages brought together here chance to have a meaning, 
it is perhaps the following: that the science of economics is subordinate to moral law 
and that there can be no conflict between what farsighted interest counsels men to do 
and what awareness of their duty to future generations orders them to do.50 
The verhal frescoes quoted in the previous section are more anachronistic 
in other places than they are with respect to the absolute numbers of the Ita-
lian public debt at the time (100 billion lire): if not the debt, but the customs 
are compared to those of today, the relationships between the periods would 
probably seem equally incommensurable. In other words, the mere compar-
ison of two periods (Einaudi's 'cultural nineteenth century' with his own his-
toric period) also implies another economic and moral judgment, between the 
twentieth century and the twenty-first, to be compared as in a proportion. 
Here we cross Einaudian conservatism with the criticisms of capitalism in 
decline and of gift economy, read, however, in a key that is liberal and not 
Marxist, no matter how paradoxical this might seem. 
In a certain sense, the description of the ideal society of the Lezioni ap-
pears to be an analogy for Lorenzetti's fresco, which describes life in the city 
and life in the country: we are thus dealing with a scene painted with words 
with an abundance of details which aesthetically supports an anthropological 
intention that is characteristic of Einaudi, to portray different types of men, 
for a moral purpose. 
It is analogous to a fresco that might appear in the nave of a medieval 
church intended to educate the masses by portraying vices and virtues, and 
intent on portraying negatively the anthropological type of 'naked men': that 
society, while an honest ideal for many men, is, for the economist, the image 
of society governed according to pian, "a program well devised, ali of whose 
5 0 L . EINAUDI, Prediche (Bari, Laterza, 1920), pp. vn-vm. 
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elements are well fitted together".51 Such a society may well be free, but only 
by historical accident, since "naked or normal men have the soul of the em-
ployee. They are born to obey",52 "they have uniform tastes, desire the goods 
and services that everyone desires; they are not ready to sacrifice themselves 
too much for future generations".53 This type of man and society is contrasted 
with the ideal society in which variety and diversity prevail, composed of men 
with initiative "who give rather than receive orders, perform a job that no one 
has told them to do, create for themselves the task they want to complete".54 
Up to this point, Einaudi's discourse might appear as purely criticai of 
collectivism, except for the fact already noted that it seems to weave together 
a contradictory braid of reactionary criticisms of modem life without value, 
and ecologistic or Marxist criticisms of the mass techno-capitalism of globa-
lisation. 
It is precisely this coincidence that makes us reflect, however, and leads us 
to ulterior observations, though it isn't clear whether they refer to mass capit-
alism or collectivism, or to that mix of politicai collectivism and globalised 
mass capitalism that seems to loom over the world scene as a new, indispen-
sable point of reference for world economie and politicai order, at seventy 
years from the end of the second world war, and with the affirmation of China 
as a new economie power (and moral? or emblematic of globalised capitalism 
of naked men? The future is stili uncertain). 
As 'nineteenth-century' Einaudi says: 
The equality of starting points does not therefore mean to say equality of naked 
men who, having reached the age when they are economically productive, make a 
rush to acquire wealth, fame, honours, the best positions. A society in which the book 
of life must genuinely begin with a new generation, would be an inferno of men un-
leashed to fight against each other for the first place, or a phalanstery or monastery 
governed by Mandarins.55 
A society of bureaucrats, in which the criterion for the selection of young 
men is also based on competitions fixed by impersonal procedures, rules pre-
sumed to be objective and bureaucratic. Here it may seem like Einaudi had 
already read the recent findings of the Agency for the assessment of Italian 
51 ID., Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 228. 
52 Ibid., p. 230. 
53 Ibid., p. 229. 
54 Ibid., p. 230. 
55 Ibid., p. 217. 
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university research,56 when he characterises the collectivist society as that in 
which "the criterion for selection is that of the competitions of the Mandar-
ins", "in a society whose essence is advancement by examination", in which 
the family is reduced to "a temporary hospice from which one departs for 
the examination", and in which 
the young naked man, equal to ali other young men, cannot at his own risk and at his 
own initiative search for and try his own road [...] and must submit to continuous 
trials to obtain employment and advancement. At every step an examiner subjects 
him to tests of intelligence, strength, skill [...]. Let us contemplate the perfect society 
of the Mandarins, in which there is equality of the starting points and successive pro-
motions depend on his mnemonic quickness in responding to questions, on an apti-
tude for guessing the answer that responds to the examiner's ideas, on his capacity for 
obsequiousness and cunning in winning the favour of his superiore.57 
The obvious consequence is the creation of a society of bureaucrats 
without identities and without responsibilities, completely different from a 
society of free men, connected by bonds of place and family, and other forms 
of social bonds. 
Once again, ali these arguments seem to be only apparently so remote 
from our current day dominated by bureaucratic procedures (consider the 
elephantine functioning of the European Union) and from the reigning pro-
ceduralism, regulator of even the smallest detail in which the very idea of free-
dom is lost and comes to be substituted by a scientistic materialism that con-
ceives man as a machine,58 perfect for living in a collectivistic society.59 These 
might easily appear as nothing more than the fruit of politically reactionary, 
anti-emancipitative, even misogynous, thinking about class, if Einaudi did 
not make use, at the culmination of ali these criticisms, of criticai point theory. 
It is precisely when he identifies the fact that in every society there is a 
place for 'those who obey' and for the 'men of initiative', for those who scru-
56 The process of evaluation undertaken by the Agenzia di valutazione della ricerca universita-
ria italiana, or ANVUR, stili ongoing at this writing, introduces a criterion of assessment aimed at 
correcting the past abuses and customs that were perpetrated in universities, communities which 
are far from idyllic. We can only hope that the indispensable innovations do not turn out to be worse 
that the previous situation, transforming itself into a rash inquisitorial and bureaucratic liquidation of 
humanistic learning, as some fear. I will not cite Einaudi's numerous writings on this issue. 
57 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 218. 
58 J.-P. DUPUY, On the origins of cognitive sciences. The mechanization of the mind (Cambridge, 
MA, MIT Press, 2009). 
59 In which the appearance of freedom is guaranteed by a mass capitalism which has, paradoxi-
cally, itself become a source of a flattening of culture and conscience. 
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pulously carry out the responsibilities assigned to them and for those who 
- almost in terms like those of the famous oration by Pico della Mirandola in 
which God symbolically makes man responsible for De dignitate hominis -
"perform a job that no one has assigned to them, create for themselves the 
task they wish to carry out",60 that he formulates criticai point theory, which 
rescues him from the danger of ending up in a reactionary programizing con-
structivism. 
The ideal society, for Einaudi the economist, is not composed of equals, 
but one in which the ideal is diversity and variety. However, he does not limit 
himself to this, but takes it a step further, a step which is methodologically 
very significant: 
There is no theoretical rule which tells us when diversity degenerates into anarchy 
and when uniformity is a prodrome of tyranny. We only know that there exists a cri-
ticai point such that, when it is passed, every way of life, every custom that had up to 
that point been a means of human elevation and refinement becomes an instrument 
of degeneration and decadence.61 
Criticai point theory is clearly an epistemological theory of the limits of 
knowledge, which set freedom opposite to the standardising use of pian 
and program. The defender of freedom knows well that following an abstract 
normative model is not what confers vitality on society; rather the concrete 
exercise of knowledge incorporated into concrete free choice is what consti-
tutes the life blood of faith in the institutions. 
In every society there is a criticai point that determines whether the effeets 
of the (individuai) act, of the (collective) government are 'good' or 'bad', but 
where, in a given situation, this criticai point lies, and who holds the knowl-
edge of it, is not known at ali in concrete terms.62 That ignorance itself repre-
sents knowledge, a limit on the theory of knowledge available, which Einaudi 
situates as the common epistemological basis for the philosophy of social 
sciences, politics, economics and law in a key that is aesthetic and figurative 
(as the frequent references to Lorenzetti's frescos of good and bad govern-
ment show). The kind of knowledge expressed by criticai point theory is 
therefore, epistemologically, a 'knowing what' rather than a 'knowing how': 
60 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 230. 
61 ID., Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 231. 
62 This theory has points in common with Legendre's notion of 'founding reference' and that of 
'World 0'. It isn't possible to go into a comparison here. For some remarks, see Società post-hitle-
riane? cit., and P . HERITIER, "From text to image. The sacred foundation of Western institutional 
order. Legal-semiotic perspectives", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, fortheoming. 
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it simply indicates that there is a criticai point, or threshold, but without making 
it possible to know exactly where it lies or when it will be reached.62 This 
doctrine of the limits of knowledge (and the role of philosophical knowledge) 
is also present in the following lengthy quote, from an article by Einaudi that 
is considered his testament,64 on the myth of sovereign democracy, which re-
capitulates and summarises the various aspects of the Einaudian discourse in a 
synthetic unitary representation: according to the economist, with accents that 
recali Legendre, the myth of sovereign democracy, 
has lasted in England since 1689 and shows no signs of disappearing anytime soon. It 
lasted in Piedmont and then in Italy from 1848 to 1922 [...]. The myth resurrected in 
1945 is stili alive and will last as long as the Italians, having experienced its sad op-
posite, the sad contrary experience, are persuaded that no other myth can surpass 
that, although this is not rationally provable, of counting heads. In the past men be-
lieved that other myths were valid, and emperors and kings were obeyed then be-
cause "they were anointed by the Lord" or consecrated by the "grace of God". These 
too were myths, accepted by the peoples because they were backed by venerable be-
liefs, habits, customs, which amounted to the consensus of today's electoral body. But 
when it was seen that the sovereigns consecrated by the ancient myths no longer 
worked in a manner in line with the advantage and will of the majority, the new myth 
arose, that of the will expressed from time to time by living citizens, and the ancient 
myths fell. 
The new myth has an enemy; and it is those who believe they have discovered the 
truth and maintain it their duty to carry it into effect. La peste de l'homme, c'est l'opi-
nion de sqavoir [there is a plague on Man, the opinion that he knows something], 
wrote Montaigne [...]. And before him, in Genesis, it is written that in the list of 
the outcasts the first place was given to those who believed they knew: Eritis sicut 
dii, scientes bonum et malum [you will be like God, knowing good and evil] (Genesis 
3:5).65 
This quotation presents an admirable synthesis of a theory of secularisa-
tion and of the symbolism of sovereignty, which was rediscovered successively 
in historiography (the rediscovery of the papal revolution of the eleventh cen-
63 From an endless bibliography on this topic, see F.A. HAYEK, Studies in Philosophy, Politics 
and Economies (London, Roudedge, 1967) where, in the articles in the first part, Hayek constructs 
his model of epistemological complexity. 
64 L. EINAUDI, "Discorso elementare sulle somiglianze e sulle dissimiglianze fra liberalismo e 
socialismo", in ID., Prediche inutili (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1 9 5 9 ) , considered to be Einaudi's spiritual 
and theoretical testimony; see S . STEVE, "La lezione di Einaudi", in Scritti vari (Milano, Ciriec Franco 
Angeli, 1997 ) , pp. 6 9 5 - 7 1 1 . 
65 L. EINAUDI, "Discorso elementare sulle somiglianze e sulle dissimiglianze fra liberalismo e 
socialismo" cit., pp. 205-206. 
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tury and of the aesthetic-legal relationship between the Corpus Iuris Civilis and 
the Corpus Iuris Canonici, between the emperor and the pope), respectively by 
authors such as Berman, Prodi, Kantorowicz, Schmitt and Legendre (who I 
will not cite at length here),66 and which finds confirmation in the economist's 
use of the notion of the myth (as in the quote given above). 
Some years later, Hayek, basing his own works in economie theory and in 
methodology of social sciences that would earn him the Nobel Prize, would 
make clear, in an epistemological setting, the point of the limit of knowledge, 
in close correlation with Popperian falsification, in his own theory of complex 
phenomena. He does this by indicating the difference between knowledge of 
mere principle, characteristic of the complex phenomena of the social sciences 
and in particular areas of the naturai sciences (similar to knowledge of the cri-
ticai point), and knowledge of detail, characteristic of simple phenomena, 
which make possible a detailed prediction of future events in causai terms (si-
milar to knowledge of the pian).67 Following Hayek's complexity theory and 
the work of von Foerster, related to second-order cybernetics and the theory 
of complexity and self-transcendence, Jean-Pierre Dupuy would then refor-
mulate the problem of complexity and the sacrificial sacrality of economics 
within the social sphere, developing a theory of the 'indigenous fixed point'. 
This can be synthesized thus: the fixed point is "a point of reference that 
everyone takes as an external, intangible datum, when everyone knows that 
it is the result of the synergy of each with the same datum".68 
Dupuy's theory ties together various aspects of the quotation given above 
regarding the myth of democracy: it has an exogenous mythological character, 
sovereign (from which derives its succession from other earlier myths of sover-
eignty, the king and the emperor), which however derives from an observable 
collective action that is mythicized (democracy, if you will, inherits the exo-
genous character, fundamental, of sovereignty). 
The nature of this process, also following Girard's theory, is, according to 
Dupuy, sacred: Violence is capable of self-exteriorising itself in symbolic and 
institutional forms - the rites, the myths, the systems of prohibition and ob-
ligation that regulate violence, containing it, in both senses of the term: they 
act as barriers for it even though they are constituted of it.69 
66 These questions were addressed in my Società post-hitleriane? cit., and other articles on this 
topic. 
67 In F.A. HAYEK, Studies cit., a text dedicated to Karl Popper. 
68 J.-P. DUPUY , "De l'oeil du cyclone au point fìxe endogène", in Dans l'oeil du cyclone. Col-
loque de Cerisy (Paris, Carnet Nord, 2008), p. 313. 
6 9 ID., Petite métaphysique des tsunamis (Paris, Seuil, 2 0 0 5 ) , p. 9 8 . 
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Today economics, just like democracy, is a founding reference, exacdy 
one of these places of constructed social sacrality that contains violence (in 
the dual sense that it both has violence in it endogenously and at the same time 
limits it), one of those sovereign and founding myths of social life that func-
tions fictitiously, aesthetically, dogmatically (exogenously) because they are 
believed beforehand (and thus constructed endogenously). 
Einaudi's criticai point theory intuits this movement, at once historic, aes-
thetic and epistemologica!, making it possible to read the criticai point as a 
fixed, endogenous point, a locus where the theories of truth and freedom are ar-
ticulated, because these are united by the fact that they cannot be the exclusive 
prerogative of knowledge of any kind, nor of any kind of positive power,10 of 
any kind of religious, politicai, juridical, economic institution, or of any kind 
of knowledge, not even scientific knowledge. 
To my mind, this interpretation therefore permits Einaudi's discourse in 
the Lezioni to escape being criticised as simple reactionary thinking, and to 
instead consider his theory of the criticai point - as an element that cannot 
be planned, programmed, knowable in deterministic terms - fundamental 
"to science, both economic and politicai, of men living in society".71 
Precisely in the article mentioned earlier, regarding the existence of a cri-
ticai point in the measurement of unemployment benefits, Einaudi clarifies 
how, by means of going beyond the criticai point, "takes place the passage 
from social good to social evil"; what was virtue at first becomes vice, and vice 
virtue. By means of the theory, the ambivalence that is characteristic of eco-
nomics, characteristic indeed of any founding myth of society, is introduced, 
in terms of evil understood as a principle for explaining social action.72 
Moving away from economic theory, and in particular from that of mar-
ginalism,73 but extending himself, though brietiy, to politicai sciences,74 com-
munication theory,75 the area of family sociology,76 to a reading of the history 
70 This is the theory of truth maintained by P.A. SEQUERI in 11 Dio affidabile. Saggio di teologia 
fondamentale (Brescia, Queriniana, 1996), esp. pp. 366-370. 
7 1 L . EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 231. 
72 On this point, see J.-P. DUPUY, Avions-nous oublié le mal? Penser la politique après l'il sep-
tembre (Paris, Bayard, 2002). 
73 According to the theory of diminishing degrees of utility, L . EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica so-
ciale cit., p. 231. 
74 Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
75 Although in embryonic fashion, but very significant: regarding the extraordinary invention of 
the radio, Einaudi anticipates many later debates, up to the stand that Popper takes in Cattiva mae-
stra televisione-, "The man-demon invented what might become a most perfect instrument for 
turning men into imbeciles if it were to fall into the hands of one who used it for the purposes of prò-
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of institutions and the criticism of collectivistic societies, 'nineteenth-century' 
Einaudi formulates, in other words, a theory that can be read in an anthro-
pological sense, which, even though highly liable to criticism and difficult to 
accept because it is based on the centrality of sacrifice,77 appears aimed at 
doing what to the twentieth century appears to be forbidden: holding the 
pieces of human knowledge together, while also showing the reasons for 
the inevitability and inexhaustibility of knowledge with regard to freedom 
as a foundation for the social and for institutions (legai, economie). Criticai 
point theory plays a part in this fundamental epistemology of truth, reread 
in an aesthetic key (by means of a reference to a social scenario, a founding 
scene, such as that of the garden city): I know that, on the collective and his-
torical piane of the succession of periods, there is a defining feature of the 
institutions, which is freedom, but I cannot know precisely where it is lo-
cated, I cannot predict it and pian it, I cannot arrange it: this is the anthro-
pological mystery of the nexus between law and freedom, both evoked by a 
representation of the truth that cannot be reduced to the factual, a perspec-
tive triggered by the Christian anthropology of freedom in comparison with 
the Pharisaism of the law.78 
According to Einaudi there is a criticai point: a free society or institution 
degenerates or declines due to the exaggeration of one of its elements, and 
"soon becomes the victim of the tyrant or the morta gora19 of employees 
and Mandarins, whose career proceeds by means of examinations and compe-
titions, competitions and examinations, hierarchies of degrees, honours and 
salaries"80 when free men give way to servants, but it is impossible to deter-
mine exactly what, in a given society, the threshold when this occurs is, and 
thus construct predictive knowledge of the moment of social decadence: only 
ex ante is it possible to 'predict' the contents of freedom, and only ex post is it 
possible to recognise that freedom is gone: "Freedom exists, if free men exist; 
paganda [...]. The voice commands, orders to think in a certain way, insults the disobedient and the 
sceptical; and by means of repetition it obtains surprising effeets of blind obedience, convinced 
persuasion to which no written work can arrive", L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 232. 
76 Asking himself what the criticai point for the family was with regard to the number of chil-
dren, at the level of the single nucleus and the collective; see ibid., pp. 232-233. 
77 It does not appear possible here to even touch on this theoretical profile, which falls entirely 
outside of the Einaudian discourse. 
78 Here it is certainly useful to recur to the catastrophe theory of René Thom. On this point, see 
also J. PETITOT, Morphogenesis of Meaning (Bern, Peter Lang, 2004). 
79 Morta gora, referring to a dead or stagnant channel, is a reference to Dante's Inferno (Canto 
VIE: 31). 
80 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 2 3 3 . 
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it dies when men have the mind of servants".81 There is nothing mystical in ali 
of this. In an even more explicit way, this impossibility of predictive knowl-
edge, which is characteristic of the naturai sciences and simple phenomena, 
expressed in the theory of the criticai point in the development of a society, 
conveys, for Einaudi, the pre-eminence of the individual and of the moral 
over organisation and procedure where he notes that "when in a society there 
exists a sufficient number of men who are truly free, it makes no difference 
what its economic, social or politicai organisation is. The letter [of the law] 
can never kill the spirit".82 
Freedom entails the possible ambivalence of its effects: good and evil, 
good and bad government. 
The criticai point is also the place where the private and public, the indi-
vidual and collecdve dimensions, are placed along the same line, as Bruno 
Leoni makes acutely clear, in a perspective that unifies private and public, 
the cognitive and the operative, from the point of view of the finiteness of 
man, of his acts, of the institutions that he constructs, of the theories that 
he develops, of the works of art that he creates. As Leoni notes, 
In matters of government and state in general there exists a criticai point to 
which, to teli the truth, can be traced ali of the other 'criticai points' that Einaudi 
considers in his analyses of institutions and structures, and thus that of the govern-
ment and of the market. It is the criticai point beyond which no mind of a single in-
dividual or a committee of single individuals can foresee - in any of his plans - the 
indirect or remote consequences that will reverberate, as in a genuine series of chain 
reactions on the entire life of a society, as a result of any possible decision made by the 
government. But this is not ali: there is another aspect of the same criticai point that 
always imposes itself, sooner or later, on the considerations of those who study these 
problems: the limit inexorahly encountered, along with the knowledge of the indivi-
dual, by his own personal volition, when he thinks that he can alter, at a stroke and in 
a brief space of time, of his own volition and that of a few friends - with his pian -
the general course of things according to his desires.83 
Criticai point theory thus reunites the private and the public, the indivi-
dual and the social in the common moment of the impossibility to predict crisis, 
related to a fallibilistic concept of knowledge and action that is fundamental 
to the ideal of freedom and thus linked to the ambivalence of its effects (good 
and bad government). 
»! Ibid., p. 239. 
82 Ibid., p. 241. 
83 B. LEONI, "Luigi Einaudi e la scienza del governo", Il Politico, 1 (1964), pp. 69-86: 84-85. 
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It is therefore possible to make some conclusive observations on the 
whole of Einaudi's discourse on freedom, beginning with the particular collo-
cation of criticai point theory. 
There is in the construction and exposition of this theory, even in the lim-
ited context of the Lezioni, an important historic element that was identified 
earlier with regard to the sense of time in the construction of the imposing 
works of the Middle Ages, endowed with a sense of eternity. Here the econ-
omist returns to a classic itinerary of Uberai thought, the origins of collectivism 
beginning with monastic rules, conferring an entirely different meaning on 
them, that of a micro-treatise on the formation of the rules in an institution. 
The rule (of St. Benedict, or St. Francis) defines the spirit of the institution as 
being "founded on the spirit of renunciation of the individuai, on devotion of 
individuals to the common good, on the abandonment of earthly goods for 
the conquest of eternai happiness":84 this is the spirit of the institution which, 
as long as it was maintained, turned convents into 'shining lighthouses' amidst 
the shadows of the Middle Ages. Merciless as a true expert of economics, Ei-
naudi analyses the decline in the long run ('Everywhere, at a distance of a 
hundred years from its foundation, more or less, we find the same things hap-
pening') and the diminishing of that spirit as the history of monasteries goes 
forward, deriving from the weakening of the spirit of renunciation, of a reduc-
tion of equality among the monks which follows the progressive introduction 
of corruption into the everyday life of the monastery, inevitably implied by the 
diminution of freedom in that institution. 
A similar analysis is also carried out for the communist system in which ali 
means of production have become public. That society is one where "if ali 
men were born in obedience and if there existed a means of selection so that 
the best were placed in positions of command, that society could live, and 
while perhaps not becoming excellent, could render universal content-
ment".85 Even collectivism, if supported by a spirit of renunciation and a 
shared social bond, would be viable if believed in by the society, because this 
is the essential element for a society's cohesion. But, in the long run, this too is 
subject to the law of decline, to the prevalence of conservatism and the refusai 
of the new. In the collectivist society it is science, and not religion or the mar-
ket, that provides the criterion for authority, but Einaudi questions exacdy 
which science that is: 
8 4 L . EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale cit., p. 2 3 3 . 
85 Ibid., p. 235. 
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The theoretical science taught in the schools, accepted by scientists who are al-
ready famous; the science successfully applied by accredited technicians who have al-
ready proven themselves, or the science which now opposes the accepted principles, 
which presumes to shake the abstract foundations and the concrete applications? 8 6 
In this rhetorical question begins to emerge the real reason for the deca-
dence of a society, drawn from a particular analysis, but capable of being gen-
eralised: collectivism, a programmed society cannot pursue the new, but is 
rather entangled in the snares of what is known, proven, tried, because this 
authoritarian social structure does not consent to change and innovation, 
which are only possible when the ideal of freedom is put into practice. Here 
Einaudi becomes a radicai critic of orthodoxy; it is even possible to hear Fou-
caultian overtones in the these few passages that follow the argumentation lo-
gically, and extol criticism and the emergence of what is out of the ordinary 
and the normal: non-free societies discourage criticism, banishing heretics and 
ostracising those who rebel against the program. When criticism is eliminated, 
the sense of institution and society is lost: "In homage to reason, in obedience 
to science, the life that is the new, that is the unusual, that is variety, that is 
contrast, that is dissension, that is struggle, loses its very reason for being".87 
In using the parallel between the Middle Ages of the monasteries and 
communist societies (the USSR didn't even live to be a hundred years old), 
working out the theory of a criticai point that is not known and cannot be 
known, but which is strongly connected to a moral ideal, a social bond that 
can only be ascertained in action but whose evolution cannot not determined 
by laws, plans and programs, the reasoning that Einaudi elaborates is not at ali 
spiritualistic, although the letter of his text might suggest this interpretation.88 
He is formulating a concrete anthropological argument which acknowledges 
the limits of abstract knowledge in comparison to practice and experience; he 
identifies a specific conception of man at the basis of a culture and a society as 
the essential element for its survival. When this fundamental vision, not neces-
sarily expressed or formulated but present in shared sentiments (thus the im-
portance of family, land and house), is weakened by the passing of time and 
diminution of sentiment, what inevitabile follows is social decadence, due first 
of ali to anthropological reasons concerning the lack of faith and values: this is 
the significance of the criticai point, which, once passed (but without ever 
86 Ibid., p. 236. 
87 Ibid., p. 237. 
88 "Man must find in himself, in his soul, in the strength of his character the freedom he is seek-
ing. Freedom is spirit and not matter", ibid., p. 238. 
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knowing exactly where this point lies), inexorably leads "not to a society of 
living men, but to an aggregation of automatons manoeuvred by a centre, 
by a superior authority"; to a society formed by automatons who will make 
magnificent soldiers, "ready to obey the command that orders them to be 
killed", but not one of men capable of replying to one who orders an act that 
goes against their conscience, "No, up to here commands Caesar, beyond that 
we only obey Christ and our conscience".89 
The inner and spiritual dimension in Einaudi is thus only a condition for 
withdrawal into oneself, necessary when social conditions do not permit a free 
life, but it relates to a situation of public restraint, of totalitarian regime, and 
not that which is auspicious for the life of free men. Freedom has an primary 
dimension that is social, concrete and intersubjective, because it is based on 
relations of free men inserted into a familial and social context, not on roodess 
automatons that can be manipulated by science or religion. In this society a 
specific space is assigned to diversity and rebellion: "Where the orthodox 
are such by command from on high and the heretics are banished from water 
and fire; where it is impossible for anchorites to flee to the desert or forest, 
there is no freedom, except for saints and heroes".90 
Along with the figures of the hero, the saint and the thinker, necessary in 
extreme cases, the ideal of good society rests on a more concrete and humble 
vision of freedom: there is the freedom of man as such, teacher, artist, journal-
ist, farmer, saver, public administrator, common citizen, worker, that is 
intuited when he "attempts to summarise in a few words" what is meant 
by freedom, its pragmatic dimension, and the social and politicai implications: 
Thus the man on the Street, enemy of the tyrant and desirous of living freely as 
the common man likes to, desirous of peace and justice, is involuntarily, even though 
he knows nothing about the related theory, abhorred by the kinds of societies that are 
approaching the criticai point; that is, equally abhorred by societies where wealth is 
concentrated in the hands of a few as by those in which the instrumentai goods, the 
so-called instruments of production, are possessed by a mythical so-called collec-
tive.91 
Thus for Einaudi the free man has no need of imposed sacrifice, but 
rather that which is voluntary or chosen. Freedom therefore is neither spiri-
tual nor material, but radically anthropological; it can never be guaranteed 
89 Ibid., p. 238. 
90 Ibid., p. 242. 
91 Ibid., p. 244. 
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or presumed precisely because it does not depend on legai conditions or on 
types of structures for social living (capitalistic, rule of law), but on the con-
crete condition of men who live individually in a given society and collectively 
construct their own condition of being automatons or men, of servants or free 
men, believing individually and collectively in one of the sovereign myths of 
common living (which can always fall instead into the totalitarianism of the 
society of naked men and automatons). Freedom has a dimension which 
is originally anthropological, which derives from inside man himself, from 
the strength of his character and his spirit, and which is necessarily unfolded 
within a given social situation. This is the reason why Einaudi, who possesses 
a fortunate anthropological intuition that he never seems to master fully on a 
theoretical level, and with regards to freedom, is not always able to "speak of 
a utopia and analyse a fact".92 
The anthropological relevance of Einaudi's intuition as an economist and 
as a man lies precisely in the identification of the essentiality of that relation 
between utopia and reality in its concrete expression, never truly compre-
hended theoretically to the very bottom in his works, but intuited: a trait that 
makes it so that his words, even though historically outdated, remain, like 
those of great men, ever full and complete, even more so than those of the 
great thinkers, in their inevitabile and inexorable incompleteness, offspring 
of the existential and epistemologica! finiteness of human freedom. 
4 . USELESS NON-PREACHING: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF FREE-
DOM BEYOND EINAUDI? 
The starting hypothesis of this present paper is that in Einaudi's work is 
found a vision of economies, the moral and the legai, although only outlined 
and not worked out completely, one that is aesthetically informed but never 
conceptualised (as shown by the reference to Lorenzetti's fresco and to the 
anthropological scenario recalled in the Lezioni di politica sociale), which, in 
the face of the radicai contemporary economic crisis, a genuine 'crisis of 
meaning'93 of the Western lifestyle, makes it possible to see again the perti-
92 Ibid., pp. 245-246. 
93 This is how Jean-Pierre Dupuy expressed it in an article that carne out during the corrections 
of the galleys for a book that was already almost finished, a position whose discussion is beyond the 
scope of this present paper. According to Dupuy, the current crisis has revealed the illusory false-
hood of the contrivance of a system of prices in the market as the basis of social bonds capable 
of 'containing the violence': Cette crise est une crise du sens (This crisis is a crisis of meaning); see 
J.-P. DUPUY, L'avenir de l'economie. Sortir de l'économystification (Paris, Flammarion, 2 0 1 2 ) , p. 4 3 . 
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nence of the questions raised by Einaudi, positing them far beyond mere re-
levance of the return to the principle of the 'constitutional balanced budget'. 
It is often in fact contemporary economists (and jurists) who reduce the moral, 
economie and legai significance, that is, the perspective of a criticai social 
science, to detailed elements, such as the respect necessary for contemporary 
nations, the constitutionalisation of the principle of a balanced budget, draw-
ing justification from the occasionality and apparent lack of theoretical coher-
ence of the Einaudian vision. 
The having elucidated precisely and specifically the anthropological back-
ground present in the statement of criticai point theory in the Lezioni di po-
litica sociale - going beyond a superficial and hasty reading that reveals only 
the obvious anachronistic elements in the face of a society in profound evolu-
tion - makes it possible to identify a program of research, which can certainly 
not be carried out here, aimed at reconfiguring Einaudi's text as a contribu-
tion that appears to be important in times of crisis for understanding what is 
happening today, more than six decades after its writing,94 avoiding both a 
shallow eulogistic interpretation and a too rash dismissal due to a presumed 
anachronism of the opinions expressed with reference to an outdated society. 
If, as Hayek has written, the twentieth century has been an "age of supersti-
tion",95 the perspective distance that makes it possible to see what those 
superstitions were is not yet sufficient, but at least the question regarding 
which criteria and lifestyles have become outdated appears to be completely 
reopened and thus it is difficult to understand exactly what is more anachro-
nistic: Einaudi's pages, or the pages of those who criticised them. Pending the 
resolution of these doubts through the process of evolution, I feel it is impor-
tant to indicate, among the many possibilities, three lines of perspective of 
authentic social philosophy and philosophy of law - the former intended in 
its noble sense concerning the concrete meaning of institutions and not simply 
94 It might be important to recali in these times, in which culture as well is in large part a 
culture of the new and ephemeral, the anecdote told by Einaudi's grandson regarding the principle 
of avoiding first impressioni: "One day I brought him a book that had just been published that I had 
read in the course of my studies at Harvard but which he did not have. I don't remember if I offered 
it to him as a gift or to prove a point. I believed I had understood that for him books were the highest 
expression of civilisation and that, surrounded with books as he was, he would have appreciated it. 
He refused it. 'Why?', I asked, disconcerted. 'Before buying a book you need to know if it is worth it 
or not. I, if I can help it, never buy a book until 40 years after its publication. Only then can you 
know if it is worth something or not'. You can imagine my surprise. I was not yet 20 years oidi", 
L.R. EINAUDI, "Le molteplici eredità. Un ricordo personale di Luigi Einaudi", in Luigi Einaudi nella 
cultura, nella società e nella politica del Novecento, R. MARCHIONATTI and P . SODDU (eds.) (Firenze, 
Leo S. Olschki, 2009), pp. 309-335: 324. 
95 F. HAYEK, Legge, legislazione e libertà, voi. ILI, Epilogo (Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1986), p. 558. 
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reduced to a mere general theory of normativistic law - which appear to me to 
be present in Einaudi's social philosophy: 
1) The philosophical-legal interest and the modernity of Einaudi's so-
cial philosophy reside, more than in the inevitably outdated historical-social 
analysis, in the anthropological and non-theoretical character of his theory of 
knowledge, anti-elitist and criticai of the intellectualism of manner which 
had and stili has a great following in Italian culture. The centre of society is 
human freedom assumed in concrete form and exposed to the vulnerability 
of its historicism, never guaranteed by knowledge or a theory of its rationality 
(not even economic rationality), but ever open to the dimensions of future 
and actions. Thus in his thinking, the theoretical knowledge and the rigour 
of the logical-conceptual considerations never diminish the concrete dimen-
sion of human freedom, which can never be reduced to a simple theory (much 
less an ethics): in this sense, the oscillation between the areas of theory and 
practice, both spheres which on their own are incapable of describing man 
in his complexity, is one factor of the great relevance, whose real anthropolo-
gical significance, however, does not appear to have been understood as yet. 
Without taking refuge in the protection of a theory that is dogmatically as-
sumed (not even that of human rights or some underlying naturai law), Einau-
di configures a theory of freedom in which the theoretic is not the a priori 
solving criterion for practice, without this causing him to fall into the irra-
tional and into a conception that sees freedom reduced to a mere opinion. 
Free choice requires an act that can never be dissoeiated from conditions that 
can be concretely identified, which hinders the construction of a complete 
doctrinal system, and always defers to the responsible decision of the indivi-
dual man, constitutive of a order that is open, fallible, historical and demo-
cratic.96 
2) This concrete vision of human freedom as a point of departure and 
fulcrum of the analysis is also the explanation of the interdisciplinarianism pre-
sumed by the analyses that he performs, on one hand aimed at denouncing 
the myths of constructivist rationalism and ideologies intended as objective 
theories of knowledge, and on the other aimed at capturing the concreteness 
96 As his grandson recalls, Einaudi did not forget to place man, in the concreteness of his own 
conditions of life, in the centre of this theory: "The intellectual and man of politics do not have the 
right to decide what is right for the farmer or factory worker. 'The only person who knows if the 
shoe fìts is the one who wears it'. This cutting phrase was part of many of our discussions. It reflects 
an extremely profound conviction of the individual value of the person and respect he is due beyond 
his social condition, and without politicai sectarianism", L.R. EINAUDI, "Le molteplici eredità. Un 
ricordo personale di Luigi Einaudi" cit., p. 322. 
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of free choice in the lens of the disciplines that study human actions, from 
economics to religion to politics, to science, ali the way to ethics, in a unitary 
anthropological vision which always remains in the background but is never 
translated into abstract theory. Thus from his work there seems to emerge 
the intuition of a vision of man as a unitary phenomenon based on freedom 
of choice, even if he wasn't able to, nor probably ever wanted to develop in a 
coherent way this requirement, which remains confined, as we have seen, 
within the sphere of the aesthetic (Lorenzetti's fresco) or the social (in the 
anthropological scenarios contained in the historical-social analyses of the Le-
zioni, for example). The objective of one promising study would then be to 
seek to conjoin in a criticai way the intuitions contained in places in his works 
with the philosophical anthropology of the twentieth century and the acquisi-
tions of phenomenology, in the attempt to construct a representation of the 
human being that, in addition to being prescriptive (the 'preachings') would 
also be descriptive, or better, indicative, not limited to the historic analysis of 
lifestyles and customs; moreover, a human figure not thought of religiously in 
a vision based on the sacrificial. The issue of the relationship between econom-
ics and the religious ethics of sacri}ice certainly would need to be examined in 
depth in this sense, an issue that Einaudi condenses into a theory of the eco-
nomie need for savings, linking it, in an individuai and social dimension, to 
the sphere of the ideal (the family, the institutions as entities that collocate 
man in a context beyond the individuai). Such an analysis should be extended 
in depth to arrive at identification of the root of the present-day European 
crisis, a crisis of faith, of institutions and of economies. Einaudi, however, 
does not appear to perceive the necessity of formulating the problem in a phi-
losophical key, choosing instead to maintain a historic register, which, how-
ever, defers to a philosophy of history (but also to the interruption of a phi-
losophy of history as knowledge concerning the historian): this problem 
emerges clearly in the formulation of criticai point theory. 
3) The criticai point theory that he outlines appears to be inserted in a 
representation of man's complexity, which seems to be compatible with re-
cent analyses that can be worked out starting with the theories of catastrophe 
and complexity, but there seems to me to be a need, in order to be compre-
hended in a real sense, for a specifically aesthetic-legal approach as well. Once 
again, the existence of a criticai point97 in development beyond which the 
society moves towards decadence appears to be an open theoretical analysis. 
97 As Silvestri notes, the doctrine of the criticai point "is at bottom a doctrine of limits"; see 
P. SILVESTRI, Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi o del Buongoverno cit., pp. 260, 278. 
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The existence of a historic point that defines a threshold is represented, but it 
cannot be predicted or programmed, nor even knowingly produced. In 
Hayekian epistemological terms, the doctrine of the Einaudian criticai point 
is negative knowledge, which attests to the existence of a limit and at the 
same time the need to limit the importance of predictive knowledge regarding 
the limit: hence the need to limit the anthropological importance of knowl-
edge itself to the real and to the intersubjective relationships in ali historic 
periods. I know that there is a limit, a threshold, but I don't know where this 
limit lies: this is the structure of the doctrine of the criticai point, which, 
however, Einaudi develops, in contrast to Hayek, not in an epistemological 
but in a historic-descriptive sense: an element that integrates and enriches 
the Hayekian-Popperian formulation, but which in its turn, precisely because 
it is primarily historical, is much more limited than that. It is precisely the 
impossibility of depicting this limit positively and devising predictive knowl-
edge of it, characteristic of simple phenomena, that attests, to my mind, to 
the need for an approach to the problem that is not merely historic or epis-
temological, but that begins with a legai aesthetic of the foundations, aimed at 
holding together the historiographical aspect with the epistemological-cogni-
tive aspect of the limit.98 The role and prevalence of the lexicon of the ideal, 
express, in my opinion, in Einaudian theory, exactly the intuition of the pro-
blem and the impossibility of formulating it and addressing it in philosophi-
cal terms, except by means of a discourse perceived as aesthetic-predicatory 
(the reference to the ideal society, the 'ethical' need to make 'useless' preach-
ings). The discourse cannot be specified here except as a problem, already 
present in Einaudi's work, which can be better comprehended today, in 
the face of an epochal crisis in the foundations of Western institutions and 
markets, in the face of the acknowledgment of the possible non-uselessness 
of the useless preachings of Einaudi for the purposes of configuring the social 
bond (and of the representation of the foundation as limit) on which demo-
cratic institutions rest, and the functioning of the markets. The problem of 
the changing register of the discourse, from useless preachings to a possible 
usefulness of a non-preaching discourse on the foundations and on the anthro-
pological issues, takes us, through Einaudi, into a territory of research that 
98 I allow myself to refer once again in this regard to my monographic text, Estetica giuridica, in 
preparation, in which I attempt to conjoin the historic aspect (the historiographical problem of 
secularisation) with the epistemological and gnoseological one, and in relation to the notion (borrowed 
from Popper's three worlds theory) of World 0 and starting from the dogmatic aesthetic of Pierre 
Legendre. 
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lies beyond Einaudian theory (even though perceived in it) and into an 
anthropological territory that is litde explored, situated at the centre of the 
contemporary institutional, politicai and economie, cultural crisis of Europe 
and of the Western world as a whole. This appears to be, however, another 
matter, properly anthropological. 
PAOLO SILVESTRI 
AFTER-WORD. I N V I S I B L E C I T I E S : 
W H I C H ( G O O D - B A D ) M A N ? F O R W H I C H ( G O O D - B A D ) P O L I T Y ? 
If you choose to believe me, good. Now I will teli you how 
Ottavia, the spider-web city, is made. There is a precipice 
between two steep mountains: the city is over the void, 
bound to the two crests with ropes and chains and catwalks. 
You walk on the little wooden ties, careful not to set your 
foot in the open spaces [...]. 
This is the foundation of the city: a net which serves as pas-
sage and support. [...] Suspended over the abyss, the life of 
Octavia's inhabitants is less uncertain than in other cities. 
They know the net cannot endure beyond a certain limit. 
Now I shall teli of the city of Zenobia, which is wonderful in 
this fashion: though set on dry terrain it stands in high 
pilings [...]. 
No one remembers what need or command or desire drove 
Zenobia's founders to give their city this form, and so there 
is no telling whether it was satisfied by the city as we see it 
today, which has perhaps grown through successive super-
impositions from the first, now undecipherable pian. But 
what is certain is that if you ask an inhabitant of Zenobia 
to describe his vision of a happy life, it is always a city like 
Zenobia that he imagines, with its pilings and its suspended 
stairways, a Zenobia perhaps quite different, a-flutter with 
banners and ribbons, but always derived by combining ele-
ments of that first model. 
This said, it is pointless trying to decide whether Zenobia is 
to be classified among happy cities or among the unhappy. 
It makes no sense to divide cities into these two species, but 
rather into another two: those that through the years and 
the changes continue to give their form to desires, and those 
in which desires either erase the city or are erased by it. 
1 I. CALVINO, Le città invisibili [1972], Engl. trans!: Invisible cities, transl. by W. Weaver [1974] 
(London, Vintage, 1997), p. 67. In this afterword I generally adhered to the above cited English tran-
slation of Le città invisibili, except in cases of certain words of the Italian text whose meaning, in my 
opinion, required a different translation, provided by myself with the help of Rachel Barritt Costa. 
2 I. CALVINO, Invisible cities cit., p. 30. 
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After this long journey one might ask: what conclusions can be drawn 
from this collection? Which routes should be followed for our future 
research? Here I would venture no further than a 'simple' sketch of a story, an 
account of our own ceaseless journey of research and the good or bad society 
that men form by being together. This endeavor will be pursued by giving 
shape to the manifold and complex impressions I have drawn from a reading 
of the essays gathered together in this collection, but also from those that 
carne out between 2008 and 2011, on the occasion of the celebrations for 
the sixtieth anniversary of the election of Einaudi as President of the Republic 
(1948) and the fiftieth anniversary of his death (1961).3 It can hardly be a co-
incidence, I would suggest, that in a time of crisis, even those holding the 
highest institutional offices of the Italian state felt the need to return to the 
symbolic, moral, intellectual and institutional figure of Einaudi.4 Perusal of 
this set of contributions has prompted me to reflect once more on a few un-
frequented paths of Einaudi's journey in search of a good society. I will follow 
his itinerary without any claim of exhaustiveness or systematic coherence: 
rather, I will adopt a narrative style (albeit eschewing any literary pretensions) 
with a sprinkling of elliptical and rhapsodic considerations whose allusive 
character will, hopefully, be of aid in relaunching the inquiry into the good 
polity and the relationship between man and society, individual and institu-
tions. 1 trust that the reasons underlying this choice, which is not merely sty-
listic, will become clearer upon complete reading of this book: from the intro-
duction to the contributions and up to the end of this afterword. 
1. As a first step towards explaining this point, let me start from the title, 
which interweaves allusions and analogies that will develop the thread of my 
discourse. 
The allusions refer to Italo Calvino's famous work, Invisible cities, as well 
as to the allusive use I propose to make of it. Thus in the perspective adopted 
3 Among these see: R. EINAUDI (ed.), L'eredità di Luigi Einaudi. La nascita dell'Italia repubbli-
cana e la costruzione dell'Europa (Milano, Skira, 2008); F. FORTE, L'economia liberale di Luigi Einau-
di. Saggi (Firenze, Olschki, 2009); R. MARCHIONATTI - P . SODDU (eds.), Luigi Einaudi nella cultura, 
nella società e nella politica del Novecento (Firenze, Olschki, 2010); A. GIGLIOBIANCO (ed.), Luigi Ei-
naudi: libertà economica e coesione sociale (Roma - Bari, Laterza, 2010); N. ACOCELLA (ed.), Luigi 
Einaudi: studioso, statista, governatore (Roma, Carocci, 2010); F. TOMATIS, Verso la città divina. L'in-
cantesimo della libertà in Luigi Einaudi (Roma, Città Nuova, 2011); the n. 127 (September-October 
2011) issue of the review Reset partly dedicated to Einaudi, pp. 29-56. 
4 See: M . DRAGHI, Prefazione, in A . GIGLIOBIANCO (ed.), Luigi Einaudi: libertà economica e coe-
sione sociale cit., pp. v-vn; G . NAPOLITANO, "Luigi Einaudi: un'eredità per il riformismo e per tutti", 
Reset, n. 128 (November-December 2011), pp. 5-10. 
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in this Afterword, Invisible cities is a presence from the realm of allusion, and 
I believe it should awaken no impulse to analyse or recali the specific litera-
ture on this work. Here I draw encouragement from Calvino himself who, 
spurred by the attempt of various commentators to pinpoint the "moral of 
the story" - which has often been found in its conclusion - suggested that In-
visible cities is "a book built like a polyhedron, and as for conclusions, they are 
scattered everywhere, written ali around its sharp corners, and it also has 
some that are no less epigrammatic or epigraphic" than its own conclusion.5 
In this sense, I trust that an epigrammatic or epigraphic use of Invisible cities 
will not be taken as a forced interpretation, especially hearing in mind that it 
is my own personal and ingenuous re-reading. 'Ingenuous' at least in the sense 
that, 'from the incipit1, from the very beginning, whenever we open a book, 
enter into a dialogue, a relationship or research group, or embark on an indi-
viduai line of exploration, we always find ourselves hovering between 'to be-
lieve' and lnot to believe'. 
"If you choose to believe me, good". At every new beginning we are 
constantly exposed to misunderstandings, face to face with the difficult 
interpretative-communicative situation such as that recurring throughout the 
dialogues between Marco Polo and Kublai Khan and narrated from the very 
incipit of the tale: 
It cannot be taken for granted that Kublai Khan believed everything Marco Polo 
said when describing the cities visited on his missions [...]. In the lives of emperors there 
is a moment which follows pride in the boundless extension of the territories we have 
conquered [...]. There is a sense of emptiness that comes over us at evening [...]. It is the 
desperate moment when we discover that this empire, which had seemed to us the sum 
of ali wonders, is an endless, formless, min, that corruption's gangrene has spread too 
far to be healed by our sceptre [...]. Only in Marco Polo's accounts was Kublai Khan 
able to discern, through the walls and towers destined to crumble, the tracery of a 
pattern so subtle it could escape the termites' gnawingf 
Furthermore, Calvino himself, faced with the question of the overall 
meaning of the story, wrote that "only the text itself, in its own form, can 
authorize or exclude this or that reading. As a reader among many, I can 
say that in chapter five, which at the very heart of the book develops a theme 
of lightness strangely associated with the city theme, there are some of the 
pieces I consider the best as visionary evidence, and perhaps these spidery fig-
5 I. CALVINO, "Italo Calvino on Invisible cities", Columbia, n. 8 (1993), pp. 37-42, Ital. transl.: 
"Presentazione", in Le città invisibili (Milano, Mondadori, 1993), p. x. 
6 ID., Invisible cities cit., p. 5. 
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ures ("thin cities" or suchlike) are the lightest zone of the book". But his con-
clusion was: "I would hardly know what more to say".7 A conclusion Einaudi 
himself might well have come to if he had been prodded by his critics into 
being explicit about the overall meaning of his search for good government. 
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the 'story of good government' is 
a message that always appeals to one's own freedom and sensibility or to 
the response of a 'you' who reads, listens and re-interprets and re-writes or 
re-tells the story. 
Kublai asks Marco: - When you return to the West, will you repeat to your people 
the same tales you teli me? 
- I speak and speak, - Marco says, - but the listener retains only the words he is 
expecting. [...] It is not the voice that commands the story: it is the ear. 
- At times I feel your voice is reaching me from far away, while I am prisoner of a 
gaudy and unlivable present, where ali forms of human society have reached an extreme 
of their cycle and there is no imagining what new forms they may assume. And I bear, 
from your voice, the invisible reasons which make cities live, through which perhaps, 
once dead, they will come to l i f e again2 
On the issue of analogies, one may find several family resemblances be -
tween Invisible cities and the research on good government: those I will devel-
op later are just a few of the possible. But it is worth noting forthwith two 
fundamental analogies: one related to content, the other to form or style. 
The content-related analogy concerns the relationship between traveling 
and researching. Marco Polo's journeys are to the Einaudian quest for good 
government as they are to our own research. In other words, here I assume 
the paradigm of the traveler-researcher. 
As regards form or style, perhaps it is time to do justice to Einaudi the 
preacher and storyteller, for his expository style is by no means a mere detail. 
Rather, it is the typical form in which the thoughts and sentiments that most 
deeply affected him took shape.9 To recali our starting point - the fertile dua-
lity of Einaudi's thought, the individual and the institutional - this is true both 
for the Einaudi who reflects on the individual foundation of a good society -
Einaudi the narrator of everyday stories of individual men, humble and falli-
7 ID., Presentazione cit., p. xi (italics mine). 
8 ID., Invisible cities cit., pp. 123-124. 
9 See V. DELLA VALLE, "La lingua di Luigi Einaudi fra classicismo e pathos", in A. GIGLIOBIAN-
CO (ed.), Luigi Einaudi: libertà economica e coesione sociale cit., pp. 138-154. 
— 316 — 
AFTER-WORD. INVISIBLE CITIES: WHICH (GOOD-BAD) MAN? FOR WHICH (GOOD-BAD) POLITY? 
ble, who learn through experience by "trial and error" - and also for the Ei-
naudi who reflects on the institutional foundations of the good society: in-
deed, the very portrayal of good government appeared to elude him save 
by casting it in the narrative-allusive mold. 
Finally, Calvino's mention of "lightness", almost anticipating his spiritual 
testament, Six memos for the next millennium, might well sum up the sense of 
Einaudi's style as well as my reference to literature and why I consider it just 
another way of looking at the world: 
Whenever humanity seems condemned to heaviness, I think I should fly like Per-
seus into a different space. I don't mean escaping into dreams or the irrational. I 
mean that I have to change my approach, look at the world from a different perspec-
tive, with a different logie and with fresh methods of cognition and verification.10 
2. Having said this, Einaudi the narrator of stories of concrete men can be 
found from as early as his first book, Un principe mercante [A merchant 
prince] (1900),11 where he relates the deeds of a self-made-man, an entrepre-
neur who, undaunted by difficulties and failures, built a business empire in 
South America. It was a work that earned Einaudi the following compliment 
from a colleague of his: "you have become a fine novelist economist, almost a 
Verne of politicai economy". This is also the same Einaudi who, upon return-
ing to his home town for the inauguration of a company, wrote the following 
dedication to its founders and their "vocation": 
Thousands, millions of individuals work, produce and save in spite of everything 
we can invent to put spokes in their wheels, to thwart them, discourage them. It is the 
naturai vocation that spurs them, not merely the thirst for money. Enthusiasm, the 
pride in seeing one's business grow and prosper, seeing it acquire reputation and in-
spire trust in an ever greater range of customers, expand the industriai plant, embel-
lish the sites - ali these aspects constitute a driving force of progress every bit as 
powerful as that of profitti2 
Yet this is the Einaudi who, at the same time, was aware that economie 
activity and exchanges are not intrinsically self-founded (but what is?). In 
his Lectures on social policy, he introduces his students to the topic with the 
incipit: 
1 0 I . CALVINO, "Lightness", in ID., Six memos for the next millennium, P. Creagh trans! (Lon-
don, Jonathon Cape, 1992), p. 7. 
1 1 L . EINAUDI, Un Principe mercante. Studio sulla espansione coloniale italiana (Torino, F.lli 
Bocca, 1900). 
12 ID., Dedica all'impresa dei Fratelli Guerrino, Dogliani, September 15, 1960. 
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Have you ever been in a country town on the day of a fair? [...] That fair is a 
market, that is to say a place where on a fixed day, hundreds of sellers [...] come to-
gether [...]• And from every direction, from the circle of villages and farmhouses 
around the large town [...] a multitude of buyers converge to acquire the things they 
lack. The crowd of buyers and sellers is especially large at the Easter and Ali Saint's 
Day fairs.13 
This great narration of exchanges and human relationships is then fol-
lowed by a colourful description of what lies in the background or "around 
the fair and affects it", precisely because the "market" is not "something that 
stands by itself': rather, it is also embedded and depends on legai, politicai, 
symbolic and moral institutions.14 
Euphemia, where the merchants of seven nations gather at every solstice and 
equinox [...]. But what drives men to travel up rivers and cross deserts to come here 
is not only the exchange of wares [...]. You do not come to Euphemia only to buy and 
sell, but also because at night, by the fires ali around the market, seated on sacks or 
barrels or stretched out on piles of carpets, at each word that one man says - such as 
'wolf, 'sister', 'hidden treasure', 'batde', 'scabies', 'lovers' - the others teli, each one, 
his tale of wolves, sisters, treasures, scabies, lovers, battles. And you know that in the 
long journey ahead of you, when to keep awake against the camel's swaying or the 
junk's rocking, you start summoning up your memories one by one, your wolf will 
have become another wolf, your sister a different sister, your batde other batdes, 
on your return from Euphemia, the city where memory is traded at every solstice 
and at every equinox.15 
This is also the Einaudi who was aware that the market, the state as well as 
any policy or any (good) governance are founded on a certain sense of a limit, 
which he emblematically formulated in the doctrine of the "criticai point". 
Hence, in this context the Einaudian lesson can be interpreted as an ethic 
of limit and finitudef6 of which the 'economie' is an emblematic figure. 
And this is hardly a story that begins with the emergence of the market-econ-
omy in modernity: it is a far older story, which Einaudi himself dated back to 
13 ID., Lezioni di politica sociale (1949), partially transl. in "Lectures on the market", in ID., 
Selected economic essays, L. EINAUDI, R . FAUCCI and R . MARCHIONATTI (eds.) ( N Y , Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), pp. 39 ff. 
14 Ibid, 57 ff. 
1 5 I . CALVINO, Invisible cities cit., p. 31. 
16 See P. SEQUERI, L'umano alla prova. Soggetto, identità, limite (Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2 0 0 2 ) . 
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the great biblical narration of the Fall from Paradise. In a paragraph sympto-
matically entided "The national minimum income. The limitedness of goods", 
Einaudi sums up the main problem confronting a sound social policy in a 
sound welfare state: on the one hand he accepts and endorses the hypothesis 
of a "national minimum income", with the aim that even those most severely 
afflicted by the contingencies of life "can develop their naturai talents", so 
that from within their ranks there will "come scholars and inventors who today 
have no chance of achievement. This is the ideal we must strive to attain". Yet 
on the other hand he immediately warns: 
Let us never forget that when God chased Adam and Ève out of the Garden of 
Eden he said to them: "By the sweat of your brow you shall eat your bread". Cer-
tainly, bread should become more abundant for ali men, and many other things must 
be made available to men free of charge. But the law compelling men to toil in order 
to scratch from the ungenerous earth the fruits with which it is so richly endowed will 
endure for ali eternity.17 
This Einaudian insistence on the sense of the limit, on the ethic of saving 
and sacrifice, by no means implies an attitude of mortification of l i f e or of de-
sire or, much less, of liberty. For Einaudi, economie action and initiative al-
ways arise in a context of limits and constraints, but he was equally aware that 
it is precisely through experience of the limit that the meaning of freedom can 
be appreciated and a window of opportunity for the emergence of novelty 
opens up. Accordingly, even when he emphasizes the fundamental economie 
principle of scarcity or "limitation of means", Einaudi also underscores the 
anthropological dimension of "desire": 
Even though technical and scientific advances daily push back [...] the obstacle 
of the limitedness of means which thwarts satisfaction of human desires [...], man's 
desires race faster than does science [...]. In fact, if man's gaze were not directed to-
wards the new, and upwards, then how would humans be distinguished from animai 
species?18 
Following along this path one thus encounters the same Einaudi who, in 
his Prediche inutili [Useless Preachings], composed the essay In lode del pro-
17 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale [1949] (Torino, G. Einaudi, 2004), pp. 55-56. 
1 8 ID., Scienza economica ed economisti nel momento presente (Torino, Tip. Artigianelli, 1 9 5 0 ) , 
p. 23 (trans! mine); Engl. trans!: "Economie science and economists at the present days", Interna-
tional social science bulletin, E, 2 ( 1 9 5 0 ) , pp. 1 6 0 - 1 7 1 . 
22 
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fitto [In Praise of Profit] as praise of the human faculty of initiative, the faculty 
of sparking a new beginning, the willingness to take on "risk", to embrace the 
"new" and "unknown".19 
3. Now, further pursuing the game of analogies between the search for 
good government and the Invisible cities, and directing attention towards 
the 'institutional-instituting' level of Einaudi's discourse - from good govern-
ment of the oikos to good government of the 'city' - let me focus once more 
on those ideal-real places that were conventionally assumed in the introduc-
tion of this volume as the Alpha and Omega of Einaudi's journey in search 
of good societies. The Alpha is Einaudi's ethos-home, which was also fiction-
ally assumed as a bridge allowing us to take our first step in our own research-
journey. The Omega is the fresco by Lorenzetti, The e f f e c t s of good and bad 
government, of which Einaudi interpolated a few details in his collection II 
buon governo (1954), printed when he was President of the Republic. 
Let us start again from Einaudi's ethos-home, the place where it ali began, 
the symbolic place of origin, but also the place which, through distance and 
lack, endows the Einaudian everlasting quest for good government with sense 
and significance. Einaudi's Introduction to the writings of his uncle, whom he 
"worshiped like a father", was composed partly in the wake of the devastating 
effects of World War I and during the ensuing social and economic crisis. It is 
an essay cast in the mold of a great autobiographical tale, almost epic and bib-
lical at once, where there stands out, on the one side, the heroic figure of the 
mother who, "having been left a widow", succeeded through "sacrifices" that 
verged on "the miraculous" in assuring a future for the children and in "trans-
mitting the small endowment from our father". On the other side stands the 
symbolic authority of the uncle who, after the father's death, welcomed the 
young Einaudi into his home as if the boy were his own son. In later years, 
recalling the ethos of this family home and that of the locai institutions, Einau-
di embarked on his journey in search of good government.20 
Following on from this 'first' image of good government of the oikos (later 
also projected to the public sphere), the pages of this collection chart the 
many waystages of Einaudi's long journey in quest of ideal or historical 
- but no less idealized - forms of good polities: 
19 ID., "In lode del profitto" (1957), in ID., Prediche inutili (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1956-1959), 
pp. 171-193. 
2 0 ID., Avvertenza del compilatore [ 1 9 2 2 ] , in Pagine doglianesi, 1893-1943, ed. by the Munici-
pality and the "Luigi Einaudi" Civic Library, Dogliani, 1 9 8 8 , pp. 1 3 - 3 8 . 
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- the "divine city", an ideal society where pluralism reigns under the rule of 
law - a city sketched in the very midst of the social unrest from which 
fascism drew its lifeblood;21 
- the "ideal city", emerging from discussions with his pupil Gobetti on Le 
Play's thought (institutions are founded on a fragile "magic speli", as it 
were, yet it is this fictional stage act, made up of symbols, myths or 
"taboos", that enables societies to hold together) - a city glimpsed in 
Gobetti's thought and recognized after his death;22 
- the "finance of Periclean city", where "the leader chosen by the valentior 
pars of the citizens [...] intends to elevate the mortals of the earthly city 
to the divine city" - a finance counterposed to that of "tyrannical govern-
ment";23 
- the "13th and 14th century city states", where Einaudi meets his friend and 
colleague Ròpke, who was himself on a quest for a Civitas humancv,24 
- the "garden city", ideally counterposed to uniform mass societies - a con-
cept Einaudi outlined when he was in exile;25 
- the "liberal society", as an "ideal of society of free men", to be rebuilt after 
twenty years of the "fascist bad government", but also in a European per-
spective, after and beyond the "dogma of state sovereignty";26 
- the "beautiful city" and the "ugly city", which are such depending on the 
kind of tax on building sites adopted by the government;27 
- the images of The e f f e e t s of good and bad government in the city and the 
country side... 
[Khan:] - What is the use, then, of ali your traveling? [...]. You advance always 
with your head turned back? [...] Does your journey take place only in the past? [...]. 
2 1 L . EINAUDI, "Verso la città divina" ( 1 9 2 0 ) , in ID., Il buongoverno. Saggi di economia e politica 
(1897-1954), E. Rossi (ed.) (Bari, Laterza, 1954), pp. 32-36. 
2 2 L . EINAUDI, "Piero Gobetti nelle memorie e nelle impressioni dei suoi maestri", IlBaretti (16 
March 1926), p. 80. 
2 3 ID., Miti e paradossi della giustizia tributaria ( 1 9 4 0 , second edition revised and extended) 
(Torino, G. Einaudi, 1959), pp. 263 ff. 
24 ID., "Economia di concorrenza e capitalismo storico. La terza via fra i secoli XVIII e XIX", 
Rivista di storia economica (June 1942), pp. 49-72: 72. Engl. transl.: "Economy of competition and 
historical capitalism", Scienza Nuova (Oxford), I, 1954, n. 1, pp. 1-29: 28. 
25 ID., Lezioni di politica sociale cit., pp. 192 ff. 
26 ID., "Lineamenti di un programma liberale" (1944); "Commento al programma" (1944); 
"Gerarchia nel programma" ( 1 9 4 4 ) ; in ID., Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia. 1943-1947, 
P. SODDU (ed.) (Firenze, Olschki, 2 0 0 1 ) , pp. 4 2 - 5 9 : 5 4 . 
27 ID., "Dannosa nella città bella l'imposta sulle aree fabbricabili", Corriere della sera (January 
6, 1961), p. 1; ID., "Nella città brutta è il luogo dell'imposta sulle aree fabbricabili", Corriere della 
sera (January 7, 1961), p. 1. 
— 321 — 
P A O L O SILVESTRI 
What [Polo] sought was always something lying ahead, and even if it was a matter 
of the past it was a past that changed gradually as he advanced on his journey, because 
the traveler's past changes according to the route he has followed: not the immediate 
past, that is, to which each day that goes by adds a day, but the more remote past. 
Arriving at each new city, the traveler finds again a past of his that he did not know he 
had: the foreignness of what you no longer are or no longer possess lies in wait for you 
in foreign, unpossessed places. 
- Journeys to relive your past? - was the Khan's question at this point, a question 
which could also have heen formulated: - Journeys to recover your future? 
And Marco's answer was: - Elsewhere is a negative minor. The traveler recognizes 
the little that is his, discovering the much he has not had and will never have. 
Indeed, it is no coincidence that Einaudian reflection on good govern-
ment took shape post res perditas and that its most important moments stem 
from the darkest periods and most tragic events of the twentieth century, and 
particularly of both Italian and his own personal history: the first World War, 
the ensuing economic and social crisis, fascism, the great depression of 1929, 
World War II. 
Taken together, the above reflections should yield a first conclusion: the 
quest for good government is spurred by the individual or collective experience 
of evil,29 of suffering, of crisis, of loss, of 'bad government'. As Calvino put it, 
in a later comment on his book: 
I feel I have written something approaching a final love poem for cities, at this 
time when it is becoming more and more difficult to live one's life in them as cities. 
Perhaps we are moving dose to a moment of crisis in city life, and the Invisible Cities 
are a dream that springs from the heart of unlivable cities.30 
This list representing the game of analogies between the Einaudian quest 
and the Invisible cities could easily be extended: 
- In a time of crisis, Einaudi had set out to explore historical-ideal forms of 
good polities, inquiring into the moral reasons that enabled cities to experi-
ence eras of prosperity in which decadence was kept at bay. / "The heartfelt 
2 8 I . CALVINO, Invisible cities cit., pp. 2 3 - 2 5 . 
29 The question of evil, often forgotten by the contemporary social sciences, would deserve 
examination in greater depth for a better understanding of the human; see: J . P . DUPUY, Avions-nous 
oublié le mal? Penser la politique après le 11 septembre (2002), Ital. transl.: Avevamo dimenticato 
il male? Pensare la politica dopo l'il settembre, transl. by P. Heritier, E. Scattolini (Torino, Giappi-
chelli, 2010); P . HERITIER, L'antropologia giuridica e il problema del male. Dieci anni dopo l'il settem-
bre, ivi, pp. 1 1 5 - 1 3 8 . 
3 0 I . CALVINO, Presentazione cit., p. ix. 
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wish my Marco Polo cherishes is to discover the secret reasons that have led 
men to live in cities, reasons that can hold true irrespective of ali crises".31 
- The Einaudian investigation is likewise a search for the invisible foundations 
that are the linchpin supporting a good society. / The first of the "thin ci-
ties" is introduced in the following manner: "Isaura, city of a thousand 
wells, is said to rise over a deep, subterranean lake. [...] an invisible land-
scape conditions the visible one".32 
- The Einaudian search for the good society is not the quest for paradise on 
earth, nor a flight to Utopia, or the search for a perfect city. "Perfection" 
can only be conceived in terms of perfectibility, given man's unavoidable 
"originai sin", and it "cannot be equated with uniformity, nor with unity: 
the essence resides in variety and contrast"33 of actions and ideas. / The 
most infernal invisible cities, frightening and populated by monsters, are 
the "continuing cities" - immobile cities, without change or variation, 
without an "inside" and an "outside" - , cities in which ali differences are 
eliminated. 
Beyond these analogies, one could seek to draw a further conclusion in an 
attempt to render meaningful Einaudi's gesture of ideally returning to his 
ethos-home - a gesture made in a moment of distress - as well his writing 
of the Introduction mentioned at the outset of this volume, with which he tes-
tifies to his rootedness and his debt of gratitude to his father and mother. The 
good society appears and hegins to take shape through the free acknowledgment 
of a limit: a lack, a dependence, a debt, a bond between individuals or even 
between generations, with a "thank you for the trust given to me". This is the 
Einaudian way of recognizing the importance of the institutional: variously 
portrayed by Einaudi in terms of "myths", "taboos", "formulas", "rituals", 
"traditions", "values", "customs", the institutional re-emerges in his specula-
tion, like a hidden or invisible foundation, precisely at times when the institu-
tions were under threat or crisis and when he felt the need to rebuild the lib-
eral society on new foundations. Paraphrasing Einaudi, it could be stated that 
if, on the one hand, a good relationship or a good society develops from this 
recognition of a limit, on the other hand, the symbolic and institutional re-
sources have the task of helping to reactivate, give shape and meaning to 
the trust on which good bonds are founded. 
31 Ibid. 
32 ID., Invisible cities cit., p. 17. 
33 L. EINAUDI, "Verso la città divina" (1920), in ID., Il buongoverno cit., pp. 32-33. 
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4. To gain additional insight into this point, we must take one step for-
ward and one step back, following Einaudi a little further along the road of 
his unfinished search for the good society. We must walk beside him through-
out his personal and institutional parable, while at the same time going back 
to the beginning of Einaudian anthropology and, at an even deeper level, to 
Christian anthropology: man as a flawed and fallible being, constitutively torn 
between good and evil, past and future, tradition and criticai awareness, rules 
and life, institutions and freedom, Law and desire... Father and Son. 
Symptomatic in this regard is the Einaudian essay on The doctrine of origi-
nai sin and the theory of the élite in Fredric Le Play (1936). In the darker years 
of fascism Einaudi definitively turned away not only from the theories of the 
elites developed by Pareto and Mosca, inasmuch as such theories, guided by 
the category of necessity, inevitably ended up with the conclusion that "every-
thing is power", but also from the corresponding theories of legitimacy, which 
maintained that power always obtains consensus through "formulas" and 
"myths" that prey on the (always irrational) emotions of the governed. This le-
gitimation of the fait accompli had induced the additional consequence of loss 
of any criterion of distinction between good and bad government. Einaudi's 
conclusion, where he makes an appeal to men of good will, is symptomatic: 
If a number of sound families survive ruin, then there exists no invincible fate that 
necessarily leads society to death. The politicai techniques employed by ruling classes 
not inspired by the moral law are not fatally destined to prevail. Their formulas for 
gaining and holding politicai power do not take account of the elite, the only class 
throughout the ages that has given mankind real guidance and direction. Let there 
be some survivors, actively operating and teaching, composed of a cluster of wise 
men, let some families and some social groups stili draw inspiration for their action 
from the teachings of the wise men, and the eras of prosperity can return once more.34 
These conclusions testify to the faith and hope by virtue of which the 
Piedmontese liberal uttered his no to the evil (the evil of fascism) and, at 
the same time, asserted that a different world was stili possible. 
And even when he was vindicated by history and the good seemed to 
'emerge triumphant', Einaudi in no way abandoned his quest, and never for-
sook the attempt to pinpoint the foundations of a good polity. 
34 ID., "Il peccato originale e la teoria della classe eletta in Federico Le Play" (1936), in ID., 
Saggi bibliografici e storici intorno alle dottrine economiche (Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 
1953), pp. 307-344: 328 (transl. mine); Engl. transl.: "The doctrine of originai sin and the theory 
of the dite in Fredric Le Play", in Essay in European economic thought, ed. and transl. by L. SOMMERS 
(Princeton, N.J., D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1960), pp. 162-217. 
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This was the period when Einaudi, as a protagonist of the economie re-
construction of Italy, was no less concerned with its institutional reconstruc-
tion. After the fall of fascism, almost anticipating the future institutional refer-
endum in which the Italian people were faced with the choice between 
Monarchy and Republic, Einaudi explained, with a legal-philosophical argu-
ment implicitly evoking Saint Paul's epistle to the Romans, that it was neces-
sary to save the "spirit" and not the "letter" of the constitutional monarchy, 
precisely in order to prevent that which had already happened during the 
fascist period with regard to the reduced royal prerogative to dismiss the 
prime ministeri an excess of "strict observation of the rule" implied that 
"the letter had killed the spirit of the Constitution".35 The "institutional 
referendum" was held in June 1946. Einaudi publicly declared he would vote 
for the Monarchy. Victory went to the Republic. From the very beginning Ei-
naudi was perfectly aware of what was at stake not only in Italy but throughout 
Europe, where many constitutions were being rewritten: the symbolic and 
invisible resources of Legitimacy, now in need of a new founding reference.36 
The day after the referendum Einaudi wrote an essay with the tide Della paura 
[Of Fear], recalling Guglielmo Ferrero's works on legitimacy and, implicitly, 
Ferrero's spiritual testament, Pouvolr: Les génies invisibles de la c i t é f 1 a work 
that endeavored to explain how, with the support of 'sound' legitimacy, 
societies overcame the fear that often threatened to undermine both their 
governors and the governed. In Della paura Einaudi explained: 
[Stable] politicai societies are built on the rock-solid base of juridically indefin-
able myths, of some words whose meaning is probably impossible to define precisely, 
of words and myths which, however, embody the will of the past and the consensus 
of the living. [...] Politicai myths do not operate by virtue of written laws. They are 
states of mind, and woe betide us if no such states exist! Sooner or later, a country 
with a deficiency in this regard is doomed to ruin. It lacks the basis of legitimacy. To 
endow countries with stability it is by no means necessary for those words to be pro-
35 L. EINAUDI, "A proposito della scelta in Italia tra Monarchia e Repubblica" (1943), in ID., 
Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia. 1943-1947 cit., pp. 2 3 - 3 6 . 
36 On the notion of "founding reference" and its politicai, legai, aesthedc and anthropological 
implications see: P . LEGENDRE, Della società come testo. Lineamenti di un'antropologia dogmatica 
( 2 0 0 1 ) , Ital. trans! P. HERITIER (ed.) (Torino, Giappichelli, 2 0 0 5 ) ; ID., L'occidente invisibile 
( 2 0 0 4 ) , Ital. trans! P. Heritier (Milano, Medusa, 2 0 0 9 ) ; P. HERITIER, Legendre e la fondazione antro-
pologica dell'estetica giuridica, ivi, pp. 8 9 - 1 1 8 ; ID., Società post-hitleriane? Materiali didattici di antro-
pologia ed estetica giuridica 2.0 (Torino, Giappichelli, 2 0 0 9 2 ) . 
3 7 G . FERRERÒ, Pouvoir. Les génies invisibles de la cité, New York, N.Y., Brentano's, 1 9 4 2 
(Paris, Plon, 1943). In a certain sense, this is a theme that Ferrerò faced, even though with a posi-
tivistic approach, from the moment of his first work in legai anthropology: I simboli in rapporto alla 
storia e alla filosofia del diritto alla psicologia e alla sociologia (Torino, F.lli Bocca, 1 8 9 3 ) . 
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claimed day by day and to be insistendy emphasized [...] rather, what is far more im-
portant is for those words to become a formula that goes unnoticed, possibly not even 
written down, one that raises no objections. [This is how the institutions are accepted 
by the] future generations.38 
Perhaps it was not simply an irony of history that Einaudi became the first 
elected President of the Republic, destined to become a myth in his own right. 
He occupied the same symbolic place as the Monarchy, and was perfectly 
conscious that he should be a " r e f e r e n c e figure" and a "Third super partes".29 
Moreover, he acted as a bridge both synchronically and diachronically. Syn-
chronically because, as stated in art. 87 of the Italian Constitution: "the Pre-
sident of the Republic is the head of State and represents national unity"; dia-
chronically because he was a bridge between the past liberal system and the 
future republican regime. It is no coincidence that Einaudi was indeed cele-
brated as a moral and spiritual founding father. 
But even after becoming a living institution and reaching the position of 
"Third super partes", of guarantor of last resort, committed to urging obser-
vance, through his own institutional behavior, of the fundamental moral com-
mandment: "one has to set the good example",40 Einaudi constantly main-
tained a firm distinction between myth and idolatry, for he knew that his 
own word was not the last word. 
By starting out from here we may perhaps reach the Omega of Einaudi's 
journey: the images of The e f f e c t s of good and had government, a few details of 
which were interspersed by Einaudi in his collection II huon governo (1954), 
printed when he was President of the Republic. What did Einaudi recognise 
in those images? 
Dawn had broken when he [Polo] said: - Sire, now I have told you about ali the 
cities I know. 
- There is stili one of which you never speak. 
Marco Polo bowed his head. 
- Venice - the Khan said. 
Marco smiled. - What else do you believe I have been talking to you about? 
3 8 L . EINAUDI, "Della paura" [1946], in ID., Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia. 1943-
1947 cit., pp. 223-226. 
39 L.R. EINAUDI, "Le molteplici eredità. Un ricordo personale di Luigi Einaudi", in R. MAR-
CHIONATTI - P. SODDU (eds.), Luigi Einaudi nella cultura, nella società e nella politica del Novecento 
(Firenze, Olschki, 2010), pp. 319-320. 
"e Ibid., p. 322. 
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The emperor did not turn a hair. - And yet I have never heard you mention that 
name. 
And Polo said: - Every time I describe a city I am saying something about Venice. 
- When I ask you about other cities, I want to bear about them. And about Venice, 
when I ask you about Venice. 
- To distinguish the other cities' qualities, I must speak of a first city that remains 
implicit. For me it is Venice. 
- You should then begin each tale of your travels from the departure, describing 
Venice as it is, ali of it, not omitting anything you remember of it. 
The lake's surface was barely wrinkled; the copper reflection of the ancient palace of 
the Sung was shattered into sparkling glints like floating leaves. 
- Memory's images, once they are fixed in words, are erased, - Polo said. - Perhaps 
I am afraid of losing Venice ali at once, i f l speak of it. Or perhaps, speaking of other 
cities, I have already lost it, little by little.41 
At a first superficial glance one might be tempted to say that the fresco of 
good government is perhaps the best known representation of the medieval 
experience of the communes or of the "communal model" (in that case with 
specific reference to Siena), which Italy successfully nurtured, dispersing its 
seeds throughout Europe: the Europe of the cities, with their squares - that 
emblematic public space - and the communication routes, the Europe of 
the peaceable yet belligerent meeting among civilizations, cultures, customs, 
people and goods. Moreover, in the final chapter of II buon governo Einaudi 
inserted a few of his more far-sighted reflections on globalization processes, 
the crisis of the principle of sovereignty and the need for a new institutional 
architecture, identified as residing in the European Federation.42 The Federa-
tion, he believed, could help to solve what he felt to be the real problem of the 
future: how to find the "formula for mediation between small, spiritual home-
lands and the unity of the economie world",43 between locai and global, di-
4 1 I . CALVINO, Invisible cities cit., pp. 77-78. 
42 On this aspect of Einaudi's thought see: U. MORELLI, Contro il mito dello stato sovrano. Luigi 
Einaudi e l'unità europea (Milano, Franco Angeli, 1990 ) ; C . CRESSATI, L'Europa necessaria. Il federa-
lismo liberale di Luigi Einaudi, intr. di R. FAUCCI (Torino, Giappichelli, 1 9 9 2 ) ; A. QUADRO CURZIO -
C ROTONDI "Luigi Einaudi: il disegno istituzionale ed economico per l'Europa", in Luigi Einaudi: 
Istituzioni, mercato e riforma sociale (Roma, Bardi, 2 0 0 5 ) , pp. 1 6 3 - 1 9 4 ; F. FORTE, "Economia dei 
mercati globali e governo sovranazionale secondo Luigi Einaudi" ( 2 0 0 7 ) , in ID., L'economia liberale 
di Luigi Einaudi. Saggi (Firenze, Leo Olschki, 2 0 0 9 ) , pp. 3 0 3 - 3 4 2 . 
43 L. EINAUDI, "Why we need a European Economie Federation" ( 1 9 4 3 ) , in ID., Selected eco-
nomie essays cit., pp. 2 4 5 - 2 4 9 . "Alongside the tenacity with which peoples, small and large, yearn to 
conserve and perfect their own spiritual, cultural and politicai autonomy, we have the opposite ten-
dency of the economy towards unity, not merely of large areas, but of the entire world. Not just small 
states but larger ones too have become economically anachronistic and absurd" (ibid., p. 245). 
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versity and unity.44 In pursuit of this goal, what was necessary was to "recre-
ate the medieval worldwide Christian community": in other words, to rede-
sign in a contemporary perspective that model of composite (or variable geo-
metry) city-states, beyond the "dogma" or "the myth" of the sovereignty of 
the State. It is worth noting that from Einaudi's point of view, the problem 
is not the "dogma" or "myth" as such, which, as we have seen, he character-
ized as symbolic resources of the institutional. The real problem, to quote the 
concluding words of The myth of the sovereign state, is when the myth be-
comes an "idol"45 with claims of absoluteness and perfection, and, conse-
quendy, is no longer open to criticism. 
In Einaudi's view, this was true both for the social-political sphere and for 
that of scientific knowledge, because even Economic Science can become an 
"idol devoid of soul" when its claims to "scientific neutrality" go beyond a 
certain limit.46 Therefore, in this discourse, in which the foundation (of the 
individual and the social) assumes an aesthetical character, it may not be sur-
prising to discover James Buchanan attempting to re-vitalize The soul of clas-
sical liberalism and visualize that "soul" through an evocation of an ancient 
myth, the "shining city on a hilT': "I suggest invoking the soul of classical lib-
eralism, an aesthetic-ethical-ideological potential attractor, one that stands inde-
pendent of ordinary science, both below the latter's rigor and above its anti-
septic neutrality".47 
But Lorenzetti's fresco interpolated into Einaudi's Buongoverno also raises 
further questions: what is the communicative-normative significance of this 
44 On the Einaudian tension between locai and global, diversity and unity and his reflection on 
the symbolic structure of the future European institutions see: P. SILVESTRI - A. ODDENINO, "Auto-
nomie locali e istituzioni sovranazionali. È problema del buongoverno tra globalizzazione e localiz-
zazione alla luce del pensiero einaudiano", in S . SICARDI (ed.), Le autonomie territoriali e funzionali 
nella provincia di Cuneo in prospettiva transfrontaliera (alla luce del principio di sussidiarietà) (Napoli, 
ESI, 2011), pp. 97-132. 
45 L. EINAUDI, "Il mito dello Stato sovrano" (January 3,1945), in ID., Il buongoverno cit., p. 630. 
46 ID., 0« abstract and historical bypotheses and on value-judgments in economic sciences, edited 
with an Introduction and an Afterword by Paolo Silvestri (London - New York, Roudedge, Forth-
coming: 2012). 
47 J.M. BUCHANAN, "The soul of classical liberalism", The Independent review, V, n. 1 (Sum-
mer 2000), p. 114 (italics mine). Buchanan's aesthetic-allusive conclusions deserve further attention: 
"If politics is allowed to become little more than a commons on which competing coalitions seek 
mutuai exploitation, potential value is destroyed and liberty is lost just as surely as in the rigidities 
of misguided efforts at collective command. Who, indeed, can be expected to be motivated to sup-
port such "politics as competition for the commons"? Where is the dream? Perhaps resurrection of 
the soul of classical liberalism is beyond realistic hopes for the twenty-first century. But those of us 
who think that we have glimpsed the shining city have a moral obligation to proceed as if that society 
[...] can become reality" (ibid., p. 119). 
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message from a President who "is the Head of State and represents national 
unity"? Why did Einaudi, a "reference figure" and "Third super partes", feel 
the need to point to a further third and symbolic 'place', a kind of aesthetic foun-
dation of the good society? At a distance of six centuries, Einaudi seems to re-
peat the same gesture as the rulers of Siena, who chose to have Lorenzetti's fres-
coes visible on the walls of the Palazzo pubblico \Civic Building], as a founding 
reference of their government. Reviving the contents of this ancient myth, the 
then President of the Republic seems to have called attention to it as, in a sense, 
a founding reference for a future European and, possibly, global society. 
Yet these questions elicit more and yet more queries... Perhaps because 
the images depicted in Lorenzetti's frescoes continue to teli us something 
of the complexity of the human: 
- as a Founding Reference situated in a third and separate place, they testify 
to the circumstance that civilizations cannot conceivably be lacking in an 
organizational form that centers around reference points; 
- in their representation of the multiple activities of mankind, from labor to 
trade to consumption, ali the way to man's architectural organization of 
space and to legal-political institutions, they speak (to us) of the infinite 
communicative-expressive registers of the human; 
- in displaying the (visible) e f f e e t s and not the (invisible) causes of good and 
bad government, they speak to us of the mystery of its (our) foundation; 
- in their visible form, these images cannot but be made "in the image of" 
that Foundation and, mirror-like, they ceaselessly reflect the question back 
towards it... 
Perhaps because cities are like dreams, and dreams are by no means the 
reign of the irrational. 
[Polo: - ] from the number of imaginary cities we must exclude those whose ele-
ments are assembled without a connectìng thread, an inner rule, a discourse. With cities, 
it is as with dreams: everything imaginable can be dreamed, but even the most unex-
pected dream is a rebus that conceals a desire or, its reverse, its fear. Cities, like dreams, 
are made of desires and fears, even ifthe thread of their discourse is secret, their rules are 
absurd, their perspectives deceitful, and everything conceals something else. 
- I have neither desires nor fears, - the Khan declared - and my dreams are com-
posed either by my mind or by chance. 
- Cities also believe they are the work of the mind or of chance, but neither the one 
nor the other suffices to hold up their walls. You take delight not in a city's seven or 
seventy wonders, but in the answer it gives to a question ofyours. 
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- Or the question it asks you, forcing you to answer, like Thebes through the mouth 
of the Sphinx.48 
Finally, Lorenzetti's depictions, appearing in their horizontal structure, 
elongated and dual - such that a path must be followed to pass from darkness 
to Iight, from bad government to good government - speak to us of our experi-
ence as fragile and free beings, everlastingly poised between good and evil... 
5. ...This is the end of the story. Or at least so I thought. Yet, just when II 
buongoverno was about to go to press, at the very last moment Einaudi in-
serted at the end of the first chapter, which likewise bore the tide II buongo-
verno, an article directing his (and our) attention again to the foundational 
issue, once more in a narrative perspective. 
There was a post-war Italy that was called upon to rouse itself to action 
and reawaken to new l i f e , get to its feet and start walking on its own two legs. 
This was the Italy that needed to heal not only the wounds inflicted by the 
war, but also those resulting from the Resistenza and the 'civil war'. In his ca-
pacity as President of the Republic, Einaudi held up to the Italian people the 
image of a symbolic resource in the story "The Cervi brothers' father" (1954). 
During the commemorations held on 17th January 1954, in which the nation 
celebrated the memory of the seven Cervi brothers put to death by the fascist 
firing squad in Reggio Emilia in December 1943, the President received the 
aged father of the Cervi family at the Presidential Building, immediately en-
tering into warm conversation with him and establishing a sort of bond of af-
finity, almost a form of kinship; this friendly exchange of talk and feelings 
continued for quite some time. 
Initially, in the story Einaudi seems to identify with the description of the 
sons as portrayed by the Cervi father, who tells of the experiments and inno-
vations they introduced in crop management practices and land irrigation. In-
deed, Einaudi himself was a great innovator who introduced a number of 
novel experimental methods on his estate. 
Yet Einaudi also seems to hint, delicately, that despite the terrible tragedy 
and grief that has befallen the family with the death of the seven sons, some-
thing seems to rise to new l i f e upon the entry of a new figure into the family 
circle, a "nephew". This was the son of the Cervi father's brother, and he had 
come to give a helping hand to the widowed daughters-in-law. Einaudi, 
4 8 I . CALVINO, Invisible cities cit., pp. 3 7 - 3 8 . 
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prompted by curiosity, asks whether the nephew now forms part of the family 
and whether he has a share in the family's "assets" (the question concerned 
the nephew's financial status within the family and whether he was recognized 
as a "relative"). The "nephew", answered the Cervi father, "is not a son of this 
family but it's as if he were". 
We perceive here the replay of a story that harks back to the past, the 
same story from which we started out. This analogy has to date never been 
noticed: Einaudi had worshiped his uncle "like a father", and here there is 
an uncle - the father of the Cervi brothers - who welcomes a nephew into 
his home "as if he were a son". Einaudi seems to be spellbound by the story 
about how the father rearranged the question of the family inheritance after 
the death of his sons, granting this new son a "place" in the family and be-
queathing him a share in the family's property and possessions. 
The president [and the others present at the scene] listened to the father with 
astonishment [...]. Was he a rustie countryman from our parts, a Homeric hero or 
a patriarch from the Bible? [...] As they gazed at the father, they saw in him the 
patriarch who, in the shade of the sycamore, was dictating the inheritance rules for 
his family. They were witnessing the formation of the law, almost as if the Civil Code 
had not yet been written.49 
"Almost as if the Civil Code had not yet been written". This pre-juridical 
and pre-politicai, but also pre-economie dimension of human relations embo-
dies the 'sense' of the foundation of the good society imagined and narrated 
by Einaudi. The 'heritage' that is handed down from generation to generation 
is not (indeed, is never) only 'genetic', nor is it (ever) merely economie but 
rather, as this story testifies, highly symbolic. In the remarkable story of a 
father and a family that withstands evil, of a father who welcomes a nephew 
into the family home as if he were a son, of a nephew who leaves his own 
home to go to the help of an uncle-father, Einaudi testifies-tells-transmits 
the rebirth of life, the transcendence of life over death. 
Once again: what, then, are the conclusions that can be drawn from this 
research-journey? Which route should we follow? 
The Great Khan's atlas contains also the maps of the promised lands visited in 
thought but not yet discovered or founded: New Atlantis, Utopia, the City of the 
Sun, Oceana, Tamoé, New tìarmony, New Lanark, Icaria. Kublai asked Marco: - You, 
4 9 L . EINAUDI, "Il padre dei fratelli Cervi", Il Mondo (March, 16 1954), in ID., Il buongoverno 
cit., pp. 140-144: 144. 
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who go about exploring and who see signs, can teli me toward which of these futures the 
favoring winds are driving us. 
- For these ports I could not draw a route on the map or set a date for the landing. 
At times ali I need is a brief glimpse, an opening in the midst of an incongruous land-
scape, a glint oflight in the fog, the dialogue of two passershy meeting in the crowd, and 
I think that, setting out from there, I will put together, piece by piece, the perfect city, 
made offragments mixed with the rest, of instants separated by intewals, of signals one 
sends out, not knowing who receives them. If I teli you that the city toward which my 
journey tends is discontinuous in space and time, now scattered, now more condensed, 
you must not believe the search for it can stop. Perhaps while we speak, it is rising, scat-
tered, within the confines ofyour empire; you can hunt for it, but only in the way I have 
said. 
Already the Great Khan was leafing through his atlas, over the maps of the cities 
that menace in nightmares and maledictions: Enoch, Babylong, Yahooland, Butua, 
Brave New World. 
He said: - It is ali useless, if the last landing place can only be the infernal city, and 
it is there that, in ever-narrowing circles, the current is drawing us. 
And Polo said: - The inferno of the living is not something that will he; if there is 
one, it is what is already here, the inferno where we live every day, that we form by 
being together. There are two ways to escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: ac-
cept the inferno and become such a part ofit that you can no longer see it. The second is 
risky and demands Constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and learn to recognize 
who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, 
give them space.50 
Whether and which ones of the many characters, images or experiences 
recounted in these few pages will strike a chord with the authors and readers 
of this book, I cannot say. Yet I cherish the hope that with this book - even 
though none of us has been able to "draw a route on the map or set a date for 
the landing" - we will ali have shared in this mission and will continue, be-
yond this book, "to put together piece by piece... fragments... instants... sig-
nals...". And "you must not believe the search for it can stop". 
5 0 I . CALVINO, Invisible cities cit., pp. 147-148. 
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